accuracy/efficiency of machine gun fire

[c3k]

Apocal - very useful results for the tuning question.

I think the direct fire effect of each burst against men in the open is low, but within a factor of 2 of the right amount. A modest uptick is fire effect is needed there, but it can be limited in size - 10 or 25%, on that order, to start with.

I think the suppression effect (how deep the morale dives) from a succesful burst (that hits one man, say) is too low, and that the average such "hit" should send an average motivation regular squad to prone and pinned. Occasional panic, occasional only cautious, but the middle of the distribution should be right over "go prone, pinned". It can be just cautious for vets and similar (though, see the next), but regulars that lose a man should normally react by ceasing the movement attempt and trying to protect themselves.

And I think the continuous rally from suppression is clearly too fast - like, twice as fast as it should be - and is the biggest single problem with the current tuning. It currently allows the average squad to recover its morale completely, from the average morale effect of the last burst, by the time the next arrives. Only an above average series of effective hits or morale impacts result in an accumulating hit to morale state. And those are matched by equal or more stretches of below average hits or effects.

The effect we want to see, instead, is that morale drops if the fire stays on, and it keeps dropping, unless the accuracy or morale hits are well below the expectation level. This will eventually send a single target to ground, and will not let it get up again unless the fire shifts to a new target. Even then, it should take on the order of a minute for a squad to get out of pinned to cautious, and twice that long to clear a panic to pinned.

I hope this helps...

I find myself in agreement with the bolded parts. Fear is the key. Knowing that you're in the middle of the beaten zone of a ranged in machinegun is powerful knowledge. Veterans and well-trained troops would be aware, at a high cognitive level, that stopping right there means you'll take more casualties. But standing up increases YOUR chance of being hit. (Or so it feels.)

Fear of possible fire, rather than suppression due to ACTUAL fire, seems like it could be tweaked.

How many gamers would complain when all their companies are hugging dirt and refuse to advance?

(Insert NCO-based counterargument that training overcomes fear.)

Ken

[JonS]

Killkess,

Various. I don't have anything immediately to hand except my experience and accumulated reading. I'll try and find something, although troops-to-task is a notoriously malleable and under-documented beast, especially at such a low level. (maybe Paddy Griffiths' "Battle tactics", and/or Doubler's "Closing with the enemy"?)

I do know that the current 3:1 teaching tells us that a single section (8-10 men) is expected to roll over 2-3 men with rifles or a single LMG. Scaling that up means a platoon should be able to handle ~10 men with an LMG or two, or an HMG.

Ground and specifics dictate, of course, so sometimes a platoon will be able to handle much more than that, or perhaps not even that. But that's the way it goes with rules of thumb.

But let's flip this around. What makes you think that an independent platoon would not be able to handle an isolated HMG?

[JasonC]

I think you guys are talking past each other in a very basic way, on the issue of lack of cover vs. typical tactical situations.

In real typical tactical situations, a platoon of infantry advancing on a single MG position has tons of cover. It can approach well within spotting distance by chosen covered routes. It can set up overwatch from positions with good concealment or hard cover. It can set up a base of fire from its organic or attached heavy weapons, whether light or medium mortars, its own crew served MGs, or at a minimum several SAWs or magazine fed LMGs. It can then try to advance on an IDed MG position by fire and movement, with the base of fire suppressing the shooter while very limited numbers of riflemen try to get close enough to add their fire, effectively. Once a squad or so or riflemen are in a covered position close to the MG, they can suppress it much more thoroughly and consistently, if not eliminate it outright by direct fire. If necessary, a half squad or less can advance to grenade range to finish off an MG team that goes to a full defilade position under such fire.

But we flat are not talking about that tactical situation. We are talking about a hypothetical in which the HMG position is separated from the attacking infantry by *a full kilometer of completely open ground*. No cover at all, for 1000 yards. Dominating such long expanses of open ground devoid of cover is the tactical essence of heavy machineguns. It is the specific combined arms and terrain situation in which HMGs are *trump*.

Trump because they are deadly to *twice* the range the rifle platoon's organic weapons are. Both because of their higher volume of fire and because of the cover differential. Also because the range will be so long the rifle platoon will not even locate the firing MG until taking its fire for several minutes - minutes of fire typically sufficient in real life to drive the moving platoon to ground and keep it there. Or if they stay up and moving, to cut them in half. Before there is *any* effective reply.

In such tactical situations, the infantry reaches for a different arm. For armor, for an artillery fire mission (or smoke), or it waits for night and low visibility, or the larger force tries somewhere else. They do not expect to be able to advance a full kilometer under continuous observation and fire from dug in heavy machineguns with just rifle infantry. They expect to get their heads handed to them if they try.

What you can do with 5 times the manpower odds in terrain with full cover available, covered routes, an isolated shooter with a limited sight picture and lots of LOS "shadows", is completely different, it simply isn't the tactical problem under discussion. In any way.

[JonS]

I think you guys are talking past each other in a very basic way

Is this you welcoming me to the club then?

Trump because they are deadly to *twice* the range the rifle platoon's organic weapons are. Both because of their higher volume of fire and because of the cover differential.

Cover differential? What cover differential?

As Apocal and slysniper have both pointed out; when you alter the scenario, the outcome changes in predictable ways. Add advantages to the HMG, and the HMG will win. Add advantages to the infantry, and the infantry will win.

Isn't that kind of the point?

[ForwardObserver]

Is this you welcoming me to the club then?

Cover differential? What cover differential?

As Apocal and slysniper have both pointed out; when you alter the scenario, the outcome changes in predictable ways. Add advantages to the HMG, and the HMG will win. Add advantages to the infantry, and the infantry will win.

Isn't that kind of the point?

I think the point is that of calibration, that is, what should be the performance of HMGs in a baseline scenario. What Apocal points out is that the simplest - or barest - baseline scenario conceivable, conveys results which don't feel realistic to quite a few people here (including myself). I find troubling - but incredibly informative, thank you Apocal for sharing those insights - that the 'baseline' scenario for HMGs dominating clear terrain is so 'contrived'.

Regarding the suppression mechanisms proposed by JasonC. I see one problem with rules which might boild down to be 'one man down, everyone ducks'. While this makes sense for infantry on the move, it doesn't make much sense for infantry defending a position (or an HMG). Just imagine one of those German HMG's squads with 5 guys, and one of the guys gets hit. Under that system, the whole team, including the HMG crew, would be hitting the ground for a good minute. Which might be a lot of time. Accounting for this kind of context-dependent effects can be quite hard.

[womble]

Some of the "casualty response" parameters are carried in the movement mode. Elements of Fast moving teams will generally continue with their movement unless they themselves suffer suppression to Cower, whereas Quick movers are supposed to respond more directly to incoming. Some sort of tweak in that area might be productive too.

[Broadsword56]

In real typical tactical situations, a platoon of infantry advancing on a single MG position has tons of cover. It can approach well within spotting distance by chosen covered routes. It can set up overwatch from positions with good concealment or hard cover. It can set up a base of fire from its organic or attached heavy weapons, whether light or medium mortars, its own crew served MGs, or at a minimum several SAWs or magazine fed LMGs. It can then try to advance on an IDed MG position by fire and movement, with the base of fire suppressing the shooter while very limited numbers of riflemen try to get close enough to add their fire, effectively. Once a squad or so or riflemen are in a covered position close to the MG, they can suppress it much more thoroughly and consistently, if not eliminate it outright by direct fire. If necessary, a half squad or less can advance to grenade range to finish off an MG team that goes to a full defilade position under such fire.

This reads to me like a good textbook description of the preferred infantry tactics against an enemy MG in the modern era, but not what actually happened on a WWII battlefield, from what I've read.

In Normandy, in particular, Joseph Balkoski writes in Beyond the Beachhead (p. 89):

"US Army field manuals emphasized the importance of fire superiority, but in truth, the Yanks found it difficult to achieve without supporting artillery. American infantrymen simply were not provided with enough firepower to establish battlefield dominance [he cites the TO&E of a US rifle company with 193 men and only 2 MGs, vs. 15 MGs + 28 SMGs in a German company, which had only 142 men].

"...Instead of forcing the Germans to keep their heads down with a large volume of M1 and BAR fire, as the American manuals demanded, it was usually the Yanks who got pinned."

So fire-and-movement doctrine didn't really work for the US in WW II, and the SAWs and assault rifles other weapons we've come to know in the modern era were a result of these hard lessons -- to give infantry the firepower to make fire-and-movement possible.

(Of course, by the time US infantry were fully equipped and ready to win the fire-and-movement fight for Normandy, it was the 1960s and they happened to be in Vietnam, where yet another new set of tactics for a new type of war were needed -- but that's a whole 'nother story)

[JonS]

Hi FO,

yeah, that's sort of the point I've been erratically edging towards. What is 'baseline', and what should the performance of HMGs be?

I don't really think that 'baseline' has a useful meaning in this case, because the outcome is so dependent on the variables. In other words, the expected outcome - or performance - of the HMG depends on whether it's dug in or not, the motivation of the enemy, etc. Not in terms of the number of kills, but in terms of whether it fails or succeeds.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Was any consensus ever achieved regarding machine guns in CM deliberately spraying around infantry instead of aiming at them, as demonstrated in the OP?

[JasonC]

JonS - are you even reading the same thread?

The entire reason this thread exists, is that right now one HMG team *in cover* with 1000 meters of completely flat, completely *open* ground ahead of it, cannot hold off a single rifle squad in CMx2, reliably, and always gets smoked by a single platoon of rifle infantry. Crossing 600-800 meters of open ground to get close enough to even spot the HMG, firing from cover, is easy for the infantry, in the game as it is today.

Notice, an HMG is stationary in cover and firing continually. A platoon of infantry is not stationary or in any cover, and has a long way to go, all of it moving in the open.

If that isn't a cover differential to you, then we have bigger problems than talking past each other.

[JasonC]

Broadsword56 - that more reflects the greenness of US infantry at the time of the Normandy fighting than any deficiency in squad firepower. Also, heavy reliance on artillery reflected the fact that it was routinely available and responsive.

As for a benchmark, in CMBB I created a bunch of training scenarios to teach in game tactics step by step. One of them had a green rifle platoon against a lone German HMG team, the latter in cover. The last 200 yards around the HMG were mostly open ground, with only a couple of shellhole dots for close in cover, at 100-125 meters. The Russians could get 25% cover (scattered trees or one small wood building) around 250-300 yards out.

Proper tactics for that one included using LOS shadows and "advance" drills to get the platoon to a jump off point around 250-300 yards, overwatch from that, movement closer expected to fail initially (men getting pinned), but followed up with suppression fire from that range. Done right, that could be followed by a squad making it to one of the shellholes, rallying there, and keeping the HMG team continually suppressed once it was up and firing from that closer range. Then the rest of the platoon could maneuver closer and take out the HMG.

But notice, that required proper tactics and use of small cover. Also, many people including some experienced CM players reported to me that they failed at it continually, even after playing it through more than once, knowing all its parameters, and hearing advice on how to do it. On regular morale, most could do it.

Compare that experience to what is reported at the start of this thread. Fewer men, less cover, longer distance, and no difficulty whatever in walking over the HMG team. The difference? CMx2 fire and rally mechanics.

One could plausibly argue it was too easy in CMBB. But it was much more nearly right than what we have now. I think a number of people on this thread are frankly in denial on the matter, either that or flacking in a rather ridiculous fashion for something that is clearly just broken, as it stands.

[JonS]

rofl. Yeah, that's it exactly

[GerryCMBB]

Over time it has been amazing to me to see how much effort supporters of the game and/or Battlefront are willing to put in defending CMx2. If someone dares question something they better have done a scientific study to prove their point. Pretty soon many of the regular supporters are on here mocking their ideas. It's embarrassing at this stage. In terms of the mortars I don't think BF has even acknowledged the problem to their paying customers.

Gerry

[Childress]

@Gerry

Isn't all the carping and b*tching a back-handed tribute to Battlefront's success, their preeminence in this niche? After all, they made us care.

And they're oh-so-close.

[John Kettler]

dieseltaylor,

Outstanding, groggy link!

JasonC,

I well remember how, when CMBB came out, I had to unlearn all my CMBO MG nest storming skills. What had worked well before was now, following the changes in MG modeling, all but certain suicide, a recipe for disaster. Judging from the test reported here, MG modeling is now way worse than it was for CMBO. While CMBO allowed actions which made for great war movies, it quite evidently wasn't there on modeling MGs and their effects properly. It would appear, therefore, we've retrogressed on this vital aspect of battlefield mechanics.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ForwardObserver]

Hi FO,

yeah, that's sort of the point I've been erratically edging towards. What is 'baseline', and what should the performance of HMGs be?

I don't really think that 'baseline' has a useful meaning in this case, because the outcome is so dependent on the variables. In other words, the expected outcome - or performance - of the HMG depends on whether it's dug in or not, the motivation of the enemy, etc. Not in terms of the number of kills, but in terms of whether it fails or succeeds.

I think that thinking about baseline scenarios is a very meaningful idea, especially when there are so many variables involved. This process of ablating variables - by fixing them to certain values - potentially allows you remove feedback effects, which are notoriously hard to understand. The art in this comes on how to choose the variables to fix, say you have this kind of interaction

X <-> Y <-> Z

of the three variables, which one should you choose to understand better X and Z? The answer is Y, since fixing it to a given value renders X and Z independent. Besides that, then you have to choose what possibles values for Y do you decide to focus. This is hard as well, since there might be a huge number of possible choices.

What experiments/observations such as the ones by Apocal, JasonC, poesel71, slysniper - sorry if I forget anybody here - try to do is to figure out which variables matter the most, and produce the most simple scenarios that allow to observe some particular aspect of CMx2 modeling in isolation.

Of course, these are synthetic examples, cherry picked from a vast array of possible scenarios, need to be taken with a grain of salt. They might not be informative or just be considering irrelevant variables to fix or too similar values. In all these 'experiment' threads, however, I do see a lively and interesting discussion regarding the meaningfulness of the particular selection of the guy building the experiment scenario, and often advice and comments from other forum readers help to get more informative observations on CMx2.

I've found many of this kind of 'baseline scenario driven' discussions to be extremely enlightening, useful and intellectually stimulating. Going over the backlog of threads, there's at least two cases where this approach I understand you consider meaningless has lead to identify - and nail down - two major bugs in CMx2.

Namely, low walls providing more cover to troops placed between the wall and the enemy than having the wall between them and their enemies (this was a very good one). Another, the realization that mortar targeting routines weren't being resetted when switching targets (almost as good as the previous one). People should be encouraged to approach 'confusing' or 'confronting' observed effects in this manner. It has indeed improved the game. Not all bugs are so evident as say, AT crews abandoning a gun acting as if they were still pushing (or pulling, more appropiately) it around.

Apocal experiment has been most enlightening to me: in all my own experiments I never ever thought about TRP's, and what do they mean. They're documented on the manual, what until Apocal told us on this thread about the results he was getting (and how they were changing when not using them) I didn't realize that they weren't a 'bonus' but rather a standard tool for effective defense in CMx2.

The question is whether it was intended or not TRP's to be so important for defence. I'd say no, judging from the fact that in the point-based QB system, TRP's aren't free: they're sort of an extra. Because, if they were meant to be so fundamental, then I wonder why when one buys an HMG team, one doesn't get along a couple of TRP's included in the price.

[ForwardObserver]

As for a benchmark, in CMBB I created a bunch of training scenarios to teach in game tactics step by step. One of them had a green rifle platoon against a lone German HMG team, the latter in cover.

I remember these, and I think that recreating such hands-on learning scenarios for CMx2 would be extremely interesting.

[JonS]

this approach I understand you consider meaningless

Wait, what!? No! I don't consider the approach meaningless at all. I consider the concept of baseline - as a measure of some true and correct base performance - meaningless.

I'm probably just confused about what you mean by 'baseline'.

I took it to mean some kind of 'normal' or 'average' behaviour. I think that's pointless because no one will ever agree on what normal or average should be. For starters, there's no useful data on which to base it on, and then there's too many variables that influence it.

But it you simply mean it in the sense of "I'm going to set up a simplistic situation as my baseline, then add or remove variables one at a time to see what effect each has" then I think that's a very useful approach. It still says nothing much about whether the 'baseline' performance is correct, but it can tell you what the performance delta associated with each variable is. That provides for a useful discussion (for example: should a stone wall at the target end affect performance more or less than a brick wall?).

I think the major problem, in this particular case, is that the stopping power of (real) MGs is primarily composed of suppression and morale effects. Obviously, if you stand upright for too long then an MG will kill you. So will a rifle. But since about 1 July 1916 those kinds of targets massed upright targets have mostly gone away. Since then MGs generally tend to fix and/or turn, which is fundamentally a 'soft' effect of firepower. In CM that - turning - is something the player has to do, since the TacAI can't do it by itself.

But few of the tests in this thread have measured soft factors. What is the suppression of units at different ranges? How much does the MG switch its fire amongst the targets available to it or otherwise spread it's fire around (which, incidentally, is one of the resons I don't think the OPs observations are necessarily indicative of anything worth changing)? How far away from incoming rounds are units experiencing suppression effects? And so on. IMO, those are the sorts of soft firepower effects that need to be measured, because that's where I think any unexpected behaviour is likely to be found. CM MGs are killing about the right number of people.

[JonS]

I'd say no, judging from the fact that in the point-based QB system, TRP's aren't free: they're sort of an extra. Because, if they were meant to be so fundamental, then I wonder why when one buys an HMG team, one doesn't get along a couple of TRP's included in the price.

QBs are CM's bastard stepchild, with about as much connection to reality as Kettler.

TRPs in CM are also a sort-of combat Gerber-knife - all things to all units. They can be used for many different units, at the same time. In a perfect world there'd be about a dozen different types of TRPs - several for different artillery functions, one for mortars, one for on map weapons, one for MGs, one for A-Tk guns, etc. And each weapon type would only be able to use 'their own' TRP. Or alterately, but along the same lines, when a unit was selected only TRPs that unit could exploit would be visible while any others would be hidden. But that'd be a UI nightmare.

[John Kettler]

ForwardObserver,

Because of the current implementation, it makes some sense to pay for TRPs--because a TRP that makes MG fire nasty also creates near zero artillery response time and the ability to blind fire on and near that TRP. Further, it's not just the MG that benefits from a TRP in direct fire, but ANY direct fire weapon. Thus, a TRP can, not necessarily does, provide a lot of force multiplier effect. When I played Fire on the Mountain in ROW, I specifically pointed out in my lengthy AAR that a separate mortar TRP would be most useful, since mortars are organic weapons at a much lower echelon, typically, than field artillery. Now, we're facing a somewhat similar bind, with our Swiss Army knife TRP now functioning as a variety of FPL (Final Protective Line). If we could designate FPLs for emplaced MGs, as was and is done in real warfare, then we wouldn't be in this mess. MGs would do MG things, mortars would do what they're supposed to, and overarching these, would be the mighty field artillery, each under its own control measures.

In researching the mortar issue, I read a Rand study done on the M107 4.2" mortar at NTC. One of the summary conclusions was that, as a general rule, mortars were NOT included in the brigade and divisional fire planning. They tended to fight their own war, hurting overall combat effectiveness through lack of integration into overall fire planning. Mind, this is ~66 years after the war we're discussing!

JonS,

It's really a shame that someone who offers such cogent observations and useful comments regarding CM, behaves like a boorish git when it comes to me. You seem to have an OCD grade need to gratuitously insult me. Why the Mods put up with your ongoing, gross flaunting of the Forum Rules is quite beyond me--even more when we factor in your "being here by their sufferance" status! Recommend you back off.

Regards,

John Kettler

[ForwardObserver]

Wait, what!? No! I don't consider the approach meaningless at all. I consider the concept of baseline - as a measure of some true and correct base performance - meaningless.

In that sense, I have to agree with you. Baseline scenarios allow to compare things in a systematic way against our expectations or beliefs. And in this department, indeed, each person mileage may vary greatly

I'm probably just confused about what you mean by 'baseline'.

I took it to mean some kind of 'normal' or 'average' behaviour. I think that's pointless because no one will ever agree on what normal or average should be. For starters, there's no useful data on which to base it on, and then there's too many variables that influence it.

I meant normal or average behavior as in enabled by CMx2 engine models. They allow us to understand what are the expected outcomes of CMx2 simulation and to understand what affects or doesn't such outcomes.

Judging whether the expected outcomes are 'right' in some historical sense, or another, is indeed a subjective call of judgement, but still, allow us to spot stuff that confronts our beliefs and expectations. Sometimes these are wrong, sometimes they aren't.

But it you simply mean it in the sense of "I'm going to set up a simplistic situation as my baseline, then add or remove variables one at a time to see what effect each has" then I think that's a very useful approach. It still says nothing much about whether the 'baseline' performance is correct, but it can tell you what the performance delta associated with each variable is. That provides for a useful discussion (for example: should a stone wall at the target end affect performance more or less than a brick wall?).

That's what I meant, indeed

I think the major problem, in this particular case, is that the stopping power of (real) MGs is primarily composed of suppression and morale effects. Obviously, if you stand upright for too long then an MG will kill you. So will a rifle. But since about 1 July 1916 those kinds of targets massed upright targets have mostly gone away. Since then MGs generally tend to fix and/or turn, which is fundamentally a 'soft' effect of firepower. In CM that - turning - is something the player has to do, since the TacAI can't do it by itself.

Actually, the TacAI sometimes tries (note the self-preservation retrograde Slow or Fast commands overriding player commands). However, such commands when they happen - especially in WEGO - are just a minor inconvenience, since they can be overridden in turn during the next orders segment. I have only seen that behavior in low motivation, low experience and poorly led troops, by the way. Use Fanatic and you get a banzai charge of sorts.

But few of the tests in this thread have measured soft factors. What is the suppression of units at different ranges? How much does the MG switch its fire amongst the targets available to it or otherwise spread it's fire around (which, incidentally, is one of the resons I don't think the OPs observations are necessarily indicative of anything worth changing)? How far away from incoming rounds are units experiencing suppression effects? And so on. IMO, those are the sorts of soft firepower effects that need to be measured, because that's where I think any unexpected behaviour is likely to be found. CM MGs are killing about the right number of people.

Indeed it might be the case that it's all well but it's just that the scale used to rate troops and leadership is confusing us, or is perhaps too lenient, or the 'typical' presets in the editor are too generous.

But I didn't read in JasonC posts that much about lack of lethality, but rather about lack of severe morale effects.

[JonS]

Actually, the TacAI sometimes tries (note the self-preservation retrograde Slow or Fast commands overriding player commands). However, such commands when they happen - especially in WEGO - are just a minor inconvenience, since they can be overridden in turn during the next orders segment. I have only seen that behavior in low motivation, low experience and poorly led troops, by the way. Use Fanatic and you get a banzai charge of sorts.

I was dancing up and down the size scale there, without being clear enough. the TacAI does take over at times, as you mentioned, but I was referring to fixing or turning an entire attack, not just one or two elements of it. The TacAI can't do that, and I don't really think it should be expected to either.

Indeed it might be the case that it's all well but it's just that the scale used to rate troops and leadership is confusing us, or is perhaps too lenient, or the 'typical' presets in the editor are too generous.

There's a playability aspect here, too. Units that continue to do what you want them too, even under duress, are much easier (and more fun?) to play with than try to herd wet kittens. If the 'typical' presets resulted in troops that needed to be handled with extreme care, then there'd be a LOT more complaints about how hard CM is to play and win

[ForwardObserver]

QBs are CM's bastard stepchild, with about as much connection to reality as Kettler.

Natural child or not of CM, or connected or not to reality, I take the point system to have been designed to be portraying the notions of effectiveness and availability. I have always been under the impression that BFC drew inspiration for that scoring system from similar systems for miniature wargames, where there such scoring systems are a judgement of value - made by the game designers - on the two qualities I just mentioned.

TRPs in CM are also a sort-of combat Gerber-knife - all things to all units. They can be used for many different units, at the same time. In a perfect world there'd be about a dozen different types of TRPs - several for different artillery functions, one for mortars, one for on map weapons, one for MGs, one for A-Tk guns, etc. And each weapon type would only be able to use 'their own' TRP. Or alterately, but along the same lines, when a unit was selected only TRPs that unit could exploit would be visible while any others would be hidden. But that'd be a UI nightmare.

Yes, you're right that TRP's are 'blanket bonuses' that apply on any unit which can see the TRP. And indeed, introducing different types of TRP's, I agree, is not a very bright idea. On the other hand, your observations don't really disprove what I meant, that BFC thought MG's modeling to be just fine, not needing any crutch to enhance its effectiveness.

Note that effectiveness is measured with respect to a goal. The means to do that are either a) getting kills on the enemy force or breaking the enemy force morale. While I don't really have a strong position on a), on I do indeed think something is just wrong. That something might be, indeed, something specific to MG's, or perhaps 'something' in the modeling of morale and suppression level or rallying - just imagine someone just wrote 'if rnd(100) > 50 then rally troops' when he meant to write - 'if rnd(100) > 75 then rally troops' that can happen-, and therefore, not specific to MG's but rather 'systemic' , or the 'something' in the interaction between the TacAI module and the module of troops morale/psychology (such as the TacAI not acknowledging changes in morale at a high rate enough or giving preference to those rather than user input or stuff such as returning fire).

At the moment, I must say I don't know whether of these three possibilities is the case. And there might be quite a few more possible explanations. Including the one I deem the most unlikely, than decades of 'design for effect' in tactical wargaming got it absolutely wrong.

[ForwardObserver]

There's a playability aspect here, too. Units that continue to do what you want them too, even under duress, are much easier (and more fun?) to play with than try to herd wet kittens. If the 'typical' presets resulted in troops that needed to be handled with extreme care, then there'd be a LOT more complaints about how hard CM is to play and win

Difficulty settings over Warrior in CMx2 are totally underdeveloped. I do think that Iron (or Elite) levels could accomodate more 'frustrating' morale effects.

EDIT: I'm not sure if it is 'extreme care' to wonder if one should approach the enemy position along a covered route or a route in plain sight of the enemy MG positions. You make the wrong tactical call... and it's game over. Same thing in a strategy game, you made the alliance with the wrong player in a game of Civ IV... and it's game over even if you didn't realize it at the moment of making the wrong call

[ForwardObserver]

Because of the current implementation, it makes some sense to pay for TRPs--because a TRP that makes MG fire nasty also creates near zero artillery response time and the ability to blind fire on and near that TRP. Further, it's not just the MG that benefits from a TRP in direct fire, but ANY direct fire weapon. Thus, a TRP can, not necessarily does, provide a lot of force multiplier effect. When I played Fire on the Mountain in ROW, I specifically pointed out in my lengthy AAR that a separate mortar TRP would be most useful, since mortars are organic weapons at a much lower echelon, typically, than field artillery. Now, we're facing a somewhat similar bind, with our Swiss Army knife TRP now functioning as a variety of FPL (Final Protective Line). If we could designate FPLs for emplaced MGs, as was and is done in real warfare, then we wouldn't be in this mess. MGs would do MG things, mortars would do what they're supposed to, and overarching these, would be the mighty field artillery, each under its own control measures.

In researching the mortar issue, I read a Rand study done on the M107 4.2" mortar at NTC. One of the summary conclusions was that, as a general rule, mortars were NOT included in the brigade and divisional fire planning. They tended to fight their own war, hurting overall combat effectiveness through lack of integration into overall fire planning. Mind, this is ~66 years after the war we're discussing!

Brigade and divisional having mortars out of the loop has quite some sense. I was thinking more about the scale of CMx2 which - for gameplay purposes, not technical - is from Section to Battalion. I'd expect the fires in a prepared defense within a Battalion, that every officer and NCO would be aware of such preparations for the positions they were posted.

Type-specific TRP's would be nice but I agree with Jon that they would be overkill, and having them assigned a hefty cost in the QB editor is reasonable.