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Did Roosevelt know that Japs were to strike Pearl Harbour?

It is a well known fact that Americans had broken the japanese diplomatic code and that the message sent to Jap Embassy to declare war was decrypted byAmerican government well before jap clerks did at the Embassy.

Moreover the jap ambassador was left waiting for more than a hour…just in time to have jap planes strike Pearl before war declaration….and strangely the two carriers, always in harbour in the weekends, were in mission at sea that day.

Now for more details read Pearl’s scapegoat Admiral Kimmel’s book…”Admiral Kimmel’s Story” (Henry Regnery,1955) and Rear Admiral Theobald’s “The Final Secret of Pearl Harbour” (Devin-Adair, 1954).

Roosevelt had well understood that after WWII USA would replace Great Britain in ruling the world and needed a fact to inflame anti-war public opinion to enter the war.

I would be very grateful to get some more info and opinions about this topic.

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There's been books written to advance that thesis, and websites and books written to denounce that thesis (that Roosevelt knew).

However, my opinion is that there's no way anyone would've had the foreknowledge and guts to make the call of "Let 'em bomb Pearl, we'll nuke 'em in '45." Could anyone have been sure enough of the carrier's supremacy to give away all the battleships? It's not plausible, and the people who say otherwise have only coincidence and supposition in their corner.

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admiral kimmel a scapegoat?!! the man was in charge of the most important naval base in the pacific. he was repeatedly warned throughout 1941 about a possible japanese attack on pearl by the us navy dept. he received an explicit war warning from the war dept on nov 27 yet did virtually nothing. as for the "theory" that the battleships were sacrificed so that the carriers could be saved that is nonsense. prior to dec 7 you'd have been lucky to find a handful of us naval officers who thought carriers were more important. also do you think any sane person would let his enemy deliver the first blow when the opportunity exists for an ambush? prior to dec 7 every us naval officer would have bet the ranch that the us navy would kick ass on the japanese fleet. only after the attack did we learn differently. sorry for the long rant but i'm tired of hearing about all these conspiracy theories. read gordon pranges "at dawn we slept" and "pearl harbor the verdict of history" he puts all these hokey theories to rest.

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What did FDR know and when did he know it? Bruce Lee has written a fine book on the breaking of the diplomatic code used by Japan during WW2 (Magic): "Marching Orders, the untold story of WW2", Crown pub. 1995.

Anybody who wants to consider the battle of secret in WW2 will find this a must read

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Despite all the little indications, such as the carriers being at sea, I am pretty sure we didn't know it was coming "then and there".

I agree, "At Dawn We Slept" is really a well researched and informative book. We got creamed due to mistaken beliefs that we were unasailible, and that the Japanese were no match for us...and a lot of STUPID little mistakes. We learned. The hard way.

All the information was RIGHT THERE, but, we were blind. In some cases intercepts were decrypted and sent and then put in the INBOX "because it was the weekend".

I think everybody knew an attack was immenant, I just don't think Roosevelt "knew" it would be at Pearl and wrote off the pacific fleet. 2300 servicemen lost. Almost half of those being still entombed in Arizona. Think of the political consequences if THAT ever leaked out. There would never be a Democratic president again.

No, we were just arrogant as we usually are. And we got rounced because of it.

Zamo

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This past weekend, Friday, I think, there was a talk by an author named Sinnet on the CSPAN Book TV. His book has just been published and is titled something like "Day of Deceit - FDR and Pearl Harbor". The author served in the Navy 1942-1946 and apparently has a solid feel for his material.

Mr. Sinnet is one of those who believes that not only did FDR know, so did Marshall, MacArthur and several others, but ADM Kimmel and GEN Short were kept in the dark.

He uses as his evidence, among other things, the original records that show one of the US Navy radio sites tracking the Japanese fleet on its approach.

There is also reference to a document which he found in some archives, written by a Navy officer named McCollum (sp?) who was a close aide to FDR. This fellow had laid out an 8-point plan on what would be required to get us into the war. One of the heavily stressed items was that Japan would have to commit the first blatant act of war.

Mr. Sinnet underscored several times that we do not now understand the situation at the time of Pearl Harbor because the anti-war movement, led by Charles Lindbergh was so strong. He said that a large majority of Americans were absolutely opposed to any entry into "Mr. Hitler's War."

I got the impression from his presentation that the premise was that both Churchill and FDR felt the situation was truly a desperate one - Hitler was winning in Europe, Japan was winning in the Pacific, and if the US did not enter the war, it was pretty much a guaranteed loss for Britain and Russia in the long term.

Apparently several of the items that McCollum came up with had to do with ways of provoking Japanese responses, including the stationing of the fleet at Pearl Harbor - which was not the normal duty station, rather it was somewhere in California. There was also discussion of what he called "Pop-up Cruisers" which were U.S. cruisers that would show up in various locations considered sensitive by the Japanese.

I only saw a small part of his presentation - basically answering odds 'n ends questions at the end of it. I would certainly like to read his book to get a better feel for it as he was pretty confident about his information.

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Marty said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>This past weekend, Friday, I think, there was a talk by an author named Sinnet on the CSPAN Book TV. His book has just been published and is titled something like "Day of Deceit - FDR and Pearl Harbor". The author served in the Navy 1942-1946 and apparently has a solid feel for his material.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I saw a show on the History Channel the other day on this subject. It was one of that series done by Roger Mudd. It had interviews with various key participants in the whole mess, including Brit codebreakers from Singapore, Dutch codebreakers from Java, etc. Plus it produced various documents by FDR staffers that Marty mentions in his post.

From seeing all this, there is no doubt in my mind that FDR knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor. All of the information was there for him. And it wasn't something he had to piece together from various sources--the whole thing was spelled out in total in a couple of documents.

It was not known just to FDR, either--even Nimitz had at least a strong hunch. To this end he turned down the command at Pearl and took a Stateside job instead just before the war so he'd survive the lynching afterwards and be in command for the actual fighting. This motivation is recorded in his personal papers.

As to Aacooper's problem with supposed prescience of carrier superiority, that cuts both ways. How could FDR have known the Pearl Harbor attack would have been so devastating to battleships? He probably thought, like everybody else at the time, that airplanes were no real threat to them, so letting the Japanese take a free shot at them seemed like a safe bet. There was also the feeling that Pearl was too shallow and narrow for torps--it's certainly narrower than Taranto.

But to me, regardless of the hard evidence, one need look no further than FDR's personal agenda. Marty is also correct in noting FDR's strong desire to get into the war, against popular sentiment. He was at best a socialist, at worst a commie, and either way a big fan of Stalin--he even sent cabinet members to Russia to study collectivized agriculture with the thought of doing the same thing here. So once Russia looked in trouble, FDR decided he had to fight the Germans to save his idol Stalin.

But due to popular sentiment, the US would only go to war if we were attacked first. However, this was beyond German capabilities except for U-boats. So he put US destroyers out to be shot at by U-boats for most of 1941. A few were sunk but this didn't create the uproar he needed.

OTOH, the Japanese had enough navy to really hit some of our stuff in the Pacific, and if they fought us, the Germans would probably honor their treaty and fight us also. So he did everything possible to provoke the Japanese into attacking us.

This was a project very high on FDR's priority list. So naturally, every time he tightened the screws on Japan, he would have monitored their reaction closely. It is therefore inconceivable that he would NOT have known of the Japanese decision to attack us--that was what he was looking for, after all. And thanks to the codebreaking efforts of the US, the Brits, and the Dutch, all the information was there for him to see. Not only the general decision, but also time and place of the attack.

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-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[This message has been edited by Bullethead (edited 06-27-2000).]

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A lot of interesting information in this thread. It's very enlightening to read such well founded opinions.

Even if FDR and others knew of the impending attack on Pearl, the US Congress only declared war on Japan. However Hilter's declaration of war on the USA was sufficient fuel for the USA to go to war with Germany and Italy.

I'd seriously consider the implications of what I wrote. The Majority of the USA didn't want or desire to fight in 'another' European War. Hilters' Actions along side the bombing of Pearl tilted the US population perspective, such that Congress would (and did) offer a counter-declaration of war on Germany.

I'd have to re-read the Berlin Pact, but I'm under the impression that Germany was not bounded into declaring war on the USA. Germany's formal declared war on the USA (Dec 11, 1941) is what lead to Congress approving the war versus Germany (and Italy).

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In late 1941 Russia had taken most of its eastern armies facing Japan to meet Germany at the Moscow battles. Russia was apparently routed.

Japan needed badly an access to an oilfield and the most convenient was in south east asia. Japan controlled Mandchouria and its coal from which it could made oil like Germany.

By the cash and carry the USA was already in the war at Britain side. Roosevelt was determined to bring the USA into the war.

The military clique in Japan was arrogant, so it decided that it could kick the ass of those bump yankees with their crude hardware. Yeah, but they have fantastic resources and resilience.

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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I'd have to re-read the Berlin Pact, but I'm under the impression that Germany was not bounded into declaring war on the USA. Germany's formal declared war on the USA (Dec 11, 1941) is what lead to Congress approving the war versus Germany (and Italy).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I've always wondered what would have happened if Germany had NOT declared war on us. Then where would FDR have been?

BTW, in case nobody's noticed, I'm not a fan of FDR.

------------------

-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

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Nice to see many americans arguing about this topic...that's why USA is a really democratic nation!

As to carriers someone forgot that Japanese were searching for them...and after only 6 months Midway was the turning point!

Many strange things happened about Pearl...last but not least...the final message to Adm. Kimmel was sent by civil wire without any priority!

The Trilateral Berlin Pact didn't consider the declaration of war to USA but FDR did know what on 29 Nov the jap ambassador Oshima in Germany had telegraphed to Tokyo referring its debate with Ribbentrop.

To the question "What will Germany do with countris aiding Great Britain?" Ribbentrop replied to Oshima "It's clear:if Japan will be engaged in awar against USA, Germany will aid Japan". (Shirer "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich")

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To add some more info to this topic let’s look at these facts:

1. On 19Nov Ambassador Nomura in Washington received the message “Winds”, promptly deciphered by Cordell Hull’s Magic clerks. This message said that if Tokyo Boroadcasting had transmitted the message “East wind, rain” Japan would have gone into war with America.

2. On 22Nov through Magic Hull and FDR knew that last jap proposals were ultimate and last date for american reply was 29Nov.

3. Nov 26 was a highly critical day. Pearl Harbour Striking Force left the Kuriles, and Secretary Hull presented the American answer to the last Japanese diplomatic proposal. Disregarding the possibility of a truce, Hull reaffirmed the longstanding American principles which demanded that Japan give up her military conquests in China and Indochina. It was so tough a note that shocked the Japanese Ambassadors, who dared not send it immediately to Tokyo. Even Americans were taken by surprise. Army and Navy officers were still working on compromise provisions for the President. Stark was worried. (The West Point Military History Series “ The Second World War, Asia and the Pacific”, pag.50)

4. On Dec 6 the lengthy Japanese reply to Hull’s proposals arrived in Washington. American code clerks, through Magic, deciphered the message. At about 10PM Lt Lestr R.Schulz, an assistant naval aide, presented the message to FDR , who was in conference with Hopkins. FDR carefully read the long message and then passed it to Hopkins, who also read it. Then “FDR turned to Hopkins and said, ‘This means war’. Schulz was ‘not sure of the exact words’ but had no doubt about the meaning. “ The President wanted to talk to Admiral Stark, but decided not to call him out of a theater, lest such action cause undue alarm. Shortly before midnight , the two men talked, but no call for action followed the conversation.(ibidem, pag.51)

Now it seems clear that American Government decided to let Japan go to war on Nov 26 and in the night of Dec 6 it seemed to FDR most important to let Stark at theater, keeping him in the dark about Japan going to war on the next day.

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I would have to agree with Cooper. Confidence in the carriers was not as high as the outcome of Midway might have shown. It could have gone the other way just as easily, and US would have been in big doodoo.

Woody

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I think that it's reasonable to presume that FDR could sense the approaching winds of war with Japan, if FDR and his cabinet had any bare inkling that what they demanded of the Japanese government (full withdrawl from occupied territories) couldn't be done by Japan without a major "loss of face."

But FDR having specific knowledge of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor? Anyone who buys into this allegation had better explain the following issues that don't seem to be broached:

1) What basis did FDR or any Allied intelligence service have that the raid was going to be a strict "hit & run"? What if Admiral Nagumo opted to have a follow-up raid and stuck around for another day or two?

2) In such a case, what would've prevented the USS Enterprise from being attacked, having arrived just after the historical raid? If the "foreknowledge" guided an effort to prevent the US carriers from being attacked, why was the Enterprise allowed to get so close to Hawaii?

3) One presumption for FDR letting the Japanese attck Pearl Harbor seems to be: "They'll only be attacking a bunch of old battleships." Uh....why limit to that? With added raids, the Japanese aircraft could just as well had knocked out the fuel storage tank farms that propped up the fleet and the based aircraft. As well as the submarine pens. Had severe damage been done to those, the US sub fleet's ability to interdict the Japanese west Pacific shipping routes would have been hampered for months. People seem to forget just how much historical damage the US subs did in WW2 (LOTS!).

Now let's connect all of the above into a "worst-case" scenario: The Japanese raids are followed up, more damage is done to Pearl, the Japanese have immediate air superiority, the US subs are wrecked, the Enterprise is sunk. Now let's assume that on the heels of the Japanese carrier force is an INVASION force fleet. How much would be around to stop that from approaching?

Was FDR really willing to contrive a "set-up" situation that MIGHT have lost Pearl Harbor and Hawaii as a military staging base, along with the majority of the Pacific fleet?

Would the Japanese have won the war by invading Hawaii there & then? Not necessarily. Time & attrition might still have brought about eventual defeat. But the time it would've taken to recover by retaking Hawaii and then to push westward would've chainlinked to all other events in the Pacific. Australia might have been blockaded and invaded in this time. Burma certainly would've been cleared out, and the Indian Ocean also under full Japanese control. How long then could the Chinese government hold out without seeking a separate peace?

There was much more to Pearl Harbor than a fleet anchorage. In logistics terms, it was a major stepping stone that helped tremendously for the US to carry the war to the Japanese. Was FDR really willing to allow a possible situation that would've amounted to losing this base and its capabilities? If proven absolutely so, then he'd be guilty of the grossest criminal negligence, along with his advisers and cabinet.

BUT it hasn't been absolutely proven to me yet. I'm more inclined to believe that FDR and the US military leaders felt that any surprise attack from the Japanese would've been directed first only against the Philippines, Wake, or Guam.

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Sanctions eventually led to this attack. It is important to remember that Japan went to war with the US to help secure China and for the resources (read oil) in SE Asia. Japan was compelled to alleviate the issue of it's flank by going to war with the US.

Did the US understand that it's actions would eventually lead to war? Almost certainly, but this period was clouded by arrogance that the Japanese would be "push overs". This mentality existed well into the war. Look at some of the surface actions that took place in and around the Solomons (most notably Savo Island).

Like the Japanese Navy, the USN, also struggled with the gun club faction. Who would've imagined the Japanese were capable of traveling thousands of miles from the home island and delivering this type of blow.

Did the US believe hostilities were iminent. Certainly, did they believe Pearl Harbor was the target. Unlikely. The Phillipines? Most Likely.

No matter. Whatever the outcome at Pearl Harbor, Japan was doomed to eventual defeat. Japan was also struck by the same misperceptions that the US was guilty of. However, Japan fought the economic equivalent of Godzilla.

Check out this website...

http://www.combinedfleet.com

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Apply the K.I.S.S. principle.

1) Conventional Military thinking in Dec of '41 said the Battlewagons counted. Carriers were considered fleet auxilary. The US would have wanted to protect their Pacific fleet and territory regardless of motive.

2) It is not unusual for someone to let the other guy get in the first punch to justify a fight. It is not usual to let the other guy cut off your right arm to justify a fight.

3) Therefore, Roosevelt and other U.S. leaders would never have sacrificed THE ENTIRE PACIFIC FLEET!! as a preliminary to war. Whatever Roosevelt knew or wanted, he did not sit by with full knowledge that a massive Japaneese fleet was about to hit Pearl while the U.S. military there was completely unready.

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OK, but if it was thought that japanese were pushovers and that carriers wouldn't be so powerful.

Then maybe the outcome of Pearl Harbour would have been total surprise to those who knew.

Maybe what FDR expected was a largely inefficient raid causing not much damage.

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Now let’s gain some other interesting info from West Point Military History (not some strange book….West Point you know).

Early the morning of Dec 7 the 14th part of the Japanese message was distributed to Washington authorities through MAGIC channels.

The 14th part announced :

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that, in view of the attitude of the American Government, it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

The President’s reaction to it was milder than his response had been to the first parts of the message the previous evening. The most involved War Department intelligence officer, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, reacted similarly. Upon seeing the interception of a much shorter message from Tokyo to Nomura, however, Bratton was shocked into action; the message instructed the Ambassador to submit the 14-part note to Secretary Hull at 1:00 PM on Dec 7. Convinced that Japan intended to attack some American installation in the Pacific, and that time and date in the message were significant, he wanted to warn field commanders. Having no authority to send such a message, at about 9:00 AM Bratton tried to reach General Marshall. The Chief of Staff had gone horseback riding and did not return Bratton’s call until 10:30AM. Bratton then told Marshall that he had a most important message, but the Chief of Staff declined having it delivered, saying that he would shortly be coming to his office. (While Marshall later did not recall this conversation, Bratton clearly remembered it)

Marshall arrived at his office at 11:25 AM and Bratton promptly went to see him, but had to wait while the Chief digested the 14-part reply to Hull. Freeting because the minutes were slipping by, Bratton finally presented the message he considered so important.

(omissis)

The Chief of Staff then told Bratton to have the message to field commanders dispatched by “the fastest means”. By then it was almost noon.

Because atmospheric conditions had blocked the radio channel to Honolulu, at 12:17PM the War Department Signal Center sent the message through Western Union Channels. Marshall’s communications advised commanders that Japan would be presenting what amounted to an ultimatum at 1:00PM Washington time, and that her consolates were under orders to destroy their code machines at once. This warning message reached Honolulu at 7:33 AM, but the messenger making the delivery to the Hawaiian Department was caught in the rain of Japanese bombs.The message reached Short at 3:00PM.

We shall never know whether a more expedient dispatch of the final warning message might have blunted the Japanese strike at Pearl Harbor. It is clear, however, that no one in Washington seems to have considered using the telephone, which might have given Short and Kimmel about an hour’s preparation time- if it is assumed that they would have taken the message seriously and gone to full alert status at once. Likewise, the Washington authorities, including those who were most concerned about the japanese 1:00 PM message, seem to have considered Pearl Harbor an unlikely point of Japanese attack. Marshall later testified that “even if he had used the phone, he would have first called macArthur, the Panama”.

Now some considerations of mine:

- FDR in the nite of Dec 6 said to Hopkins “This means war”, but he let Stark looking the theater performance

- It seems that FDR did not inform Marshall too, considering that on that crucial Washington morning the Chief of Staff was nicely riding (very strange…a war is impending and the President doesn’t inform his Chief of Staff!)

- That Bratton guy was a bit importunate: he wanted to see Marshall immediately!..well finally Marshall agreed to send the warning message but 3 precious hours were gone away

- No one in Washington thought about the telephone (well it was only 1941!) but I would expect that with an impending war the telephone had to be used

- And last Marshall said it considered more probable a Jap attack on Panama than on Pearl Harbor (no comments!)

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