Tankers in WW II

[JasonC]

I think many have an innaccurate picture of what WW II was like for a typical tanker. I was prompted to post this because of what seem to me misconceptions in another thread. I think it relevant to CM, to get a sense of how common the "both have a few tanks in a meeting engagement" scenario actually was in the real war. And a sense of what happened the rest of the time. The related issue of casualties among tankers was the immediate issue that led to this response.

One often gets the sense from this board that some believe everyone in a penetrated tank was toast, especially if in a Sherman; that just about every Sherman was shot to bits, being rolling coffins; that the life expectancy of an Allied tanker was probably a matter of days; and presumably that all of this was overcome through a conveyor belt of suicides and scrap metal continually fed into the furnace, day after bloody day. This is not remotely the case.

The corrective to such notions is to follow the history of a given unit throughout the war, and see everything they faced. One will certainly find some periods of sustained and intense combat in which losses were high. But "high" means on the order of 10% of running tanks lost per day, spread into particular incidents in which a handful here, a company there, got shot up. And such episodes are rare, peak intensity fights, strung out between months of successful campaigning with very low losses.

Tanks mostly overcome enemies that can't hurt them at all. Or can only inflict small losses occasionally through many chances, like sustained artillery fire or numerous attempted infantry ambushes, only a few of them succeeding in bagging a few tanks. When enemies that can hurt them are encountered, local odds or heavy fire support often removed the obstacle - "scissors" brought out to counter the enemy "paper". Then the "rock" of the armor was freed up and continued on its merry way, smashing enemies it was suited to smashing. There are exceptions, of course, but exceptions are exactly what they are.

From the unit history of the 68 tank battalion, 6 Armored division, which you can read for yourself at this URL -

http://members.aol.com/super6th/tank68/index.html

"One tank was hit by Panzerfaust fire at a very close range, and was set on fire, However, the tank crew remained inside and continued to machine gun the krauts until the heat became unbearable; crawling out of the vehicle they found themselves surrounded by Wehrmacht troops who called to them to surrender. Unanimously they refused, and immediately opened fire on the group in the face of overwhelming odds, and almost certain death. Technician 5th Grade, Santo De Nunziato, Fred K. Blaylock, were cut down by machine gun fire. Nunziato was immediately killed and Blaylock died of wounds later in the hospital. Technician 4th Grade Charles E. Pidcock continued to fire his sub-machine gun at close range until his tank exploded, and threw him into a nearby hedgerow."

"Both tanks of the section were knocked out. Lt. Lundh's tank was knocked out by direct fire from a captured enemy French 75, and Sgt. Capozi's tank was knocked out by bazooka fire. The casualties were two killed, one wounded, and 4 missing". (Since the battalion had only 1 MIA at the end of the war, the 4 missing were later resolved - but how is not said).

"S/Sgt. Brock-Jones's tank was hit by bazooka fire, but he kept going and kept pouring lead into the jerries"

"our casualties were four killed in action, 24 wounded, and a vehicular loss of 2 tanks destroyed" (in an attack 9 hours long, near Nancy, under continuous artillery fire. Most of the losses were exposed TCs) "We would like to quote one statistic which sums up the action in a few words: Of the thirty-seven tank commanders in the first attack wave, eighteen were either killed or wounded". (This was a case of relatively green tankers, who had so far seen only lighter action and much less in the way of artillery, all staying unbuttoned too long).

"Company "B" while moving up the slopes northeast of Diebling came under heavy anti-tank fire from the vicinity of Metzing. It was dusk. Visibility was poor, and ground was extremely soft, thus greatly hindering their mobility. Company B, partially bogged down, was unable to extricate itself from this quagmire Enemy anti-tank guns in well defiladed positions blazed away at "Baker's right flank" and knocked out seven tanks."

"a very unusual incident occurred. Before Company A reached Metzing Lt. Kratzer's tank was hit and all members (sic) of the crew bailed out. Unknown to them Tech. 4th Grade Shunk, the driver had been instantly killed and he was in such a position that his foot kept the accelerator depressed and the vehicle rolled on in low gear, a dead man at the levers, through the enemy lines into the town, and beyond it, describing great lumbering circles before it came to a halt."

(January Bulge fighting vs. 12SS, starting Jan 2 "At this point, our attacking force was taken under very heavy anti-tank fire and small arms fire in and around the town. As a consequence, all but one of "B" Company's tanks were knocked out, and the doughs suffered very heavy casualties and were pinned down. The positions became so untenable and exposed that it was necessary to withdraw the force under cover of smoke."

(Next day, 3 Jan '45) "The enemy counter-attacked in the morning with tanks and infantry, but was repulsed with many casualties. At that time AT guns, in well concealed and defiladed positions fired on "A" Company's line of tanks, destroying four, and making their position untenable, it was imperative that they be withdrawn. Then at 1500, the task force withdrew in orderly fashion to better defensive positions north and east of Bizory. We must mention the fact here that while it was a necessary move and one to better our position, it was the first time in our experience that we had had to move to the rear due to enemy pressure."

(The same fight and heavy shelling continue through January 8) "Again on January 8th, the enemy made a coordinated tank-infantry attack against our right flank and along the axis of the Bizory-Magaret road. Six "A" Company tanks were knocked out like so many clay pigeons, and their fire couldn't effectively find Jerry in his positions along the draw; also the neighboring 69th's fire was long in coming, and ineffectual when it did. The enemy then swung the force of their attack against the hill south of the road and southwest of Magaret. Finally, however, before he could do more damage, Jerry was driven off again by our TD's and artillery fire."

On the 9th the battalion was relieved, though elements were re-committed on a few occasions in the rest of January. But by the 9th of January, "In spite of the excellent recovery and maintenance job that Captain Halloran's Battalion Maintenance men had done, we had suffered severe losses, and our total strength amounted to little better than a company of tanks."

The battalion had probably lost 2/3rds of its (then) tank strength in 7 days, half of those losses on the three occasions mentioned above, the rest spread throughout the week of heavy fighting. The losses of that one week of heavy fighting outside Bastogne accounted for around half of all the tank losses the battalion experienced in the whole war, including mechanical / non-battle causes. And the losses in that period were 2/3rds of all tank losses explicitly mentioned in the unit history.

The next few months, the unit faced only light opposition - at first refitting, later in breakthrough drives against crumbling opposition. When serious resistence was encountered, the response was a mix of changes of route, air strikes, large artillery concentrations, or infantry attacks in which the tanks only had to support by ranged fire. Losses to battalion personal were by handfuls, a dozen at most in a given action. Most opposition was smaller scale - an ambush at a defended roadblock, bridge, or town, quickly broken up by overwhelming odds.

E.g. "Later that night... when combat team reconnaissance elements reached Wabern and Zennern, they received small arms and bazooka fire, as a result of which one attached tank destroyer was crippled."

Overall losses of the battalion in the whole war were as follows -

84 KIA

1 MIA

212 WIA

272 non-battle

187 returned to duty (WIA&Non-battle medical cases)

---

-380 net losses

+373 replacements received

The overall losses were about equal to the initial strength, but with roughly 1/3rd of them returned to duty. Around half the initial personnel were still with the battalion at the end of the war; most of the rest came in after the Bulge and remained with the battalion for the rest of the war.

The battalion drew 80 replacement tanks over the course of the war, including unrecoverable losses in combat, mechanical failures, and 76mm upgrades. (It also received 17 replacement jeeps and 10 replacement trucks). TOE strength was about the same number, so the vehicles turned over once. Average losses were 2 per week, but actually 30-40 of them were concentrated in the heaviest week of fighting (thus losses around 10% per day), with around 1 per week for the rest of the war. Otherwise put, the "half life" of the battalion was about the length of the whole campaign (9-10 months) at the ordinary intensity of action, but only one week long for the highest week.

This does not mean the battalion did nothing the rest of the time - it captured Brest and Lorient, participated in the fight for Nancy and the Lorraine, the Saarland and breakthrough fighting in Germany proper. It just didn't "fight fair"; whenever it could manage it, it got overwhelming local odds. When it didn't have local odds in maneuver forces on the ground, it was supported by time-on-target artillery "shoots" of up to 18 battalions at once, and occasionally by Jabo attacks up to group strength (36 P-47s).

Most of the tank losses were from hidden PAK or the tanks and TDs of 12SS, in one week of fighting in the Bulge. But many of the personnel casualties were caused by sustained artillery fire at other times, by non-battle injuries and sickness. A few tanks were KO'ed by fausts and schrecks, but in ones and twos - the same was sometimes done by heavy HE, firing indirect for long enough that a few direct hits did something.

Most noteworthy, only hidden PAK or tanks/TDs accounted for large numbers of tanks - platoon and company strength - on individual occasions. As for losses when tanks were knocked out, overall KIAs per tank replacement were only 1 each. Some of the replacements were for non-battle causes of course, which might push it to 2 each. But some of the KIA occurred for reasons other than penetration of a tank (e.g. exposed crew, or artillery hitting men while not in their vehicles, or in the support elements, or after a successful bail-out), so 1 may be more accurate. Casualties were quite low overall if compared to those in infantry battalions. The obvious reason why is that the number one cause of infantry casualties, sustained artillery fire, was mostly (though not entirely) negated by tank armor.

There are some other interesting facts available on this battalion, about its ammo expenditure. The unit fired more than 1.8 million rounds of 30 cal MG, and around 200K of 50 cal MG. 6400 76mm and 16000 75mm tank rounds were fired by the medium tanks. That is about 1/4 76mm, so 1-2 76mm per platoon was probably standard (perhaps closer to 2 when the larger ammo load of the 75mm is taken into account). The Stuarts fired only 2750 rounds of 37mm, implying they saw much less action than the Shermans. The unit also fired 2400 rounds of 81mm from its HQ mortar platoon.

But the heavy lifting for fire support was done by the Sherman 105s, which fired nearly 11000 rounds - half as much as the rest of the Shermans put together, from only 1/9 as many tanks. The Sherman 105s fired indirect regularly, as a battery, and averaged 1800 rounds from each piece over the whole war. That was probably done in several hundred fire missions, sometimes none in a given day and sometimes several, plus a smaller amount of direct fire on occasion. Obviously, there were many occasions to fire on areas where enemy were known to be, but unseen for direct fire, or avoided. If you found PAK you got out of their way, then radio'ed the location, so 105 shells (or more) could be dropped on them. Most of the time you didn't have to duel with them in direct fire.

For the rest, the average works out to 1-2 gun rounds and 100 rounds of MG per tank per day. One can safely conclude that half the tanks weren't in action at all on a typical day, and those that were generally saw only light fighting, like small roadblocks holding up a column. In the heaviest fighting, the engaged tanks might have been going through a full ammo load every couple of days, for that peak week. They certainly did not regularly go through a full ammo load every 30 minutes, although a few of them might have, on rare occasions.

It is perhaps also worth noting that this unit fired more than 25000 direct fire tank rounds, but lost only 80 tanks (or less) in battle (some were certainly mechanical breakdowns, etc). Which gives you some idea of how much of the shooting was HE at non-AFV targets. The idea that 2-8 rounds in a tank duel shoot-out per KO'ed tank, was typical for a WW II tanker, is not at all consistent with that picture. Of course this is the experience of a US unit, on the attack and against an enemy usually without armor, or much of it. Any way you slice it, though, hundreds of rounds were expended per tank that died. By all accounts far fewer AP per kill were needed in duels. Ergo, the HE load turned over many times, in fights against unarmored opponents, for every tank duel actually run across.

[JonS]

Thanks for another thoughtful post Jason.

As always, well grounded, and well written.

Cheers

Jon

[JonS]

Ina similar vein to the post above are Ken Touts' experiences as a tankr with the British from Normandy till Holland. He was rumbling around in a Sherman for the most part, and what struck me was not so much how busy he was, but how much time-off he got. IIRC, in his 4-5 month campaign, he was in action for a total of about a week, maybe two. The rest was in the rear, or waiting for something to happen.

Though not explicitly chronicled, the losses to Touts unit appear to be of a similar magnitude as those of the 68th Armd Bn detailed above.

Regards

Jon

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks for another breath of reality, Jason.

Michael

[Beltfed]

Something about computer games in general strikes me after reading this. I feel, and I am as guilty as any, that one never quite gets that very healthy aversion to getting shot at as that developes in a real life situation. I tend to rush forward more recklessly than I might were it real and I was there. So as real as CM is it still may be more lethal than what happened. When the fecal matter flies most hunker down and start thinking more. It's probably been discussed ad nauseum here already so I won't go too far. The unfortunate thing is that it all gets slightly gamey in CM and others because of this lack of a healthy sense of self preservation. There are of course various methods used to try and simulate it. But in the end I feel that so far it hasn't been done. BTW this is not a knock at CM or others I just don't think we're there yet. I figger it's down the road with more powerful CPUs and such.

BTW it was a very good read. Thanks fer the post

OK one more remark vis a vis the down time remark. My limited real life tanking was as a gunner in a Sheriden at the NTC fer 3 weeks ( i was an 11bravo attached to a 'bimp' company) The down time between actions was huge. NOw obviously this was all practice but with maintenance, planning, simply travelling to the jump off points the actual battle itself lasted mebbe til about noon with an early morning assault. Now obviously the pace of operations was not near a real conflict but we spent more time doing all the other things that one does to keep a tank and crew functioning than any of the actual 'fighting'

Whew! Sorry that got long

[ 08-12-2001: Message edited by: Beltfed ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JonS:

Ina similar vein to the post above are Ken Touts' experiences as a tankr with the British from Normandy till Holland. He was rumbling around in a Sherman for the most part, and what struck me was not so much how busy he was, but how much time-off he got. IIRC, in his 4-5 month campaign, he was in action for a total of about a week, maybe two. The rest was in the rear, or waiting for something to happen.

Though not explicitly chronicled, the losses to Touts unit appear to be of a similar magnitude as those of the 68th Armd Bn detailed above.

Regards

Jon<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I thought Tout was in 2nd Northants Yeo, 11th AD's Recce. He was in a Cromwell, IIRC, since he complained about the poor quality of it (the Sherman was seen as the Rolls-Royce of the Allied tanks). His unit was almost totally destroyed in GOODWOOD (lost 57 out of 64 tanks or somefink), and rebuilt by disbanding 1st Northants Yeo. All from memory, long time since I read it. This is all based on Tank!, haven't read any of his other books.

[Username]

An interesting comparison can be made with the german tank battalion data given in panzertruppen II on pg 129.

Over a 7 month period (July 43 to Jan 44), the Bn fought 76 battles. About 1 every 2 2/3 days.

The data does break down the ammo usage by type. 10387 HE vs 7571 AP and 1336 HC. They fired 219,140 MG. This a Bn mix of mostly MkIII and MKIV type tanks.

The data supports Jason's assumption about main battle tanks,ie they fired HE mostly. Of the 37 panzers lost during this period, 21 were destroyed by hits. This is higher than the west where reports for german tanks lost to gunfire is 40 percent (70 percent of allied tanks were destroyed by german gunfire).

The nature of the fighting can be judged by the russian losses. The german Bn claims 251 enemy tanks and 245 enemy guns. Strait math works out to 24 AP/HC per tank killed. Obviously, AP/HC were also fired at bunkers/pillbox/etc also. But many tank actions did not result in tank destruction. Rounds were fired, hits were achieved, and the enemy pulled out. The germans would use about 115 rounds AP/HC per battle. The germans had a tank kill ratio of 251 to 37 or 6.8:1.

This was a panzer grenadier (116 tank Bn) unit that mainly had panzer III long and 75mmL24 and PIV long. The majority tank was the PIII types from the ammo expenditure.

Since this was a period of german reversals, the number of ATG/AA/guns destroyed is slightly lower than the number of AFV destroyed. I would expect this to be higher in earlier attack conditions. I would also expect the number of HE used to also be higher then further supporting Jasons claims. The ratio of HE to AP per tank type is also revealing. The PIII long fired 2:1. The PIV long fired 2.6:1. So the german 75L48 was doing alot of the tank killing and was also using its HE too. The 75L48s also used 1237 HC. This is a ratio of 9:6 of AP to HC. The HC seems to have been a bigger player than most people would assume. I would assume it was being used as a dual purpose round for tanks, bunkers, dugin ATGs, etc. The 75mmL24 on the MKIII also fired 3:1 HC to AP. This would be expected given its limited AP performance at this time. No HE use is listed for this vehicle though, which is odd.

While Jason has given a good insight into the typical US battalion, the typical german battalion (if this is typical) was on a different mission. The reader can make his own comparisons.

Lewis

[Username]

This from an M10 website...

"During the eight months of active combat in the ETO the battalion fired the staggering figure of 63,625 rounds of three-inch service ammunition and 811 rounds of 76mm service ammunition---captured over 3,186 German prisoners of war, or about six prisoners for each man in the battalion---assisted the infantry in capturing many hundreds more---killed 85 of the enemy and probably killed many hundreds more---knocked out four enemy tanks including a MK VI Tiger, two MK V Panthers and a MK IV---destroyed three combat vehicles and fourteen general purpose vehicles, fourteen flak guns, seven 88mm guns, eighteen machine gun positions, five pillboxes, and even shot down one observation plane---and assisted the infantry in causing the surrender of Forts Yutz, Illange, Julian and Bellecroix. During all this fighting the battalion was fortunate in sustaining relatively light losses--twenty men killed, and eigthty men wounded, more than half of whom returned to duty. In all, over 2,500 miles of European soil was ground under the wheels and tracks of the rapidly moving 807th Tank Destroyer Battalion."

http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/barracks/8929/page2.html

(Extreme Sarcasm mode on)

I guess the Seek part of Seek part of 'Seek, Strike, Destroy' was missing. To field a TD battalion and have it rack up 4 tank kills is a waste of time. Since it fired 3 inch and 76mm, I would assume it was a mix of M10 and some M18 with mostly M10.

I would say that they fired mostly HE most of time.

Lewis

[Username]

Another TD report...

"30th Company A reported---moved---left Perkam, Germany 1245 hours Apr 29th and arrived Salching, Germany 1420 hours Apr 29th---distance traveled 9.2 miles. At 1445 hours Apr 29th, Captain Williams took 9 prisoners (1 Lieutenant) in woods south of Salching, Germany. Approaching an airfield outside of Ganacker, Germany, vicinity grid square 6425, the 4th platoon had a small arms fight with the enemy and took 43 prisoners after expending 100 rounds of .30 cal Machine gun. Action took place between 1700 and 1800 hours Apr 29th. At 1400 hours Apr 30th the 1st platoon in position and 4th platoon in position; both positions just west of Kleegarten, Germany, fired 59 rounds of 3" APC, 43 rounds of 3" HE and 5 rounds of 3" HVAP at suspected observation points in the town of Zeholfing, Germany. High buildings, Church steeples and other suspected strong points were blasted and demolished eliminating all opposition for infantry upon entry. After completing their position of the mission assigned the platoon, the 4th platoon displaced farther west and the 1st platoon remaining in position received 40 to 50 rounds of counter battery estimated at 75mm artillery with approximately 20% mortar. Although a number of rounds exploded 25 to 30 yards from the platoon's gun positions, no damage was sustained. 2nd platoon took 2 prisoners on Apr 30th in town of Kleegarten, Germany."

This report shows that AP and even specialized rounds like HVAP were fired at what most CM players would call an infantry target. This is late in the war and there could have been other circumstances (low on HE?) but it shows that AP was fired at infantry (I have read stugs would also do this to dug in guns, MG, troops). The kinetic energy of a slug of hard metal slamming into a position has a power all its own. It would be very usefull for troops in cellars. The penetration of the earth and wall being easy for the round.

Lewis

[Wild Bill Wilder]

Well for some interesting insight into how it all works, check out this piece of historical data.

A destroyer standing off shore at Iwo Jima picked up these transmission from a Marine tank company in action on Sulfur Island.

Makes for some intense, sometimes comical reading. I found this in an old long out of print book on the Marines in WW2.

Tank Talk

In the background of the transmissions, one could hear the chatter of machine gun fire. The voices of the men ranged from flat and authoritative, with moments of acid stress, to almost unbelievable male soprano during peaks of excitement. Red One is the tank company commander.

"This is Red One. Blue Two and Blue Three, move left a little, but be careful of the swamp."

This is Red Two, Red One. Heartburn says that he is ready to start shooting at those pillboxes."

"Tell Heartburn I can't receive him. You will have to relay. Tell him to give us a signal and we'll spot for him."

"Red Two, wilco."

"Heartburn, raise your fire. You're right into us."

"That's not Heartburn, Red Two. That's a high velocity gun from our left rear. I heard it whistle. Red One, out."

"Red Three, this is Red One. Can you see that gun that's shooting at us?"

"Red One, I think that our own gunfire."

"Dammit, it's not, I tell you. It's a high velocity gun and not a howitzer. Investigate over there on your left. But watch out for the infantry; they're right in there somewhere. Red Two, tell Heartburn, Down Fifty, Left Fifty."

"Red Two, wilco."

"Red Three, what are you doing? Go southwest."

" I am heading southwest, Red One."

"For Christ's sake, get oriented! I can see you, Red Three. You are moving northeast. Fox Love with hard left brake. Cross the road and go back up behind that house."

"But..."

"I don't know why I bother with you, Red Three! Yellow One, take charge of Red Three and get him squared away. And get that gun. Its too close!"

"Red One from Red Two. Heartburn wants to know if we are the front lines."

"Hell yes, tell him we're plenty front right now."

"This Red Two. Artillery on the way."

"Red One, wilco."

"Red One from Yellow One. I can see some Japs setting up a machine gun about a hundred yards to our right."

"Those are our troops, Yellow One. Don't shoot in there."

"The man at my telephone-I think he's an officer-says we have no troops in there."

"Yellow Two, go over there and investigate. Don't shoot at them. That man at your telephone probably doesn't know where the troops are. If they're Japs, run over'em."

"Yellow Two, wilco."

(A long pause)

"Go ahead Yellow Two. What in God's name are you waiting for?"

"I'm up as far as I can go and still depress my machine guns."

"The hell with the machine guns. I told you to run over them. Run over them, Dammit! Obey your orders!"

"Yellow Two, wilco."

"Green Two, do a right flank and go up to the top of that hill. Keep in defilade. Red Two and Yellow One, open out a little more. Guide Right. Move out, now. And watch very closely; these troops are in a position to get into the same sort of trouble that they did yesterday. They're all screwed up, so be ready to move immediately."

"Green Three, where are you?"

"I'm on the left of the road, Red One, just below Green Two."

"Raise the muzzle of your gun so I can spot you."

"Green Three, wilco."

"I thought so. Move out some more. I can't tell whether you or Green One is at fault, but you are too close."

"Move over, Green Three! You're within ten yards of me now!"

"O.K. O.K., Green One. I'm movin'!"

"Yellow One, what have you to report on that machine gun?"

"Red One, a Jap stood up and threw a hand grenade at us so I gave him a squirt."

"Did you run over that gun like I told you?"

"No, Red One, we put an HE in it, and wrecked it. It's gone."

"Damn! Won't you people ever learn to conserve your ammunition?"

"All tanks, move out. Guide right and open out the interval to one hundred yards. Red Two and Red Three, you are too close. Why are you always too close? Open out to the left flank."

"Red One from Green Four. I am moving out to take a pillbox the infantry's pointed out. I will take care of it and let them catch up."

"Where is it, Green Four?"

"In that clump of bushes to my right. It's one of those coconut log things. It looks like it might be too strong to squash. Can you see it? Is it all right to fire in the slit?"

"Affirmative. But be careful."

"Wilco."

"See that mortar over there, Hap?"

"No I don't Fuzzy. Where?"

"To your right. I'm squirtin' now."

"O.K. I got it."

"Red One, this is Blue Two. I just passed six AA guns looked like they was in pretty good shape and just been deserted. I destroyed 'em anyhow."

"O.K. Blue Two, Wilco."

"Red One, this is Hairless. We've got some Japs bottled up in two caves in Target Area Four Baker. We'd like you to leave two tanks to watch them."

"You know damn well that's infantry work. We're a mobile unit, not watchdogs. Put your saki drinkers in there."

"O.K. Harry."

"Red One, out."

"All tanks, this is Red One. Start 'em up. Move out now. Guide right and form a shallow right echelon. As soon as we hit the flat ground around the airfield, spread out to 150 yard interval. All right, move out, move out."

Wild Bill

[JasonC]

I have some comments on Lewis's examples, in two passes. First the US TD stories, then the German example. On the expenditure of AP by the TDs, if Lewis checks the second case which gives that breakdown, there were 2 TD platoons firing, which is 8 guns if none were missing. They fired 59 HE, which is 7-8 apiece. That may have been more than half a full ammo load. M-10s typically carried only about 1/4 HE. The use of AP on buildings may well have reflected the local scarcity of HE, some guns running out or wishing to save at least some, or having expended theirs earlier on.

In the other example, Lewis noted with sarcasm that there is little point in a TD battalion that KOs only 4 tanks. But perhaps that is all they encountered. Consider that most late war German tank production went to the east, where the fighting went on longer on a larger front, etc. The total number of tanks available for the west was probably between 6K and 10K. The western allies fielded quite a few AFVs, easily enough to outnumber that limited total by 6 to 10 to one overall. Well, a formation of 36 TDs would then expect to face only 1/6 to 1/10 their own number, which is 4-6 tanks. In other words, the Allies *had* a battalion's worth of AFVs for every platoon's worth of German ones in front of them, overall. Not all of them could meet and kill above average numbers of their opponents. Otherwise put, they can't kill 'em if the Germans don't field 'em.

Next to The German example. First there is a minor math issue. Lewis gave the AP+HC per tank kill claimed as 24, when his own numbers make it 35. 7571+1336 / 251 claimed equals 35.5. The AP alone is 30 per claimed kill. It is also noteworthy that the 251 claimed AFVs in the reported 76 battles comes to 3.3 tanks per battle. In turn that may reflect KO'ing a company worth of tanks in about 30% of the battles, with no enemy armor present at all in many of the other ones.

Then there is the issue of the kill ratio. First Lewis gives it as 6.8, from 251 to 37 - but he also states that only 21 of the German tank losses were due to hits. Thus the ratio might appear to be as high as 12 to 1. However, it is most unlikely this ratio is accurate. The losses on the German side almost certainly refer to total write-offs, with all vehicles in short or long term repair excluded. While the kills claimed are likely to be quite inflated, first by multiple claims for the same kill, second by kills claimed that weren't kills at all, and third and probably largest, by claimed kills that were recovered and repaired, short or long term. Total write offs vs. "I got one" is not exactly an apples to apples comparison.

As anyone knows who has tracked tank returns for particular units, usually a battalion in action reports a dwindling portion of its tanks "ready", even with only modest numbers reports "total loss". Up to half the initial total will be in "short term repair", which includes everything from breakdowns to penetrations leading to abandonment, as long as the field is held to recover the tank. A better comparison to total kill claims is the total movement out of the "ready" category over a given period (gross, not net). Some of those will be mechanical, but some of the claims will also be false. Without that data, the figure of 37 total write-offs over 7 months is just not comparable to the 251 claimed figure. If it were available, I'd predict (or guess) it would be between 2:1 and 3:1, from the other numbers presented.

Certainly, actual kills of 251 for 37 losses could not be average or typical for German tank units over the whole war. Because the Germans only killed 2-3 times as many tanks as they lost in Russia, counting all causes, including PAK and heavy FLAK, which were as numerous as all AFVs.

Note also that 37 total losses is probably around 50% of the unit. We can estimate the average strength as between twice that and that, thus around 55 AFVs (initially more, less later on). It would be exceptional if their readiness were much above 80%. So, if we want to get an idea how many tanks are doing the things covered, it was probably on the order of 45 operational tanks.

Imagine 45 tanks each firing around 9 AP or HC, with the result that they KO a company of enemy armor (of course, it could occasionally be 2 companies firing twice as much each). This happens in about 30% of their battles. That would then account for the AT ammo expenditure and the claims. With some of those round types fired at other target types, it might be 6-7 instead of 9 each, but the basic picture remains. It is an awful lot of AT shooting per kill. Undoubtedly, the principle reason for the high volume of AP per kill was the inability of the 50mm long or 75mm short to penetrate the front of the T-34 at medium combat ranges.

On the HC use, I've speculated on that subject before. The Germans definitely went on a HC kick in the mid-war period, producing millions of such shells for the longer 75mm guns. By mid 44 they had practically stopped making it. My theory is that HC was used against T-34s at longer ranges. The longer 75mm lost penetrating ability against the front of the T-34 somewhere near or just beyond 1km. So the L48s at range would use it, as well as the L24s even close.

Incidentally, your figures for HC use are somewhat confusing. You give 1336 for the overall use of HC, but then say their usage from L48s amount to ~1200, and the L24s used them 3:1 compared to AP. Unless overall ammo usage from L24s was tiny indeed, all the HC is not accounted for in the 1336 figure. I suspect the 1336 figure may be for one model of HC. It came in A, B, and C varieties, each with a progressively larger HEAT warhead. The A model was not really useful against the T-34. C would be, while B would generally need side or turret hits.

[JasonC]

PS. If my guess about the HC kick is accurate, it leaves the question, why did they stop? The obvious reason is they fielded enough Panthers, and phased out the long 50s and short 75s, and uparmored the Pz IVs. As a result, all their guns could penetrate the T-34 at medium range, and some could at long - while the T-34s wanted to close the range. Before then, while there were still undergunned German tanks in the force mix and not many Panthers, the Russians had an incentive to stand off at 1-1.5 km ranges. That incentive disappeared by 1944, and as a result the "75mm HC at range" idea was no longer necessary or useful.

[Username]

4687 75long HE

1798 75long AP

1237 75long HC

99 75short HC

39 75shortAP

5700 50long HE

2845 50long AP

This is the data.

It works out to 18.6 AP per tank destroyed

It works out to 24 AP+HC per tank destroyed

The original data:

The data does break down the ammo usage by type. 10387 HE vs 7571 AP and 1336 HC. They fired 219,140 MG. This a Bn mix of mostly MkIII and MKIV type tanks.

Should have read 4682 AP.

The panzer bn also claimed two aircraft, 87 mortars, 164 ATR, 34 trucks and 4680 enemy killed. 435 Captured too.

Personnel losses

43 killed

192 wounded

14 missing

Anyway. I think the point is lost on you Jason. The typical tankers experience (you named the post) depends on alot of things. As Wild Bill is demonstrating, the pacific was different from the west as it was different again from the east. As I am also pointing out, A TD bn experience would be different still (and yes I think the whole TD policy was crap).

Even if the panzer tank battalions didnt rack up the ratios here, the point is that they engaged in more armored battles than a US tank battalion would typically. See? Thats a point. Discussions hinge around people making points, relating information, etc. Otherwise you might find yourself in the company of someone who insists on rattling off on tangents about his "hollow charge usage theories". (The germans, by the way, gave orders to tankers to substitute HC for HE when the HE was getting scarce. This further supports the point about HE being used mainly, even to the point of scarcity in the german case)

Heres an interesting site: http://members.aol.com/dadswar/7ada.htm

Notice the losses in the three armored inf battalions and tank battalions. Pretty close. From data like this, I would start making claims about the average US tanker and armored infantrymens experience in the western front of WWII. I couldn't guess at what it was like to be in a tank in the pacific or eastern front from this data.

But I think I get some of your points. Yes, most tankers in most places fired HE most of the time. Most blowouts, like the typical CM game, would not happen to a formation more than a few times. Unfortunately, the game does nothing to stop the knock-down-drag-out fight-to the-last-cartridge syndrome. But the game rarely showcases skirmishing but rather battles.

For what its worth.

Lewis

[CombinedArms]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username:

This from an M10 website...

(Extreme Sarcasm mode on)

I guess the Seek part of Seek part of 'Seek, Strike, Destroy' was missing. To field a TD battalion and have it rack up 4 tank kills is a waste of time. Since it fired 3 inch and 76mm, I would assume it was a mix of M10 and some M18 with mostly M10.

I would say that they fired mostly HE most of time.

Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Maybe they didn't kill a lot of tanks, but it looks like they sure were effective. My guess, based on all I've heard and read, is that Allied TDs were mostly used as tank substitutes in real life.

[ 08-14-2001: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Blenheim]

excellent thread.... BTW, any significant difference between east and west fronts?

[JasonC]

Thanks for the corrected figures on the rounds. Curious that the AP figure in the total is off by so much - 2889. Perhaps each tank company had 5 Pz IIs and they expended some?

Next, in one place you say the losses for the US armor and armored infantry battalions look "close". I assume you meant "close to the example of the 68th AB", the one I gave the unit history stuff on. Because each of the armor battalions of the 7th AD averaged 85 KIA, very close to each other and to the figure for the 68th. But the armored infantry battalions lost 3 times as many KIA - around 250 each - not "the same" as the armor battalions.

Then you say I've missed the point, which is supposedly how different all the experiences are, with the German battalion fighting much more - or fighting armor much more - than the US ones. Obviously in Russia there was more armor to fight than many US units faced in France, and so far I quite agree. But the figures don't present that wide a range of experience, if you look at the divisional box score on the 7 AD site.

They claimed 710 AFVs KO'ed or captured (about 10% of them captured). That is 2.8 times the claims of the German battalion, and reflects the score of 3 armor battalions and 1 of TDs (the last only ~2/3rds as big). Roughly 3/4 as much per battalion, and the German battalion has four companies to three (mediums, that is) each for the US ones. The 75 and 76mm ammo expenditure for each battalion (counting the TDs are 2/3rds because of their numbers) runs around 16K, very close to the German battalion's figure, but a bit under that of the 68th AB in the 6th armor division. The division also claimed 944 weapons over 50mm, or roughly 3 2/3s as many gun claims, too.

The KIAs+MIAs in the German unit are only about 2/3rds the average in one of the US battalions. But they average 1.5-2.7 per tank reported lost, depending on whether one counts only "hits" or all write-offs. Similar, though not exact. The number of wounded is almost exactly the same for the German battalion as for the US 68th, and dominates "total battle casualties" if you add them up.

So, far from showing enourmous differences, I think the data on the tank battalions are all close, within a factor of about 1.5 times (as are the periods involved, number of tanks, etc). The similarity in total tank rounds fired, and in total casualties suffered, are particularly striking.

[MikeyD]

About expenditure of rounds: I read in the Jentz book "Tiger I & II Combat Tactics" how Tiger 1 commanders in Tunisia were downright envious of the Allied ability to rain shells of all type on them from extreme distances, while the Tiger with its excellent long-range gun was under expicit orders to first close with the enemy so as to not waste ammo.

As to the line "Tanks mostly overcome enemies that can't hurt them" in the original question: That just was what the Sherman had been designed to do, that's why the 76mm M1 gun was held up in favor of continued production of the 75mm M3 gun with it's more powerful HE charge, and that's the source of most of the subsequent near-universal criticism of the Sherman design concept. I'm not sure the statement is appropriate for the German heavies though, which were designed specifically as tank fighters and had plenty of opportunity to do just that.

I do agree CM tends to be too 'balanced' for my tastes. I guess it's the difference the gamer and the 'historical recreationist'. I feel there are some scenarios one side shouldn't EXPECT to win!

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

PS. If my guess about the HC kick is accurate, it leaves the question, why did they stop? The obvious reason is they fielded enough Panthers, and phased out the long 50s and short 75s, and uparmored the Pz IVs. As a result, all their guns could penetrate the T-34 at medium range, and some could at long - while the T-34s wanted to close the range. Before then, while there were still undergunned German tanks in the force mix and not many Panthers, the Russians had an incentive to stand off at 1-1.5 km ranges. That incentive disappeared by 1944, and as a result the "75mm HC at range" idea was no longer necessary or useful.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I can't for the life of me understand how you think HC can be used at range. It was known to be wildly inaccurate at long ranges. It was used around 500-600 meters max and required alot of rounds to get a kill (3-6 quoted for MkIV short and PIIIM on pg 41 panzertruppen). It was not liked by the panzertrupps.

The germans used HC in rifled weapons as an interim solution till more heavy ATG and panzerkanone could be fielded. they probably still used it for 251/234/etc using 75mmL24 till the end of the war.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by MikeyD:

About expenditure of rounds: I read in the Jentz book "Tiger I & II Combat Tactics" how Tiger 1 commanders in Tunisia were downright envious of the Allied ability to rain shells of all type on them from extreme distances, while the Tiger with its excellent long-range gun was under expicit orders to first close with the enemy so as to not waste ammo.

!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ive read of US tanks firing HE and AP at the tops of hills just to get the range in case a panzer showed up.

The tigers only real advantage was at range. Try to read Tank Tactics. Its a really good book about the western tank battles. The author supplies lots of info from studies.

Lewis

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Thanks for the corrected figures on the rounds. Curious that the AP figure in the total is off by so much - 2889. Perhaps each tank company had 5 Pz IIs and they expended some?

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

No. The number was a error. The second post has the correct data verbatim from the book.

[Username]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by JasonC:

Next, in one place you say the losses for the US armor and armored infantry battalions look "close". I assume you meant "close to the example of the 68th AB", the one I gave the unit history stuff on. Because each of the armor battalions of the 7th AD averaged 85 KIA, very close to each other and to the figure for the 68th. But the armored infantry battalions lost 3 times as many KIA - around 250 each - not "the same" as the armor battalions.

.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Excuse me but you make me laugh.

Whats the armored infantry have to do with the armor? Nothing. I am just showing that they all had about the SAME casualties.

I am making a point that multiple sources would back up YOUR suggestion of what a TYPICAL armor battalion experience was like. I am also saying that you can only make a case what a typical US ARMOR experience was like in WWII on the west front. See? Do you get the difference?

Now as far as your "they fired about the same amount of shells" and they had "about the same casualties"..weeelllllll.. Jason you have a propensity to boil out numbers, "facts", etc. to suit what ever point you are trying to make (and I am not so sure you have one). But the US tank battalions had 4 companys (3 medium 1 light)? The panzer gren division 16 (pz bn 116) started july 43 with:

4 pzII

32 PzIII

5 PzIII75

11 PzIVlong

1 PzBef HQ

This is the starting strength.

They all tied their shoes about the same too. But they werent wearing the same shoes. They didnt walk the same road either. They didnt walk the same amount of time either.

Lewis

[JasonC]

Um, you were the one who brought up the armored infantry figures, not me (except to say initially that losses in the armored infantry were higher than in the armor, which they were).

I quote you "Notice the losses in the three armored inf battalions and tank battalions. Pretty close." If all you meant to say was "in the tank battalions", then you should have said that. You are the one who mentioned the AIBs. But whatever.

The ammo usage for your German case was 2069 medium tank gun rounds per month. The 68th used 2489. The average for the 4 units in the 7th AD is 1704. I'd call that a "bracket", wouldn't you? As for total battle casualties, that was 249 for the German unit and 297 for the 68th, which comes to 36 per month and 33 per month respectively. Or if you prefer KIA+MIA per month, that is German 8.14, 68th 9.4, 7th AD 11.2, 9.8, 8.9, and 6.1 for the TDs. That is 6/5ths as many for the Sherman units (perhaps from slightly more brew ups).

Pretending numbers that close reflect widely different combat experiences, so far apart as to be incommensurable with each other, is just silly. Obviously there is enough similarity in the way medium tanks were used that ammo expenditure, losses, and even KO claims were quite close. Sure there will be variation from unit to unit, but not nearly as wide as some would have us believe.

[Username]

There were about 80 Tanks in the Battalion.

A-Co: 3 platoons of five 76mm M4 Sherman Tanks,

one 105mm M4a3 Assault Gun Sherman Tank, one 76mm M4 Sherman Tank

for the Company Comander, 17 MediumTanks (30 Tons).

B-Co: Same as above but 75MM M4 Sherman Tanks and 1 Assault Gun. 17 MediumTanks.

C-Co: Same as above 75MM M4 Shermans and 1 Assault Gun. 17 Medium Tanks.

D-Company: Same as above except they had a 37MM cannon in the turret. 17 Light Tanks (18 Tons).

Service Co: Tank retrivers, Tanks with dozer blades spikes, (for hedge rows and other obstacles),

Tanks with flails with chains (for land mines to clear our paths.

Hdq- Co: One Platoon of 3 Assault guns with 105mm M4A3 Shermans

and three M4 Shermand with 75mm Cannons. The assault guns

were for support and street fighting - they had larger guns

and inflicted more damage that the 76mm & 75mm guns.

This is a US Tank Battalion. Compare and contrast to the German Bn. Notice especially that the US has 4 companies and built in 105 support. The german Bn is 3 companies. the US battalion has over 50 percent more tanks.

Care to crunch your numbers again?

[Panzer_Meyer]

Wild Bill,

Thanx for that "transmission", confusing and funny at the same time.

[Wild Bill Wilder]

I enjoyed it Rommel. It really gave me some insight into the happenings inside those minds of those tank commanders.

Just mortal men dealing with problems and their own insufficiences.

Glad you liked it....Wild Bill