The Platoon -- A Maneuverist Perspective

[Guest Pillar]

ScoutPL,

Understanding a different point of view means the point of view has to make sense to the rational mind. So far you havent come back and explained to me why the things I found wrong with your "point of view" are inaccurate. And Bud, its not just becuase I think I'm right and you're wrong. Your ideas just dont pass the acid test. I dont have a problem with maneuverists theory, I think some of the extreme examples are a little wishful thinking on the real battlefield but as a whole its a sound theory. I still believe the best commander is one who can blend both theories into a good solid workable technique. So far I havent seen any evidence of your examples fitting that bill.

Well said. I like the way you write "has to make sense to a rational mind." I was hoping you'd do some reading before jumping in here (as I requested beforehand) that way any poor examples etc. might be easier looked over, as Henri did. Remember, I wrote that very quickly, at work, with interruptions, FOR FUN.

So I admit, the example was crappy (the one with the names). But what I wrote *directly* under that paragraph sounds very similar to what you wrote when critiqing that example.

If you want an understanding of these views, please read Lind's "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" from cover to cover. Will you do that? I have read all the US Army Field manuals (for infantry up to Battalion+). If you have any recommendations for some authors who refute Maneuver theory I'll read them, just point me to them.

However, in the end, it's like I said. I'm not here to convince you. I've accepted your opinion a long time ago and I have no intention of trying to sway you. If your "Realist" style works well for you that's fine with me. I think there's room for more than one style here.

EDIT -- oops, started my reply to Henri here. Henri get's his own reply for all that writing.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 02-19-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by The Tanklord:

What do you do if the enemy has the larger force and you have no terrain advantages?

Either find some good terrain (good enough to even the score) or try to split

the enemy force up in smaller parts that you can beat. I think that everyone agrees that to stand and fight would be stupid. Both options require movement, the latter some pretty fancy dancing esp if your opponent is the cautious type.

Now if you apply this strategy even when the forces are evenly matched or when you are commanding the larger force, you get some serious advantages. Bigger reserves, can cover a larger area, (in CM) be able to buy more tanks (now that's something to think about) etc.

Simply put accomplishing more with less can never be a bad thing. Now I'm probably to much of an attritionist to fully have grasped the whole point of Pillars article but this is my interpretation and I think his reasoning is sound.

The only (game) disadvantage I can see is that you may loose focus if you micromanage to much.

Thanks TankLord. If you are really interested in maneuver theory I highly recommend the books mentioned previously in this thread. You'd enjoy them I think.

Oh, on the "attritionist" perspective. I didn't mean to say those who favour "attrition" (or whatever you want to label it) CAN'T understand Maneuver, I was meaning that Maneuver warfare doesn't make sense IF looked at through "attrition goggles".. I.E. You evaluate it based on attritionist principles rather than it's own principles.

I was implicitly following attritionist philosophy until relatively recently myself.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Henri:

One problem with your description is that it is about pure tactics, about which maneuver theory has little to say in such situations out of context.

Ah, ok let me clarify. Yes, I described some techniques ("pure tactics") in my writing, such as splitting a squad into a maneuver and support element. I give you that. But, I was trying to stress continuously in the article that the important thing was WHY I did things like that, not WHAT I was doing.

So I understand your point and agree with you. The techniques must always serve the intent. Sorry if I came across as propogating a singular methodology. Indeed that would be locking ones self in a box, and you'd become predictable.

As Lind puts it, "Maneuver warfare brooks no rules", so attempting to reduce maneuver warfare to a set of precepts about what to do in absolute terms independently of mission intent leaves you open to criticism where your opponent is free to add circumstances that make your approach bound to fail.

Exactly. But just for people who may not have read much on the topic, I'd expand on "Maneuver warfare brooks no rules" a little. We don't want it to sound like "Do whatever the hell you want" There ARE principles behind it and a thought process which IS based on a describable mindset.

As ScoutPL pointed out, some of the methods that you describe are standard fare and are not specifically maneuverist nor attritionist.

Of course. It's *why* one does these things and *how* one uses/reacts that are important when understanding varying styles. I remember ScoutPL once exclaiming "The Soviet Army assaults a village the same way an American one does." True enough, but *why* they assault is a different matter often entirely. It's not about techniques so much as state of mind.

While I am at it, let me give an example of when maneuver theory would require an attrition-type attack.

Grrrrr! We're making definitions very fuzzy by doing this. Perhaps a better way of putting it would be "let me give an example of when maneuver theory would use firepower/attack an enemy."

Attrition and Maneuver are a mindset, a philosophy, a guide to action (like ethics almost). Based on the way you worded that, some readers may get confused into thinking "attrition" is a *method*... which it isn't.

Although this may look like an attritionist procedure, it is simply applying the maneuver idea of striking at the enemy's main vulnerability (not necessarily his weakest point, but his "center of gravity").

Might want to expand on "centre of gravity" vs. weakpoint for other readers.

Leonhard clearly states in his book that maneuver theory does not always exclude attrition.

I'd like to read the context he said that in. Can you give me the page? (I have the book).

Again, your comments are appreciated. BTW, thank you for introducing me to these authors. I started thinking in terms of what one might call "maneuver theory" a while ago and never knew there were some publications on it as a theory.

All I'd been reading before was Soviet/German doctrine and comparing that with US. I never would have used the words "Maneuverist" and "Attritionist" before.

Hell, I probably didn't even know how to spell "Maneuver"....

I probably still don't.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

Oh, on the "attritionist" perspective. I didn't mean to say those who favour "attrition" (or whatever you want to label it) CAN'T understand Maneuver, I was meaning that Maneuver warfare doesn't make sense IF looked at through "attrition goggles".. I.E. You evaluate it based on attritionist principles rather than it's own principles.

Nothing like saying "if you could think correctly you'd see it clearly... but you don't."

Cav

------------------

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Nothing like saying "if you could think correctly you'd see it clearly... but you don't."

Cav

CavScout is correct. It is nothing like that at all.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

So why don't you put your money where your mouth is and show that you can beat the maneuverists with your "realistic" style? C'mon, be a sport! My poor fighting record can be excused by my being an amateur, but being a professional soldier, you'll need another excuse if you think that you can't win against a team of attritionists, and amateurs at that (amateurs at real war, that is...).

Sad day when people begin to think CM reresents Real Life^TM. What one is willing to risk in CM, "..ahh it's only a few points..", and what they would do on the real battlefield is laughable.

[Henri]

Originally posted by CavScout:

Sad day when people begin to think CM reresents Real Life^TM. What one is willing to risk in CM, "..ahh it's only a few points..", and what they would do on the real battlefield is laughable.

So are you saying that CM is not a realistic enough simulation to reward/punish real-world tactics? If not, what ARE you saying exactly?

Henri

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Henri:

So are you saying that CM is not a realistic enough simulation to reward/punish real-world tactics? If not, what ARE you saying exactly?

It certainly doesn't. How often do you hear "I'll buy this for X amount and if I take out one of these, I'll be have won the point battle."?

Or, "I'll split this squad and run them out untill they run into somehting. There worth more dead and finding the enemy than alive to me.."

Cav

------------------

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Guest Pillar]

I think if you guys want to discuss the merits of CM as a simulator you should probably start a new thread.

[ScoutPL]

Pillar,

I understand perfectly well the premise behind Maneuver theory and wholeheartedly support it, when its applicable. My problem has always been that I'm not so sure that its applicable to CM. What makes it so appealing in CM is that it takes advantage of game mechanics that arent available to the real world company or battalion commander. For example, you have a very well defined, restrictive battle space. You can always attack knowing that your flanks are secure and with the knowledge that the enemy's counterattack capability is extremely limited. Either to forces he has set aside (making his MLR weaker) or to weak in game reinforcements. Another key factor is of course the spotting rules, which everyone is familiar with by now.

Interestingly enough, I dont think its possible in CM to take out the enemy's "main vulnerability" with applying attrition. If its a VP location then there is certainly going to have to be a fight for it. If its to limit exit VP then only direct fire can stop that. So where is the maneuverist theory being applied? I think you are mixing up tactics and strategy again. Yes its always best to use maneuver to put your enemy at a disadvantage. But in the CM realm, a disadvantage is a spot in battlespace that makes it easier for you to kill the enemy (i.e. attrit him). I was fighting a battle with CavScout the other day (CavScout, sorry I got disconnected man, and this is going to ruin our game but it's a great example. Please let me know if I miss read the situation.) I was weak on my left flank and kept getting strong reinforcements on my right. Rather then use those reinforcements to strengthen my left, as a true attritionist would do, I kept them consolidated and continued to show weakness on my left. From what I could see of the battlefield CavScout had taken the bait and heavily weighted his attack on my left. I was in the process of conducting a combined arms attack into his left flank as we were disconnected. I had quickly dispatched his left flank security element and was closing in on him with fives tanks and a company(-) of infantry. I think he had begun to react to this new threat but I felt certain it was too late. Now, that wasnt purely attritionist. But, I was using maneuver to gain an advantage over my enemy. Does that make me a maneuverist? Not by your definition. So as a maneuverist what should I have done? What was CavScout's "main vulnerability"? I feel certain it was his armor, which without, his attack would have stalled and it would have been easy to slice up the rest of his force. Does that make me an attritionist?

My understanding of maneuver is rather complete I believe. And I think Leonhard does a good job of arguing his case. I think his example from the Gulf War is a poor one, but I do understand his theory. I took a number of classes in college taught by a Marine Infantry Major, Henri, so I have a very solid base in the Marine Corps view of maneuver as well. But once again its all about scale. "Maneuver theory" doesnt apply to the rifle company or the rifle battalion, and I know you guys are going to insist you're not arguing that it does. The only reply I can make to that is to stop using platoons and companies in your examples.

I doubt if Lind has anything significantly different to say about maneuver then Leonhard, and I know he was a major influence on the development of Marine Corps doctrine. So unless I'm wrong about that, please forgive me if I don't run out and purchase his book.

As far as Capt.'s game, I'd love to partake, provided the playing field is even, etc, etc. How do I find out what the hell you guys are talking about? I cant find a reference to his post, unless you're talking about the brigade game he wants to run.

[Bullethead]

I said:

The whole point of maneuver is to achieve a better position from which to engage in attrition

Henri said:

The italicized part of the above is exactly the attritionist point of view as expressed by Lind and Leonhard. As one or both of them put it, attrition warfare uses movement in order to allow fighting, whereas maneuverists use fighting in order to allow movement.

Dude, I hate to dis your heroes, but that's the most bass-ackwards definition I've ever heard in my life (next to Clinton's definition of sex). By L&L's definition as you state it, Napolean, Stonewall Jackson, Moltke the Elder, Rommel, Patton, and Schwartzkopf were "attritionists" while U.S. Grant, Haig, von Falkenhayn, and Nivelle were "maneuverists". Each of the above "attritionists" used grand maneuvers specifically to set up decisive ass-whuppings for the enemy, while each of the above "maneuverists" engaged in extremely bloody, often futile frontal assaults in the hope they'd eventually wear down the enemy enough to allow breakthrough maneuver.

This requires a lot more explanation than I care to write right now (maneuver theory cannot be summed up in a single snappy statement)...

In general, the more words required to explain a theory to experienced practitioners of the art it applies to, the more bogus the theory. That seems to be the case here, as well.

But I just wanted to point out that what you consider a given is nothing more than the attrition warfare point of view.

And I supposed that if I stated the earth goes around the sun, you'd write that off as simply the Copernican point of view and hold forth on the esoteric virtues of the Ptolomeic universe, which us dim-witted Copernicanists can't fathom.

I hope that this doesn't sound patronizing, but why don't you read the Marine Corps Warfighting Manual MCDP-1, which is free on the web? It is a pretty good description of maneuver warfare from a practical point of view, and it IS the USMC official doctrine of how to make war.

And I hope you don't take this as patronizing, but not only have I read that, I also read and absorbed everything else the USMC taught me about warfare. And I learned it well enough to go fight an actual war with great success and lead platoon-sized elements in combat without getting any of my Marines killed, while inflicting horrendous losses on the enemy.

If you read any USMC stuff, you completely misunderstood it. The Corps is all about killing the enemy, and all its efforts are directed towards bringing that happy event to pass. "First to Fight!" and all that. The basic mission of the Marine Corps rifle platoon on the attack is to "locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver." The basic mission of the Marine Corps rifle platoon on the defensive is to "destroy the enemy by fire and close combat". IOW, destroying the enemy is the main objective on both sides of the ball.

The above maxims are painfully drummed into the head of every Marine recruit in bootcamp. As such, they constitute much of the institutional philosophy of my beloved Corps. According to your definition, that makes the Corps an "attritionist" institution. Yet you cite it as an example of your "maneuverist" school. I think there's no further proof needed to show you don't have a clue what you're talking about.

------------------

-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

I was fighting a battle with CavScout the other day (CavScout, sorry I got disconnected man, and this is going to ruin our game but it's a great example. Please let me know if I miss read the situation.) I was weak on my left flank and kept getting strong reinforcements on my right. Rather then use those reinforcements to strengthen my left, as a true attritionist would do, I kept them consolidated and continued to show weakness on my left. From what I could see of the battlefield CavScout had taken the bait and heavily weighted his attack on my left. I was in the process of conducting a combined arms attack into his left flank as we were disconnected. I had quickly dispatched his left flank security element and was closing in on him with fives tanks and a company(-) of infantry. I think he had begun to react to this new threat but I felt certain it was too late. Now, that wasnt purely attritionist. But, I was using maneuver to gain an advantage over my enemy. Does that make me a maneuverist? Not by your definition. So as a maneuverist what should I have done? What was CavScout's "main vulnerability"? I feel certain it was his armor, which without, his attack would have stalled and it would have been easy to slice up the rest of his force. Does that make me an attritionist?

You are right that I was fighting to your left (my right) but it was because of the strength you had/have on your right (my left). God damm Panthers... instead of trying to fight them, I am fighting away from them.

If my TDs would have done their freakin' jobs and killed a tank or two, instead of bouncing shell after shell off of them, I'd be OK. I had the perfect ambush, so I thought, on the flanks of your Pantehrs as they crossed the bridge. I thought I would score some hits there. Useless tungsten...

I still think there is a surprise or two left up my sleeve if you want to finish the game. (I saved it, I think)

I am still wondering what the hell that Puma was doing!

Cav

------------------

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[This message has been edited by CavScout (edited 02-19-2001).]

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

I'm viewing "attrition" as a philosophy. I'm not really looking at "attrition" as in "fighting" or "destruction" etc. Know what I mean?

I see what you're saying, but it doesn't make any sense. I can't think of anybody except U.S. Grant and von Falkenhayn who deliberately set out to conduct attrition as an end unto itself, as the underlying philosophy of their campaigns. IOW, there doesn't seem to be a "school of attrition" against which a "school of maneuver" can be set up. So it seems to me that L&L misconstrued military history and science, invented a problem that doesn't really exist, and then provided a bogus "solution" to the equally bogus problem. Kinda like Hillary and health care.

------------------

-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Guest Pillar]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

Pillar said:

I see what you're saying, but it doesn't make any sense. I can't think of anybody except U.S. Grant and von Falkenhayn who deliberately set out to conduct attrition as an end unto itself, as the underlying philosophy of their campaigns. IOW, there doesn't seem to be a "school of attrition" against which a "school of maneuver" can be set up. So it seems to me that L&L misconstrued military history and science, invented a problem that doesn't really exist, and then provided a bogus "solution" to the equally bogus problem. Kinda like Hillary and health care.

Hehehe I think the "School of Manuever" is about concetizing and making explicit things that are prooven from history etc.

There's a good book called (amazingly enough) "Maneuver Warfare" (An anthology) by Major Richard D. Hooker Jr. Worth a look. It talks about where the whole "Manuever Warfare" thing came up, what the school is about, etc.

[CavScout]

Originally posted by Pillar:

Hehehe I think the "School of Manuever" is about concetizing and making explicit things that are prooven from history etc.

The "School of Manuever" is good at finding what "worked" in history and attributing it to manuever, that is for sure.

There's a good book called (amazingly enough) "Maneuver Warfare" (An anthology) by Major Richard D. Hooker Jr. Worth a look. It talks about where the whole "Manuever Warfare" thing came up, what the school is about, etc.

Read the dissenting opionons in there as well.

Cav

------------------

"Maneuverists have a bad case of what may be called, to borrow from a sister social science, "'Wehrmact penis envy.'"--D. Bolger

Co-Chairman of the CM Jihad Brigade

Founder of the CMers who like playing the Allies Club

[Bullethead]

Pillar said:

Hehehe I think the "School of Manuever" is about concetizing and making explicit things that are prooven from history etc.

OK, let's talk history. Napolean is widely credited with breaking the mold of "positional warfare" by targeting the enemy's main army instead of a spot of ground. He therefore conducted huge, daring maneuvers to bring about decisive battles in which he could inflict horrible attrition on the enemy while keeping his own force intact as much as possible in order to exploit battlefield success later. This is maneuver used to enhance battle. According to Henri, this makes Napolean an "attritionist". So is he or is he not an "attritionist" by your definition?

OTOH, there is von Falkenhayn, who caused Verdun to happen with attrition as the express intent of the campaign, rather than taking Verdun itself. He wanted to bleed France to death, figuring he could win in the end because there were more Germans than Frenchmen. His goal was either to cause France to surrender once a certain number of casualties had been inflicted, or to weaken them enough that breakthrough maneuver could be be achieved. This is battle used to enhance maneuver, which by Henri's definition makes von Falkenhayn a "maneuverist" despite his express intentions of attrition. So to which school does von Falkenhayn belong according to you?

As an aside, what do you think of von Falkenhayn's plan? Given the military realties of the time (continuous front with no flanks to turn, inability of frontal assaults to achieve breakthrough), can you think of a more logical goal for an offensive?

------------------

-Bullethead

In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is strength, in water there is bacteria.

[Henri]

Originally posted by Pillar:

I'd like to read the context he said that in. Can you give me the page? (I have the book).

Here are a couple of quotes from Leonhard:

Maneuver warfare theory de-emphasizes but does not ignore, force ratios and loss rates. Numerical superiority in battles, campaigns and wars takes on a minor role;local superiority is somewhat more important. (p.79).

I have maintained previously that this command-push approach to warfare is not necessarily a violation of maneuver theory. (p. 269).

I have not found the specific sentence I was thinking of, so either I missed it(it is a thick book) or maybe I saw it in the Marine Corps Warfare Manual that I don't have the address of here.

The part on Soviet doctrine is an interesting analysis of two different ways to apply maneuver warfare.The Soviet doctrine puts less emphasis on mission orders and more on planning, scouting, deception, surprise, stealth and deep penetrations.

Henri

[JoePrivate]

Getting back to the platoon in combat, I just watched a show for the first time called "Battle Stripes", a documentary about the training of Platoon Leaders and Sargeants for the British Army(?). It was very enlightening I thought. Three concepts I recall the instructors kept on hammering into the trainees was leadership, work as a team to kill the enemy and keep your men alive. Most interesting was the post-exercise analysis, the reason for trainee failures: "he knows his theory but unable to use it/doesn't use it in practice".

[Major Tom]

Originally posted by JoePrivate:

Getting back to the platoon in combat, I just watched a show for the first time called "Battle Stripes", a documentary about the training of Platoon Leaders and Sargeants for the British Army(?). It was very enlightening I thought. Three concepts I recall the instructors kept on hammering into the trainees was leadership, work as a team to kill the enemy and keep your men alive. Most interesting was the post-exercise analysis, the reason for trainee failures: "he knows his theory but unable to use it/doesn't use it in practice".

It was a determination of which of the group of British sergeants (from all military arms) would become officers (I think!). They were from all sorts of regiments of all sorts of arms (Army, Airborne, Marines, etc...). A very interesting show!

[Guest Pillar]

Before I continue on any "Maneuver vs..." discussion I'd like to have an opportunity to finish reading "Manuever Warfare: An Anthology" edited by Richard D. Hooker Jr.

It has some arguments from both sides and I'd like a chance to weigh this on my own some more. Is this ok with everyone?

Would you be interested in returning afterward?

- Pillar

[Wisbech_lad]

At least the Peng threads are imaginative in their insults…

As for USMC, that is a relatively lightly armoured force, that is designed to see combat at the “edges” of major theatres, e.g. Northern Norway rather than the Fulda Gap (no offence meant to the USMC in this) I would expect them to have a different doctrine at an operational level to (say) BAOR or the Bundeswehr, who expected to face Warsaw pact in a two week frenzy before supplies ran out/ it went nuclear.

But at a platoon level? Uhm, no. What Bullethead said I think would go for most platoons, of any nationality, at any time in the last 50 years. Implemented with different skill and conviction, maybe.

[Guest Germanboy]

As an interested outsider to the debate, I think on current scoring the non-maneuverists are clearly ahead. IOW - if Henri wants to continue making a credible argument, it may be a good idea for him to address Bullethead's points, particularly the one about the USMC doctrine.

You may now continue with your regularly scheduled discussion.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Ksak]

This so called "maneuverist" concept (at least as applied to CM) seems to be nothing more than the application of catchy terms to basic field manual tactics. Maybe the maneuverists would make more headway if the description were changed to the "Zen of Combat Mission."

[Henri]

Originally posted by Bullethead:

And I hope you don't take this as patronizing, but not only have I read that, I also read and absorbed everything else the USMC taught me about warfare. inflicting horrendous losses on the enemy.

[snip]

If you read any USMC stuff, you completely misunderstood it. The Corps is all about killing the enemy, and all its efforts are directed towards bringing that happy event to pass.

Well my arrogant friend, you had better read the warfighting manual of your beloved USMC again again. Here are just a few quotes from the Marine Corps Warfighting Manual MCDP-1 that contradicts everything you wrote.

MANEUVER WARFARE The Marine Corps concept for winning under these conditions is a warfighting doctrine based on rapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver...

...Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope...

...Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming...

...Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy’s systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is generally not physical destruction— the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly— but the disruption it causes...

...If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function....

...In combat this includes violence and shock effect, again not so much as a source of physical attrition, but as a source of disruption...

...In order to appear unpredictable, we must avoid set rules and patterns, which inhibit imagination and initiative. In order to appear ambiguous and threatening, we should operate on axes that offer numerous courses of action, keeping the enemy unclear as to which we will choose...

There is a lot more, but this should be enough to shatter your claim of what USMC official doctrine is.It is interesting to note that MCDP-1 is taken almost literally from Lind's book on Maneuver Warfare.

As for your courageous fighting in the Gulf War, bravo! My understanding is that the main role of the Marines was to participate in a fake invasion sitting on ships while 7 Iraki Divisions waited in vain for them to land, a perfect example of the maneuver warfare ideal of neutralizing an enemy without actually fighting him

Henri

[The_Capt]

I think that the meat and potatoes of Manoeuvre and Attrition as actual tools for deployment and employment of resources happens at the Bde/Div level. At those levels (if anybody else has had the opportunity back me up on this) there is freedom to properly try some of these concepts in anything other than a philosophical sense and how they are apllied to a given situation.

At the platoon level, I think what we call Manoeuvre and Attrition are thought of in much simpler terms. Manoeuvre is what the old school call initiative "pull your head out of your ass and show some initiative!!" A quote I have heard and given many a time in training.

Attrition is mission or direct order. Or more simply put "Listen to what I have to say and freakin do it!!!"

I guess one can see how the two schools are opposed but even now modern militaries are pushing the Manoeuvre philosophy down all the way to sect.

Manoeuvre says we should tell our subordinates why we are doing this, why our boss wants it dona and why his boss wants it done. We then empower our subordinates that on any given situation they have the right/duty to apply the intent of the commander to any situation even if it run counter to the actual mission order.

Attrition basically say what I want done so do it and wait for more. Mission before all else.

We adopt Manoeuvre philosophy because it shortens our action loop by allowing sub-units to exercise initiative towards a common goal which will support the overall goal all the way up at any given moment.

A Simple example:

A Battle Group (BG) is advancing towards a town at a critical cross roads. Your BG commander has said in his orders that the BG mission is to take and secure that junction. The intent is so that the Bde can have access to a critical avenue of approach in sp of a Div advance.

Your Div Comds intent is a rapid advance with minimal tie ups so we can secure operational objectives.

Your Bde Comds intent is to swiftly advance and secure an objective which supports Div with a by-pass policy of platoon and below.

Your BG Comds intent is to ensure that the cross-roads is secure and not drain the BGs combat power doing it because he wants to be able to follow on in sp of the Bde so and fight the fight the Div Comds interested in.

Now on your left a reinforced platoon is on a position which dominates the BG approach to the junction.

On the radio your BG Comd says "En at grid 123456 destroy them!!". He is a man of few words.

So you and your Combat Team prepare for a hasty attack. You are about to move to an Assault Position when Recce comes up and tells you the enemy has withdrawn across a river to a position on high ground but which does not threaten the BG advance. Now what do you do and why? To simplify let's narrow the options:

A. You chase down the enemy and destroy them

B. You occupy the enemies former position even thought is will expose you to fire and observation.

C. You form a BG screen which keeps an eye on the enemy and ensures he cannot get back to the original position.

What do you choose and why...at this lies the heart of Manoeuvre and Attrition.

Note: this is a reproduction of a simple scenario in The Army Doctrine Bulletin but I have tinkered with it to make it a little more difficult.