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TheDesertFox

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  1. Folks, This is the situation: The bad news: Geocities screwed up the complete "The DesertFox" site including my CM subsection "CombatAddiction" and the whole Pantherfibel, Nahverteidigungswaffe, Panther-Article etc... And due to real life commitments I have absolutely zero time for restoring the site in the next months. I am pretty pissed !!! The good news: Because I´m a cautious guy I have a backup of the whole site and all its content AND, perhaps more important, some time ago I uploaded all my CM-Mods to a mirror site at NBCI. So you still can download my stuff from the links given below. I contacted Mensch, Matt and Manx and eventually my CM-MODS will find a new home on their sites. We will see. Here are the URLs of the files at NBCI: http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/filename.zip [Terrain MODs] desertfox_lowres_grass.zip dfhiresgrass.zip dflowresgrid.zip dfhiresgrid.zip [Waffen SS MOD] oak-summer.zip [Kangaroo MOD] ram_kangaroo.zip [Pedro´s MOD] JagdpanzerIVmod.zip [Gordon´s MOD] Ram_Kangaroo_DF_GM_hr.zip http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/desertfox/filename.zip [TigerIE MODs - lores] 112.zip 221.zip 313.zip 314n.zip TigerIE.zip http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/magua/filename.zip [Maguas halftrack MODs] http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/magua/Hi-Res SdKfz_251 (camo paint V2.zip http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/magua/Lo-Res SdKfz 251_v2 (camo paint).zip http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/magua/Hi-Res SdKfz_251 (foliage V2.zip http://members.nbci.com/thedesertfox1891/magua/Lo-Res SdKfz 251_v2 (foliage).zip cheers Helge [ 06-14-2001: Message edited by: TheDesertFox ]
  2. Hehehe, he wasn´t sacked and became "Hartzielkommandant" at Schießbahn 9 at Bergen battlerange. BTW: I agree, excellent book. Reading it somehow reminded me at my times at KTS 2 Munster. He is a very kind guy and knows his stuff. I ordered my book last year from him personally. cheers Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  3. I thought some of you might find this an interesting read in the context of Worthington Force, Hill 140 and Operation Totalize Phase II. BTW: Hill 140 was the Phase II Objective of 1st Polish Armoured Division which suffered badly during Totalize. They lost 26 tanks in a few minutes on 8th August alone and 66 tanks in total during Totalize. Snippet from AMENDMENT TO REPORT NO. 169 HISTORICAL SECTION CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS by (C.P. Stacey) Colonel, Director Historical Section. 3 July 47 74. To carry out the Corps Commander's intention, Brigadier Booth ordered the B.C.R. - Alq R. group "to advance to pt 195 and to reach objective by first light". (W.D., H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 9 Aug 44). The attempt to carry out these orders produced a most costly action. Having got far off its axis during the advance the combined force was almost annihilated. 75. The column moved off from near Gaumesnil a little after 0200 hours, brushed aside enemy resistance at Cintheaux and engaged between Hautmesnil and Cauvicourt on the way down. Pushing on to Bretteville-le-Rabet, our troops were fired on from the woods north of the town. As "Halpenny Force" of Lake Sup R. (Mot) and C.G.G. was just arriving in the area, the question arose whether it would not be better to wait until Bretteville was cleared before going any further. The commanding officer, Lt-Col D.G. Worthington of B.C.R., decided that the force must drive on in the hope of achieving surprise. (W.Ds., 28 Cdn Armd Regt and Alq R., 9 Aug 44) 76. 28 Cdn Armd Regt led off, firing as it went. As the tanks got deeper into hostile country, they soon discovered how effectively the German positions had been camouflaged and the diarist describes how haystacks were apt to explode and bullets ricochet off haymounds. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44). One company and one squadron had apparently been left behind to deal with enemy resistance encountered en route, and this company ("D" Coy) is reported as in action at a cross-roads (118510) about 2000 yards north-east of Bretteville-le-Rabet. The remainder of the force fought on past Estrées-la-Campagne to the high ground to the south and east. Enemy opposition around Bretteville-le-Rabet was probably responsible for the decision to move by the east of that village "and flank well out to the left to get around the resistance" (ibid). The leading tanks obviously strayed from their course (W.D. 28 Cdn Armd Regt remarks "The light was very poor this early in the morning", and later "High ground was sighted, and we headed for it"). This high ground on which they established themselves was described by many different references. It was certainly, however, the wooded area in the centre of the triangle between Estrées-la-Campagne, Soignolles and Rouvres, some 6500 yards north-east of their objective and on the wrong side of the Falaise road [This location is referred to by the diary of 28 Cdn Armd Regt as Hill 143, at M.R. 144490; the History of 10 Cdn Inf Bde as Point 82, 8000 yards east of Point 195; and by Major Monk, in an eye-witness account appended to the diary of Alq R. as Hill 140 which is at M.R. 135478, while the diary of Alq R. says M.R. 143490. Examination of the ground by Colonel C.P. Stacey on 9 Aug 46 (the precise second anniversary of the action) indicates that this last position (about one-and-a-half miles east of Estrées) is accurate. Many of the B.C.R. tanks (perhaps 15 to 20 - trees and undergrowth made precise count difficult) still remained on the spot, shot through-and-through by the enemy guns. See Report No. 157]. The text of the War Diary of H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Bde states that there was no communication with 28 Cdn Armd Regt after 0624 hours, but this is disproved by the operations log attached to the Diary (Appx 5). At the time just mentioned the unit reported itself at 105498 (just south-east of Bretteville-le-Rabet). At 0643 hours it was reported "Objective LESS 1800 metres... forming up now to reach objective"; and at 0655 hours the following message from 28 Cdn Armd Regt was entered in the log: Objective 0650 hours. No evidence of enemy occupation - but recent signs. Few lorries destroyed, slit trenches and tools about. We are holding until our friends come fwd to consolidate. At 0755 hours the unit gave its position as recorded in the log as 0964. This location (close to Caen) makes no sense, but clearly should read 0946, the summit of Point 195. There can thus be no doubt that the unit's headquarters actually believed that it was on the objective. By 0800 hours the troops were dug in on the hill and came under "traffic 88-mm fire from North and North-east" which knocked out several tanks. (W.D., Alq R., 9 Aug 44). From the main positions "B" Squadron was sent forward to secure high ground in front. Under supporting fire from one troop, a second cleared the position indicated, when suddenly tanks began to flare up, and not one from either troop (it would appear from the war diary) was able to return. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44) 77. Meanwhile, No. 2 Troop of "B" Squadron had "advanced on centre line decided on in 'B' Sqn 'O' Group" and had got as far as Hill 151 south-west of Bretteville-le-Rabet. The "O" Group referred to was held near Estrées, and the line of advance was presumably south-west from there. Here it was fired on by two anti-tank guns. These were knocked out and groups of enemy infantry were encountered too frightened to fight on. The isolated troop then fell back and joined another squadron ("A", the detached one) near Estrées-la-Campagne, where a German tank reported to be a Tiger had been cornered and driven into the village. While our tanks were killing it, four of them were knocked out, and the rest, except two which pushed on towards the main force, were pinned down and unable to move from their position. They succeeded in destroying another Tiger, but were themselves eventually knocked out. The two tanks which reached the main body made the dismal report that hostile armour and anti-tank guns had completely cut off the approaches, and that no further reinforcements from the original battle group could get through. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44) [There seems little doubt that No. 2 Troop of “B” Sqn took the line of advance intended for the whole regiment, but that the main body in some way strayed from this line and went east instead of south-west]. 78. Throughout the morning continuous fire swept the position. Tanks were being hit, bursting into flames, and exploding their ammunition. Lt-Col Worthington, whose tank was one of the first hit, eventually concentrated all the serviceable armour in "the south-west corner" (W.D., Alq R., 9 Aug 44) and continued the fight. During the battle the defenders wee assisted greatly by Typhoons which supported them with rocket and cannon. Casualties included Lt-Col Hay of Alq R. badly wounded in the leg. Fortunately a daring attempt to evacuate wounded succeeded in breaking through the encircling enemy. On the way out one of the vehicles carrying the wounded was hit by an 88-mm shell, but at 1040 hours the rest got back to 10 Cdn Inf Bde. Numerous small counter-attacks were launched from all sides during the day, and at noon Lt-Col Worthington, commander of the dwindling garrison on the hill, took stock of his resources. He found that there were about eight tanks left undamaged from the 60 that had started the advance. Tank crews had suffered heavily in both killed and wounded, and there were eight dead and 25 wounded from the infantry (ibid). About 1500 hours the shelling and mortaring increased in intensity. The Germans then counter-attacked with infantry and tanks, but were held off by the aid of rocket-firing Typhoons. Now that the infantry were well entrenched, Lt-Col Worthington ordered all tanks that could still run to make a dash for it, using fire and movement to effect their escape. Acting on this order, the remaining eight tanks got out safely. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44) 79. It was now accepted by those of our garrison who still survived that they were not on their objective, but it was decided to hold on as long as possible in the hope that the officer who had taken the convoy of wounded back to Brigade would be able to arrange some assistance. At 1700 hours the defenders on the hill were encouraged and excited by the prospects of help, when they saw friendly tanks coming towards them from the direction of Soignolles. But this new hope was soon abandoned, for not knowing the plight of the troops on the high ground ahead, and hard-pressed because of their own casualties, the Poles turned around and went back to safer ground. (W.D., Alq R., 9 Aug 44). A little after 1800 hours another strong counter-attack was put in from the south-east by a force estimated at two infantry companies and supported by a vicious concentration of mortar fire, which added further casualties and burnt up one of the four disabled tanks which could still fire. The besieging infantry were held off, but a mixed force of Tiger and Panther tanks was able to come within 200 yards and fire across our positions. At this time a mortar bomb killed Lt-Col Worthington as he was evacuating the wounded to the slight cover of a hedgerow. This gallant stand, against increasing and hopeless odds, came to an end at dusk. At some time between 2100 and 2230 hours the remnants of the two infantry companies, together with 12 or 14 unhorsed tank-men, made their way down the slope through the wheatfields and succeeded in reaching the Polish lines at Renémesnil. (W.Ds., 28 Cdn Armd Regt and Alq R., 9 Aug 44) 80. In this isolated and heroic episode the B.C.R. on its first day in action lost five officers killed, including the Commanding Officer, five officers missing and four officers wounded; while 33 other ranks were reported missing and 78 wounded. Forty-seven tanks were lost during the day. (W.D., 28 Cdn Armd Regt, 9 Aug 44). Of the two companies of Alq R. which had helped so valiantly to hold the mistaken hill only three officers and 79 other ranks were fit for duty. Known casualties were 12 dead and 46 wounded. (W.D., Alq R., 11 Aug 44) cheers Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  4. Hi Lawyer, St. Vith was 99% wiped out in December 44. There is absolutely nothing left of the ancient town (I was there at eastern last year) I would recommend to stay in either Clerf (Clerveaux) with its nice medieval Chateaux in the middle of the town (now Museum) and the old Abbey nearby (10 minute walk), or Malmedy. enjoy your trip Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  5. Cris, Try to tell this the authorities. Seriously, Entertainment and showing forbidden symbols in one application is a no go as RMC already said. What has money to do with it ? Well you have to pay some lawyers if you want to go to court with your product and enforce a lawsuit with the intention to have it accepted. And if (BIG IF) there will be a trial it will take a lot of time. Time you don´t have if you want to stay in business. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  6. Hehheehe, You can try of course if you have too much money and don´t know how to spend it except throwing it out of the window. As Dschugaschwili already said. A game is a game, may it be historically accurate or not doesn´t matter. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  7. Just in case you want to dig deeper into these issues. Here are some websites which deal with the topic. They are all in german so you will need someone who is familiar with translating german law terms into U.S. law terms without loosing the sophisticated meaning. Here we go: Some relevant paragraphs of the Strafgesetzbuch: [ http://public.rz.fh-wolfenbuettel.de/~danielzi/gesetze.htm#TOP ] Verbreiten von Propagandamitteln verfassungswidriger Organisationen (§ 86) Verwendung von Kennzeichen verfassungswidriger Organisationen (§ 86a) Volksverhetzung (§ 130) Aufstachelung zum Rassenhaß / Gewaltdarstellung (§ 131) The "Bundespruefstelle" you can find here : [ http://www.bpjs.bmfsfj.de/top/sonstige/Gesetze/ix4756_27132.htm ] Here are some sites which enlarge upon the laws : http://www.learn-line.nrw.de/angebote/computerspiele/bpjs1.htm http://www.jugendmedienschutz.de/sec3/item3a.htm#4 As already said above, as long as you avoid showing Swastikas or SS Symbols, I don´t see problems. cheers Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  8. Steve, The use of the term Waffen-SS is no problem in games. See Westfront by Talonsoft. The only thing you have to avoid is showing the Swastika or SS Runes. You guys can turn it as you want. CM is and stays a game and thus is subject to monitoring of the "Bundespruefstelle für jugendefaehrdende Schriften". To show Swastikas and Waffen SS Insignia is only allowed in a historical, educational context. This means in history books, Photo collections, etc. which deal with the context. cheers Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  9. That would be a nice feature, no question, but we IMHO furthermore really need the possibility to model 100 metres height difference with these smooth elevation settings. I dunno if this would be possible to be coded but it would add a lot to the flavour of the game. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  10. Does anyone know what what happened ? I would hate to see the content of Col.Klotz site vanish forever. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  11. Michael, No offence here. I guess I will have to further refine my english skills. There is always something to improve As for CM: Personally speaking it is no show stopper for me [see: http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/006571.html ] We had a related discussion in the past. I have to admit though that I think it would be a nice feature for CM-2. As for the scale of CM. IMHO it depends on the scenario you are playing/designing. If e.g. it is a breakthrough, latewar doctrine was to use an Infanterie Division for the break in and to use Panzerdivisions for the exploitation. I think fighting while mounted should be modelled with very limited accuracy if it is possible to code this in. As already mentioned, the main purpose was to keep the bad guys head down and it was not the purpose to hit a fly at 500 metres. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  12. Steve, Exactly that is what "fighting while mounted" meant. Stay with the tanks and stay mobile as long as possible. Suppress the enemy (nothing more is possible while driving) at the maximum to keep the momentum of the tank attack. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  13. Michael, Please bear in mind that that Panzergrenadiere execute completely different missions than infantry forces. To be clear, I speak of the Panzergrenadierbattalion (gep.) and not the truck mounted mechanized Infanterie. The halftrack mounted Panzergrenadiere are to closely follow the Tanks and to support them against enemy infantry. This is mobile warfare as it is practiced today. Their employment is strictly tied to the actual objective of the commitment of the tanks. In this context it is very important to understand that dismounted combat is very time consuming and incurs the danger of leaving the tanks stationary and thus increasing their vulnerability. It is not the task of Panzergrenadiere (gep.) to control terrain assigned to them and clear out enemy resistance that is there. That´s the job of Infanterie. The task of Panzergrenadiere is to lead wide ranging maneuvers and to deliver massive blows in close coordination with tanks. Thus it is eminently important to stay mobile. To not put a brake on the fluidity of the movement and the dynamics of tank operations. Basically the three primary missions of Panzergrenadiere are to: 1st) Overcome defiles, obstacles (in cooperation with Panzer Pioniere (gep.)) and barriers with speed and surprise. 2nd) Rapidly advance through enemy held areas in which opportunities for observation and fields of fire are limited and, if necessary, claim the battlefield in dismounted combat. 3rd) Take and hold terrain sectors that do not have clear fields of observation and/or are difficult to negotiate in advance of other forces. Keeping the momentum of the tank movements is of great importance here. I hope this makes clear that tactically speaking Panzergrenadiere were different from Infanterie and thus used different doctrine. Thus they fought mounted as long as possible, threw handgrenades, fired their rifles, their MGs while mounted, because they needed to stay mobile. Of course you can´t clear enemy resistance in a town or wood while fighting from a halfrack, but that simply wasn´t the task of Panzergrenadiere. They had to fight with the tanks and screen them against enemy infantry and keep mobility while doing this and push for the objective which usually is the enemy artillery and supply depots. I hope this helps to understand the difference in doctrine between Panzergrenadiere (gep.) and mechanized (mot.) Panzergrenadiere which essentially were tasked Infanterie missions and not Panzergrenadier missions. Just in case someone doesn´t understand why I frequently use the word mission and what this means. We, german army then and now, have something called Auftragstaktik (mission oriented orders). That means that you only tell your subordinates WHAT you want them to acchieve and WHY you want them to acchieve this. You don´t tell them HOW. It is up to the subordinate leader to figure out the details to complete the mission. This gives him full flexibility and a maximum of freedom within his borders. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  14. Just in case some of you are seriously interested to dig deeper into this. Here are some quotes and a list of relevant primary documents which deal with the subject. Heeresdienstvorschrift 298/3a (Berlin 1944) concerning command and control and combat operations for Panzergrenadiere "Fuehrung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere" - translated by Wolfgang Schneider: "Mechanized Panzergrenadiere are the armored assault troops (Sturmtruppen) of the Panzerdivision. Their unique, rapidly maneuvering operations form the prerequisite for operational commitment. Together with tanks they form a close combat team. They carry out independent assignments in bold, rapid action. A high level of maneuverability, all-terrain capability, armored protection, highfirepower and an abundant outfitting of the means of command and control enable them to master difficult situations rapidly and succesfully. Mechanized Panzergrenadier formations fight from Schuetzenpanzerwagen. Enemy action and terrain can temporarily force them to a rapid change from mounted combat to fighting on foot. Even during dismounted operations, the heavy weapons mounted on the Schuetzenpanzerwagen (antitankguns and mortars) in mobile commitment give them a unique capability. Combat elan and boldness, united with lightning-fast power of decision and great maneuverability, characterize the Panzergrenadier." H.Dv.299/4a, Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942: "Zusammenwirken mit Panzerkräften ist eine der wesentlichsten Aufgaben [...] Blitzschnelles Erfassen günstiger durch den Panzerangriff gegebener Einsatzmöglichkeiten [...], kühnes Ausnutzen der Lähmung des Feindes und ständige engste Verbindung mit dem Panzerverband sind von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung für den Erfolgg. [...] Feindliche Widerstandsnester im Hauptkampffeld, Feldstellungen und Schützenlöcher, die von den Panzerkampfwagen nicht erfaßt bzw. nicht niedergekämpft werden konnten, werden infolge des besseren Blickfeldes vom Schützenpanzerwagen leichter erkannt und mit Bordwaffen, Maschinenpistolen, Gewehren und Handgranaten vom Fahrzeug aus vernichtet." HDv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942: "Rasches und rücksichtsloses Zupacken ist die Vorbedingung für den Erfolg ... Zwingen Feindlage und Gelände zum Absitzen, so ist rascher Wechsel zwischen Kampf zu Fuß und Kampf vom Fahrzeug... anzustreben." HDv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die schnellen Truppen, Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.) vom 25. Mai 1942: "Panzerschutz und Geländegängigkeit machen die Schützenkompanie (gp.) zur Zusammenarbeit mit Panzerverbänden besonders geeignet ... Die Schützenkompanie ist zur Durchführung jeder infanteristischen Kampfaufgabe befähigt. Schnelligkeit und Geländgängigkeit, hohe Feuerkraft und Panzerschutz verleihen der Kompanie eine besonders starke Angriffskraft. Die Ausstattung mit gepanzerten Kraftfahrzeugen befähigt die Kompanie auch zum Kampf vom Fahrzeug. Entsprechend der Feindeinwirkung und dem Gelände wechseln Kampf vom Fahrzeug und Kampf zu Fuß einander rasch ab. [...] Der Schützenpanzerwagen ist ein Hauptkampfmittel der Schützenkompanie (gp.)." H.Dv, 130/2b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie. Heft 2b Die Schützenkompanie (mot.) der Infanteriedivision (mot.). Berlin 1941; H.Dv. 130/4b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie. Heft 4b Die Infanteriegeschützkompanie (mot.Z.) und die Kraftfahrgeschützkompanie, Berlin 1938; H.Dv. 130/9b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Infanterie, Heft 9b Vorläufige Richtlinien für Einsatz und Führung des Infanteriebataillons (mot.). Berlin 1941 H.Dv. 298/2a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe, Führung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere, Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie (2p.). Berlin 1944; H.Dv. 298/2b Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe. Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie, Berlin 1945; H.Dv. 298/3a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppe, Führung und Kampf der Panzergrenadiere, Heft 1 Das Panzergrenadierbataillon (gp.), Berlin 1944; H.Dv 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen. Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Schützenkompanie (gp.), Berlin 1942; H.Dv. 299/4a Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Schnellen Truppen. Heft 4a Ausbildung und Einsatz der Panzergrenadierkompanie a, Berlin 1943 H.Dv. 300/1 Truppenführung I.Teil, Berlin 1936 H.Dv. 300/2 Truppenführung II.Teil. Berlin 1934 und 1944 H.Dv 400/10 Ausbildungsvorschrift für die Panzertruppen. Heft 10 Richtlinen für den Kampf des Panzerregimentes und der Panzerabteilung. Berlin 1945; D644/2 Vorläufige Anweisung für die Ausbildung von Schützeneinheiten (mot.), Teil 2 Die MG Kompanie (mot.), Berlin 1936; D660/4 Mittlerer gepanzerter Kraftwagen (Sd.Kfz.251) auf Fahrgestell des Zugkraftwagen 3 t Typ Hkl 6p, Berlin 1943; Merkblatt 18b/38 Panzer helfen Dir ! Was der Grenadier vom gepanzerten Kampffahrzeug wissen muß, Berlin 1944; MerkbIatt 75/10 Taktisch richtiges Fahren mit SPW, Berlin 1944; Guderian, Heinz "Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit anderen Waffen", Berlin 1940 Wehren, Helmut von "Gefechtsausbildung der Panzergrenadiere", Berlin 1944 ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
  15. Michael, doesn´t matter what you call it, you can´t change what was done, and how it was done. Go ahead and talk with some veterans who served in armoured Panzerregiments and survived the war. You will easily be able to see that the drill was that as much fire as possible is sent in the direction of the bad guys in the shortest possible time if they encountered resistance. And then they had to decide if it was necessary to dismount or if it was possible to continue the firefight mounted. As I said it depends on the mission they had to complete, but to say they weren´t able to fight from the halftracks is ignoring the facts. Helge ------------------ Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate! - The DesertFox - Email: TheDesertFox@gmx.net WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891
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