How TacOps reflects current events

[IndianaEJP]

Admittedly, I am fairly new to TacOps4 – though I have played other modern tactical simulators in the past <… started with the old SSI game Mech Brigade, moved on to Patriot <ugh!>, Steel Panthers et al…>. TacOps4 -- A GREAT game!

In light of what is going on overseas, I hope my questions / comments are not viewed as either insensitive or inappropriate…

1. Anything to be learned at this early date? Admittedly, we cannot judge the effectiveness of units / personnel / new technology until everything is said and done… Still, I am curious to know if things are performing as they have been modeled in the game <you know what they say on that little sticker when you buy a new car, '… actual mileage may vary…'>.

2. It was interesting that 'withering ground <small-arms and AA> fire' was able to blunt an AH-64 assault by the U.S. Army's V Corps, 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment on the 2nd Armored Brigade of the elite Medina Division <Republican Guard?> this morning especially considering that it occurred at night…

I would love to know the details of the engagement… Assuming the AH-64’s were using primarily standoff weapons, it must imply that the target Iraqi front <between the cities of Karbala and Al Hillah> is both deep and wide. <I can’t imagine we would be foolish -- or arrogant enough – to have opted for a close combat assault?!> I wonder <rhetorical questions>… did the technology perform as expected? Did the pilots? Was there a tactical issue?

By the way, does the military following any type of engagement do some form of formal performance assessment? <Not to lay blame, but to improve performance…>

3. This leads to another point… Regardless of whose forces they are, there is something to be said for the value of the infantry… I am concerned about a Stalingrad-type of showdown in Baghdad. I fear for our boys…

It is probably the right decision to try to engage and defeat their best units before they can retreat into the city…

Having said that, does TacOps4 in any of its scenarios model tactical warfare in a specific urban environment <i.e. Baghdad or any city with a unique geography for that matter>? If not, is this practical?

4. I wonder will it someday be necessary to model the psychological <or morale> effect of false alarms associated with putting-on and removing bio/chemical gear or even the impact of wearing the bio/chemical gear for sustained periods of time in the game? <Similarly does artillary demoralize infantry?>

5. What scenarios best resemble some of the action / firefights that are taking place?

<< To paraphrase the Crazy Dane… 'My kingdom for a full scenario editor including AI.' <Looking forward to TacOps5!!> >>

Finally, God speed to our US / Allied troops over in Iraq <and Afghanistan>… May they all come home safe and sound.

Again, I apologize in advance if this is not the correct forum to have asked these questions…

Regards,

Eduardo Paternoster

American

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by IndianaEJP:

2. It was interesting that 'withering ground <small-arms and AA> fire' was able to blunt an AH-64 assault by the U.S. Army's V Corps, 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment on the 2nd Armored Brigade of the elite Medina Division <Republican Guard?> this morning especially considering that it occurred at night…

I would love to know the details of the engagement… Assuming the AH-64’s were using primarily standoff weapons, it must imply that the target Iraqi front <between the cities of Karbala and Al Hillah> is both deep and wide. <I can’t imagine we would be foolish -- or arrogant enough – to have opted for a close combat assault?!> I wonder <rhetorical questions>… did the technology perform as expected? Did the pilots? Was there a tactical issue?

It is a safe guess that the Iraq AA weapons were kept silent until juicy targets like helicopters were in range. The air defense of Baghdad is shooting without radar, they are just firing a wall of explosives into the path of oncoming planes, to avoid falling victim to radar-homing air attack.

I think that very basic IR equipment and a bunch of small AAA firing without radar can be very effective against helicopters, if you get enough of the guns and ammo. The Iraqis obviously learned a lot from Kovoso 1999. And they had 12 years to collect the equipment.

3. This leads to another point… Regardless of whose forces they are, there is something to be said for the value of the infantry… I am concerned about a Stalingrad-type of showdown in Baghdad. I fear for our boys…

Well, Stalingrad had the attackers cut off, that certainly won't happen here.

Having said that, does TacOps4 in any of its scenarios model tactical warfare in a specific urban environment <i.e. Baghdad or any city with a unique geography for that matter>? If not, is this practical?

We have maps of Mogadishu and a apparently a new one for Baghdad. But they cannot be played against the AI.

BTW, I noticed you use some unusal characters for the quote and the point signs, making it hard to reply.

[Coyote]

5. What scenarios best resemble some of the action / firefights that are taking place?

I have a somewhat modified version of TF DeGoey saved as a .tac file. If I can find it, I'll send it to you.

Gary

[ng cavscout]

"By the way, does the military following any type of engagement do some form of formal performance assessment? <Not to lay blame, but to improve performance…>"

The Army, at least, has a process called the AAR (After Action Review). This is a post action critique, supposedly non-judgemental, as one Captain put it "this is to learn, not a sh*t slinging contest". My experience is that this occaisonally produces truly valuable learning points, and is usually a positive experienced.

[Scout_42MDP]

Dude, your name is WAY too close to mine

[ng cavscout]

Yeah, I noticed, you a real 19D? If so, we can either live with it, or I will Rocheambeau you for it. lol.

[Big Duke 6]

Speaking of the Apache downing by ground fire, I suspect we won't get many of the details. I'd assumed it was a daytime attack, but thanks for clarifying it. Best guess, then, would mean the Apaches were engaged while they were occupying Attack by Fire positions, when the aircraft spends a lot of time hovering. If the ABF isn't secure, it's a risky event to say the least. Perhaps that's where the ground fire came from.

[Sarjen]

As for the Apache: as far as i´ve seen and heard of that incident with the farmer and his old shotgun: the apache happened to have an engine-breakdown and had to land with auto-sync rotation.

BTW: shortly after the tv has shown the place .. the place was bombed and the apache to pieces of debris.

[Scout_42MDP]

Originally posted by NG cavscout:

Yeah, I noticed, you a real 19D? If so, we can either live with it, or I will Rocheambeau you for it. lol.

I was :/ 89-92. Shoulda stayed in, but Oh well :/

[ng cavscout]

I was active from 90-94, in Wisconsin National Guard now. where were you stationed? Once a Scout, always a Scout.

[Thermopylae]

Apparently with regards to the AH-64s, they got so shot up by men with smalla rms precisely because they were men with small arms. They were firing from rooftops and the such, and the ROE prohibited the use of really heavy firepower on buildings which might still have civilians in them.

[Redwolf]

Originally posted by Sarjen:

As for the Apache: as far as i´ve seen and heard of that incident with the farmer and his old shotgun: the apache happened to have an engine-breakdown and had to land with auto-sync rotation.

BTW: shortly after the tv has shown the place .. the place was bombed and the apache to pieces of debris.

No, I've just seen photos of the Iraqi recovery of that Apache. They also found unexploded 40mm AAA projectiles inside, so that shotgun was probably not the only reason for going down. It was supposed tobe a late 19th century rifle, BTW, not a shotgun.

Apparently the story was that the apache was damaged by regular AAA fire but went down in an area populated by farmers. The story of the pilots was making its rounds in the last few days and they were captured by the farmers. Iraqi TV was happy to display civilian heros.

[Scout_42MDP]

Originally posted by NG cavscout:

I was active from 90-94, in Wisconsin National Guard now. where were you stationed? Once a Scout, always a Scout.

I was with 3-35 Armor in Bamberg, Germany. Went and fought in the 1st gulf war, then my unit deactivated and i finished up back at knox with 5-15 Cav, right back where i started

[Sarjen]

Originally posted by redwolf:

No, I've just seen photos of the Iraqi recovery of that Apache. They also found unexploded 40mm AAA projectiles inside, so that shotgun was probably not the only reason for going down. It was supposed tobe a late 19th century rifle, BTW, not a shotgun.

Apparently the story was that the apache was damaged by regular AAA fire but went down in an area populated by farmers. The story of the pilots was making its rounds in the last few days and they were captured by the farmers. Iraqi TV was happy to display civilian heros.

Were there two Apache´s? The official story from the CENTCOM was, that the one Apache which was shown with the farmer, was demolished using airstrike. But perhaps it was only prop?

[TheJames]

Well, I've seen pictures of an Apache sitting on a flatbed trailer being paraded through a town somewhere (there's a link to the pictures on the general forum somewhere).

So either there WERE two Apaches, and one of them DID get taken out by an airstrike, or there was only one, and it didn't get taken out.

Either one seems likely enough. I heard CNN discounting the report of the second captured Apache because it had the same unit markings as the first, but seeing as how Apaches in the same general area would likely have been from the same unit anyways, I could go either way.

I guess we'll have to wait a while to find out.

[DaveWilson]

If the Iraqi's had any of these left (ZSU-23-4) they could be quite effective against any Helicopter in the daytime if they kept their radar off and were in good cover. I'm not saying they could hide forever or escape destruction if discovered. But they could send a lot of lead downrange very quickly.

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/zsu-23-4.htm

[ April 29, 2003, 04:33 PM: Message edited by: DaveWilson ]

[Rattler]

From another Forum:

Chop the Chopper

The Army's Apache attack-helicopter had a bad war.

By Fred Kaplan

Posted Wednesday, April 23, 2003, at 3:42 PM PT

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is gearing up for his next war—not with

the Syrians or the North Koreans but with the hidebound generals of the U.S.

Army. These are the generals who criticized Rumsfeld's battle plan while Gulf

War II was still raging and who beat back his efforts, over the past few years,

to "transform" the Army into a lighter, lither fighting force. With

Rumsfeld's star rising and the generals' tarnished, he can be expected to mount a new

offensive on their bureaucratic turf at the first opportunity.

He might want to start by junking the Army's attack helicopter. The current

version, the <A HREF="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/ah-64d.htm">AH-64D Apache Longbow</A> , is in many ways a vast improvement over

earlier models, but it is still too dangerous to the pilots who fly it and not

dangerous enough to the enemy it's designed to attack.

The U.S. Army's only disastrous operation in Gulf War II (at least the only

one we know about) took place on <A HREF="http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A29946-2003Apr4&notFound=true">March 24</A>, when 33 Apache helicopters were

ordered to move out ahead of the 3rd Infantry Division and to attack an Iraqi

Republican Guard regiment in the suburbs of Karbala. Meeting heavy fire from small

arms and shoulder-mounted rocket-propelled grenades, the Apaches flew back to

base, 30 of them shot up, several disablingly so. One helicopter was shot

down in the encounter, and its two crewmen were taken prisoner.

After that incident, Apaches were used more cautiously—on reconnaissance

missions or for firing at small groups of armored vehicles. Rarely if ever did

they penetrate far beyond the front line of battle, out in front of U.S. ground

troops or without the escort of fixed-wing aircraft flying far overhead.

Shortly afterward, when a speech by Saddam Hussein was broadcast over Iraqi

television, some armchair commentators observed that the speech was probably

live, or at least very recent, because he referred to the downing of an Apache.

In fact, that proved nothing. If one thing could have been predicted before

the war started, it was that an Apache would be shot down.

Last year, during the Afghanistan war, seven Apaches were flown in to attack

Taliban fighters as part of Operation Anaconda. They all got shot up, again by

RPGs and machine-gun fire. None crashed, but five were so damaged they were

declared "non-mission-capable"—in other words, unable to go back into combat

without extensive repair—after the first day.

In the 1999 air war over Kosovo, 24 Apache helicopters were transported to

the allied base in Albania. Their arrival was anticipated by many officers and

analysts as a turning point in the war. Yet, within days, two choppers crashed

during training exercises. Commanders decided not to send any of them into

battle; the risk of losing them to Serbian surface-to-air missiles was considered

too great.

Attack helicopters have always been troublesome. The U.S. Army lost over

5,000 helicopters in the Vietnam War. (Nor is this a uniquely American problem:

The Soviets lost hundreds of Hind helicopters to mujahideen firing

shoulder-launched Stinger missiles during their Afghan venture.)

This sorry chronicle raises the question: Why did the Army build helicopters

in the first place?

It all goes back to the end of World War II, when the Air Force became an

independent service of the armed forces. (Before and during the war, air forces

were a branch of the Army.) In its first few years of independence, the Air

Force became involved in tumultuous budget battles with the other services.

Finally, in April 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal called a meeting with

the service chiefs in Key West, Fla., where they divvied up "roles and

missions." The emerging document was called the <A HREF="http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/armyxxiav.htm">Key West Agreement</A> . An informal

understanding that grew out of the accord was that the Air Force (and, to an

extent, the Navy) would have a monopoly on fixed-wing combat planes.

The Key West Agreement specified that one mission of the Air Force would be

close air support for Army troops on the battlefield. However, it soon became

clear that the Air Force generals—enamored of the A-bomb and then the H-bomb—

had no interest in this task. To their minds, the next war would be a nuclear

war. Armies would play no serious role, so why divert airplanes to giving them

cover?

The Army realized it would have to provide its own air support. Blocked from

building its own fixed-wing planes, it built rotary-wing planes (or, in

civilian parlance, helicopters). And it built thousands of them.

During the Vietnam War, the Air Force's reluctance—at times refusal—to

provide close air support became a grave problem. Congressional hearings were held

on the lack of any airplane dedicated to that mission. Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara briefly brought a wing of the Navy's late-'40s A-1 fighter

bombers out of mothballs to take up some of the slack.

Finally, the Army got bold and began research and development on a hybrid

aircraft, a bizarre-looking fixed-wing helicopter called the Cheyenne.

McNamara killed the Cheyenne before it got off the ground, but meanwhile, an

Air Force general named Richard Yudkin was furious about the Army's maneuver.

He saw it as an infringement of the Key West Agreement and a raid on the Air

Force's share of the budget. In response, he initiated the Air Force's very

first dedicated close-air-support attack plane called the A-X, which grew into

the A-10.

Yudkin was a bit of a rebel within the Air Force. The establishment generals

(who, by the early '70s, were still dominated by the nuclear-bomber crowd)

hated the idea of the A-X for the same reason they hated the close-air-support

mission: It had nothing to do with the Air Force's bigger, more glamorous roles.

Yudkin couldn't even get the Air Force R &D directorate to work on the

project, so he set up his own staff to do it.

The A-10 rolled onto the tarmac in 1976. The brass still hated the thing. It

survived only because of pork-barrel politics—it was built by Fairchild

Industries in Bethpage, Long Island, home district of Rep. Joseph Addabbo, who was

chairman of the House appropriations' defense subcommittee. The plan was to

build 850 of the planes. By 1986, when Addabbo died, Fairchild had built just

627, and the program came to a crashing halt. No more A-10s were ordered, and 197

of those in existence were transferred to the Air National Guard and allowed

to rot.

When the first Gulf War was being planned in 1990, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf,

the chief of U.S. Central Command, had to fight the Air Force to send over a

mere 174 A-10s for his use. Yet in the course of the war, those A-10s knocked

out roughly half of the 1,700 Iraqi tanks that were destroyed from the air, as

well as several hundred armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery

guns. They also conducted search and rescue operations, blew up roads and

bridges, and hunted for Scuds.

Even the Air Force brass had to admit the planes had done a good job, and

they kept them in the fleet. (They had planned on replacing all of them with

modified F-16s.) Though the statistics aren't yet in, the A-10s seemed to do well

in Gulf War II, especially now that the Army, Air Force, and Marines are more

inclined to <A HREF="http://slate.msn.com/id/2081388/">coordinate</A> their battle plans.

The <A HREF="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/a-10.htm">A-10</A> is an unsightly, lumbering beast of a plane. (It's commonly called

the Warthog.) It flies low and slow, but its cockpit is made of titanium; it

can be shot up very badly, all over, and still not crash. It was the only plane

that the Desert Storm air commanders dared fly at under 15,000 feet. Its GAU-8

gun can fire 3,900 rounds of 30 mm armor-piercing ammo per minute. It can

also fire Maverick air-to-ground missiles.

So here's a suggestion for Donald Rumsfeld: Deep-six the Apache, and restart

the A-10.

[Rattler]

Oops, ment to add:

With regards to the often discussed vulerability of helos in TO: Seems TO models the use of helos quite nicely, sending out 33 apaches ahead of my attack force overflying suspected enemy positions and engaging in small arms range would have me lose quite a few in the game as well, well done Major!

[MajorH TacOps Developer]

Thanks.

Please keep in mind though that the article above by Fred Kaplan is pretty dimwitted. The statistics and history are probably OK, but his conclusion to dump the Apache is just plain silly.

[ng cavscout]

Originally posted by DS CavScout:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by NG cavscout:

I was active from 90-94, in Wisconsin National Guard now. where were you stationed? Once a Scout, always a Scout.

I was with 3-35 Armor in Bamberg, Germany. Went and fought in the 1st gulf war, then my unit deactivated and i finished up back at knox with 5-15 Cav, right back where i started </font>

[Scout_42MDP]

I've thought about joinin the guard recently. They have a Cav troop about 45 minutes away from me. But now I'm old and fat... and WAY too hardcore for the weekend warriors