German armor attacking US forces in Normandy

[JasonC]

In my continuing series on US experiences defending against German armored attacks, here are a couple of small scale cases from the Normandy fighting. As will be seen (by anyone with the patience - this is a very long post), they were made on the KG scale (half a division) with inadequate local odds and failed miserably - once in the fight for the Caretan by 17SS, once during the push to St. Lo by Panzer Lehr.

The primary sources are the official US histories (you can find them on the web at the US army center for military history, which is worth poking around incidentally), which include some contemporary comments from the German side. I've also provided some cross check on loss claims from German staff figures, though necessarily "loose" since those are typically for longer periods than the single fights discussed.

Mortain, made on a larger scale and covered previously (about 2 divisions worth adjusted for actual strength) met a similar fate, though it took a bit longer - a few days rather than a few hours.

First the Caretan example, which occurred on 13 June. In a nutshell, it was SS panzergrenadiers with StuGs (plus a few FJ) attacking US Paras, who were then supported by armor division troops - meaning Shermans and half-tracked infantry.

"An attack by the 506th Parachute Infantry was scheduled for the morning of 13 June, to deepen the defensive base around Carentan. Before the attack could get well under way a strong enemy counterattack, supported by armor, struck along both the Carentan-Baupte and Carentan-Periers roads (Map No. 19 below). Included in the German forces were elements of the 37th and 38th Panzer Grenadier Regiments and the 17th Tank Battalion, all from the 17th SS-Panzer Grenadier (Goetz von Berlichgen) Division, and also remnants of the 6th Parachute Regiment. The attack was obviously directed at the recapture of Carentan, and it drove to within 500 yards of the edge of the city. The 2d Battalion, 502d Parachute Infantry, moved down to the 506th Parachute Infantry's right flank and helped to regain some of the lost ground. But the attack threatened the junction of the V and VII Corps beachheads so seriously that First Army decided to send armor to repel it. Not until this armor arrived was the German threat eliminated and the link between the two corps firmly secured.

At 1030 elements of Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division, arrived in Carentan. One task force attacked west along the Carentan-Baupte road at 1400 and, followed by the 502d Parachute Infantry, passed through the 506th Parachute Infantry and drove westward. Another task force attacked along the Carentan-Periers highway. Both task forces received close support from the 14th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. The coordinated efforts of the tanks, infantry, and artillery threw the enemy back several thousand yards, inflicting an estimated loss of 500 men. That night the 506th Parachute Infantry was relieved by the 502d on the right flank and passed to division reserve in Carentan."

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/utah/maps/Map19.jpg

The first units of 17 SS arrived at the front on 10 June, and the counterattack of 13 June was the serious fight the division was in. The division had 42 StuG before the move to Normandy and only 1 was destroyed enroute. The attack mentioned above was launched by the 37 PzGdr regiment supported by StuG, and renmants of a KG from the 6th FJ as mentioned. Losses of the division through 15 June, almost all from this fight, were 79 KIA, 316 WIA, and 61 MIA, or 456 total battle casualties, roughly in line with the US estimate. On 15 June the division reported 24 StuG operational and 13 in short term repair. Which implies 4 total write offs and 13 moved to "repair" in this fight - breakdowns or hit but recovered. As the map shows, the front line continued to move in the American's favor.

Notice that the US armor response was on the scene in a matter of hours - by 1030 after a morning attack by the Germans. The US was not dug in, as the Paras were attempting to advance themselves before the German attack went in. One armor battalion on each side quickly resulted in a large reduction in operational StuG and a German retreat. The infantry forces were comparable, with 3 battalions of 37 SS Pz Gdr regiment plus remaining elements of the 6th FJ, facing 4 battalions of US Paras from the 101 plus 1 battalion of armored infantry from 2nd AD. The initial German attack was about 1:1 in infantry and 1 StuG battalion vs. no armor - it made some headway but did not break the US line. The US response was made at about 5:4 odds and forced the Germans back in turn, but also did not break the German line.

Next Panzer Lehr's counterattack on July 11, trying to stem the advance to St. Lo. The report on this fight is available in much greater detail and from both sides. In a nutshell it was Panthers, Mark IVs, Jadgpanzers - all supported by Panzergrenadiers - against US infantry forces including their usual supporting M-10s and some Shermans. The US also counterattacked with some armor. But the main story is M-10s supporting infantry vs. a mix of German armor supported by Pz Gdrs.

It does not give much evidence of the supposedly telling superiority of Panthers over US tank destroyers. It does fit the pattern of an easy initial break-through past the initial US infantry positions, followed by heavy US fire support, German infantry stripped off the tanks, blind tanks floundering once through the immediate front line, hemmed in by bazooka teams, then hunted down and destroyed in detail, mostly by US M-10s.

First the forces available for the attack, amounting to a KG rather than a division because of prior losses.

"The division's available strength included troops of the 901st and 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiments, three battalions of 105-mm howitzers, and a battalion of the 36th Panzer Regiment. Bayerlein planned his attack in three formations: I and II Battalions of 902d Panzer Grenadier Regiment and a battalion of 20 tanks north from Pont-Hebert; the I Battalion of the 901st Panzer Grenadiers and two companies of antitank guns (20 pieces) through le Desert; and the II Battalion of the 901st with 11 tanks from Bois du Hommet, driving east and northeast. The initial objectives of the three attacks were, respectively, Cavigny, St-Jean-de- Daye, and le Mesnil-Veneron. The three columns were supposed to meet around St-Jean-de-Daye to organize for further advance.

"...The Germans, in their greatest effort during the Battle of the Hedgerows to knock First Army off balance by an offensive thrust, threw Panzer Lehr into action west of the Vire...The impact of Panzer Lehr's attack was to cause more trouble in the 9th Division's lines, on which the main enemy strength hit, than it did farther south and east. The initial success of the enemy penetration in the 9th Division sector was also due to a gap which had developed between the 39th Infantry which was pushing southwest along the corps boundary, and the 47th Infantry, which was moving more nearly west with the objective of clearing the Hommet woods. (See Map 7.)

"Beginning at midnight, the 39th Infantry reported several times that the enemy was in movement on its front, just southwest of le Desert, and that tracked vehicles could be heard on the east-west highway. In the early morning hours of 11 July, the threat materialized. Enemy columns struck into the gap between the 47th Infantry and the 39th and overran the CP of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry; they pushed the 1st Battalion of the 39th Infantry back 600 yards along the le Desert highway. The impetus of the enemy attack carried some German elements as much as 2,000 yards behind the American front-line positions.

"The enemy drive destroyed communications between the 39th and 47th Infantry Regiments and Division Headquarters, but through the 9th Reconnaissance Troop, Division learned of the withdrawal of the 1St Battalion and of the enemy penetration between the two regiments."

Notice the characteristic easy initial break-in. But that hardly ended the affair.

"As soon as the extent of penetration was known, the 9th Division took prompt and effective steps to seal off enemy forces already hotly engaged by the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion and units of the 39th and 47th Infantry. The 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry and four tank destroyers were ordered at 0850 to move down the road south of le Mesnil-Veneron; the mission of this force was to contact the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry, cut the enemy escape route, and mop up isolated spots of enemy resistance within the regimental area. The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry was sent to stop German infantry in the la Scellerie-la Buhotrie area. Dive bombers, scheduled for an 0900 mission, were diverted to meet the tank threat, hitting enemy armor along the road near le Desert and in the vicinity of la Scellerie. At 1230, the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry was attached to the 47th Infantry to assist in covering its north flank and rear. The personnel of the CP of the 3d Battalion, 47th Infantry reorganized their forces and successfully attacked to recover their CP, which was found to be practically intact.

Just punching into the front line infantry positions is not "breakthrough". It is more like stepping on a hornet's nest. Notice the two engaged front line units each commit their "back", reserve battalion. A "back" battalion from a neighboring regiment is also cross attached, to slide over to the threatened sector - these moves dropped the attacking infantry odds to nearly 1:2. Passing over a position once does not result in its neutralization, as the men regroup and retake ground overrun, unless strong forces are left on top of each position cleared - which can't be done at such low infantry odds. Air and artillery are diverted from other missions to the point of attack (more on the effects of that below).

And the infantry always has TDs on call to deal with attacking armor, which is the subject of the next section. The normal tasking created by one TD battalion per infantry division meant 2 companies of TDs were available in the sector attacked. As it happens, one tank company was also behind the US lines, ready to support a scheduled attack. Thus the initial armor odds, before anything new reached the area, were about 5:4 (~50 vs. ~40). The results were not exactly good from the German point of view. 24 M-10s did most of the heavy lifting.

"The heaviest fighting of the day fell on Companies A and C, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Maj. Hoyt K. Lorance), which had been alerted at 0300 to aid in halting the enemy drive. Three penetrations of the American infantry lines were wiped out by Company A between 0300 and 0600. Before daylight, a platoon of Company A attached to the 39th Infantry, in position about 300 yards east of le Desert on the road to la Perrine, attacked three tanks which had penetrated the American lines for 500 yards. During a fight in which one American TD was knocked out, one of the enemy tanks was destroyed and the other two were forced to withdraw after being set afire.

"To the west of le Desert, approximately ten German tanks drove north on the unimproved road leading from the le Hommet-d'Arthenay crossroads to la Charlemenerie and succeeded in reaching a point just south of la Scellerie. Here the column was stopped when the 3d Platoon, Company A destroyed the leading German tank after losing one of its own M-10's. To deal with the German threat in this area, the Company A commander reorganized his tank destroyers and requested a company of infantry as reinforcements. While awaiting the arrival of these troops, the TD's spotted three Mark V tanks on the road west of la Scellerie and opened fire, destroying with 12 rounds the tanks and one half-track.

"Later in the morning, Company C, 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion, holding positions near la Charlemenerie, knocked out its first German tank of the campaign. A well-camouflaged Mark V, carrying several soldiers and accompanied by others on foot, rounded the west corner of the crossroads below la Charlemenerie in front of an American tank destroyer. The M-10 opened fire and with two shots destroyed the German tank, killing and wounding several crew members and scattering the rest.

"Another Panther thrust in the early afternoon toward la Charlemenerie, near the la Caplainerie road junction, was stopped by two of Company C's tank destroyers with the aid of Company F, 32d Armored Regiment (Combat Command A). The Company F tanks were located in orchards on either side of the road waiting to take part in a 47th Infantry mission, while the two M-10'S were holding positions on the road about 200 yards from the American armor. As the Mark V's appeared, Company F opened fire with HE at a range of 400 yards. The Panthers continued to roll, however, and the leading tank broke through to fight a duel with an M-10 at a range of 120 yards. The Mark V was damaged by TD fire, but it returned a shot, hitting the TD and wounding or killing three members of the crew. The other M-10 then opened fire, finishing the Panther with two shots. Then, spotting another Mark V, the TD fired ten rounds into the suspension system of the Panther, which sideslipped helplessly against the bank on the east side of the road and hung there in a tangle of matted hedgerow and churned mud. The crews, who had left their tanks when they were hit, were tracked down by infantry and captured in a farmhouse in the vicinity.

"The slaughter of the German armor continued. As the 1st Battalion, 47th Infantry moved down the road west of la Charlemenerie to contact the 3d Battalion, the first two M-10's in the column spotted two Panther tanks approaching from a lightly wooded area to the left front. Before these tanks could get into action, the TD's opened fire with their 3-inch guns at a range of 170 yards, knocking out both Panthers. A few moments later a third Mark V was discovered on a farm road to the east. Both M-10's fired on it, and ten minutes later this third tank was found pitched inert against a hedgerow. None of the enemy tanks had been able to fire on the 1st Battalion before being hit.

"In sum the enemy armor had floundered helplessly after its breakthrough. The 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion destroyed 1 Mark IV and 12 Mark V tanks, while the American infantry hunted down the remnants of enemy foot troops which had accompanied the armor."

Fire support had meanwhile isolated the battlefield from any follow-on German elements.

"Artillery and air activity had prevented the Germans from sending additional tanks and infantry to support the initial breakthrough. Aerial reconnaissance at 0900 had reported 40 enemy tanks, parked under trees, along the paved highway west of le Desert. The 9th Division Artillery covered the road with such heavy fire that it became a death trap for anyone trying to use it. American P-47's and P-51's flew three missions against tanks on the XIX and VII Corps fronts during the day, claiming a total of 22 tanks destroyed (sic). Of this

number, the planes claimed to have destroyed 13 out of 14 tanks sighted near le Hommet-de'Arthenay in the attack at 0900."

These air attack claims are certainly inflated, as overall German armor losses in the attack show. The ground forces accounted for the German tank losses that can be verified from the German side of the hill, and error is much less likely in their case as the ground in question remained in US hands. Some of the claims above may have been tanks moved to "short term repair", perhaps, but not total losses. Still, the Jabos did ensure driving straight down the roads in broad daylight to support the attack was not high on the agenda from noon onward.

"Joint efforts of air and ground forces had neutralized the Panzer Lehr Division breakthrough by 1600. The 39th and 47th Infantry Regiments were then ordered to advance and reoccupy their positions of the morning. By 2100 their mission was completed against light opposition, and the regiments were instructed to dig in for the night in preparation for an attack the following day. The net effect of the German counterattack had thus been little more than to cause a day's loss in the 9th Division's schedule of advance."

Meanwhile, the Americans continued to push in the neighboring sectors. Part of the Lehr attack hit a portion of the 30th Infantry division - but a light one, apparently a few Pz IVs and some armored cars. It stopped that attack and pushed forward with along the part of its front that had not beeb directly attacked - with US armor supporting this move.

"The effects on the 30th Division's front were even less; here, 11 July saw notable gains by the division in one part of its zone, in addition to complete defensive success against Panzer Lehr's right wing column.

"West of the Pont-Hebert-St-Jean-de-Daye highway, the 3d Battalion of the 120th Infantry had organized positions for night defense around the village of le Rocher, on the higher ground that marked the north end of the ridge on which lay Hauts-Vents. Warned of the presence of enemy armor to south and west, Lt. Col. Paul W. McCullum established roadblocks on the approaches most likely to be used by the Germans, and placed tanks and TD's south of the village toward Hill 91.

"Warnings had come in about midnight from 9th Division, noting enemy activity south of le Desert and on the 120th's flank. This alert was repeated two hours later. At 0130 prior to the second warning, the 3d Battalion had been informed that an enemy armored vehicle, discovered on the road near Company E, had opened fire. Almost simultaneously, a message sent by runner from the roadblock toward Hill 91 announced that enemy tanks, each followed by about 20 infantry and armored vehicles, were moving toward the 3d Battalion CP. The battalion instantly alerted its companies and began to prepare countermeasures. Before these preparations were completed, two enemy vehicles slipped by the outposts and opened fire on Company K. The Americans returned the fire as the Germans approached, knocking out one tank with bazooka and rifle grenade fire, killing a member of the tank crew and wounding several others.

Notice in the next passage how the German armor easily penetrates to the HQs of the front line infantry. But doesn't settle very much by doing so.

"During this fight another tank, with two more and an armored car following close behind, had approached within a few yards of the 3d Battalion CP. An American officer opened fire with a machine gun mounted on a jeep just inside the CP area, precipitating a fight in which 3d Battalion personnel made use of bazookas, grenades, pistols (sic), and machine guns to rout the enemy. The armored car and one tank became immobilized in mud and were destroyed by the Americans. During the fight two officers and three enlisted men of the 3d Battalion were ambushed and taken prisoners by a party of approximately 50 Germans. All but one of the prisoners later got away when the armored car behind which they were forced to march was fired on by an American bazooka and machine gun in the battalion area. One of the American officers was killed, the Germans scattered, and the prisoners escaped.

"In other parts of the 3d Battalion area, in a series of isolated actions, bazooka and small-arms fire succeeded in driving away or damaging enemy tanks. When the battalion area was cleared near midmorning, the enemy had lost 5 Mark IV tanks, 4 armored cars, and 60 prisoners.

"East of the highway to Pont-Hebert, German tanks were reported behind the 119th Infantry's front by daylight. During the night a group of seven Mark IV's and approximately a company of infantry penetrated the left flank of the 3d Battalion on the river road. By 0930 a tank, accompanied by a small group of infantrymen, had been sighted near la Coquerie, a mile behind our forward lines, and ten minutes later another was reported just south of Bahais."

Notice again the ease of break-in.

"Enemy artillery showed unusual activity, including a willingness to exchange punches with American artillery. German artillery strength on the division front was estimated at four battalions, one of 150-mm guns, and a battery of mobile 88-mm's. The fire of the 150's was particularly accurate."

Notice how slight the artillery is for the scale of attack - elements of 3 US regiments have been hit. Lehr is attacking on a ridiculously wide front for the amount of force available. And it is considered unusual that ~60 enemy guns are firing on a division's front - showing the effects of ammo limitations on the German artillery most of the time. The Germans aren't in the right force-to-space league here.

"The 119th Infantry, which was preparing to attack with Combat Command B in the direction of Hauts-Vents at 1100, sent its reserve (the 1st Battalion) toward the threatened area and asked Combat Command B for tanks. Task Force Y, including Companies F and I, 33d Armored Regiment and Company A, 36th Armored Infantry (i.e. ~30 Shermans and ~20 halftracks), were sent from their positions southwest of Cavigny. The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion indicated at this time that it was prepared to deal with the enemy in the vicinity of Bahais. By 1045 the two tanks reported near Bahais had been destroyed and the accompanying troops were casualties. Bazooka fire had accounted for one tank and TD fire had destroyed the other.

Characteristically, the US armored division troops are sent on column attacks mostly -outside- the area of the initial German armor attacks. TDs run to the penetrations to kill tanks - hitting "where they are". The armor tries to hit "where they ain't". The Shermans are however noticably less successful than the TDs. They take fire when trying to attack.

"Task Force Y moved northeast to Cavigny, where two columns were formed, one moving south on the river road through Bahais and the other advancing southwest toward la Coquerie. The main difficulties of the second column came, not from the withdrawing enemy remnants, but from German self-propelled guns (Jadgpanzers probably) east of the river near St-Gilles, which scored hits on six U. S. tanks as they moved down the river road. By mid-afternoon the situation near the Vire was under control; the Germans had not been able to get armored units in any strength through the 119th's lines.

"Leaving Task Force Y to clear up the infiltrations, Task Force Z, reinforced by three companies of Task Force X, went ahead with its attack as planned toward the high ground at Hauts-Vents. The 119th and 120th Infantry were ready by 1530 to attack in their zones.

"When the assault task force of Combat Command B started on its new drive for Hill 91 enemy tanks opened with flanking fire from Belle-Lande. (See Map 8.) In the ensuing action the American armored column lost six tanks. Reorganization of the task force was nevertheless accomplished, and the advance continued. On nearing Hauts-Vents, Task Force Z was hit by friendly artillery fire which fell short and this, coupled with enemy mortar and artillery fire, made it possible for the Germans to reoccupy some of the high ground. Colonel Roysdon then went forward and personally led the task force's attack, which reported taking Hill 91 at 1736. The American armor drove headlong to the top of the hill and quickly established a defensive position, with the infantry on the forward slopes and the tanks on the slope north. There the task force dug in and held, despite heavy enemy pressure. The Germans attempted to organize a counterattack in the evening, sending a column of tanks forward from the southeast, but Division Artillery smashed this threat before it could reach the hill. The enemy armor retreated and dispersed; German infantry continued to hold a line 500 yards south of Hauts-Vents.

The Americans are moving forward in the areas not immediately under counterattack, at the same time the TDs and reserves deal with the penetrations. Not only does driving through the front line US infantry positions not result in any mythical "collapse", the occasion is seized to move forward elsewhere with the intruding armor safely out of position to defend.

"The capture of Hill 91 was the signal achievement in this sector of the XIX Corps front; only limited advances were made by right- and left-wing units of the 30th Division. Recovering from the confusion caused by the armored penetrations during the night, the 119th Infantry got its attack under way in mid-afternoon. The 3d Battalion, having been heavily hit by mortar fire, was replaced by the 1st Battalion, which attacked abreast of the 2d. They managed to advance about 200 yards before the 1St Battalion was hit with another counterattack, beaten off with the aid of artillery and smoke. The two battalions dug in short of the road from Belle-Lande to the river. Farther west, the 120th Infantry, supported by the 743d Tank Battalion, advanced in stiff hedgerow fighting and pushed a battalion down from le Rocher to tie in with Combat Command B. The enemy used tanks in an unsuccessful effort to stop this advance.

"With Panzer Lehr armor roaming around on the front, the division commander ordered physical contact ("not people using radios") with units to left and right. On the deep right flank, which still was open, the busy 30th Reconnaissance Troop was patrolling and strong roadblocks were being maintained. The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion continued close support of the two leading infantry regiments, staying in position to counter armored thrusts from the south and southwest. The 117th Infantry, now in reserve, was placed to give protection in depth to the right flank.

"The day had brought 367 casualties to the 30th Division, 174 in the 119th Infantry, and 153 in the 120th. Attack and counterattack had brought heavy artillery activity, with the 30th Division Artillery firing 9,000 rounds. This fire had been reinforced by Corps Artillery support in addition to 6,000 rounds expended by the 3d Armored Division Artillery.

Now a little on how all of this looked from the other side of the hill.

"The 11th of July was a hard day for Seventh Army on its whole front, and its War Diary could get little comfort from the reports of Panzer Lehr's attack, on which so much hope had been placed. The complete failure of the attack must have been a bitter pill, but the Diary records it with grim objectivity. The effort north of Pont-Hebert by the 902d Armored Infantry Regiment was reported as getting as far as Cavigny, but the German units had to withdraw because of powerful American counterblows against the "deep left flank." apparently this report refers to the U. S. advance, becoming pronounced by the evening of 10 July, toward le Rocher and Hill 91. This seems to have thrown Panzer Lehr's right wing column off balance. General Bayerlein later (in 1945) stated in an interview that one battalion of the 902d was diverted to meet this American attack. This may have been the unit that infiltrated some tanks into the le Rocher area, which was not in Panzer Lehr's zone of attack as originally planned, or it may refer to the German tanks that attempted to stop Combat Command B by flanking fire from Belle-Lande. The attack of the 901st Panzer Grenadiers beyond le Desert, in battalion strength, was reported to have got as far as the St-Jean-de-Daye highway, but was then hit by a flanking attack from the north. Elements of this combat group were cut off and surrounded. American attacks between the two penetrations of Panzer Lehr got "as far as Eslandes," and a break in the German lines was only closed by use of the Engineer Battalion of Panzer Lehr in counterattack. The details were "unclear" and the whole situation was regarded as critical. The Panzer Lehr units had definitely been forced to the defensive, and its effort "did not relieve the pressure on the main point of enemy effort."

"General Bayerlein's memory of his attack, recorded a year later, was marked by an estimate of losses running to as high as 50 percent of the attacking force, though his figures of 20 tanks and 500-700 men lost are low in comparison with American claims and cannot be checked by available records. Bayerlein attributed the result of the day to the exhausted condition of his men when they entered battle, ***and to the difficulty of operating Mark V tanks in the hedgerows. He declared that his armor had to fight at maximum ranges of 200 yards because hedges concealed everything farther away. He could not use the Mark V's for cross-country movement.*** Light tanks would have been better for the St-Lo terrain but he did not bring them because he had been told the area was better suited for tank operations than that around Caen (sic).

Emphasis added. Attack is not defense. Tight terrain might make a front plate useful defending. Not so useful attacking. Also note that the US 76mm in the M-10 apparently penetrated Panthers from the front - probably through the turret - at such short ranges.

"Panzer Lehr had been severely mauled by the combined onslaughts of the U. S. 9th and 30th Divisions, and was now crippled to an extent that removed the possibility of further large-scale counterattack west of the Vire."

As for Lehr tank losses, we can get some sense of them from 1 July and 1 August returns, though obviously additional fighting is involved in the net changes recorded between those dates. Here are the recorded figures for Panther, Pz IV, and Jadgpanzer, given as operational + short term repair for each type and date -

1 July Panther 32+26 Panzer IV 36+29 Jadgpanzer 28+9 Total 96+64 = 160

1 August Panther 12+6 Panzer IV 15+7 Jadgpanzer 6+4 Total 33+17 = 50

The ground kill claims are probably accurate at around 25 AFVs lost, in line with Bayerlin's report (especially if he meant "tanks proper" rather than all AFVs). The air claims are probably completely unreliable. Lehr lost 2/3rds of its tank strength in July, and probably a quarter of those losses on the 11th alone. The US lost 12 Shermans and only 5 TDs. The US TDs got almost all of the kills, inflicting at least 3 to 1, while the US Shermans did not get confirmed tank kills, but did take both losses and ground. German Jadgs got a fair portion of the German kills too, defending against the US armor columns.

The TDs often fired first, though they sometimes lost one TD out of a platoon because the Germans did, or got the first effective hits. But generally the TDs fired last. The obvious primary explanation is the sighting differential - the Germans were in enemy territory, with artillery and small arms fire constant, thus buttoned. The US were in their own territory, with infantry to report the German tank positions, and open topped. Whether because of sighting or for other causes, the M-10s also apparently showed a much higher rate of fire, in practice, than the Germans achieved.

This counterattack was doomed because it was launched on far too wide a front with completely inadequate forces. Before it was all over, the US had thrown in most of 3 regiments plus a full armored combat command, and parts of two TD battalions - about twice the attacking German force in both infantry and armor terms, all told. Interestingly, most of the AFV kills by *both sides* were made *defensively* by TDs, not offensively by tanks.

I think these examples show the US wasn't exactly a pushover for armor, even when Panthers rolled at them down narrow lanes, all gamer talk of "zippos" and supposed "greenness", let alone "the failed TD idea" to the contrary, notwithstanding.

What German armored attacks needed to succeed was not "having Panthers" or "facing zippos or 'failed' TDs". What they needed was a bigger scale of attack (meaning more like 3 armored divisions side by side) and especially better overall infantry and artillery odds at the point of attack. When they had 2:1 and up infantry and artillery odds, an armor edge could certainly help, because whenever massed tanks were used the initial break-in through or around the US infantry alone, was relatively easy. But often the infantry odds were no better than 1:1, and sometimes as bad as 1:2 after US reserves reacted to an attack. With fire support odds that bad or worse. And on those occasions, the German armor failed, uniformly.

Additional examples mentioned briefly, worth looking at for those interested but not yet covered in detail, are - the defense of the Elsenborn ridge position on the north flank of the Bulge; the well known case of Bastogne; the Lorraine counterattacks outside Nancy (covered somewhat once before); Nordwind in Alsace; and the attempt to reduce the Remagen bridgehead. I don't think you will find a single operational case where AFV "tank duel" differences were decisive on the attack.

You will find instead that the infantry and artillery ratios govern success or failure of the armor. They determine whether the "break in" the armor can indeed achieve, results in the systematic destruction of the defenders, or merely in isolating the intruding tanks in good locations for the defenders to kill them. Notably, front armor plates do not determine this. In fact, all the evidence points to the conclusion that superior tank dueling ability is more useful on defense, and relatively useless when attacking.

I hope this is interesting.

[PiggDogg]

Jason, thanks a bunch for the article. It is quite useful for putting CM into the perspective of reality.

Cheers, Richard

[manchildstein (ii)]

shuckie darns... there's a problem with that site... not only will it have me re-inventing my 'south of carentan' scenario, it opens the door for all sorts of other scenarios... did someone else say, 'who needs sleep?'

as for the 'south of carentan' thing... actually, this is the site where i originally got some of my 17th ss verus 101st info... will have to take a closer look... maybe the scenario can be 120 minutes with the first 60 turns being a german attack, with the 2nd 60 turns being an attack by elements of the 2nd u.s. armored...

as for other scenarios, for starters check this out... 506th at st come du mont:

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/WWII/506-Nor/506-5.gif

andy

[manchildstein (ii)]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by manchildstein II:

originally got some of my 17th ss verus 101st info...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

nah it looks like a different site... good reference though...

andy

[JasonC]

One additional thought occurred to me about the Lehr reports. A process of putting two and two together. Consider the following facts and then my hypothesis.

(1) the US air attack at mid-morning reported seeing a large number of "tanks" under scattered trees near roads behind the main attack sector. Pilots reported numerous kills against them.

(2) the German attack kicked off in the pre-dawn. It had been underway for quite some time by midmorning. And the reports of the other ground units account for most of the German AFVs known to have been engaged, and these were well forward.

(3) the German attack included two full Panzergrenadier regiments of Panzer Lehr. As it happens, Panzer Lehr in Normandy was unusual in that it had a very large compliment of halftracks for its infantry - well above the customary one battalion.

(4) the front line US reports speak often of tank riders or groups of infantry accompanying the German tanks on foot, but reports of halftracks are comparatively rare.

The German Panzergrenadiers must therefore have debused somewhere. Which means the halftracks must have been left somewhere.

(5) it is very hard to tell the difference between a halftrack and a tank, under trees no less, from 2000 feet going 350 mph.

Hypothesis - the pilot reports are talking about a large and reasonably successful airstrike on the *transport* of the attacking regiments, standing more or less empty along the sides of the roads used to concentrate for the attack.

[rexford]

I have read a report where a defensive M-10 in Normandy was able to knock out 3 of 4 Panthers in a column on a road with a few shots (side and rear hits), without any return fire. This was at very close range.

The fourth Panther escaped because of the camouflage, the M-10 did not see it.

Things change at close range.

[rexford]

Ten shots at the suspension of the Panther is one notable result in that terrific relating of combat. The other is the use of Sherman 75mm or M-10 76mm HE shells to button tanks and possibly disrupt their optics.

One of the threads on the G104 Sherman forum discussed how British Shermans were supposed to draw fire and use their HE to:

A. knock out German heavy tank suspension, tracks or drive wheel

B. Button up German tank

C. Disrupt panzer optics

D. Divert attention from Firefly

Several of the above noted objectives would be gained by aiming HE at the turret, since AP failure was assumed.

Firefly would be in hiding just behind lines, ready to spring into action upon call.

The use of HE fire to reduce panzer effectiveness, and shots at the suspension, are tactics that are often missing in tactical level wargames. Russian story on Battlefield site has TWO 75mm armed Shermans knocking out Tigers, first tank shoots out a track and second tank blasts the side armor as the Tiger rotates on one track.

As noted in the opening post on this thread, infantry-artillery-tank actions in close country create a different set of rules, and a few "superior" tanks are not enough to turn things around. Breaking through lines with tanks and failing to hold ground does nothing.

Thanks for an excellent research effort, Jason.

[PJungnitsch]

Nice post, appreciate the work that went into it. Agree mainly, but would conclude myself that low visibility conditions, artillery superiority, superiority in numbers, and air superiority can make up for inferior tanks and doctrine, especially when defending.

Specifically the 'infantry tank only' Sherman 75mm was a mistake, since they ended up fighting other tanks anyway, and get hammered even when all the other conditions are for them. Better to have a gun with better A/tk capability even at the expense of some anti infantry. Ergo a 'main battle tank' with a hi velocity 76mm or 90mm gun.

Also the very light armor, open top, and marginal gun of the M10 tank destroyers is not a problem as long as 1)they get the first shot in from close range 2)the Germans do not have much artillery, do not have ground attack aircraft, do not have infantry prowling around....

The US experience in the west show more how crushing material superiority plus favorable conditions could make poor armour, and poor armour doctrine, work.

[Redwolf]

Your posts get really excellent, a few quick thoughts (I regret not having more time these days):

I wonder why the losses in Jagdpanzer were greater than in MBTs. From the description of these battles, they only tangled with the Shermans attacking elsewhere while German armour was busy tangling with U.S. rearguard and TD forces. 40 Jagdpanzer used in the defensive loosing 30 of them. The majority of them seems to be lost in the fighting that the U.S. reports 12 lost Shermans for. And in that timeframe few if any of the Shermans could have been 76mm armed. What happend? Artillery, naval guns, planes?

Your remark that tank dueling ability is more useful on defense in combination with rather useless front plates, triggers another question for me. Maybe a "breakthough" tank which does't only have a thick front plate, but also thick sides, is more useful in such a situation than is slowness would imply? Obviously, I am referring to the Tigers, but also to the KV tanks.

BTW, it's "Jagdpanzer", not "Jadgpanzer".

[JasonC]

I don't see that its is particularly higher for the Jagds, but perhaps you are being misled by the time of the returns. We don't have Lehr reports for right before and right after the fight on the 11th alone. The figures given are for July 1 and August 1, and Lehr was in plenty of additional fighting in that period. Especially in the second half of it, defensively. It was broken through in Cobra toward the end of that period, for instance.

The returns show losses in runners of ~20 tanks in each of the two tank categories, and reduction of the AT battalion to less than one company of runners. The losses on the attack on the 11th, alone, were as I said probably about 1/4 of Lehr's overall losses for July - about 25 tanks.

The Jagds lost heavily over July as a whole simply because they were there to use. All categories were reduced to low figures by the end, and were left over in about their portion of the original TOE strength. 12-15-6 runners on August 1 compared to 89-99-41 brought to the theater, which is 13.5%-15.2%-14.6% of original TOE. All at ~1/7th of TOE, +/- 1%.

As for the question about breakthrough tanks and side armor, there may have been particular historical windows when particular models were significantly more survivable for technical reasons. The leading case would be the Tiger I only up until about the fall of 1943, thus for about a year.

One can identify one case of a battalion overrun in Sicily by the Herman Goering Panzer division, including use of its Tiger battalion. But this conforms to the pattern - the easy initial break-in went no further after meeting massed artillery fire and stubborn bazooka teams, which the attackers had no easy means to eliminate. Bazookas and 105 HEAT from regimental gun companies are poor AT weapons against Tigers. But they were sufficient once the German infantry could proceed no further, in the face of corps-level artillery shoots and negative infantry odds.

There still doesn't seem to be a large operational effect. Again, the break in is rarely the problem even without thick plates. (Only a few dense PAK-front cases excepted). That is commonly achieved simply by the massing of any sort of armor on a mostly infantry front. If the attackers have only Pz IVs, then their tank losses are likely to be higher, to be sure, but local odds and armor vs. none will generally still achieve the initial break in. It is what comes after that depends on the other arms.

Also, by later in the war the US had plenty of AT weapons capable of dealing with Tiger flank armor. The TDs, towed 76, and upgunned Shermans will do the job.

In the case of King Tigers, one finds a few of them with Peiper in the Bulge (from analysis of tank losses, probably only 1 company rather than the whole battalion). A platoon was knocked out in a few minutes by a platoon of 76mm towed ATGs firing from ambush, probably flank and rear shots rather than tungsten. They gave US Shermans plenty of trouble, but a few dismounted 90mm AA and Jackson TDs helped keep them at bay, and the limited road net was mined.

In the end they were reduced the same way the mass of Peiper's Panthers was, by lack of gasoline and cleared roads to move along. The decisive equation for Peiper was a corps of artillery vs. one battalion and two divisions of infantry against two battalions, not tank odds or tank specs. He could not get out of the encirclement against those artillery and infantry odds, or even reopen the roads to his rear to get more fuel, infantry, etc.

Fine questions BTW...

[Redwolf]

I think the KT kills in Peiper's KG were from the top of a hill, shooting into the top armour. Some other thread had that info.

While I noticed the Jagdpanzer loss figures were for all of July, I still wonder why they are higher than MTB losses for the same period (even if the period covers much more than the combat you describe).

Jagdpanzer should usually only operate from cover, from behind the own infantry. So even if they are hit, there is a much better chance to recover them unless the whole front has been pushed back. Compare the MBT, which on the defense will usually have to travel from a reserve position, which will increase the chance of air attack or mechnical breakdown, and -given the low infantry density- meeting unexpected enemy AT-capable forces. Surely, any MBT reserves that sucessfully hit attacking forces would continue with a counterattack bejond the own infantry line, where they might break down outside recovery reach.

Maybe the Jagdpanzer were not really used as doctrine would tell, that was that I was wondering about. Surely Bayerlein isn't the kind of general who just doesn't understand the limitations of Jagdpanzers. But maybe he is and/or was forced for unusual uses, so any further info on the Jagdpanzer's usage would be greatly appreciated.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by rexford:

I have read a report where a defensive M-10 in Normandy was able to knock out 3 of 4 Panthers in a column on a road with a few shots (side and rear hits), without any return fire. This was at very close range.

The fourth Panther escaped because of the camouflage, the M-10 did not see it.

Things change at close range.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

While this is simplistic there is some truth in it.

The US did a study about tank losses and combat. They found that the sherman losses did not matter as to range. They examined as many tanks as possible and determined the range at which they were KOd. In the catagories short, medium and long (dont have the numbers but can get them), they saw almost 1/3 in each. looking at the german tanks, they saw something like only 10 percent of the german tanks lost at long range. It was soemthing like 50 % and 40 for short and medium respectively.

The germans fought the russians at ranges they could choose. Even in attack, they could use manuver and terrain to apply the basic advantage premise, that is, Shoot at them effectively with them having a smaller chance of firing back effectively. Also, try to get a local numbers superiority. Even if you are out numbered, focus your numbers against as small an enemy force as you can. Defeat the enemy in many small battles.

The conditions and terrain in the west didnt cooperate. long range plinking was hampered by terrain. The allies air force would intervene and the artillery was just obnoxious. The allies had great numbers and the terrain was not open like in the east.

In the east, attacking could still use range advantage, in the west, it was not that easy. using range advantage needs time and that would allow the allies to recover/call in air strikes/etc. The east did not have an adversary with as many light AT weapons like the bazooka. tanks became fragile in the face of built up areas.

The german tank advantage became a defensive advantage. The germans tried to use the armor to attack in poor weather conditions in an attempt to offset airpower. This led to disaster on many occasions too. Fog at Noville and in arracourt being examples of wasting tanks.

Lewis

[imported_Wildman]

The fact that lept out at me was the effectiveness of the artillery.

It stripped the attack of infantry, buttoned the tanks, and sealed the inital breakthroughs. I think that while combined arms were/are important, we often miss the inherent power of artillery in tactical games like CM.

Imagine playing the Germans on this attack scenario with the Allies getting 4 or 5 155mm FOs, in addition to 81mm FOs.

It also lends some credibility to the TD concept. This is one instance where the TD concept was implemented as taught. Companies of TDs rush to the breakout to kill enemy tanks while your tanks (Shermans) attack where their tanks aren't. It makes me wonder if the concept wasn't sounder than we're led to believe. If US commanders actually believed and used the TD system as it was written, perhaps it would have resulted in fewer causalities?

Plus, machineman, the Sherman was NOT obsolete when first introduced in 1943 in the desert. Quite a shock to early PZIII's and PzIV's I'd say.

[Username]

I think the arty was also responsible for the german tank battalions short histories in the west also. In the east, the tank battalions would often find themselves very rarely at full strength. After months of battle they would be slowly worn down but as they got to lower number of runners, they would maintain a certain level. More than likely, tank retrieval and the canabalizing of parts allowed a quiescent point to be maintained.

In the west, after disastrous attacks by panzers, the field was denied by arty , mortars, allied infantry. later in the west, as in the bulge, there werent proper numbers of panzer retrievers at all. heavy tanks became very expensive due to loss soon after use.

many tactics used by the germans in the east did not pan out in the west. the typical infantry counter-attack they used was often smashed by arty in the west. Russian troops never had as responsive artillery as the west and there the german tactics made sense because they didnt want the russians to dig in.

the germans should have adopted a fighting withdrawl in the west. Always falling back onto their heavy tanks and inflicting a blood-letting toll to wear down the allies. Space should have been used as a substitute for diluting the enemys artillery. They allowed formations to be smashed and were hastily raising new ones who never attained the same combat power.

Lewis

[Keith]

What this article illuminates is the extreme difficulty of attacking with armor in the hedgrows. This applied to both sides. The attacker is channeled, the engagement ranges are very short, and the defender is well camoflauged.

At the time of the Lehr attack Das Reich was desperately trying to get to the front to do a coordinated attack. But fortunately for the Americans Das Reich arrived too late and launced equally futile, piecemeal attacks. The attacks of these two divisions was the best Rommel could manage in his attempt to drive to the invasion beaches. Subsequently all of his armor was commited to holding static defensive positions because there was insufficient infantry to hold the line.

[coe]

so anything info about german attacks

assuming both sides have trained infantry

but germans have the ratios in arms that

the allies usually enjoyed (i.e.

airpower, artillery, ammunition, etc.)