Bring out your dead!

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

If you are smart you look for the undefended or lightly defended spot, not the most heavily defended spot. <hr></blockquote>

And if you are really smart you find the most heavily defended spot and carpetbomb it.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

On a large scale, Normandy, El Alamein, hell the whole European theatre. You see, the Germans lost.

SFW ? Stick to the subject and scale at hand.

They were dislodged from Germany at the end to use the word a bit more loosely.

That was a ripple effect. One position had to be abandoned and the rest had to abandoned even if the positions could have been held. El Alamein is a single battle, Normandy is referred to as campaign. The one time, single battle collapses are few and far between.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

That was a ripple effect. One position had to be abandoned and the rest had to abandoned even if the positions could have been held. El Alamein is a single battle, Normandy is referred to as campaign. The one time, single battle collapses are few and far between.<hr></blockquote>

I really don't understand your point. Anywhere that the Allies penetrated an important defensive line would be a case of combined arms tactics achieving a significant collapse, from the smallest scale to the largest.

Anyway, time to get back to the daily drudgery. It's been fun sparring with you T-row. I grant you know a lot more than me, but yer also a stubborn crazy Finn!

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

My reasoning would go like this, and feel free to rip it apart.

Premises:

*Marching fire was not doctrine.

*Marching fire was tried out anyway.

*After being tried out it was implemented with increasing frequency (esp. in the 3'rd army).

Conclusion:

*Marching fire was regarded as effective by the commanders on location where it was being used.

Perhaps. But not by all US Army commanding officers. And there were armies which never used it.

And a lot of good it did to the Americans in the Hürtgen forest.

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.<hr></blockquote>

Totalize; Epsom

D-Day itself, since I never heard of any plans by Adolf to withdraw from th position.

After Normandy:

Operations:

Veritable; Blockbuster; Market Garden; Plunder; Grenade; Switchback

Places:

Woensdrecht; Walcheren (Scheldt battles); Aachen; Breskens pocket (Festung Schelde Sued); Vosges

Do you want me to go on? Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so?

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

I really don't understand your point. Anywhere that the Allies penetrated an important defensive line would be a case of combined arms tactics achieving a significant collapse, from the smalles t scale to the largest.

It is a question of timeframe. Yes, the allies broke through the defences. But it was a process of erroding them with attrition, not taking the positions by storm. And it took months, not the 60mins in the CM timeframe. The Germans could contain the beachhead but not indefinitely. And they could not annihilate it. The Allies could not inflict casualties in proportion to the fire power used (bang for the buck). When the damn burst the Germans had to pull back to save what they can, even from sectors that could have held the positions against the attacks.

Take the Falaise Cap. The Germans held the corridor open as long as they needed and could. Then, and only then did the defenders of the cap widraw. No matter what kind of a pressure the Allies excerted they could not close the cap = dislodge the defenders from their positions.

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so?

That is not my intention. The widrawals were not by no means voluntary. But were there cases when the widrawal was dictated by other reasons than tactical situation on that particular spot ? Were there cases when the Germans retreated despite still having enough assets to continue holding on to the positions after having done so for some time ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

And if you are really smart you find the most heavily defended spot and carpetbomb it.

That did not work too good. You had to use ground troops instead. Look it up.

[Sergei]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

I think the attack was supposedly made by stragler regular troops. IIRC they were dressed like regulars.<hr></blockquote>

Yes, now that I think about it... my point was that it didn't happen (ambush of convoy & rape of lotta-women) in reality at the same time; author used a similar case from later in the war, where partisans were involved.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

The widrawals were not by no means voluntary. But were there cases when the widrawal was dictated by other reasons than tactical situation on that particular spot ? Were there cases when the Germans retreated despite still having enough assets to continue holding on to the positions after having done so for some time ?<hr></blockquote>

Okay I just have to jump in one more time. If the Germans were forced, for tactical reasons, to abandon a spot that _locally_ they could have held, the tactical reason must be that they had _lost_ some other vital spot. For example, a unit is holding out just fine, but its withdrawal route is in danger of being cut off, so it has to pull out before being surrounded. So behind that decision to tactically withdraw, something, somewhere -- something important -- must have been 'taken'. Or am I just unbelievably stupid for believing the Germans were defeated and didn't just decide to sacrifice their armed forces in a giant fireworks show?

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by CMplayer:

[qb]And if you are really smart you find the most heavily defended spot and carpetbomb it.

That did not work too good. You had to use ground troops instead. Look it up. [/QB]<hr></blockquote>

I know about that. But in Normandy the problem was that after the fratricide the assault was delayed 24 hrs which let the shock effect pretty much wear off. The effect being that the timing of the 'combined arms' effect was disrupted.

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Andreas:

[qb]Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so?

That is not my intention. The widrawals were not by no means voluntary. But were there cases when the widrawal was dictated by other reasons than tactical situation on that particular spot ? Were there cases when the Germans retreated despite still having enough assets to continue holding on to the positions after having done so for some time ?[/QB]<hr></blockquote>

This is a circular argument - if the Germans had had the assets they would have stayed. They would have denied the landings, and any further advances. They did not, and in particular situations their assets did not suffice to withstand an orchestrated, well-executed attack, so they had to go. This is where the operational and strategic links into the tactical. They were beaten at these places tactically, and all these tactical losses combined to become operational and strategic loss. They were outmaneuvered during the 'Swan' across northern France (otherwise Antwerp would never have fallen so easily), and they were beaten in very brutal battles of attrition in the Scheldt and the Rhineland, while they in their turn did beat the US in the Huertgenwald.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

Or am I just unbelievably stupid for believing the Germans were defeated and didn't just decide to sacrifice their armed forces in a giant fireworks show?

You are not stupid.

But how much did Hitler and his idiotic commands affect the flow of events ? He was willing (and eventually determined) to sacrifice the armed forces in a giant fireworks show.

The Germans were defeated. But that is beside the point if you look at the events at the pure tactical level.

The argument "the Germans lost the war, 'nuff said" does not carry very far. Yes, the lost the war. But that is irrelevant when things are being examined at this level. You simply can not take some aspects from one level and other aspects from another level and combine them without taking into account what you are combining. Yes, the strategic aspects played a part in the tactical level but where does one draw the limit ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

They did not, and in particular situations their assets did not suffice to withstand an orchestrated, well-executed attack, so they had to go.

Assuming the attacks were orchestrated and well-executed. You listed the Allied high water marks. What about the low water marks ? There are the operations when the Allied effort was botched up good even before the troops crossed the line of departure. And cases when the Allied effort was not enough to break the deadlock despite their superiority.

This is where the operational and strategic links into the tactical. They were beaten at these places tactically, and all these tactical losses combined to become operational and strategic loss.

Indeed. But which is the predominant trend in a multi-month operation: the drone of the operations that fail or the flashes when the operation succeeds ?

They were outmaneuvered during the 'Swan' across northern France (otherwise Antwerp would never have fallen so easily), and they were beaten in very brutal battles of attrition in the Scheldt and the Rhineland, while they in their turn did beat the US in the Huertgenwald.

Interestingly enough Hürtgen is one of the "forgotten ones" in the history of WWII. I wonder why..... and if there are others that have been overshadowed by the more illustrious victories and defeats.

[Andreas]

If you look at single events, you would be right. But since arguably all these discrete events are in reality affected by others, and in turn affect them, you have to look at the strategic level. But even so, in the majority of actions, viewed from a purely tactical perspective, following Normandy, the Germans were resoundingly defeated, either by maneuver, or by attrition. There are a few actions where they won, but they are not many.

Regarding the Falaise Gap, I would be interested in sources for your claim that the Germans had an organised defense that could choose to hold or withdraw. Reality was that they had no such thing. The gap was help open because the Canadian 1st Army (in particular 3rd Infantry, 4th Armoured and 1st Polish Armoured) failed to close it, because of inability to control the battle. The Canadian blocking force was too weak in infantry to close the gap. The Germans swamped them with numbers at night, and got a lot of guys out. The only organised attempt was the attack on the Poles sitting on the Mace from outside the gap, but that was about all, and did not achieve its objective.

The real action happened at St. Lambert, and if you read the memoirs of von Luck, or even that old storyteller Meier, it will be clear that no organised resistance happened there after probably August 20th, and very little beforehand. If the Canadian command had not failed abjectly, or if Monty and Bradley had been a bit clearer with each other who is responsible for what, the Germans would never have escaped in numbers. Again, they were soundly beaten by the time of the gap, on the tactical and operational level.

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Assuming the attacks were orchestrated and well-executed. You listed the Allied high water marks. What about the low water marks ? There are the operations when the Allied effort was botched up good even before the troops crossed the line of departure. And cases when the Allied effort was not enough to break the deadlock despite their superiority. <hr></blockquote>

Which ones were those? The Allies eventually managed to break all the deadlocks. It did not go smoothly or from victory to victory, but win they did. A good example is Woensdrecht, where one day the Canadian Black Watch was annihilated, but a day or two later, the RHLI against the same defenders broke through. Another example is the Leopoldkanal battle where the Canadians managed to secure the bridgehead across the canal but became pinned, and could only make headway when the flank landing on the eastern side of the pocket had taken place. Clearly in that case it needed maneuver (an additional landing) to get on with the job.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Indeed. But which is the predominant trend in a multi-month operation: the drone of the operations that fail or the flashes when the operation succeeds ?<hr></blockquote>

The Scheldt battle lasted almost two months. The Rhineland battles lasted about two months. Clearing the Maas/Overloon salient took weeks. There were multiple setbacks in these battles, but at the end of the day each of the campaigns ended with an Allied victory and the destruction of most of the German defenders. In most cases the total destruction was Hitler's fault, but the failure of the defense had taken place beforehand. Especially in the Rhineland, the Germans occupied good and sound defensive positions, and it took hard fighting to root them out. But rooted out they were.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Interestingly enough Hürtgen is one of the "forgotten ones" in the history of WWII. I wonder why..... and if there are others that have been overshadowed by the more illustrious victories and defeats. <hr></blockquote>

Well I have not, and I have posted another one here a few days ago, in a thread called 'Clearing the west bank of the Maas'. 47th Panzerkorps against 7th US Armoured at Meijel. I also think that Huertgen has not totally been forgotten - it just does not capture the imagination as the Ardennes do.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Andreas:

But since arguably all these discrete events are in reality affected by others, and in turn affect them, you have to look at the strategic level.

If it were possible the best indicator would be to follow individual companies, battalions and regiments throughout the campaign. That way the strategic events and the tactical events and how they affect the flow events could be separated and examined.

And quite unsurprisingly what I am conditioned to expect as that is the approach Finnish military history has been taking.

But even so, in the majority of actions, viewed from a purely tactical perspective, following Normandy, the Germans were resoundingly defeated, either by maneuver, or by attrition.

There are a few actions where they won, but they are not many.

What is victory, actually ? If a unit is detailed to hold the position for a determined period of time and it manages that and after that the unit conducts a successful widrawal is the action a victory or a defeat for the defender ? IMO being able to fulfill a given task is one criteria when success is determined.

Reality was that they had no such thing. The gap was help open because the Canadian 1st Army (in particular 3rd Infantry, 4th Armoured and 1st Polish Armoured) failed to close it, because of inability to control the battle. The Canadian blocking force was too weak in infantry to close the gap. The Germans swamped them with numbers at night, and got a lot of guys out. The only organised attempt was the attack on the Poles sitting on the Mace from outside the gap, but that was about all, and did not achieve its objective.

Why then the version (floated also by Anglo-American sources) where the gap was held open by "gallant" efforts of the German troops at the bottle neck ?

Again, they were soundly beaten by the time of the gap, on the tactical and operational level.

What do you attribute the subsequent recovery to: Allied resupply problems and inability to continue offensive operations or active German efforts to shore up the troops ?

[Andreas]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Why then the version (floated also by Anglo-American sources) where the gap was held open by "gallant" efforts of the German troops at the bottle neck ? <hr></blockquote>

Err, because that makes better press than saying 'we had them, but because we were stupid and incapable at commanding our troops, we let them get away'?

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

What do you attribute the subsequent recovery to: Allied resupply problems and inability to continue offensive operations or active German efforts to shore up the troops ?<hr></blockquote>

Allied euphoria, and inability to grasp the opportunity presenting them. When the tanks of 11th Armoured were ordered to 'rest and refit' in Antwerp they had enough petrol to go through to Woensdrecht and cut off South Beveland and the retreat of 15th Army. If they had done that, the German forces in Holland would have collapsed (15th Army GHQ was instrumental in organising the forces into resistance), a bridgehead over the Rhine would have been possible, outflanking the Westwall (probably without Market Garden), Antwerp would have been freed for supplies six to eight weeks earlier, and the war would have been over before Christmas. Simplistically said. But yes, worries about supply levels, lack of clear instructions, failure to realise that the Germans are not beaten until they are really beaten, all that conspired in those days in early September.

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas:

Allied euphoria, and inability to grasp the opportunity presenting them. When the tanks of 11th Armoured were ordered to 'rest and refit' in Antwerp they had enough petrol to go through to Woensdrecht and cut off South Beveland and the retreat of 15th Army. If they had done that, the German forces in Holland would have collapsed (15th Army GHQ was instrumental in organising the forces into resistance), a bridgehead over the Rhine would have been possible, outflanking the Westwall (probably without Market Garden), Antwerp would have been freed for supplies six to eight weeks earlier, and the war would have been over before Christmas. Simplistically said. But yes, worries about supply levels, lack of clear instructions, failure to realise that the Germans are not beaten until they are really beaten, all that conspired in those days in early September.<hr></blockquote>

Bingo. Much is made on how Market-Garden was undone due to the unanticipated presence of II SS Panzer Corps. But in manpower terms alone, the two SS panzer divisions didn't have much more than 7,000 at start.

That the 15th Army had escaped the Scheldt and was able to reinforce all along the advance corridor was as much, if not more, of a factor in bringing about Market-Garden's failure. In fact, Allied manpower problems to hold all of the ground that was won up to Nijmegen caused Monty to ask for the two US airborne divisions to remain "fielded" there for at least another month.

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Andreas:

Totalize; Epsom

D-Day itself, since I never heard of any plans by Adolf to withdraw from th position.

After Normandy:

Operations:

Veritable; Blockbuster; Market Garden; Plunder; Grenade; Switchback

Places:

Woensdrecht; Walcheren (Scheldt battles); Aachen; Breskens pocket (Festung Schelde Sued); Vosges

Do you want me to go on? Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so?<hr></blockquote>

Add the second battle of Buron, during CHARNWOOD. HLI cleared 2nd Battalion, 25th SS Panzergrenadiers out of Buron despite their refusal to give ground.

[Spook]

Truth speaking, tero, I'm having difficulty following your presently argued point.

Are you saying that on an operational level, the Germans, when fighting the western allies, were consistently able to define the "tempo" of operations? Meaning that the Germans were almost always able to attack, defend, delay, or withdraw on the terms most favorable to them?

Take note -- I'm not citing the old "the Allies won, the Germans lost" canard, so let's leave that aside. And let's not divert into comparing against relative successes & failures of the Allies.

Rather, the question remains in specific: on the grand-tactical or operational levels (divsion, corps, or army), were the Germans always able to maintain a sufficient advantage on the West Front?

[The_Capt]

OOOoooo! Good question.

Was the Western Front won by attrition or manouevre?

I would argue that one can win at the tactical but be defeated at the strtegic. YET can one lose the Operational and still win at the Strategic or vice versa (yet strong arguments can be made that you can always lose despite the best of conditions)?

[Tero]

Originally posted by Spook:

Truth speaking, tero, I'm having difficulty following your presently argued point.

You are not alone.

Are you saying that on an operational level, the Germans, when fighting the western allies, were consistently able to define the "tempo" of operations? Meaning that the Germans were almost always able to attack, defend, delay, or withdraw on the terms most favorable to them?

In short: who had the initiative (locally) ? Lets reverse the question: how many times were the Germans forced to react without a chance or ability to counter the Allied move ? How many times could they foil the Allied timetable enought to be able to recover and counter attack and organize defences or a retreat ?

Take note -- I'm not citing the old "the Allies won, the Germans lost" canard, so let's leave that aside. And let's not divert into comparing against relative successes & failures of the Allies.

I'm game.

Rather, the question remains in specific: on the grand-tactical or operational levels (divsion, corps, or army), were the Germans always able to maintain a sufficient advantage on the West Front?

Depends what is "sufficient advantage". I would have to say no if the advantage means ability to fulfill strategic goals.

But then again the question is loaded as it does not take into account operational goals. What were they at various times during 1944/45 ? In Normandy the goal was to foil the invasion. Except the grand strategy of Hitler was following was expecting the main invasion in the Pas de Calais and every operational move was geared to that goal. When that avenue proved to be a dead end it was too late to squash the beachhead in Normandy.

So, what is the background we view the German performance in Normandy: the Allied operational goals or the German operational goals which did not coincide from the outset ?

How did the German forces stationed in the Normandy area perform ? They were not able to fullfil the task they were given. But can it be said they prevented the Allies from completing their operational task ? How did the Allied timetable hold against the German forces in the Normandy area (which did not include the startegic reserves stationed at Pas de Calais because the operational outlook did not take into account the fact that Pas de Calais was not in the Allied plan) ?

Later on the German goal was to perform a pull out from France while the Allied task was to utterly defeat the German army in the West. Were the Germans able to fulfill the goal ? Were the Allies ?

How do the Eastern Front developments figure in in all this ? Are they relevant ?

[Spook]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by The_Capt:

OOOoooo! Good question.

Was the Western Front won by attrition or manouevre?

I would argue that one can win at the tactical but be defeated at the strtegic. YET can one lose the Operational and still win at the Strategic or vice versa (yet strong arguments can be made that you can always lose despite the best of conditions)?<hr></blockquote>

Hey, good to see you in here too, Capt. You've had pretty good takes in earlier "attrition vs. maneuver" debates.

Here's one "fuzzy" way in which I think the western Allies used "maneuver" to defeat the Germans: the air echelon. Months prior to D-Day, the US/UK air forces had operated to set things up as to help "paralyze" the ability of the Germans to react, to reinforce, and to resupply.

There is a more recent backlash on the effects of tactical airpower; most notably about earlier claims of destroying German armored vehicles being too inflated. And the Germans were still able to bring up troops and supplies (aided by the poor weather in June). What is still inarguable, however, is that Allied air interdiction significantly impeded the Germans on the operational level. Bridges were dropped, rails were cut, communications were hampered, and march columns were strafed. Had the German Luftwaffe been able to apply a comparable level of effect on the Allies in their beachhead, much about the campaign's course would've been significantly altered. Heck, pushing the Allies back into the Channel might've then been a possibility.

And that was pretty much the setting of the West Front from Normandy on into Germany: Allied tactical air was more persavive, and with relative Allied air superiority, had a more free hand to operate. (A key exception, unfortunately, was Market-Garden.)

Now, airpower wasn't the most prominent factor that helped the Allies to win the West Front, of course. To claim so is an injustice to the ground forces that engaged the Germans more directly. And the western Allies had a number of other reasons for their improved abilities in operational warfare. But I regard airpower's effect to had been more prominent in supporting the Allies' ability to "maneuver" (if nothing else, just helping to "paralyze" German movements) than for helping in attrition.

[Andreas]

Allied timetable: reach the Seine by D+90.

Reality: Seine reached by D+66.

I would argue the Germans did not handle themselves well on that one.

German goal: delay allied advance across France by resistance behind water/terrain obstacles e.g. Somme.

Reality: they did not manage to, except in the Vosges.

German goal: destroy Allied spearheads (Mortain, Nancy)

Reality: both attempts by the Germans ended in utter defeat, and destruction of the German attacking force.