An answer to Simon Fox

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

So how is it that other countries who did listen to their soldiers during WW2 and did adapt their infantry training and doctrine did not come to the same conclusions? I am not trying to be argumentative I just find it interesting. The definition of suppressive fire may differ or even that of 'aimed' fire. I wonder whether for example the US had a more capable squad LMG in WW2 what would have happened then. The whole issue is also clouded by the rather fuzzy distinction between the fundamental capabilities of a weapon and the way it was tactically employed. All in all an interesting subject with varied opinions and even varied "lessons from combat".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here is the history of aimed versus suppressive fire.

Prior to the 1860s, units marched in formation, fought in formation, and aimed mostly at individuals while trying to hit units. Units lined up and shot it out, so missing your target often meant hitting another. Long range individual marksmanship first came into being as a specialized skill in the US and Confederate armies (although there were other tries at this including a British rifle unit in the American Revolutionary war) during the Civil War. In this war, soldiers fought in big formations, but snipers (called "sharpshooters" because of their issue of Sharp's Rifles, but they use any rifle) began to be an issue, and for almost the first time in the field an Army was armed entirely with rifles. In the 1870 German war of liberation the rifles again proved themselves, and by the 1890s every nation was converting to a rifle that worked pretty much the same. In addition, horse born warriors were toppled from their place of preeminence in the American Civil War, leaving the Infantry leaders with the highest commands. The rifle was the weapon of the infantry, so a cult was formed around it.

In the Boer war the British discovered that they were seriously outgunned by the Boers because their troops, trained to fight side by side, were not skilled in. In the Boer war the British joined the cult of the rifle and adopted their Lee-Enfield along with the concept of aimed, methodical fire. Also, horse soldiers fell another notch with the failure of the mounted operations during the war.

By the Great War, the cult of the rifle was firmly in place, despite growing evidence that individual rifleman were being eclipsed by artillery, the machinegun, and later tanks. After the war the Germans did a ground breaking study that determined the average engagement range for effective rifle fire was rarely more than 200 meter, and more often less than a hundred, and that soldiers aim was harmed by machinegun fire and cannon fire, often forcing them to the ground. Thus the Germans began fishing around for a less powerful round. If not for the cult of the rifle in Germany, this rifle may have made it into service in the early 40s, instead really not coming into service in numbers until 1944, and it never reached universal adoption/

During World War two both the British and the Americans followed similar infantry tactics. An auto rifleman would provide covering fire while rifleman would move forward to vantages that allowed aimed fire, allowing the AR to work. This did not turn out to be how the soldiers fought. There was a great disconnect between training and front lines in both armies, as soldiers who lived more than the first day learned to duck, crawl, and pour on the fire. The Americans were better off because the M1 was better at pouring on the fire. The British were better off than the Americans because the Bren made a better SAW. The Americans soon recognized that their squads were too big and did not have enough automatic weapons by adding a second BAR, by using more M2 Carbines, and by splitting the squads into smaller teams, but this experienced died after the war, except that many commanders issued M2 Carbines in Korea in much larger numbers to front line troops.

By the 1960s, the mistakes of Vietnam and Korea were being looked at closely. They rediscovered what the Germans had found out in 1934 and what the Russians learned in 1945. Automatic weapons are the way to go (the US refined this to mean “serial fire weapons” such as the SPIW dart gun), the power in the squad is in its support weapons, the rifleman, except in ambush with automatic weapons, is more in providing security to the squad automatics than anything else, and that engagement ranges were still much lower than thought.

[Wilhammer]

"Prior to the 1860s, units marched in formation, fought in formation, and aimed mostly at individuals while trying to hit units."

Not exactly correct. Units aimed at Units. Marking individual men was rare and impractical for most soldiers due to the shortcomings of weapons.

We also recognized prior to most European nations that the primary purpose of an Army was to DESTROY the other army, not neccesarily outmanuever it and force a "gentlemanly" surrender followed by pardons all around.

We often fell back on the old ways, but for the most part we employ either an ignore them or all out kill them method of conflict resolution.

No hard and fast rules, but general historical observation is all I offer.

The Americans became notorious during the French and Indian Wars for targeting officers with sharpshooters, and earned more "praise" for this in the Revolution.

The primary technology that made that possible was the individual talent of the marksman, especially in home made/customized weapons and ammunition. This is relatively unique to the American experience due to the fact that it was an army of well armed citizens (the well-regulated militia).

Hunting was a way of life, a neccesity, while in most European countries, hunting was a privilidge of the few, and firearms were for the most part withheld from citizens.

Interstingly, Marlborough started the employment of column formations in order to increase shock value and thus win. His reason was based on the reality of the lack of sustainable fire, and this closing in tight formation took adavantage of the pause in reload for mass firing of weapons. Also, columnar formations are easier to control.

The US in Europe used column tactics, for much the same reason, but the pause in enemy fire was due to suppression fire or smoke.

The purpose of suppression fire is to, of course, get the enemy to stop shooting while you attempt to overrun it or another it is supporting. The American method of it depended on firepower, and during World War II, an HE gap existed between combatants, the Americans becomeing (in)famous for liberal application of it in combined arms attacks. Heck, we through everything we could at the enemy.

[rune]

The British thought the MG 42 was better then the Bren, proof?

WO 291/473 Performance of bullet weapons.

On the matter of relative rate-of-fire of the Bren and MG-42, this paper says "...the advantages of the German gun over the Bren are due almost entirely to the belt feed rather than to the cyclic rate."

A trial was conducted to find out, for closely-spaced standing targets, whether "traversing fire" – traversing the gun over an arc without aiming at individual targets – was superior to "service bursts", that is, firing short aimed bursts at individual targets, with the Bren gun. The results tabulated here show the expected number of casualties per 30 seconds' firing:

Range (yds)

Spacing in feet

Service bursts

Traversing fire

100

4

9

16

100

8

5

8

200

4

8

12

200

8

5

7

Another trial concerned the relative accuracy of the Bren fired from the hip using ball and tracer ammunition. Firing at fixed targets at 35 yds and moving targets at 17 yds, an improvement averaging 24% was found firing tracer rather than ball.

Yet another trial involved comparing the Sten gun against the service pistol. At a range averaging 10 yards, the following average results were obtained on targets exposed for an average of 5 seconds and moving across the line of fire at 10 feet per second:

Type of fire

Hits per shot

Hits per engagement

Shots per engagement

Sten from the hip

0.12

1.86

16

Pistol from the hip

0.08

0.48

5

Pistol, aimed

0.14

0.71

5

Here is another interesting one:

WO 291/476 Comparison of rifle, Bren and Sten.

This paper investigates four theories about small-arms effectiveness:

Rifle and Bren shooting is generally so poor that the real accuracy of these weapons is never used;

Rifles and Brens are rarely used at long ranges except by snipers;

For semi-skilled troops, automatic weapons are disproportionately better than single shot;

The advantage of automatic over single-shot is increased by battle conditions.

Trials conducted at the School of Infantry confirm 1, 2 and 4. "It is admitted that all the above trials have been on a small scale and that the sample of men was probably not representative of the Infantry as a whole; but it is expected that the trends shown will hold for all except possibly the first class shot."

The Bren and Sten were fired at 100, 200 and 300 yards, and the equivalent 90% zones, in inches, calculated at 25 yards.

Single shot

Automatic

Bren

Sten

Bren

Sten

100 yds

2.4

4.3

3.8

4.6

200 yds

2.0

5.2

4.4

5.0

300 yds

2.0

5.4

3.8

5.6

Mean

2.2

5.0

4.1

5.0

Shooting was done lying with weapon rested; an improvised backsight was fitted to the Sten for shooting at 300 yards. An extra trial to confirm the lethality of Sten bullets at 300 yards was performed with ¾" deal targets covered in two thicknesses of webbing. All hits were "throughs".

Another set of trials, each of 20 rounds, was shot on a 30 yard range, and the following results obtained. It was noted that "the average firer has a higher overall chance of hitting an enemy at 200 yards with a Sten than with a rifle."

Note that on the above, the British feel 1,2 and 4 were correct.

Just some interesting documentation...

Rune

[Username]

Very interesting.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wilhammer:

"Prior to the 1860s, units marched in formation, fought in formation, and aimed mostly at individuals while trying to hit units."

Not exactly correct. Units aimed at Units. Marking individual men was rare and impractical for most soldiers due to the shortcomings of weapons.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You are actually misreading my statement. Soldiers were taught to aim at individuals to hit units. For example, the 1863 War department "Rifle Fire" said,

"An officer wants to assure his men aim for an enemy soldier in the opposing group he designates as the target..."

This the mass of men fired as a unit, but individual soldiers drew beads on soldiers in the opposite formations, even if it was not expected that they hit them.

American rifleman existed before the Civil War, so did European Rifleman, but they were support units because of their slow rate of fire.

[Andrew H.]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wilhammer:

[QBThe Americans became notorious during the French and Indian Wars for targeting officers with sharpshooters, and earned more "praise" for this in the Revolution.

The primary technology that made that possible was the individual talent of the marksman, especially in home made/customized weapons and ammunition. [/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Mostly it was due to the Kentucky long rifle, a very accurate weapon used by frontiersmen. Unfortunately, it took 3 to 6 times as long to load as conventional muskets, so it was not really suited to widespread usage.

Aside from these specific sharpshooters, though, there's not really any evidence to support the view that "normal" revolutionary soldiers were any better marksmen than the british regulars they fought.

[Gyrene]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The Americans soon recognized that their squads were too big and did not have enough automatic weapons by adding a second BAR, by using more M2 Carbines, and by splitting the squads into smaller teams, but this experienced died after the war, except that many commanders issued M2 Carbines in Korea in much larger numbers to front line troops. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

USMC squads had 3 BAR's and was built around 4 man fire teams, a formation used by the USMC since the 1920's.

Army and USMC views hardly ever jibed back then, so the term "Americans" is a bit too broad for this discussion.

The US Army led the USMC in the deployment of the M1 Garand, which some Old Time Hardliners in the USMC foolishly didn't want, but later in Vietnam the USMC was very reluctant in giving up the M14 and later led the way to the development and adoption of the single shot/ 3 round burst M16A2.

The fully automatic weapons "Lesson" thought by the Germans of WWII has not held it's worth to this day as accurate single shot deployment is once again the norm for modern professional armies.

Gyrene

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Gyrene:

The fully automatic weapons "Lesson" thought by the Germans of WWII has not held it's worth to this day as accurate single shot deployment is once again the norm for modern professional armies.

Gyrene<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually, this is a case of the words getting mouthed by the militaries but the weapons reflecting reality. The 3 round burst slowed down automatic fire, but did not get rid of it, almost every rifle still has it, and it gets used in many situations. So soldiers are drilled on marksmanship, but handed the tools of firepower from the lessons learned as far back as the 30s by the Germans.

In addition, the adoption of the SAW in US squads is a sign that automatic weapons are here to stay. Some armies are trying to hold onto the vestiges of the aimed firing line, such as the magazine fed rifle issued as a SAW to British infantry, but almost all armies now use short range, automatic or burst firing rifles and SAWs.

[Username]

The M16A2 three round burst is at a higher cyclic rate then "normal" M16A1 full auto? So a firer can rapidly pull the trigger and get pretty much the same thing with better control?

Lewis

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

The M16A2 three round burst is at a higher cyclic rate then "normal" M16A1 full auto? So a firer can rapidly pull the trigger and get pretty much the same thing with better control?

Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That is just the thing, the Marines and others like to claim that their core is the rifleman, and that they value marksmanship over suppression and volume, and that the battle lives and dies by slow aimed fire, but no one is turning in there automatic M16s, SAWs, GPMGs, or for that matter miniguns on helicopters. Sort of like politics, no one wants to come out and say that the individual aimed shot is not the end all, but the system shows that everyone things that sending lead down range is important.

[Slapdragon]

Of course, an unstated here is that lead has to fly in the general direction of the enemy. No one says that wild spraying until the barrel warps is the thing to win battles. Even the GPMG is fired in 20 round bursts, while the saw is triggered in 10 round bursts except in ambush or entry scenarios.

[Michael Dorosh]

Armies are funny things; they tend to cling to old ways for a long time. The British and Canadian armies seem to think that drill is the be all end all of producing disciplined soldiers. Foot drill ceased to be relevant sometime after the US Civil War and sometime before the First World War with regards to the battlefield. The German Army dispensed with teaching drill almost entirely by 1944, and many drill movements (ie the Present Arms) were dispensed with upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Yet their infantry still outperformed Allied infantry on a man for man basis.

I suspect the insistence of armies that their men qualify as marksmen every year is done for many of the same reasons that drill is taught, and units are judged on how well they march - not how well they fight.

[Username]

It will probably take a real infantry type war to change peoples minds. If you look at the Balkans footage, everyone seems to have either a full auto weapon or a scoped rifle.

I remember reading a book by a Major Johns about a US infantry battalion attacking St Lo. He was very clear that building a base of fire was absolutely a prerequisite to infantry moving out. To be clear, he meant gaining fire superiority with most people and weapons so that a small manuver element could gain an objective. He was also very clear in that Garand fire should be fired at likely enemy locations but that a target was not needed. He also reprimanded a new replacement for just going through a full clip rapid-firing at a noise during a lull in the action.

Lewis

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

It will probably take a real infantry type war to change peoples minds. If you look at the Balkans footage, everyone seems to have either a full auto weapon or a scoped rifle.

I remember reading a book by a Major Johns about a US infantry battalion attacking St Lo. He was very clear that building a base of fire was absolutely a prerequisite to infantry moving out. To be clear, he meant gaining fire superiority with most people and weapons so that a small manuver element could gain an objective. He was also very clear in that Garand fire should be fired at likely enemy locations but that a target was not needed. He also reprimanded a new replacement for just going through a full clip rapid-firing at a noise during a lull in the action.

Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This seems to be the key. Fire discipline is not methodical single shots, but blazing away at the right time in the right direction and combining the pinning infantryman with the power of support weapons from the platoon (GPMG) and the company.

[Simon Fox]

Thanks for the history lesson slappy not quite what I was looking for but still of interest. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Here is the history of aimed versus suppressive fire.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Really is the distinction that well defined? What about aimed suppressive fire ? Obviously the 'lessons' the Germans acquired in the thirties aren't that all infantry should have fully automatic weapons because they fought most of WW2 without them. The German squad/section organisation for most of WW2 and certainly the bit when they were most successful is not significantly different from the British. Sure they had a more versatile MG which was certainly more effective in a static situation but it seems to me that it is the US that is the "odd one out" in WW2.

The question occurs to me as how SMG equipped troops used used their weapons. Did they always use burst type firing? Certainly the Beretta SMG which equipped a number of FJ units in NWE was by all accounts very popular weapon both with them and the Brits when captured, principally because it was selectable for single shots. Someone posted a link in that other thread regarding aimed SMG fire too.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Actually, this is a case of the words getting mouthed by the militaries but the weapons reflecting reality.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Really slappy it's an easy way out for you to characterise the armed forces of the planet as being run by "stuffed shirts" and dissemblers. There were a lot of intelligent and professional people who came out of WW2 and remained in the army. Those people had a lot of combat experience in a variety of situations using a variety of different weapons including captured ones and having them used against them. The fact that they didn't all arrive at the same conclusions doesn't mean that the ones that don't agree 100% wholeheartedly with the point of view to which you ascribe are hidebound or dinosaurs. I get the impression that you think the current emphasis on aimed fire from riflemen in armies which 'learned' the lessons those naughty Germans taught them in WW2 is some sort of red herring. In this regard it would be best if you made a complete distinction between what is expected from a squad/sections riflemen and their LMG. You are misrepresenting the issue if you think aimed fire means some sort of antiquated rifle line sans LMG. I don't know, but a lot of WW2 stuff I have read gives the impression that the authors felt sometimes aimed fire is more useful and sometimes automatic fire is more useful (I emphasise this is not from the section LMG).

If the US troops felt that they didn't have enough firepower vis a vis the Germans was the proper answer to distribute more firepower to the individual soldiers or give the squad a decent LMG? My impression is that this was not generally the opinion of Commonwealth troops who fought the same opponent. As rune has pointed out the British were well aware of the superior firepower of the MG34/42 and going by various accounts they didn't need an ordinance board test to tell them the bleedin' obvious Why didn't they leap to and adopt it? Well they did British and Commonwealth troops habitually used the MG42 to supplement their firepower when on the defense. In other circumstances they seemed to prefer the mobility of the Bren. Who knows? *shrugs*

[Michael Dorosh]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

British and Commonwealth troops habitually used the MG42 to supplement their firepower when on the defense. *<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Come again, Simple Simon?

[Simon Fox]

You disagree? Maybe the Canadians didn't operate under the same scrounging philosophy as the Aussies, Kiwis and Brits? It's a common enough practice, more prevalent in some nationalities according to my impressions. Not something that's easy to quantify of course

But if you disagree then we'll just have to leave it there because there is no way I'm going through a bunch of first hand accounts and digging out specific quotes which might not satisfy you anyway, hehe.

When it comes to CM3 though then there is more hard data for that.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Thanks for the history lesson slappy not quite what I was looking for but still of interest. Really slappy it's an easy way out for you to characterise the armed forces of the planet as being run by "stuffed shirts" and dissemblers. There were a lot of intelligent and professional people who came out of WW2 and remained in the army. Those people had a lot of combat experience in a variety of situations using a variety of different weapons including captured ones and having them used against them. The fact that they didn't all arrive at the same conclusions doesn't mean that the ones that don't agree 100% wholeheartedly with the point of view to which you ascribe are hidebound or dinosaurs. I get the impression that you think the current emphasis on aimed fire from riflemen in armies which 'learned' the lessons those naughty Germans taught them in WW2 is some sort of red herring. In this regard it would be best if you made a complete distinction between what is expected from a squad/sections riflemen and their LMG. You are misrepresenting the issue if you think aimed fire means some sort of antiquated rifle line sans LMG. I don't know, but a lot of WW2 stuff I have read gives the impression that the authors felt sometimes aimed fire is more useful and sometimes automatic fire is more useful (I emphasise this is not from the section LMG).

If the US troops felt that they didn't have enough firepower vis a vis the Germans was the proper answer to distribute more firepower to the individual soldiers or give the squad a decent LMG? My impression is that this was not generally the opinion of Commonwealth troops who fought the same opponent. As rune has pointed out the British were well aware of the superior firepower of the MG34/42 and going by various accounts they didn't need an ordinance board test to tell them the bleedin' obvious Why didn't they leap to and adopt it? Well they did British and Commonwealth troops habitually used the MG42 to supplement their firepower when on the defense. In other circumstances they seemed to prefer the mobility of the Bren. Who knows? *shrugs*<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually, you are making a few mistakes. The first is that anything that can be criticized can have the answer thrown back, "well, that is only your opinion." In fact my opinion is based on extensive readings of Ezell, Dockery, Dunnigan, Dupuy, and reports such as SAWS, SPIW, British Small Arms Board, NATO standard calibre trials, Petersen trials, SALVO, SAMMCO, and several minor reports, each of which are available to the scholar. An opposite example of this sort of argument is if you said, "doctors use antibiotics to treat disease, and those antibiotics are very effective, but they often attribute a great deal of success to the placebo effect", and I said that doctors were not idiots but that it was only your opinion that antibiotics made people better in the first place, and so many doctors believe in the placebo effect they can't be wrong by saying it is very effective.

Now, to the root historical issue. First off, you said that Germans did not adopt auttomatic weapons, why not when they had the data. I can answer your question:

1) To many soldiers to arm -- 15 divisions of soldiers went into Russia equipped with Czech weapons, the Kar98 was in use still because it was that or fire pokers.

2) Extended Development time: The German study for infantry effectiveness started in 1932 (somewhat earlier if you count indepenent attempts). In 1934 Gustav Genschow, RWS, and Polte were let development contracts for prototypes of a short cartridge. It was not until 1938 that Polte finished development of the concept and was let a contract, completing the cartridge, the 7.9x33mm Kruz, in 1941. At the same time Haenel and Walther started construction of a gas operated weapon to fire the cartridge, not finished until 1942.

At the same time, the military was facing for the first time autoloading rifle troops. The Russians had 7 million autoloading rifles, used in the North equipping entire regiments, and the south equipping squad leaders. The German military leadership had in 1938, when the short rifle contracts were let, assumed that war would come in 1945, but had compromised by issuing MG34 to squads and MP40s to back up rifles. This was recognized as far from ideal as early as the Polish campaign, but it was the best that could be done. In 1940 an autoloading rifle was developed, the G41, but it sucked.

Facing the Tokerov (although, by the time a solution was found, the Tokerov was no longer issued in any great numbers), the German military scrambled for any weapon they could find. 15000 test rifles firing the short 7.9 round where sent to the front (the MKb42(H) and MKb42(W)). And the Haenel Mk42 was authorized very quickly for mass production, replacing all MP40 production by 1944.

Then it all skidded to a stop. Hitler noted the studies, but could not understand why anyone would need more. He ordered a halt to the program. If not, it was planned to have the MP40 and Kar98 removbed from front line units by 1944.

As it was, the Army believed in the concept of suppressive fire so much that they snuck behind Hitler's back and called their weapon the MP-43, listed as an "updated MP-40". It was followed by the MP-44, until a common soldier convinced Hitler they needed the rifle to counter the massed SMG units of the Soviets, and the project went on with the STG-44 and 45. It should be noted that in the meantime the Army also got the G43, and improvement over the Kar98, but not the revolution of the MP-43.

Now, as to why current military leaders still say they are completely wedded to the system of aimed fire, it is not because they are dumb, but tradition. They recognize the need for suppressive fire, they buy the guns that do the job, but they are like the army officers that still swore by the sword until WW1, and by sword skills. Tradition rules.

As for the issue of suppressive fire versus aimed, I would really need to take you to the Fort Jackson firing range here in the US to demonstrate how they are different, but they are. Of course suppressing fire is aimed, but slow methodical "slow fire" is not used.

Finally an issue you have confused. The Bren and the BAR are not truly LMGs. They are Automatic rifles, and are not capable of firing continued 20 rd busts. The German ability to carry a true LMG on the advance was an immense advantage in combat.

[Stalin's Organ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Finally an issue you have confused. The Bren and the BAR are not truly LMGs. They are Automatic rifles, and are not capable of firing continued 20 rd busts. The German ability to carry a true LMG on the advance was an immense advantage in combat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Um...since when did any "LMG" (a "true" one or otherwise) fire 20 round "bursts"?

And if they did, why couldn't the Bren or BAR do so? (note not why _didn't_ they, but why _couldn't_ they)

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Actually, you are making a few mistakes. The first is that anything that can be criticized can have the answer thrown back, "well, that is only your opinion." <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Well I would be if that is what I was doing, but I'm not. I don't have an opinion, I'm quite open minded about the issue. I say other people disagree with your opinion, which I do not say is unsupported. I was wondering how you could account for their point of view, which in many cases seems to be based on personal first hand experience, without characterising them as hidebound dinosaurs.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Finally an issue you have confused. The Bren and the BAR are not truly LMGs. They are Automatic rifles, and are not capable of firing continued 20 rd busts. The German ability to carry a true LMG on the advance was an immense advantage in combat.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Did I mention the BAR? Well obviously definitions of LMG must vary. That many people refer to the Bren as such must be really confusing to you. Rest assured that neat categorisation is the least of my concerns.

Finally an issue you have confused. I am not picking up the mantle of Brian.

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ:

Um...since when did any "LMG" (a "true" one or otherwise) fire 20 round "bursts"?

And if they did, why couldn't the Bren or BAR do so? (note not why _didn't_ they, but why _couldn't_ they)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

An LMG gunner fires in bursts rather than just running through the ammo supply. This is because firing bursts was discovered to be better. The 20 round rule is first found in German MG34 mauals in 1938 (or at least, that is the first time Ezell attributes it) and shows up in Belgian literature on the MAG-58, US literature on the M-60, and is the current GPMG practice in most militaries using a GPMG (modern LMG).

The distinction between an AR and an LMG was based upon feed mode (how much ammo can it carry) barrel replacement (needs to be able to change its barrel) and some authors say weight (some do not though). The Bren will be called an LMG because of its weight and bipod, and its mounting on vehicles, but its magazine feed makes it tactically function like an AR (BAR, M15, etc). In addition, the Bren barrel masses half that of a MG-42 Barrel, meaning that it is not capable of as effective heat disposition, just like the BAR. Of course, the Bren was the better of the two weapons tactically in most situations, but nothing says a Bren or a BAR have to be good or bad ARs, just that they are ARs.

The reason why the Bren and BAR are not fired in 20 rd bursts is the mass of the barrel 5 pounds less mongery, is much lighter than the MG-42 at 9 pounds. If you throw ammo through the barrel too fast, you don't get to change the barrel (which you can't on the BAR anyway) before it gets to hot to fire. In addition, the MG-42 had more mass to add a shroud around the barrel which made it easier to pass heat to the outside air by providing more exposed surface area. The earliest Bren marks had this, but the Bren lost them by WW2.

This is not a Bren bad, MG-42 good issue. The Bren survived in service for a long time, it was an excellent weapon, and it performed well, but it was an AR, and would be closer in its function and purpose to the modern concept of a SAW, than the LMG which matches more closely the idea of a GPMG.

[Fairbairn-Sykes]

Not truly an LMG?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Did I mention the BAR? Well obviously definitions of LMG must vary. That many people refer to the Bren as such must be really confusing to you. Rest assured that neat categorisation is the least of my concerns.

Finally an issue you have confused. I am not picking up the mantle of Brian.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No problem on the Brean issue, people refer to it, the Cz24, and the French M29 as an LMG all the time. They were thought of as LMGs when they were introduced. But they never could perform the LMG (and later GPMG) role. They DID perform a valid role in the tactics they were designed to handle, it is just the tactics they were designed for were trumped by the tactics that put more sustained firepower at the finger tips of the squad, and by the time the MP-43 entered service a single rifleman at less than 250 meters could equal the power of these weapons if carrying an assault rifle.

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>This is not a Bren bad, MG-42 good issue. The Bren survived in service for a long time, it was an excellent weapon, and it performed well, but it was an AR, and would be closer in its function and purpose to the modern concept of a SAW, than the LMG which matches more closely the idea of a GPMG.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>No I know that, it's an issue of semantics. Interesting point about SAWs and GPMGs. So which one should be in the section/squad?

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fairbairn-Sykes Trench Knife:

Not truly an LMG?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Correct in one grasshopper, you get a gold star when I can find one. Often referred to as one, but in reality an AR. Tripod mounting makes no difference. The M1919A6 had a bipod in an attempt to make the pig an LMG and it is still usually called a MMG. The M2HB is mounted on a tripod, and is also not an LMG. Mounting on a tripod is not indictative of anything until you get to the GPMG concept, which the MG-42 also fits and replaces MMG, HMG, and LMG in one weapon

You can slap SUV on the side of a pickup, and it is still a pickup.

However, since this will make everyone mad, you can think of it like a ORV, which has a very definate meaning to an insurance agent and is based on capabilities, use, and defined characteristics, and ORV to a marketing agent, which could be slapped on anything and often is. You are merely taking the marketing route rather than the functional route for defining the weapons role.