accuracy/efficiency of machine gun fire

[Fernando]

Fernando - here is your problem. When you jump into a conversation to disagree with statements others have made, people expect that you are saying something other than what those already in that conservation, that you are explicitly pretending to correct, just said themselves. If you are, you have to defend the difference. If you aren't, the interruption is a bit of impertinence. Saying you are disagreeing and then backing away from what you said when challenged, to what the other fellow already said, manages the worst of both.

What do you prefer?

1. Going to bed at 3 a.m. then get up at 7 a.m. tired and sleepy because I must answer your attacks.

2. Working in the CMFI, CMBN and CMBN 2.0 uniforms?

Cool down, please.

[Fernando]

I spent a weekend, recently, watching some guys who - from a standing start - have trained on the 81mm mortar pretty much continuously over the last six months, including four or five live-fire and combined-arms exercises, each at least a week long.

On that same weekend were some other guys who've trained for several years on the 81mm mortar, but only occasionally. Like, maybe, 4 or 5 weeks total over the course of several years.

Earlier on this year the second group were able to blow the first group out of the water with their - then - much higher overall skill level. Now the shoe is firmly on the other foot. Sure, the second group can carry out the basic drill of getting the mortars into and out of action in about the same time. But there is a whole lot more to effectively employing a mortar than just that simple drill. It's all those other little, and not so little, things that highlight the differences between the two groups.

To put that another way; I can teach any muppet how to boil water in an afternoon. It takes a bit longer to teach someone how to make good pasta.

That's a false syllogism. You cannot get a universal conclusion from individual premises:

1. You had pasta for lunch

2. You won a football match two hours later

so...

People must eat pasta in order to win football matchs.

[LongLeftFlank]

Fernando, first, thanks for your insights. A lot of us here read them with great interest even if others found them somehow irrelevant. So I'd just ignore the rest and move on.

But more generally, I'm still trying to understand -- was it German tactical doctrine to shift their HMGs from firing position to firing position during the course of a defence or attack? And I'm not just talking about heaving a HMG out of a bomb shelter and into its firing position once the barrage lifts, or trying to salvage a weapon from an outflanked position -- all armies did that of course.

What I'm really asking is a "chicken or egg" question. IF the Germans did such things, was that a wartime tactical expedient enabled by the excellent lightweight, modular design of their MG? Or was that very design (the original Solothurn weapon) driven by a set of specifications emerging from late WWI tactical doctrines (light weight, modularity, high ROF, etc.)? And if the latter, what *were* those doctrines?

Sure, every wargamer is aware the Germans were explicit about building the squad around the LMG -- although they weren't really all THAT different from other armies in that regard. And everyone also knows the Germans -- uncharacteristically for them! -- cleverly standardized on a single weapon for LMG, MMG and HMG. Fine, but *why* do that? Why not just knock off the sturdy Czech ZB26 like the Brits did, and then stick a nice watercooled HMG on a Sokolov carriage or sumfink?

Much higher rate of fire! Well fine, but what does that *really* give you tactically, other than a high burn rate of ammo? in the way of lethality, suppression or area denial? .... that you wouldn't get with a conventional Maxim-style gun.

I spent 3 hours on the interwebz (AxisHistory, Feldgrau, gun sites, etc.) late last night trying to shed light on this question, and there's surprisingly little. I will not emulate others and post it all here though. Insights appreciated.

[JasonC]

ForwardObservor -

This is my attempt to sum up in one post the items of concern, as I see them - responding to your request.

The fire effect of HMGs at infantry targets without cover at long range seems to be too low.

Visual inspection shows bursts missing by large angular deflections at range.

Bursts are evenly spaced in time and relatively infrequent, even with a highly vulnerable, continuously visible target.

Some posters would prefer seeing the gap between bursts shorten for continuously visible targets - MGs that go "hotter" in a target-rich environment.

Direct fire effect of individual bursts seem low but within a factor of 2 of correct, perhaps 1.5 times present chance of a man hit is the right ballpark.

Infantry in the open under ranged MG fire remains unsuppressed over long approach distances.

Some of the low suppression reflects lower than correct accuracy and firing rate.

But some seems to be quite limited suppression effects from even a successful burst that hits a man.

Rally seems significantly faster than is correct, up to twice as fast as seems correct.

Fast rally seems to prevent the MG from achieving a lasting suppression result, even on a single infantry target.

More realistic results have been reported using approaching infantry 2 full morale levels below the defaults.

In my own personal opinion, rally that is way too fast is the biggest single issue. But direct fire effect, especially suppression effect, is also low.

At closer range (300 yards e.g.), rifle fire back at an MG in cover suppresses it successfully in about a minute.

The overall fire effects are not too high, therefore, for targets in cover (based on the previous point).

The lower effect seen for the MG may reflect fewer individual shots too widely off.

The lower effect seen for the MG may also reflect an insufficient impact of cover differential (open too good or woods too thin, or both).

A few posters consider the ease of moving full HMG ammo loads overmodeled, and suggest a moved HMG should transport only a reduced portion of its ammo supply.

Moved ammo might use a formula based on functioning team members, with the first 2 getting less each (as moving gun and tripod), more for each additional member.

I hope that helps...

[PzKfW]

JasonC, I have been following this thread (obviously) with great interest. Thanks for restating the points brought up in this thread.

One thing I might point out is that the game already does model reduction of ammo based on loss of team members.

In fact when German squads get split, if the number of guys in the squad has been reduced, the section without an MG (with k98s, say) still gets a significant amount of the total squad 8mm ammunition, leaving the MG team(s) significantly reduced ammo loads.

Also, if a HMG team loses a few guys on the move, a portion of their ammo is immediately lost (the portion the lost guys were carrying). If they lose a few guys stationary, it is not.

As to squad effects versus MG effects on suppression. It is pretty simple, an American squad has 10 M1 semi-auto rifles, a thompson smg, and a BAR automatic rifle, IIRC. Perhaps a 1903? In any case such as squad has 12 men independently spotting and choosing targets for each of these weapons. The cumulative fire eminating from such a unit, when these weapons are within closer ranges, completely outclasses the relatively few bursts eminating from the HMG unit, as it is currently modeled.

Turn up the HMG ROF, and you turn up the suppression and lethality effect. (accuracy also matters).

[Fernando]

Intelligence Bulletin Vol II, No 4. (December 1943):

4. German Tactical Doctrine

a. General

(1) Light Machine Guns - While the basic principles of the tactical use of the German light machine gun are not unusual, the following are specially stressed in enemy doctrine: surprise, fire and movement, coordination of firepoewer, conservation of ammunition, and ALTERNATE POSITIONS.

...

b. Attack

In the attack heavy machine guns cover the deployment of the rifle companies from echeloned positions sited on commanding ground. In a penetration (Einbruch) the HMG, firing from positions in the rear of the attacking troops, aims at centers of resitance within the hostile position, and prepares to give covering fire against counterattacks. HMG's floow the attacking companies from position to position. In as much as unified control of this type of work is difficult, sections and platoons are usually placed under the command of the rifle companies to exploit local successes. Single guns may even be used in support of rifle squads or platoons to consolidate ground gained and to cover the flanks; however, this is practically the only time when HMG are used singly.

c. Defense

....

It is a German principle to site them for enfilade and crossfire. The HMG are sited in covered postitons, with open positions forwards of the main line of resistance having beign reconnoitered beforehand and echeloned in depth. Thus the guns are able to move forward and engage any hostile foirce attempting to penetrate.

d. Conclusion

.....

German training stresses cooperation between the HMG and the battalion support weapons (inf. guns and AT guns and mortars). The utmost attention is paid to the careful siting of fire positions, as well of alternate and dummy positions.

...

Intelligence Bulletin Vol III, No 2. (October 1944)

....

Figures for the number of rounds of the different types of ammunition vary greatly. For LMG and HMG, the supply usually will not be less than 1,100 rounds for each MG, or more than 3,000 rounds. As a rule the figure is somewhere betweeen 1,250 and 2,000. ....

The German Squad in combat, translation from German manual done by the Military Intelligence Service in January 1943:

B. Basic principles for the Squad Leader in Defense

...

(2) The Gruppenführer first finds the most suitable location for the light machine gun within his Gruppe, a position providing the most effective field of fire and also insuring a good opportunity to support adjacent units with flanking fire. Several alternate firing positions are reconnoitered at once and chosen and they are organized later. Alternate firing positions must not be located too close to other positions. They should be at lest 50 meters apart; otherwise the MG will not evade the hostile fire. Furthermore, it should always be possible to occupy alternate firing positions well concealed from enemy observation.

...

[PzKfW]

Fernando, it appears that from "the book":

1. HMGs, when on the attack, were used in stationary weapons overwatch sites.

2. LMGs, when on the attack, maneuvered with the squads/platoons whilst the infantry advanced.

3. After a successful attack (at the company level), positions were consolidated and new weapons overwatch sites were chosen, at which point the HMGs were moved forward.

4. While on defense, HMGs were sited in a series of fallback positions.

[LongLeftFlank]

I read it differently. I read that on the attack the HMG moves forward as necessary to continue supporting the infantry company. And on the defence it has a hardenened position in the MLR, but also identifies positions in no-mans-land it can displace to to deliver enfilade on an enemy attack against an adjacent sector. So the enemy is always under crossfire.

[JonS]

So you are saying that you recently watched some guys with less than 2 months training over several years that were better than some other guys with 6 month of recent training? So the conclusion is that they shouldn't have trained that long?

No.

Group 1 were re-roled earlier this year, and have now had about 6 months focussed training, including multiple long live-fire and combined-arms exercises.

Group 2 have trained on the equipment over many years, but at a much lower intensity.

Initially, shortly after 1 re-roled, 2 > 1. 2 were teaching 1 how to go about their business.

Now 1 >> 2. Not because 2 has gotten worse, but because 1 has come along in leaps and bounds. And it’s not because 1 are noticeably better at the basic drills, either.

Also: better at what? Setup time, accuracy?

As I said in my post: “all those other little, and not so little, things.” Things like levelling bubbles between rounds. Knowing what to say. Knowing when to say it. Dealing with the unexpected. Survey. Dealing with volume. Preparing shelter. Dealing with ambiguity. Coping with weather. Anticipating what’s coming next. Cooking. And so on.

Individually they’re mostly quite small and quite simple things. Collectively they make a huge difference.

The point is that there's a lot to become effective than just being able to conduct a basic drill within an arbitrary timelimit during training.

You are usually the first to cry foul at anecdotal evidence. If this isn't one I don't know.

It’s an extended example of a pattern I’ve seen often. How many times do I have to see the same pattern before it meets your standard?

That's a false syllogism.

You commented on your poor English earlier (which isn’t that bad – I’m fairly sure I’ve understood you throughout). I think you might need to pay a care to the way you read other people’s posts, not just the way you write your own. The false syllogism is that you seem to think playing soldiers in a re-enactment unit gives you some deep insight to WWII German tactical *mumble*somethingorother*mumble*. Playing with your MG42 and tripod does give you some limited insight into setting up and breaking down, and maybe into moving the thing. But that’s about it.

Jon

Edit: incidentally, "Intelligence Bulletin December 1943, vol. 2 No. 4" can be read in full here

[LongLeftFlank]

You commented on your poor English earlier (which isn’t that bad – I’m fairly sure I’ve understood you throughout). I think you might need to pay a care to the way you read other people’s posts, not just the way you write your own. The false syllogism is that you seem to think playing soldiers in a re-enactment unit gives you some deep insight to WWII German tactical *mumble*somethingorother*mumble*. Playing with your MG42 and tripod does give you some limited insight into setting up and breaking down, and maybe into moving the thing. But that’s about it.

Jon, I just reread the last few pages. You're the one who picked the fight with Fernando to begin with, when he helpfully volunteered some .... yes! insights, based on extensive personal experience handling this gear as a reenactor. Now you (and Jason, unaccountably) are criticizing him for reacting to your contemptuous dismissal.

The weapon components being dead easy to set up and break down, compared to other HMGs of the day, as well as specially designed slings and frames being issued to ammo carriers, all count as insights to me, at least. Maybe you knew all this stuff all along and find it all a big snoozer, but I personally learned something new. And I'm hardly an ignoramus on things WWII.

What is not insightful in contrast is going "Bah! it isn't so easy on a real battlefield!" as if that truism makes the weapon's designed capabilities somehow irrelevant.

So cut the guy a break already.

[JonS]

The weapon components being dead easy to set up and break down, compared to other HMGs of the day, ... count as insights to me, at least.

That would be insightful, except ... he hasn't said anything about that :confused:

What is not insightful in contrast is going "Bah! it isn't so easy on a real battlefield!" as if that truism makes the weapon's designed capabilities somehow irrelevant.

Fernando has presented himself as an authority on the MG42 based on some playtime in his backyard. He certainly has some insights because of that, but IMO they're very limited. They're limited because the context and frame of refence he was playing in is so narrow.

So yes; he's got some useful things to say, and as I've already said: thanks for that, but don't overegg it.

BTW, and FWIW, I've played with an MG42 too. And one of the tripods. And some of the ammo tins. Yay me, and it was all pretty neat (although I thought the MG42 has an unweildy length). The reason I haven't mentioned it was because I felt it irrelevant, largely because the context was so narrow.

[Fernando]

Fernando has presented himself as an authority on the MG42 based on some playtime in his backyard. He certainly has some insights because of that, but IMO they're very limited. They're limited because the context and frame of refence he was playing in is so narrow.

I am afraid you are going too far....

Please cool down (second time)

Argumentum ad hominem:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ad_hominem

[JonS]

Don't fret. I'm cool

[poesel]

...

The point is that there's a lot to become effective than just being able to conduct a basic drill within an arbitrary timelimit during training.

I'm sorry but I fail to understand what you are trying to tell me. We were talking about the difficulties of transporting a sMG42. Fold it, carry it, set it up. Not choosing the right position, time to fire, when to re-locate or the other million things that separate a good from a bad team.

Just that, quite simple.

It’s an extended example of a pattern I’ve seen often. How many times do I have to see the same pattern before it meets your standard?

Since you are dismissing the post from Fernando why are you asking for my standards?

And 'example of a pattern I've seen'? You argument is a purely subjective impression.

JasonC, thanks for compiling the list. I fully agree with you.

There's another thing we never see: that a crew panics and blows a full belt at a perceived threat. Has probably happened more than once in RL and would be a nice touch to see.

[JonS]

I'm sorry but I fail to understand what you are trying to tell me. We were talking about ...

We've been talking about a lot of things.

Since you are dismissing the post from Fernando why are you asking for my standards?

Strawman, much?

I didn't dismiss the post(s) from Fernando. I pointed out that they have narrow relevance. There is a rather large difference.

I'm asking you because you're the one who moaned.

[An] 'example of a pattern I've seen'? You[r] argument is a purely subjective impression.

That's an interesting characterisation.

[PzKfW]

From the above Intelligence Bulletin V2, No4...

For the MG34 LMG:

"Bursts of 7 to 10 rounds are fired, and approxi-mately 15 aimed bursts can be fired in 1 minute."

That's 150 rds/min.

And for the MG34 HMG variant it is mentioned that:

"Practical rate of fire (HvMG) ... 300 rpm"

Regarding the MG42, the bulletin has to say this:

"Use of MG 34 and the MG 42 as light machine guns is comparable, except that, in the case of the newer model, the higher rate of fire and the conse-quent "creep" of the gun makes shorter bursts (of 5 to 7 rounds) advisable. Twenty-two aimed bursts can be fired in 1 minute."

Thats 22x(avg)6=132 rounds/minute

And for the MG42 HMG, it is mentioned that

"German manuals advise bursts of 50 rounds for

best results."

and

"As in the case of the MG 34, the barrel should be changed after 250 rounds of more or less continuous fire, although prisoners of war have stated that barrels need not be changed until 400 rounds have been fired."

And as for PLACEMENT of the HMGs...

The heavy machine gun is employed from open or

covered positions. In the case of open positions,

which may be taken up in battle, use is made of all

available cover. A position of this kind is normally

manned by a section (two guns) under the control

of the section leader. Covered positions are generally

on reverse slopes, and are normally manned by a whole

platoon (four guns), which the platoon commander

controls from a central command post.

As for how much dispersion (the natural drift of the bullets fired at a single spot, of the "cone" of fire put out) the MG42 had, well... not too much (Not the case in present CM -or discussion here eh, JonS?)... from Section II. U. S. SOLDIERS DISCUSS

GERMAN MG TACTICS:

"Although the German machine gun is first-rate as

to fire power, its dispersion is poor. One of my

friends had so much confidence in his ability to get

away from it that on one occasion, even though he

had already received a number of shoulder wounds,

he made a successful dash for safety, and then turned

and got the machine gunner with rifle fire. Three

shots in the stomach."

and again...

"It's true that the dispersion of their machine-gun

fire is poor."

although, regarding accuracy (where you aim, versus where you hit)...

"I'd like to add, too, that our Browning automatic

rifle is accurate at a greater range than the German

MG 42."

and

"Their light machine-gun fire is harassing as hell,

but I don't think much @f its accuracy."

[PzKfW]

Now that we've discussed reality (albeit in the past). Just want to point out a few things here about our CM's modeling of reality (it is supposed to be a battle simulator, after all).

1. HMG fire may appear to be purposefully modelled as inaccurate. Although, if you think about it, that makes no sense, as vehicle MGs are far more accurate and of similar type. (Might be an interesting test to conduct)

2. The volume of LMG fire as modeled by CM is under-represented versus reality.

3. The volume of HMG fire is ridiculously low versus reality.

[akd]

Now that we've discussed reality (albeit in the past). Just want to point out a few things here about our CM's modeling of reality (it is supposed to be a battle simulator, after all).

1. HMG fire may appear to be purposefully modelled as inaccurate. Although, if you think about it, that makes no sense, as vehicle MGs are far more accurate and of similar type. (Might be an interesting test to conduct)

AFAIK, vehicle MGs vs. infantry behave the same way (spreading fire left and right).

[JonS]

As for how much dispersion (the natural drift of the bullets fired at a single spot, of the "cone" of fire put out) the MG42 had, well... not too much (Not the case in present CM -or discussion here eh, JonS?)

well ...

its dispersion is poor ... the dispersion of their machine-gun fire is poor

What does that mean?

a) an MG is supposed to have a reasonably large dispersion (being an area weapon) but the MG34/42 grouped it's round's too tightly, therefore 'poorly' from an effects POV (which, by the way, was/is a common criticism of the Bren), or

The people being quoted thought that the MG34/42 sprayed rounds all over the damn place, so it's dispersion was - in their opinion - too large and therefore 'poor'.

Which? My interpretation is a), but I'm not convinced that's a correct reading of it.

By the by, I interpret the OP of this thread to be deliberate behaviour by the gunner to purposefully spread rounds around the target, and not due to systemic imprecision of the weapon. It seems to me that each burst in CM is about as precise (i.e., tightly grouped) as I'd reasonably expect, and the bursts are spread around in the way I want. But given a) above maybe the individual bursts are correct, and the burst-to-burst spread could be tightened?

[PzKfW]

Dispersion is the natural variation of where each round impacts if the gun is aimed at the same target. I see what you're driving at JonS, but I suspect it is your "a" definition. Otherwise, with such a high ROF, even a large cone of fire (or dispersion) would be adequately saturated with bullets. IE: more effective.

Although angular dispersion is largely equal at all ranges, the absolute dispersion increases with distance to the target. This is why, I suspect, that The Bulletin mentions of the MG34:

"The most effective range

seems to be between 650 and 850 yards."

If you assume "a", IE: a high ROF, but small dispersion for the MG34/42, then the benefits of the high ROF, especially at close ranges, are largely negated and what the GIs are saying then makes a lot of sense.

If vehicle MGs have the same behavior (I have not observed it, but tend to believe akd) then I believe this may be CMs way of providing artificial dispersion.

If true, then the real issue at stake here is the effects of HMG fire. IE: not realistic. The main issues are suppression and lethality. To my mind, when observing fire effects on a target, caused by a squad, both suppression and lethality really equates to the sheer number of bullets whizzing by the heads of the target troops.

HMGs are getting unrealistic results not because of suppression levels, etc. But because they simply aren't making enough fire to produce accurate/realistic results.

[Redwolf]

I think you are losing it, Jon, sorry

[PzKfW]

In scientific, not military, terms, I believe we could translate the GIs' "accuracy" to mean precision.

And their "dispersion" to mean accuracy.

It's a bit confusing but scientific definitions are... no pun intended... precise in their meaning.

[JonS]

Yes, I know very well the difference between accuracy and precision. Generally, though, I think dispersion translates to precision (or consistency), rather than accuracy.

Consistency means the size of the spread of outcomes (eg shells) around their MPI. In artillery this variability is called 'consistency' or 'dispersion' (the optimistic or pessimistic views of the world - do you call a glass half-full or half-empty?), elsewhere it is sometimes called 'precision'.

Why do you think accuracy -> precision and dispersion -> accuracy? :confused:

edit:

but I suspect it is your "a" definition

Obviously I agree with your suspicion

Hmm. Looking at those two 'dispersion' quotes again, they appear to be talking about different things.

* The first one - "its dispersion is poor" - seems to be talking about an innate characteristic of the weapons; the rounds in a burst are too precise.

* The second one - "the dispersion of their machine-gun fire is poor" - seems to be talking about the way that MG fire is typically employed or moved about by German MG gunners; the bursts in an engagement are too precise.

Re-reading those quotes, and others, in context tends to reinforce that, and therefore a), with the added provisio that precision is being used to refer to both intra-burst precision (characteristic of the weapon) and inter-burst precision (characteristic method of employment). 'Precision' is being used here in the sense of 'precise' in the diagrams embedded in post #422.

[PzKfW]

In statistics and probability theory, standard deviation (represented by the symbol sigma, σ) shows how much variation or "dispersion" exists from the average (mean, or expected value). A low standard deviation indicates that the data points tend to be very close to the mean; high standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a large range of values.

To a GI or lay shooter in general, "accuracy" only means if a target is hit when it is aimed at. This can comprise either precision or accuracy. The above definition fits "dispersion" as it is mentioned in the document.

inter-burst precision (characteristic of the weapon) and intra-burst precision (characteristic method of employment).

By the way, your usage of these terms is reversed. Inter-burst means between bursts. And intra-burst means within the burst.

If you want to get precise.

[JonS]

Re: precision - I don't know whether you're agreeing with me or not now :confused: That dictionary definition perfectly matches the way 'precise' is used in your diagrams. 'Precise' says nothing about whether the target was hit, but everything about the spread between rounds. It also matches my understanding of dispersion/precision/consistency.

Most shooters I know understand the twin concepts of accuracy and precision, rather than just recognising a single attribute of 'accuracy'.

Could you check that what you wrote in #422 is what you meant to say?

inter/intra: noted and corrected.