Bring out your dead!

[Slapdragon]

Attrition

Attrition vs Manuever

The second thread is probably the better of the two.

[Spook]

Getting back to some of your earlier comments, Jason:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

As for Normandy, no the Germans did not run out of defensible terrain. The terrain through which Cobra succeeded, as far as Avranches, was no different than that through which they fought in July. The Germans ran out of defenders, and especially out of defending tanks. Their AFV strength was down to 1/4 of the late June levels by the time of the breakout, while the Allies had been building up strength ashore, and holding several US armor divisions out of the battle. The armor ratio in the whole theater swung from around 2:1 in late June, to more like 5:1 by the begining of Cobra (at 10:1 after Mortain).<hr></blockquote>

Actually, Jason, you are indeed the most correct in this assessment of the Normandy breakout, because the US forces didn't really "break out" from the bocage terrain after reaching St. Lo; in fact, a good portion of bocage was still further south. But given that German armor was comparably limited in effectiveness in the bocage (as were Allied tanks until the "rhino" mod), citing armor ratios alone wouldn't tell enough concerning the US sector. It also was the greater depth of US infantry manpower, larger artillery ammo stocks and better fire control, a highly motorized logistics echelon, and the aerial interdiction also available "in depth" that contributed to the German collapse on the US front as comparable factors to armor availability ratios.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

It was the logic of attrition, not any change in terrain, that led to the eventual success. Which is the same story you will find for most of the Russian successes, regardless of terrain. Only defenders with poor doctrine, in the early war, lost significant breakthrough battles without being attrited first. <hr></blockquote>

Attrition was a core factor to the Normandy campaign's initial battles, but alone doesn't account for the Allies' final success. Along with the issues I noted earlier must also be added the improved combined-arms tactics, particulary tank-infantry cooperation, which isn't normally addressed by attrition as a sub-factor.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Incidentally, the same logic of combined arms attack was used by the Germans in North Africa, and by both sides on the Russian steppe, successfully. Without any supposed inability to do so because the ground was open. And no, attacking dug in MGs by infantry advance in heavy snow is not equivalent to all fighting in the open..<hr></blockquote>

Steve's example wasn't presumed to consider all conditions of attacking in the open. But per his description, I think it was sufficiently representative of the potential hazards to open attack by infantry.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

As for the supposed inability of Shermans to fight German tanks without close terrain, several historical cases show it to be innaccurate. Notably the fighting around Celles at the tip of the Bulge, which was comparatively open ground. CM scale fights make front armor plates look more useful than they actually are in relatively open cases, because the bottomless pits on either side prevent flanking shots. <hr></blockquote>

I've gotten flank shots onto German uber-tanks plenty of times in CM scenarios, so the notion that CM games "heighten" the value of frontal armor isn't always consistent. It is, of course, terrain-dependent, force-dependent, & situation-dependent.

And the notion that expanded ranges for flanking the better German tanks will make them more vulnerable isn't always consistent either. Greater ranges can also mean lower hit chances and lower shell velocities when reaching the target. It all depends.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

Better guns and armor help certainly, but they are by no means magic bullets. If they were, the Tigers, Elephants, and Panthers available to the Germans from Kursk to the end of 1943, fighting on the open steppe of the Ukraine, would have proved decisive. Instead, that is the precise period and location of the decisive battles of the war, which the Russians won with T-34/76s. Attacking. In the open.<hr></blockquote>

Or perhaps it was that the Soviets could mass manpower more effectively in a given sector than the Germans, had the ascendancy in aerial interdiction, and far greater numbers of artillery per km of frontage by the time of the "decisive battles"?

In due respect, trying to talk in terms of armor alone is not going to provide resolution to an "attrition vs. maneuver" debate.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>

The maneuverist theology is constructed around the belief that frontal anything, and especially frontal anything over open ground, is always suicidal and stupid. The fact that many historical examples defy this orthodoxy is simply not admitted at all. From numerous cases in WW II, to Ridgeway in Korea, to the success of the Marine attack up the coast in the Gulf.

The school bases this dogma on persistent and sometimes deliberate confusion, of "attack" with "charging", citing every case of a suicidal charge as evidence that intelligent frontal attacks, delivered by coordinated firepower not headstrong bludgeoning maneuver, are supposedly unsound. Which is related to the cult of the offensive, a view of ground warfare primarily in terms of ground controlled, the ascendency of the maneuver arms over artillery and "supporting" fires (even terminologically relegated to a secondary status), and similar one-side distortions.

It is relatively easier to kill defenders easily seen and without significant forms of cover, and relatively easier to coordinate all the various capabilities of combined arms, in wide open terrain (like desert or steppe), than in close forests, mountains, or cities.

Attackers always require a preponderance of firepower, whatever the maneuverists say. And if they have it - even modestly - 3:2 or 2:1 is quite sufficient, not 5 ot 10 to 1 - then an intelligent use of it can win battles by destroying the defenders, by attrition processes. 5 and 10 to 1 odds may be needed to run defenders off their feet with a single maneuver rush, but that only shows that such rushes are usually not very effective to begin with. Such odds are not needed to gradually eat through a defense by firepower and attrition methods.

This whole view is alien to maneuverist doctrine, because to adjust to it properly one has to see the enemy forces as the primary target and objective of the battle. Not as obstacles to be worked around or avoided. The advance of ones own forces has to be directed and discovering and threatening the defenders, not on getting to an objective or seizing anything. And then every firepower means must be directed at taking the defense apart, rather than the main maneuverist use of it, to clear paths for movement.<hr></blockquote>

You had some good points earlier in that attrition or "frontal attack" has its place and role. But your ending point is off-target by characterizing maneuver warfare as primarily to seek "freedom of movement" as a military objective.

The effective use of maneuver is the same as that for attrition --- to defeat and destroy the opposing enemy force. The primary difference to each is that attrition usually seeks to inflict defeat by head-on engagement of the enemy's frontal combat units, destroying such units by decisive firepower or favorable attack "mass," or combinations in-between. Maneuver, instead, seeks defeat by achieving paralysis of the enemy force to react effectively. A classic example to this is to flank an enemy force on a grand-tactical level (if possible), overruning the HQ, communications, & supply echelons, and then turning to defeat the frontal combat units in detail that are now "disrupted." Of course, the enemy force might have "defense in depth" and may not be quite so easy to "paralyze." Again -- it's all situation-dependent.

Brian's response to you is spot-on in one respect, in that both attrition & maneuver have a role in operational warfare. ("The Capt" also asserted the exact same thing on an earlier occasion.) It shouldn't be regarded as an either-or premise, nor should it be assumed that attrition & maneuver always pursue different military objectives.

[Battlefront.com]

Spook wrote:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Steve's example wasn't presumed to consider all conditions of attacking in the open. But per his description, I think it was sufficiently representative of the potential hazards to open attack by infantry.<hr></blockquote>

Exactly. Had I done things differently, I might not have suffered so many initial casualties. However, given the same exact scenario again I would be forced to do one of two things:

1. Abandon my imediate attempts to take the enemy town and instead call up far more assets (artillery in particular) to win a straight forward battle of attrition without suffering unacceptable losses.

or...

2. Did what I previously suggested and switched more emphasis on to the flanks, thereby avoiding a primarily head on battle of attrition.

Even if I had my division's artillery at my beck and call, I still would have chosen option 2 because it offers the quickest, reliable, and practical solution for the situation. I as a lowly Battalion commander should be stripped of rank if I were to skip over a viable option to maneuver and win the battle rather than sit on my butt until preciously scarce resources were brought up to bail me out.

The oath of an infantry Battalion commander in WWII might very well be "I am but a peon asked to do more than my fair share of the work. The world does not revolve around me or my needs, therefore I must accept this reality and use my brains instead of my radio to higher HQ. For like the little boy who cried wolf, if I cry wolf every time I am asked to engage the enemy nobody will listen to me, even when I really need the help" Or something like that

Steve

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sergei:

On the other hand, Red Army really couldn't have done better if the terrain was something different, except if it was summer (snow hindered mobility, thus not making it truly open).

Snow cover does not turn open ground into unopen ground. Unless it is deep enough for the troops to walk upright without being spotted.

And in that case all the lakes and swamps would have posed a problem.

As they did in the summer of 1944. Funnily enough though both attacks used pretty much the same route despite different climatic conditions and (arguably) diffrent attack doctrines used.

If it was a closed terrain, Finns surely could have intercepted attacks swiftly compared to how quickly Soviets would have noticed the counter-attack, and that way gained a local superiority, destroying Soviets piece-meal.

Or stopping them in their tracks. This did happen North of lake Ladoga both in 1939-40 and again in 1944. As you well know counter attacks against Soviet troops ran into troubles if the Soviet troops had had time to consolidate and dig in. If the counterattack was done within 12hrs of the breach it was more than likely they would be driven off the positions.

Of course it is true that the Soviet tactic wasn't effective. But what would you have done if you were the commander, considering training of the forces?

Hmmmmm.... the question is loaded. With the same level of initial preparation and prevailing tactics and doctrine there was precious little a commander could do and not get shot for going againts orders. As of November 30th 1939 there was nothing wrong in the tactics and doctrine of the Red Army. By December 31st 1939 the shortcomings were obvious. And the renewed assault in February 1940 was not done with THAT dissimilar tactics and doctrine. It was just more focused and this time around the preparations were up to speed with the task at hand.

[Tero]

My first ever double post.

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[Sergei]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer:

I have a question about it though. When they broke through the Russian line from behind, were they really supposed to do that? Or did the commander just make it up, as some kind of suicidal wish. They didn't seem to be expected on the other side. Maybe I went to the toilet right when they explained that bit.<hr></blockquote>

"Rukajärven tie", called as "Ambush" I believe over there. Darn, I can't really remember that either, but I think it was lieutenant Perkola's own decision. Maybe they tried to communicate it to own troops, but it didn't get through.

By the way, that movie is "based" on real actions of that light unit. Yes, including the scene where the soldier on the bridge gets hit by some n+zillion bullets, falls into river and later returns. Talk about some Überfinn... the ambushed convoy thing however was imaginary. Although Soviet partisans did make attacks against Finnish supply lines and civilian villages later in the war, partisan units weren't yet formed in the beginning.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

Who said anything about not sustaining any casualties?

Nobody really. But good LOS works both ways. And if the defences are done properly any and all potential cover areas are covered by mines or what not to prevent their use. And a lump of trees or a depression in the middle of a field are SO obvious target areas even the British army advised against their use during WWII.

I'm just trying to suggest what I thought was an axiom of WWII theory, that ideal terrain is open enough to allow full combined-arms coordination: infantry, armor, artillery and air support. That's the ideal for attacking. That's all I'm really suggesting, and I'm looking at that only from the point of view of the Allies in the period and theatre covered by CMBO.

Then you should take into account the fact that in most cases the Germans were not dislodged from their positions by brute force until they chose to widraw. In the tactical level their preponderance on manouver warfare worked well against the attritionist warfare waged by the Allies.

Attrition warfare works well only if the opponent plays ball.

Because of your personality you might prefer, if you had to fight yourself, to fight in dense forest as a sneaky and resourceful patroller. If that's the kind of soldier you are then I bow to you. Seriously. But if you've got a simulated WWII force comprised of normal, physically timid pixellated infantrymen, then you're best off in terrain where they can work in a combined arms manner.

I never denied WWI style frontal assaults work in CM.

You can experiment this by running a QB twice or side by side: use uninterrupted Move order (simulating walking fire) for all the infantry in one and Run/Hide with bounding overwatch (unhide the overwatch element) combination to simulate RL WWII tactics in the other. The way things are modelled now the former tactics work better (generally) than the latter in open terrain. The combined arms support element work pretty much the same in both but the force using walking fire does not get suppressed as easily as the infantry using RL WWII infantry tactics.

But much of this "walking fire vs bouding overwatch" falls into the "force specific tactics and doctrine" realm and are out of the scope of this debate.

Dense forests inhibit that and lead to much more casualty intensive battles, against a determined defender. Of course there are exceptions, such as in very uneven situations like a beach landing. I'm not sure we actually disagree so much, it just seems we are misreading each others' intentions.

You talk of the trees and I talk of the woods ?

BTW I haven't seen the movie you mentioned though I'd like to. The only Finnish war movie I can think of right off that I've seen is the one about the long range bicycle patrol, which I really enjoyed. I have a question about it though. When they broke through the Russian line from behind, were they really supposed to do that? Or did the commander just make it up, as some kind of suicidal wish. They didn't seem to be expected on the other side. Maybe I went to the toilet right when they explained that bit.

AFAIK Finnish LRRP's sometimes did have to break through in that manner. But the preferred and recommended practise was to avoid contact if at all possible.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Many realistic attacking tactics still work, even with all of that. And in particular, all "up" defenses, with long range weapons trying to cover all of the open ground, can usually be beaten by a little scouting and a lot of prep fire on what it reveals, provided any decent starting positions exist for the attackers to sit in, in the meantime.

The fact that AT guns shoot at what they damn well please does not exactly help the defender.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

The attacker does not always have the luxury of covered avenues of approach and anyway at the tactical scale any modestly competent defender would have such forming up points well covered in their defensive fire plan.

Exactly. If the defender picks the ground (which is usually the case) the attacker almost invariably faces a terrain where he has to emerge from cover into the open and he has to traverse that open country to reach the defenders positions. Any cover terrain in between is noted and taken into account.

There were numerous successful attacks by both sides in the western desert at far less than 10 or 5 to 1 odds. El Alamein comes to mind.

The defender can not be strong all over while the attacker can reach local superiority in the place of his choosing.

[Tero]

Originally posted by Sergei:

the ambushed convoy thing however was imaginary. Although Soviet partisans did make attacks against Finnish supply lines and civilian villages later in the war, partisan units weren't yet formed in the beginning.

I think the attack was supposedly made by stragler regular troops. IIRC they were dressed like regulars.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

I never denied WWI style frontal assaults work in CM.

<hr></blockquote>

Who said anything about WWI style frontal assaults? Not me anyway. I was referring more to the usual idea of using the infantry to flush out the defensive assets and then hit them with tank fire or arty. In a recent game, a total slaughter of an axis defender, I had about 5 tanks take on enemy platoon positions in a piecemeal fashion. They routed after 1-2 minutes (in line with CM's time compression) But in heavily forested battles (which I have played a lot) it becomes much more necessary to mass infantry and get into hand grenade range. Exactly how you do this depends on how much arty is allowed in the rules of the QB. The less/smaller the arty, the more massed infantry dominates.

But one of my favorite kinds of defence is in heavy trees with at least 120mm mortars and TRPs. Then you can make it very hard for the attacker to mass a lot of infantry into his close assaults. And he can hardly bring any serious support forward. (MGs and no-minimum-range mortars like the 2" are about it)

I should add that in this sort of defence you don't 'spread your forces thinly to cover a wide front'. You set them up in a way that you believe will enable to you ambush and wipe out the attackers, readily allowing some VLs to be taken (uncontested sometimes). OTOH you do put out pickets and outposts, so that you know where his infiltrators are going, and know when they are momentarily stalled right on a TRP {rubs hands in glee}

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

You can experiment this by running a QB twice or side by side: use uninterrupted Move order (simulating walking fire) for all the infantry in one and Run/Hide with bounding overwatch (unhide the overwatch element) combination to simulate RL WWII tactics in the other.

<hr></blockquote>

Actually 'marching fire' was used to good effect in WWII as well, by the Americans at least.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Then you should take into account the fact that in most cases the Germans were not dislodged from their positions by brute force until they chose to widraw.

<hr></blockquote>

ROTLRFLMFAOTMSB! And they often 'chose to withdraw' precise because of the quantity of brute force being applied to them. Thx, that made my lunch hour!

[edited to add smiley]

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

AFAIK Finnish LRRP's sometimes did have to break through in that manner. But the preferred and recommended practise was to avoid contact if at all possible.

<hr></blockquote>

Thx, and sorry for the multiple post response. So did you think the Lt. ? chose that course of action because he was suicidal after believing his girlfriend was killed in the ambush? Because it seemed they had no problem sending the wounded back by boat, so couldn't they have tried that if nothing else worked?

[manchildstein (ii)]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer:

I'm just trying to suggest what I thought was an axiom of WWII theory, that ideal terrain is open enough to allow full combined-arms coordination: infantry, armor, artillery and air support. That's the ideal for attacking. That's all I'm really suggesting, and I'm looking at that only from the point of view of the Allies in the period and theatre covered by CMBO.

<hr></blockquote>

but you want to be attacking from the side or rear, 'rolling their flanks.'

a frontal attack across open ground could not have been a picnic.

with a frontal attack, if you throw in some attackers on the flank or rear it would make all of the difference in my opinion.

now the other way an open ground frontal attack can win is with overwhelming firepower, but you can bet dimes to dollars that once an attack were finished, that then those victorious attacking units would move onto other battles against the enemy flank or rear.

in cmbo i've won with shattering 'u.s. cavalry' frontal assaults. those victories seemed to involved a combination of surprise and mobility.

a) the other player wasn't expecting a swarm of vehicles and infantry within his own ranks by turn 2 or 3 and the americans managed to knock all of the germans out with overwhelming firepower; as if at every point of enemy contact along the route of the charge the americans were all there firing and only a few of the germans.

i've seen walls of u.s. cavalry moving fast through the fog and for the germans it has often not been pretty.

andy

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by manchildstein II:

but you want to be attacking from the side or rear, 'rolling their flanks.'

<hr></blockquote>

Well yes. But if the defenders are in a line, then someone has to make the initial penetration to even start rolling up the flanks.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

Actually 'marching fire' was used to good effect in WWII as well, by the Americans at least.

The "success" of it is debatable.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by manchildstein II:

in cmbo i've won with shattering 'u.s. cavalry' frontal assaults. those victories seemed to involved a combination of surprise and mobility.

<hr></blockquote>

Yes, especially in fog, as you mentioned or if you buy two or three 81mm mortar spotters and use them to pour down smoke all over the place. There are cases of this kind a tank 'charge'! being done successfully with Sherman tanks in the CMBO theatre, despite what Slappy has said about it.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

The "success" of it [marching fire] is debatable.<hr></blockquote>

My reasoning would go like this, and feel free to rip it apart.

Premises:

*Marching fire was not doctrine.

*Marching fire was tried out anyway.

*After being tried out it was implemented with increasing frequency (esp. in the 3'rd army).

Conclusion:

*Marching fire was regarded as effective by the commanders on location where it was being used.

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

ROTLRFLMFAOTMSB! And they often 'chose to withdraw' precise because of the quantity of brute force being applied to them.

True. But not quite accurate.

They widrew because the situation had altered: indeed avoid further casualties but also developments elsewhere etc. But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.

Thx, that made my lunch hour!

Busted

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions.

<hr></blockquote>

On a large scale, Normandy, El Alamein, hell the whole European theatre. You see, the Germans lost. They were dislodged from Germany at the end to use the word a bit more loosely.

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

Thx, and sorry for the multiple post response. So did you think the Lt. ? chose that course of action because he was suicidal after believing his girlfriend was killed in the ambush?

I'll have to look the movie again to determine that. But why would he take his troops with him ? He might be indifferent but it is not plausible he would be willing to cause the death of his troops in such a manner.

Because it seemed they had no problem sending the wounded back by boat, so couldn't they have tried that if nothing else worked?

What kind of an ending would that be in a war movie inteded for international distribution, the heroes rowing into the sunset peacefully and without incident ?

[Tero]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

Well yes. But if the defenders are in a line, then someone has to make the initial penetration to even start rolling up the flanks.

If you are smart you look for the undefended or lightly defended spot, not the most heavily defended spot.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

But why would he take his troops with him ? He might be indifferent but it is not plausible he would be willing to cause the death of his troops in such a manner.

<hr></blockquote>

That's exactly the followup issue I was wondering about. There seemed to be some issue where he 'hid' their real orders or lied about them, but I didn't really catch it.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

If you are smart you look for the undefended or lightly defended spot, not the most heavily defended spot.<hr></blockquote>

Okay I see what you are getting at. Please see, was it Steve's? response above where he sings, along with Donny and Marie: I like a little ma-noo-verrr, I like a lit-tle At-trish-unnn.

[ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>