Bring out your dead!

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

So, what is the background we view the German performance in Normandy: the Allied operational goals or the German operational goals which did not coincide from the outset ?

How did the German forces stationed in the Normandy area perform ? They were not able to fullfil the task they were given. But can it be said they prevented the Allies from completing their operational task ? How did the Allied timetable hold against the German forces in the Normandy area (which did not include the startegic reserves stationed at Pas de Calais because the operational outlook did not take into account the fact that Pas de Calais was not in the Allied plan) ?

Later on the German goal was to perform a pull out from France while the Allied task was to utterly defeat the German army in the West. Were the Germans able to fulfill the goal ? Were the Allies ?

How do the Eastern Front developments figure in in all this ? Are they relevant ?<hr></blockquote>

Now, tero, I posed the questions to you first. But for your convenience, do not invoke the East Front as a side issue, or West Front overall strategy.

What I am asking, is that on an operational level (or even adding the tactical & grand tactical levels), did the Germans on the West Front always perform more effectively, regardless of the strategic end results? I'm not just talking about Normandy here.

To help refine the question as to account for the historic German operational failures, was it a case, even in these, that the Germans always had the inherent potential advantage, were it not for external circumstances (like interference from Hitler, lack of supplies, etc.)?

Or were there actual operational cases in which either the German planning was not good enough even in ideallic conditions, or that Allied countermoves were just better?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

Now, tero, I posed the questions to you first.

You did. But you did not define the parameters.

But for your convenience, do not invoke the East Front as a side issue, or West Front overall strategy.

You guys invoke these same grand strategic things all the time so why not me ?

did the Germans on the West Front always perform more effectively, regardless of the strategic end results? I'm not just talking about Normandy here.

Always ?

It has been suggested the Falaise Gap was an Allied fiasko as much as it was an Allied victory in that it failed in its ultimate goal of trapping the Germans due to personal clashes and ineffective use of assets rather than due to fierce resistance by the Germans keeping the Gap open. Were the Germans more effective than the Allies in this case ?

To help refine the question as to account for the historic German operational failures, was it a case, even in these, that the Germans always had the inherent potential advantage, were it not for external circumstances (like interference from Hitler, lack of supplies, etc.)?

Essentially what it boils down to is the question: what were the reasons the Germans failed the goals they set for themselves ? Did they fail the goals they set for themselves ? By the same token: did the Allies reach their goals on schedule and the way they had planned ?

Or were there actual operational cases in which either the German planning was not good enough even in ideallic conditions, or that Allied countermoves were just better?

You must define what "just better" entails ? You ruled out supply status for the Germans. Do you count them in for the Allies ?

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

You did. But you did not define the parameters. <hr></blockquote>

Allow some flexible thinking that you yourself can define or constraint these "parameters" at your option. It's perfectly valid, and provides a frame of reference to others on what your thinking is.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

You guys invoke these same grand strategic things all the time so why not me ? <hr></blockquote>

I've never invoked "grand strategic things" when I regarded such to be inappropriate for a comparison discussion, or if the scale is improper.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Always ? <hr></blockquote>

This is the point I'm leading you to; to see if you can allow for exceptions, or enough such exceptions exist as to nullify the presumption of a consistent German advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

It has been suggested the Falaise Gap was an Allied fiasko as much as it was an Allied victory in that it failed in its ultimate goal of trapping the Germans due to personal clashes and ineffective use of assets rather than due to fierce resistance by the Germans keeping the Gap open. Were the Germans more effective than the Allies in this case ?<hr></blockquote>

Sure, I would say overall that the Germans performed better than the Allies at Falaise during the "escape" phase, given that many cadres escaped than should've likely been the case. Then again, that the Germans allowed themselves to get pocketed in the first place, and then strafed & bombed into a near-mob, could be a whole added issue to discuss.

The lesson: If you are trying to make a case here one way or the other regarding this issue, it's best not to expect that one example alone will suffice. Andreas earlier reeled off an interesting set of examples that seem counter to your position, but that you haven't responded to.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Essentially what it boils down to is the question: what were the reasons the Germans failed the goals they set for themselves ? Did they fail the goals they set for themselves ? By the same token: did the Allies reach their goals on schedule and the way they had planned ? <hr></blockquote>

As I noted earlier, you yourself are capable of answering these questions and including the same in your response, so to help put your answer in context. The focus I was seeking from you, however, was on the initial points above concerning "failure to meet operational goals" based on decisions by German commanders.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

You must define what "just better" entails ? You ruled out supply status for the Germans. Do you count them in for the Allies ? <hr></blockquote>

No, I was talking about conduct & execution of operational plans with all other things being equal. And I didn't rule out "supply status" for the Germans. Recall that I had added the term "ideallic conditions"?

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: Spook ]</p>

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer:

And if you are really smart you find the most heavily defended spot and carpetbomb it.<hr></blockquote>

And what do you do when you don't have air superiority or a thousand bombers to spare?

Over-application of firepower was a real problem in many of the Normandy battles. The use of large quantities of strategic bombers to drop vast amounts of bombs in order to influence the tactical battle tended to produce the same sort of battlefields as the Western Front in WWI - cratered and difficult to move mechanised forces through.

From my reading of it, much better results were achieved with the use of continious tactical CAS - large numbers of fighter-bombers roaming the battlefield, attacking any enemy units that moved and the pockets of resistence which developed.

[edward_n_kelly]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Originally posted by tero:

But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.

Originally posted by CMplayer:

On a large scale, Normandy, El Alamein, hell the whole European theatre. You see, the Germans lost. They were dislodged from Germany at the end to use the word a bit more loosely.

<hr></blockquote>

CMPlayer your examples seem to fail the test.

Normandy was not a single actions ut a series of very large battles (including GOODWOOD, TOTALISE, COBRA to name but a few) that ground down the Germans ability to keep their defences manned, supplied and equipped until they eventually failed.

Similarly, El Alamein (and I assume you mean the SECOND Battle of El Alamein under Montgomery/Alexander) required several battles over the period of three or four weeks including at least one change of direction (rather than breakthrough - the original objective - they swung north to "crumble" the Axis forces defending the northern sector and to draw the Axis armour and mobile forces onto their (Allied) defences))

These were not "single" actions except at a strategic level. On the tactical or grand tactical (also known as "operational") levels these were a sustained "slog match" (rather like calling the "Hundred Days" one battle that lasted 3 months...)

Edward N Kelly

[Louie the Toad]

So after reading all of this, moving off and back onto the original topic, which I had to go back to in order to remember:

Would you say that fighting (extending the game)to the last man, when you know in your (commander's) heart that you would have withdrawn or surrendered ..... is gamey?

Wicked, wicked Toad

[Louie the Toad]

Getting back to the original topic, and based on everything we have read....

Do you think that fighting to the last man when in your heart of military hearts you know that as a responsible commander you should either surrender or retreat ...... is gamey ?

Wicked, wicked Toad

[Louie the Toad]

Sorry about the double post.

[Kallimakhos]

Going way back:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

When any given section of the defender's front is effectively suppressed by fire, heavy weapons are moved in closer opposite them. While they are heads-down, infantry maneuvers closer and swells the volume of fire on that area. Fire ascendency, not local odds, is the name of the game. The winner will be the side with heads up, firing, instead of down and ducking.

When the fire ascendency is heavy enough over one area, and the nearest creeping infantry is already very close - then and only then, will a last rush carry the forward infantry to grenade range. Not bayonet range, but grenade range yes. The grenades will then force the defenders out of their holes or kill them there.

<hr></blockquote>

Im not saying Jason is wrong, these a standard sound tactics, but the picture is oversimplified. Let's assume infantry defending an treeline against combined armes. Firs of all the defender has better concealment than attacker, who is in moving in the open, and can shoot at targets when the attacker must resort to area fire. Needles to say, CM doesn't yet modell this well enough. Defender can often also switch places unseen by the enemy once they are spotted, fire few shots, change again etc. Also artillery is more efficient against attackers in the open than defenders in their prepared positions. All of this initial face should mean comparably more attrition to the attacker.

Secondly we shouldn't assume that defender places all his forces on the MLR. In this kind of situation a good commander would a reserve a large part of his troops for a counterattack (my choise would be crack troops with SMG's ). So once part of the attackers troops get to the treeline, propably tired and spending good part of their ammo shooting at trees, they are attacked immediately in the woods, hopefully out of sight of the supporting tanks and machineguns. This the ultimate moment when the battle is decided, and of course it too can go any way.

All in all attacker really needs to get that ground and more importantly to keep it, so that they won't have to attack again, which would mean again more attrition to the attacker, or that they would have to do (oh no!) a manouverist flanking movement to avoid difficult terraine! As has been said, better ground means better odds in attrition, that's why taking ground is often important.

[Tero]

Allow some flexible thinking that you yourself can define or constraint these "parameters" at your option. It's perfectly valid, and provides a frame of reference to others on what your thinking is.

Which you in turn debunk and/or exclude according to your frame of reference. Your basic assupmtion, based on your frame of reference, is "of course the Allies performed better" whereas my basic assuption, according to my frame of reference, is "there were instances when the Germans performed better and there were instances when the Allies performed better".

I've never invoked "grand strategic things" when I regarded such to be inappropriate for a comparison discussion, or if the scale is improper.

You yourself said there were things that affected the flow events. I posed (what I think is) a fair question about the relevance of the simultaneous events on the Eastern Front when OKW/OKH level decisions are being examined. Anglo-American history writing seldom forgets to mention the effect the landings had on the events in the Eastern Front (Kursk and beyond) but when there should be similar paralles drawn the other way around no correlation is not readily recognised and/or admitted.

This is the point I'm leading you to; to see if you can allow for exceptions, or enough such exceptions exist as to nullify the presumption of a consistent German advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45.

You presume too much. My presumption is: there was no consistent ALLIED advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45.

Sure, I would say overall that the Germans performed better than the Allies at Falaise during the "escape" phase, given that many cadres escaped than should've likely been the case. Then again, that the Germans allowed themselves to get pocketed in the first place, and then strafed & bombed into a near-mob, could be a whole added issue to discuss.

That is a what-if you excluded by ruling out Hitlers meddling. I think it would have been an interesting option if instead of sending the forces from Calais to get butchered in Normandy they would have been deployed along the Seine or other appropriate place and the the Normandy perimeter would have been abandoned and a fighting retreat had been conducted towards the new prepared defensive line.

The lesson: If you are trying to make a case here one way or the other regarding this issue, it's best not to expect that one example alone will suffice. Andreas earlier reeled off an interesting set of examples that seem counter to your position, but that you haven't responded to.

The boss and wife keep bugging me. Something about the work and kids and other such trivialities.

He reeled out a number of examples and he rebutted my thesis. I'm gathering data so bear with me.

As I noted earlier, you yourself are capable of answering these questions and including the same in your response, so to help put your answer in context. The focus I was seeking from you, however, was on the initial points above concerning "failure to meet operational goals" based on decisions by German commanders.

At what level and in what scale ? The Normandy campaign was an Allied success culminating in the Falaise Pocket victory, right ? The operational goal was the annihilation of the German army in the West, righ ? The Germans avoided total annihilation due to Allied ineffective use of assets and personal beefs more than the German combat performance (ultimately ?), right ? At no point could the Germans counter the Allied superiority at any level or scale, right ?

The fact that the Germans could escape and regroup would indicate the Allies failed to meet their operational goal. Ergo, the Allies failed partially in the Normandy campaing to meet the operational objectives set down by the Allies themselves.

That makes me wonder if there were other instances when the Germans could outperform the Allies, if the scope and scale is appropriately set.

No, I was talking about conduct & execution of operational plans with all other things being equal.

Is the success or failure determined according to the Allied or German yardstick ? Also, is the only appropriate scale operational level ? If so, why ? Because at lower level I might have a case ?

And I didn't rule out "supply status" for the Germans. Recall that I had added the term "ideallic conditions"?

That is how I interpreted

were it not for external circumstances (like interference from Hitler, lack of supplies, etc.)?

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by edward_n_kelly:

These were not "single" actions except at a strategic level.<hr></blockquote>

That's why I said 'on a large scale'.

If you keep reading the thread, you'll see it's moved on from the comment you cited and others provided much better examples.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Brian:

From my reading of it, much better results were achieved with the use of continious tactical CAS .<hr></blockquote>

I agree. That comment was tongue in cheek. Thanks for the info though, I hadn't considered the craters hindering vehicles.

[Tero]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer:

I agree. That comment was tongue in cheek. Thanks for the info though, I hadn't considered the craters hindering vehicles.<hr></blockquote>

Consider this

http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/rocket.txt

[Brian]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer:

I agree. That comment was tongue in cheek. Thanks for the info though, I hadn't considered the craters hindering vehicles.<hr></blockquote>

I'm surprised. Every analysis I've read of Normandy has made that point about the use of strategic bombers.

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: Brian ]</p>

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

[qb]The operational goal was the annihilation of the German army in the West, righ ?<hr></blockquote>

I doubt that. AFAIK this only became the goal when the opportunity presented itself with the Mortain counter-offensive, i.e. relatively late in the war. The sudden collapse during the two weeks of August and September came as a total surprise, as can be seen by the airlanding operations that were planned and then cancelled because the ground forces had seized the dropzones. I think the operational goal was far more limited - establish a sustainable bridgehead on the continent, capture a large harbour, and undertake operations against Germany as are possible. Happy to be corrected on this though.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Allied timetable: reach the Seine by D+90. Reality: Seine reached by D+66.

I would argue the Germans did not handle themselves well on that one.

The issue is not that simple and clear cut. If you care to take a look at the Allied plan and their projected advance on D+35 you will find that they were behind schedule. By D+35 they should have been past Avrances and as far as St Nazaire but they hade barely cleared Lessay. Avranches was cleared by July 31st (D+55 ?). Things developed more rapidly after that because the German left flank was blown wide open and the Americans could stream out to the open country side and the Germans could not hold such a long continuous frontline. The Falaise pocked had formed by August 13th (D+68 ?).

German goal: delay allied advance across France by resistance behind water/terrain obstacles e.g. Somme.

Reality: they did not manage to, except in the Vosges.

Because they had expended all their reserves in trying to contain the Normandy beachhead.

German goal: destroy Allied spearheads (Mortain, Nancy)

Reality: both attempts by the Germans ended in utter defeat, and destruction of the German attacking force.

Was the Mortain attack really intended to destroy the spearhead more than a first step to take Avrances and seal the invasion force off from the open ground ?

I doubt that. AFAIK this only became the goal when the opportunity presented itself with the Mortain counter-offensive, i.e. relatively late in the war.

The sudden collapse during the two weeks of August and September came as a total surprise, as can be seen by the airlanding operations that were planned and then cancelled because the ground forces had seized the dropzones. I think the operational goal was far more limited - establish a sustainable bridgehead on the continent, capture a large harbour, and undertake operations against Germany as are possible.

The German flank blew wide open when Avranche was taken. If you take a look at the plan and compare it with the actual advance you can see that it was indeed an action brought on by the prevailing situation. BUT the Anglo-American history writing has compartmentalized the Normandy campaing all the way up to the Falaise pocket and its destruction, as if it was all planned that way. Now, if you are willing to accomadate changes in the Allied operational planning then I see no reason why the changing situation should not be allowed to affect the German planning and their execution.

All the way up to D+55 the Allies were behind schedule. Then within a few weeks they managed to take up the lost time and then some. The initial plan did indeed call for a sustainable bridgehead. But when the change in the plan was made the operational objective was the destruction of the German forces. And they failed to adcheive that goal even if the losses the Germans sustained were very serious indeed. The Germans on the other hand had failed in their operational goals, but (arguably) only after 55 days of hard fighting.

[Andreas]

End of the operation, even.

tero, you seem to be concluding that the Germans outperformed the Allies in Normandy because of Allied squabbling. That is an interesting jump in logic.

You initially asked for a single example of the Allies outfighting the Germans on the tactical level to a degree that they had to give up ground they did not want to give up. Instead of broadening the subject out as you do, thereby obscuring it, why don't we concentrate on four:

1. Totalize Phase I

2. Woensdrecht

3. Buron (as mentioned by Michael)

4. Walcheren

1. The Germans had no intention of giving up Bourgeubus Ridge. Simonds' idea of a night attack using tracked APCs instead of a frontal asault forced them out of this perfect defensive line. Never mind that Phase II did not go as well.

2. The Germans had no intention to give up Woensdrecht, because it was the lifeline into the Breskens pocket and to the South Beveland peninsula and Walcheren Island. They put von der Heydte and his paras in place there to keep it. The Canadians forced them out.

3. Buron - what Michael said.

4. The Germans had no intention of giving up Walcheren, but the combination of flooding the island (Simonds again), and a two-pronged attack across the channel to South Beveland and across the Scheldt forced their surrender. This one is a bit unfair in terms of tactical fighting, since the Germans really only folded because of the flooding. You may elect to drop this example.

Please note that the spectre of Bagration and/or the moustachioed one himself was not invoked in the making of this post.

I look forward to your comments.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Kallimakhos:

Secondly we shouldn't assume that defender places all his forces on the MLR.

IIRC the German defensive positions facing Goodwood were 15 km deep.

All in all attacker really needs to get that ground and more importantly to keep it, so that they won't have to attack again, which would mean again more attrition to the attacker, or that they would have to do (oh no!) a manouverist flanking movement to avoid difficult terraine! As has been said, better ground means better odds in attrition, that's why taking ground is often important.

An interesting comparison: the Allied casualties were almost 100% KIA and WIA while the German casualties were KIA, WIA and captured. The number of KIA and WIA for the Allies and for the Germans are almost the same in any engagement or operation. If the POW are disregarded and we look at the "pure" combat casualties we find the combat kill to loss ratio for the (atritionist ?) Allies is virtually the same (or worse) as for the (manouverist ?) Germans. What has brought up the Allied casualtie ratio is the huge numbers of captured Germans who are not combat casualties technically speaking.

[ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[Andreas]

You posted while I wrote.

tero - I am not interested in Anglo-American history writing and how they try to make the facts fit the bill. Yes there are cases where they failed abysmally, operationally and tactically and I am the first to acknowledge that (again, dig up that post by me regarding Meijel). Alternatively taking Caen on D-Day or first battle for Cristot anyone? That was not your point though, if I may remind you. You asked specifically for 'one' example where the Germans were forced out of a position they intended to hold. I gave you several. Discuss

Regarding the failure of the Allied time-table - as Moltke said, no plan survives contact with the enemy. The Germans achieved the delay by feeding in the reinforcements that they could instead have used to conduct a fighting withdrawal across France (something they later did very successfully in the Netherlands). Since these forces were only available once, that meant that once they were put into the grinder, and failed to achieve success, the way would be wide open. One could argue that Montgomery's failure in planning was to assume that sane military thinking (trading space for time/forces) would prevail over 'hold at all costs'. It did not, and the consequence was a brutal slog and a battle of attrition lasting two months, followed by an astonishing collapse lasting two weeks.

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

What has brought up the Allied casualtie ratio is the huge numbers of captured Germans who are not combat casualties technically speaking.<hr></blockquote>

Cough cough - excuse me. I believe that this would be news to German staff officers who had to replace these guys. At the time, I am sure they were listed MIA, as everyone else.

Situation: a fortified hamlet has been by-passed by an Commonwealth force in the night. Come dawn, the Commonwealth force (say 250 men altogether) attacks the hamlet, which is held by infantry (say 250 men), with a combined arms attack. Tanks shoot the place up, artillery rains down on it, the infantry closes in. For the sake of the argument, let's assume that KIA/WIA are roughly similar (50 each). After an hour or so, 200 Germans surrender. Are these men combat casualties or not? Discuss

Mind you, the Allied wounded will return to battle (except for the seriously wounded and maimed) within, say, one day to six months. The German wounded won't, no matter how lightly WIA they are. Also, the 200 still combat capable Allies move on to the next objective.

Allied attrition:

short-term: 50

medium-term: 30

long term: 15

German attrition:

250

Which force would you rather be commanding?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

tero, you seem to be concluding that the Germans outperformed the Allies in Normandy because of Allied squabbling. That is an interesting jump in logic.

That is actually an idea you put into my head with your stories of mismanagent and poor relations between the Allied commanders at the most critical time when the Allies could have removed the last serious obstacle between themselves and the Rhine. The performance of the German formations along the lenght of the campaign is irrelevant and had nothing to do with it, the Allies shot themselves in the foot. Right ?

An überFinn parallel: the Soviet assault in the summer of 1944 bears the same marks as the Normandy invasion. It started in the 10th of June (as per Stalins promise to Churchill and Roosevelt about a simultaneous operation to distract the Germans). What was done differently was the fact that instead of feeding in reinforcements into the breach piece meal the Finnish high command gathered a defensive force some distance (~100 km) behind the frontline and the troops on the spot fought a rear guar action in effort to slow down and attrit the Soviet hordes. The Soviets took in 10 days what had taken them 105 days to take during Winter War. What happened then was they slammed into the Finnish defensive positions in the place our high command had picked. The Soviet assault got stopped and it ground to a halt by mid July. The Soviets botched up the timing of a secondary attack to tie up Finnish reserves north of Lake Ladoga.

I'll have to look up the stats so I can pick an Western Allied operation of the same order of maginitude.

You initially asked for a single example of the Allies outfighting the Germans on the tactical level to a degree that they had to give up ground they did not want to give up. Instead of broadening the subject out as you do, thereby obscuring it,

Actually, invoking the operational level is not my idea at all.

Never mind that Phase II did not go as well.

That is like saying "we won at half time, never mind the opponents scored a few more goals than we did during the second half".

And this is exactly the kind of douple standard I abhor. Is it OK to disregard the less than excellent performance for the Allies but not OK to include better than average to poor performance for the Germans.

4.This one is a bit unfair in terms of tactical fighting, since the Germans really only folded because of the flooding. You may elect to drop this example.

No reason to exclude it.

Please note that the spectre of Bagration and/or the moustachioed one himself was not invoked in the making of this post.

Duely noted.

I look forward to your comments.

I'll look up some places where the Germans faired a bit better than in your selection. Or can you cite some off the top of your head ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Cough cough - excuse me.

You are excused.

You better go to the doctors if that cough of yours gets any worse.

I believe that this would be news to German staff officers who had to replace these guys. At the time, I am sure they were listed MIA, as everyone else.

True. But that is not quite the issue here. Think of it in CM game terms.

If we look at the combat performance cost effectiness if you will the German and the Allied casualties in terms of KIA and WIA being practically the same but the Allies expending more ordnance there are some questions that need answering. Like: Howcome, for all their firepower, do the Allies sustain similar casualties as their less lavishly endowed opponents ?

Situation: a fortified hamlet has been by-passed by an Commonwealth force in the night. Come dawn, the Commonwealth force (say 250 men altogether) attacks the hamlet, which is held by infantry (say 250 men), with a combined arms attack. Tanks shoot the place up, artillery rains down on it, the infantry closes in. For the sake of the argument, let's assume that KIA/WIA are roughly similar (50 each). After an hour or so, 200 Germans surrender. Are these men combat casualties or not? Discuss

In my view they are not combat casualties as such, they are strategic casualties.

How long is the Allied advance delayed and how does it affect the events that follow ?

Mind you, the Allied wounded will return to battle (except for the seriously wounded and maimed) within, say, one day to six months. The German wounded won't, no matter how lightly WIA they are. Also, the 200 still combat capable Allies move on to the next objective.

How many actions before the Allied formation runs out of infantry (for all intents and purposes) and can not keep up the operations and as a result more than 20 000 German troops evade capture ?

Also, did it ever occur instances when the German defenders evade in small groups and later rejoin their parent unit (I honestly don't know) ?

[Ligur]

Hello! Sorry if I break your discussion for one post, but I want to say something on the original topic:

CM is a game and as long as I have to play 60 second rounds, without the big picture happening around me, I don't WANT to play realistic battles in the sense that realistic = normal in the WW2 field. I don't want to pass on tanks on nine battles out of ten because they were rare. I don't want bad troops because there were lots of them and far fewer vetarans. I don't want to play an "average WW2 battle" that would make some twisted purist scream with delight. I don't want to pull back in a QB and tell my friend I will "withdraw and return tomorrow with some SP-guns" because I suffered 10% losses in the initial advance. Indeed I am gamey for wanting to fight after such losses but my friend would be quite baffled otherwise =)

PS. Of course, seeing King Tigers in every game is not fun either but gaming is not supposed to be dull. CM is a good engine for intense tactical fights that tend to be decisive! Yay!

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

That is actually an idea you put into my head with your stories of mismanagent and poor relations between the Allied commanders at the most critical time when the Allies could have removed the last serious obstacle between themselves and the Rhine. The performance of the German formations along the lenght of the campaign is irrelevant and had nothing to do with it, the Allies shot themselves in the foot. Right ? <hr></blockquote>

Yes pretty much, except it is not the campaign, it is the operation to close the gap that counted, and 1st Canadian Army messed it up. Of course if the Germans had just adopted the 'tickle my belly, aren't I a cute puppy' position instead of continuing to fight or flee this would have been irrelevant. But it does not mean that the Germans 'outperformed' the Allies here. They were just incredibly lucky. Read the passage on the battle in 'The South Albertas' - the sense of frustration that must have raged with the lower ranks is palpable.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

That is like saying "we won at half time, never mind the opponents scored a few more goals than we did during the second half".

And this is exactly the kind of douple standard I abhor. Is it OK to disregard the less than excellent performance for the Allies but not OK to include better than average to poor performance for the Germans.<hr></blockquote>

It is not a double standard. The important thing about Totalize was to get through Bourgeubus Ridge. This they did. From there the next good defensive position was the high ground overlooking Falaise, and the south bank of the Laize River, IIRC. Breaking through to Falaise was the order, but they did not manage. It would be great to have taken that ground too, but the main thing was to get through the defense in depth that Rommel had set up. In the tactical engagements fought on the day, the Germans lost. In those on the next day, they did better.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

I'll look up some places where the Germans faired a bit better than in your selection. Or can you cite some off the top of your head ?<hr></blockquote>

Hürtgenwald, Arnhem (clearly the Germans in Arnhem outgeneralled the command of 1st Airborne and XXX Corps/2nd Army), Meijel, initial Ardennes, Herrlisheim (where what amounted to two men and a dog captured the better part of a green US tank battalion).

[Spook]

I'm going to end the "twenty questions" between us, tero, because I wasn't looking for a verbal game of dodgeball. What I wanted for you to do, instead of dodge with questions, was commit or clarify what you had seemed to assert as an earlier stance.

In effect, you had posed a statement that inferred that the Germans, on a consistent basis, had an inherent advantage in conducting military operations over the western Allies. In fact, its inference seemed as such that the western Allies never were able to defeat the Germans, in a deliberate battle, in a way as unanticipated by the Germans. That is what I was seeking for you to either commit to, or clarify; or even qualify as to recognize exceptions to this inferred position.

If you don't think that you were giving such an impression, then why are added posters like Andreas posing the kinds of questions that they are? What Andreas is posting, in his own way, is driving at the same things as I am. You gave the impression that you had "fixated" again, presuming an inherent German military superiority in conducting military operations on the West Front, regardless of timeframe, circumstances, or even of the command skills that the Allies could have.

And don't cite for me to define "consistent" for you. We went through all that in a separate discussion months ago.

One response of yours is getting closer to an answer, though:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

You presume too much. My presumption is: there was no consistent ALLIED advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45.<hr></blockquote>

News flash: I don't presume that either. Under a given set of circumstances, the Germans could, and did, have the upper hand. See. I made allowance for that. I'm not so nationalistic as to seek the suppression of giving each protagonist of WWII its proper historical due.

All of my earlier exercise was trying to see if you in turn could make similar allowance for the Allies. Because again, an earlier post of yours gave the inferrence that the Germans were always "in control" of events on the operational level, or that they couldn't be defeated in an unanticipated way.