How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

[MikeyD]

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. This war was always going to go on until Russia didn't want to do it anymore. That's not a matter of military strategy but of Russian sanity.

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, MikeyD said:

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. This war was always going to go on until Russia didn't want to do it anymore. That's not a matter of military strategy but of Russian sanity.

Sorry, to be more exact I meant there was an expectation by some that the injection of NATO hardware would end the war / collapse the Russian defences. NATO hardware is obviously doing a lot to help sustain the AFU in the fight but its not a magic I win button as some hoped it might. 

Edited 1 hour ago by ArmouredTopHat

[Joe982]

55 minutes ago, MikeyD said:

The NATO hardware did shift the tide, though, but there's a difference between shifting the tide and draining the ocean, if I may use an awkward analogy. 

Excellent analogy thank you!

[Battlefront.com]

3 hours ago, The_Capt said:

I definitely fall into that last camp. Why? Well the major reasons is that the trend lines we saw before this war are matching observations we see on the battlefield in Ukraine.

All of what you said, but adding that ISR isn't the only armor unfriendly trend we've been watching for decades and discussing here.  I speak, of course, our out friend precision munitions.  In particular top attack precision AT.

To recap this very quickly, for a long time the West has coasted along without an adequate defense for a weapon that, eventually, their enemies would be able to field.  Decades, in fact.  APS has struggled to get to the point where MAYBE it can defeat top attack munitions, but unfortunately for APS makers a new threat (unmanned) has emerged and it is unlikely to offer a solution for it.  At the very least, not any time soon and certainly not without the procurement and engineering costs going up.  Since these systems are already frighteningly expensive, it should have nations questioning whether APS is ever likely to be viable, especially given the reasons to question if the costs of the platform itself are worth it.

Obviously I'm also in the camp that believes the TankIsDead™ and that traditional maneuver doctrine needs to be completely rethought.  Those in the middle, the ones who think it hasn't gone that far, are worth listening to because they don't completely disagree and therefore might make some suggestions that are productive.  But the ones who think this is a fad are a waste of time other than to learn what their arguments are so they can be effectively trashed in the decision making rooms.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, ArmouredTopHat said:

In straight up capabilities I would agree with Steve and imagine Russia would get utterly mauled, there is a reason why they have been so reluctant to fight with NATO forces

Yes, I believe that if NATO and Russia had gone to war in 2022, instead of Ukraine and Russia, this war have been over within a few weeks or months.  Hopefully not with nukes, but that's one scenario I would not rule out their use.  The premise is that NATO would have trashed all of Russia's forces (air, land, and sea) so horribly and so quickly that military and/or political collapse would have been unavoidable.  Losses for NATO would have no influence on this outcome.

If it played out this way the deep stocks for munitions and replacement systems would, ironically, be less than it is now even though NATO isn't fighting in this war at all!

However, this is just theory.  As confident as I am that it would play out this way, it absolutely could fail to do so and leave Russia functional and in possession of lands NATO was trying to liberate.  In that case, the amount of replacements could be a major issue.  At a minimum it would require countries engaged in the fighting figure out how to rapidly jump start very expensive production and to do so immediately.  That is rarely the most cost effective strategy.

I'm also in the camp that Russia is so compromised that it won't be a threat to any other neighbor, not to mention NATO members, for a decade after this current war ends.  At least.  It would be good to have NATO's ducks in a row now so that when Russia reconstitutes its ability to wage new wars it is ready for it.

And then there's China...

Steve

 

[Battlefront.com]

6 hours ago, Offshoot said:

No skin in this game, but from foggy memory, was not something done a while back to enable a post of his to be pinned? And he does have a moderator badge.

Ah!  Well, yeah duh.  He has a moderator badge.  Turns out we gave that to him and Bil in 2020 because of Cold War related activities.  I don't think either he or Bil ever used those special powers, for good or evil, so I rescinded them.  They are now mere mortals as far as the Forum software is concerned.

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

4 hours ago, Vanir Ausf B said:

Lengthy article on the tactical situation near Pokrovsk.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/09/17/7475408/

 

That's interesting.  His points about the wisdom of not using badly positioned defenses is sound, but the question is why are defenses badly positioned?  I had the impression that all of them were constructed since the fall of Avdiivka, not pre-2022 when the threat of drones wasn't in the equation yet.

It's also interesting to ponder why Russia is seemingly using infantry instead of artillery to keep its advances going.  Is it voluntary or are conditions such that it's obligatory?

Steve

[ArmouredTopHat]

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

Obviously I'm also in the camp that believes the TankIsDead™ and that traditional maneuver doctrine needs to be completely rethought.  Those in the middle, the ones who think it hasn't gone that far, are worth listening to because they don't completely disagree and therefore might make some suggestions that are productive.  But the ones who think this is a fad are a waste of time other than to learn what their arguments are so they can be effectively trashed in the decision making rooms.

To be clear, I consider myself to be in the middle of that spectrum. I think the days of concentrated mechanised warfare cold war style are almost certainly over (they certainly cannot be approached in the way the Russians are doing currently if you want to preserve your fighting power over any length of time) My view is that approaches can be reworked and adapted to find better in the conditions at least present in Ukraine. This would work even better with appropriate design considerations and definitive battlefield shaping operations. There must be a greater effort to deny enemy ISR and drone striking potential, which in its own right has become in effect a second layer of air warfare. Whichever side dominates that spectrum is going to win all the harder with its mobile elements less constrained and able to deal decisive blows. 

Overall all though, things are most certainly not 'fine' as they stand and this cannot be ignored, that much is evident. 

I also think those who think this is a 'fad' completely misunderstand the impact drones overall are achieving, I am not sure one would apply that logic when we are still barely figured out counters to the current generation of drones, let alone the next. I certainly dont see drones or attitudes going back to before 2022 in that regard. 
 

1 hour ago, Battlefront.com said:

To recap this very quickly, for a long time the West has coasted along without an adequate defense for a weapon that, eventually, their enemies would be able to field.  Decades, in fact.  APS has struggled to get to the point where MAYBE it can defeat top attack munitions, but unfortunately for APS makers a new threat (unmanned) has emerged and it is unlikely to offer a solution for it.  At the very least, not any time soon and certainly not without the procurement and engineering costs going up.  Since these systems are already frighteningly expensive, it should have nations questioning whether APS is ever likely to be viable, especially given the reasons to question if the costs of the platform itself are worth it.

To this, some good summaries: 

Quote

One important development is that the Russians have made several modifications to their tanks that are reducing the effectiveness of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). First, they are fitting vehicles – as well as many defensive positions – with anti-thermal material,46 which is proving highly effective. Second, modification to the engine deck and thus the heat plume from the vehicle’s exhaust and engine is reducing the reliability of where certain ATGMs engage the target. Third, by fighting at dusk and dawn when the vehicle temperature is most similar to the ambient temperature of the surroundings (known as ‘thermal crossover’), the vehicles are harder to detect through thermal imagery.47 The result is a significant decrease in the probability of kill from several ATGM types, although this is only achievable by imposing a range of tactical constraints on the employment of Russian armour.

Source: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf

RUSI have also pointed out in the past ATGM teams suffered heavily if the tank detects them (which happens more than you might think, especially if they fire:
 

Quote

Furthermore, evidence from Ukraine suggests that fighting armoured forces is difficult and dangerous for ATGM-armed dismounted light infantry, even if they possess Javelin, one of the most effective and lethal systems currently available. If such forces are detected by enemy tank crews they become acutely vulnerable to the tank’s main armaments, which cause large numbers of casualties.72 The main gun of an MBT can also outrange all but the most capable of ATGMs, such as Javelin, and the evidence from Ukraine indicates that the addition of thermal shielding to Russian T90s could successfully reduce the effective range of Javelin to well within that of the vehicle’s main armament by making it harder for the command launch unit to lock on to targets.73

Source: chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://static.rusi.org/heavy-armoured-forces-in-future-warfare-occasional-paper-december-23.pdf

There are reasonable means a tank can employ to defend itself on the passive side (which are much cheaper than the active measures) Of course top attacks are still highly lethal, especially against tanks with little dedicated protection against them. Outside of course, a tank can do plenty to avoid being shot at in the first place (which is where that drone recon comes in!) Strv 122s upgraded top scheme protection (MEXAS) has made a significant difference in its ability to survive such attacks for instance, a relatively minor modification that has paid dividends. I know I mention Strv 122 a lot but its one of the few tanks with that heightened emphasis on top attack that is likely to be followed up on by others. 

Edited 36 minutes ago by ArmouredTopHat