Terrorist commando raid KO's Harriers in Afghanistan

[Vanir Ausf B]

So I'll repeat the question: Do you believe Rasmussen when he says the security handover plan is still on track?

No. Maybe. I didn't see the original quote, so I'm not sure of the context. On track in what way? If by that he meant that the process is going smoothly then that is clearly not the case. If he meant that the time table for the handover is on track then that could well be true, and I suspect that is what he was referring to.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19642555

If you do believe him, even in general terms, why?

Rassmussen? To be honest, before this thread I had never heard of the guy. I have no real opinion on him one way or the other. If you mean NATO, I try to judge every piece of information on it's own merits. Having said that, based on what we know I do not believe NATO is engaged in a widespread systemic coverup of the sort you seem to believe in.

As you have probably gathered, I have concluded (not assumed from the get go, concluded, as in "after weighing the evidence available and making a considered judgement)" that NATO has little idea of the situation in the country, or that they are willfully handing the people that pay their salaries a load of bull hockey.

Oh I think you have been very clear that you have a very low opinion of NATO and NATO service members in general.

[Michael Emrys]

And it is worth noting that the Taliban were actually losing the war against the Afghan government up until support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began flowing in.

And you are assuming that there is negligible chance of that being repeated? Why?

Michael

[Vanir Ausf B]

And you are assuming that there is negligible chance of that being repeated? Why?

With regard to Saudi Arabia it is simple. It's the same reason they are not supporting the Taliban right now. And that is their relationship with the United States is far more valuable to their national interests that their relationship with the Taliban. And although I can't say for sure, I suspect that their recent experiences with al-Qaeda attacks on their own soil may have altered their view of the Taliban's alliance with that organization, compared to what it was in the 90s.

Pakistan is more difficult to predict. They presently support some elements of the Afghan Taliban while fighting an insurgency of their own against elements of the Pakistan Taliban allied with al-Qaeda. Pakistan's support seems to take the form of a wink and a nod towards the activities of those groups rather than material support. But I think at the least they are unlikely to resume the level of overt material support they did in the 90s because there would be serious consequences both in terms of their relationship with the US and other Western nations and also because of their own insurgency problems.

[Bigduke6]

Vanir,

Anders Fogh Rasmussen is the Secretary General of NATO. He has held the job since 2009. Before that he was Denmark's Prime Minister, and a key player in pushing NATO participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Here is the key phrase from his comments, which are in the link you provided:

"The goal is unchanged, the strategy remains the same, and, eh, the timeline remains the same."

This begs two questions.

1. If the Secretary General of NATO is not some one to whom you look for the "blue" position on Afghanistan war strategy, then who is?

2. Why do you think the handover timeline is still on track?

If the ANA is not trustworthy, and Rasmussen is saying the full handover will be complete by the end of 2014, how do you see that happening? I argued in a previous post that that leaves something like 24 months to convert the ANA from what it is to a force capable of providing security in the country on its own. Given that it is clear NATO and the US are, right now, not even sure which ANA soldiers can be trusted not to attack NATO and US soldiers, how do you see the ANA becoming a reliable and independent force over that time frame?

P.S. If I've given the impression I think NATO and NATO service members are slovenly, I apologize. I think the service members are fairly dedicated but that like any rich military they are overly dependent on a high-tech approach and that many sevice members have an unsafely high opinion of themselves and their mission. I consider them tactically competent although, given the amount of resources they spend to do simple things like conduct a patrol or clear a village, I would say they damn well better be.

I think the special forces, by which I mean the green berets and units like them, have failed miserably in Afghanistan, in that these special forces' primary mission is training foreign forces to support US military objectives. I'm sure the US special forces are competent enough at raiding compounds and calling down air strikes and rousting Afghans out of their beds, but the ANA sucks and the US trainers are the ones that took on the job of making the ANA a reliable force.

As for the hope "Well, once the combat forces leave we'll guarantee Afghan security with air support and special forces", I think there are more than a few of us old enough to remember that was precisely what the US promised the South Vietnamese regime.

Air support and special forces, even competent ones, are insufficient to support a discredited regime lacking support from the poplulace. The Karzai regime is corrupt and strictly speaking its sway right now extends not much further than Kabul's city limits.

How many ANA soldiers do you think are ready to lay down their lives for that regime? And if they are not, how can we hope to keep that regime in place?

If, when the US/NATO main force leaves, the Taliban and warlords are united, along with the population, with a collective hatred of the Karzai regime, the Taliban and the warlords - be they Uzbek or Tajik or Hazara or whatever you want - will not need conventional forces. They simply will waltz into provinces and the local leadership and population will receive them with open arms.

And some super-duper NATO special forces trooper on the ground with a radio and a laser-designator is going to stop that? If he is stupid enough to follow orders and try, in nine cases out of time, I would predict his local "friends" will rat him out to the Taliban or their allies. If they can't trick him into calling in strikes on the ANA first.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Here is the key phrase from his comments, which are in the link you provided:

"The goal is unchanged, the strategy remains the same, and, eh, the timeline remains the same."

This begs two questions.

You're in trouble if Womble reads this.

1. If the Secretary General of NATO is not some one to whom you look for the "blue" position on Afghanistan war strategy, then who is?

Usually the US Secretary of Defense. Sometimes the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Sometimes the ISAF commander especially back when Petraeus was in the post.

2. Why do you think the handover timeline is still on track?

If the ANA is not trustworthy, and Rasmussen is saying the full handover will be complete by the end of 2014, how do you see that happening? I argued in a previous post that that leaves something like 24 months to convert the ANA from what it is to a force capable of providing security in the country on its own. Given that it is clear NATO and the US are, right now, not even sure which ANA soldiers can be trusted not to attack NATO and US soldiers, how do you see the ANA becoming a reliable and independent force over that time frame?

I think the handover timeline is still on track because there is no indication I am aware of that it has been changed, nor is there any reason why it must be changed. That fact that some minority of ANA soldiers are not trustworthy is not a reason for the handover to not happen. I somehow doubt 100% trustworthiness was ever the goal to begin with.

As for the hope "Well, once the combat forces leave we'll guarantee Afghan security with air support and special forces", I think there are more than a few of us old enough to remember that was precisely what the US promised the South Vietnamese regime.

The Vietnam canard, again. I think I mentioned before that the US Congress passed a law making it illegal for the US to provide direct military assistance to South Vietnam after 1973. And the South Vietnamese government was toppled by an invading army, not a popular revolution. Lots of differences with Afghanistan.

Air support and special forces, even competent ones, are insufficient to support a discredited regime lacking support from the poplulace. The Karzai regime is corrupt and strictly speaking its sway right now extends not much further than Kabul's city limits.

How many ANA soldiers do you think are ready to lay down their lives for that regime? And if they are not, how can we hope to keep that regime in place?

I don't know how much longer Karzai will last. I do not think his personal survival is necessary, as if his life force were the only thing holding the Taliban at bay.

If, when the US/NATO main force leaves, the Taliban and warlords are united, along with the population, with a collective hatred of the Karzai regime, the Taliban and the warlords - be they Uzbek or Tajik or Hazara or whatever you want - will not need conventional forces.

This is your end game scenario? The Taliban don't win by conquering everyone, they win when everyone joins the Taliban? The Shia Tajiks and the Shia Hazara and the Sunni Tajiks and the Hazara all forget about that little unpleasantness in the 90s and decide to join up? That is pure wishful thinking, and completely preposterous. The ethnic and religious divides, the competing ambitions of warlords and nation states that tore the country apart in the 90s have not magically disappeared. The Taliban are still the Taliban, except probably even more religiously intolerant than before after years of close contact and cooperation with al-Qaeda. Most of the senior commanders of the ANA are former Northern Alliance. No matter how much of a turd Karzai is at least he's not cutting off people's heads for listening to music or stoning them to death for not growing their beards long enough.

They simply will waltz into provinces and the local leadership and population will receive them with open arms.

They will be welcomed as liberators? Really?

And some super-duper NATO special forces trooper on the ground with a radio and a laser-designator is going to stop that? If he is stupid enough to follow orders and try, in nine cases out of time, I would predict his local "friends" will rat him out to the Taliban or their allies. If they can't trick him into calling in strikes on the ANA first.

Super duper NATO trooper

[Wicky]

Aftermath of Taliban attack at Camp Bastion

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19704120

Not sure if this is viewable outside of the UK but interesting film footage.

[Michael Emrys]

Not sure if this is viewable outside of the UK but interesting film footage.

Played fine on my machine.

Michael

[Bigduke6]

Vanir,

Of course the Taliban will be welcomed by many as liberators. As your link makes clear, Dick Cheney was talking about invading another country.

The Taliban, among others, are defending their country from foreign invaders. They are fighting a jihad.

Karzai's death or flight abroad will not solve the basic problem that the regime we have installed in Afghanistan is corrupt and is so unpopular, that compared to that regime, for many people living in the country, the Taliban seem like a better alternative.

Getting rid of the foreign invaders and tossing out the Karzai regime is appealing to many non-Pathans, it's not like the Taliban have a monopoly on wanting to run their country themselves. Why should the Hazara/Uzbeks/Tajiks etc. etc. support the Karzai regime? It's not as if Hazara/Uzbeks/Tajiks etc. etc. have never made deals with Pathans before, or that all those ethnicities wouldn't be united by a desire to grab a bigger share of the pie and kick out the foreigners.

As I see it, the ANA is incapable of securing the regime or the country, and post-2014 the will on the part of the US population to secure the regime will be even less. Would Obama if re-elected re-commit troops to prop up the regime? If Romney is elected,would he? Would any forseeable Congress agree to it? Could such a recommitment, once most US troops are out of the country, be accepted by the US populace?

Absent another bloody terrorist attack originating in Afghanistan on US citizens and territory, I don't see it. The end game I see is, the infidels leave and Afghanistan reverts to its normal state of equally-shared chaos, followed by lots of hands-wringing in some western military circles along the lines of "We coulda won if the politicians had let us".

Which brings me back to my original point. This is what defeat looks like.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Of course the Taliban will be welcomed by many as liberators. As your link makes clear, Dick Cheney was talking about invading another country.

The Taliban, among others, are defending their country from foreign invaders. They are fighting a jihad.

How nobel of them. But the shortcomings of the Karzai government do not abrogate those of the Taliban.

Getting rid of the foreign invaders and tossing out the Karzai regime is appealing to many non-Pathans, it's not like the Taliban have a monopoly on wanting to run their country themselves. Why should the Hazara/Uzbeks/Tajiks etc. etc. support the Karzai regime? It's not as if Hazara/Uzbeks/Tajiks etc. etc. have never made deals with Pathans before, or that all those ethnicities wouldn't be united by a desire to grab a bigger share of the pie and kick out the foreigners.

The foreign invaders are mostly leaving anyways. And the Taliban will not accept any deal that does not leave them in charge.

As I see it, the ANA is incapable of securing the regime or the country, and post-2014 the will on the part of the US population to secure the regime will be even less. Would Obama if re-elected re-commit troops to prop up the regime? If Romney is elected,would he? Would any forseeable Congress agree to it? Could such a recommitment, once most US troops are out of the country, be accepted by the US populace?

Given the small number of troops required the answer to all of those questions is "yes".

Absent another bloody terrorist attack originating in Afghanistan on US citizens and territory, I don't see it. The end game I see is, the infidels leave and Afghanistan reverts to its normal state of equally-shared chaos, followed by lots of hands-wringing in some western military circles along the lines of "We coulda won if the politicians had let us".

Here's the thing you are not understanding. Or one of the things. There will always be opposition to the Taliban. Always. Their ideologically harsh and authoritarian brand of governence guarentees it. We back the opposition. Whether that opposition involves Karzai or not is ultimately not of critical importance.

Which brings me back to my original point. This is what defeat looks like.

You're posts are what wishful thinking looks like.

[ZPB II]

If one sits down and watches this little film it may help in the eternal quest to understand the past, the present and the future.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCtj9k6HqKE

Perspective may change. Patterns might not. War does not.

[Bigduke6]

http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/03/cnn-poll-u-s-opposition-to-afghanistan-war-remains-high/

It is data like that that makes me suspect that, once the US troops substantially leave, they will not return. Two out of three Americans is pretty difficult to overcome.

But if there's any evidence out there that the US population and politicians would support a re-commitment of force to Afghanistan, symbolically or materially, I'd be interested to see it.

[Vanir Ausf B]

If by "return" you mean commit 100,000 troops, I completely agree. But keeping a few thousand in country in a support role is not a problem politically. Once the steady drip of casualties dries up the issue will subside into the background.

[Stalins Organ]

A "few thousand" in a "support role" are going to look like a juicy target for your basic terrorists.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Imagine what big fat juicy morsels the 100,000+ ISAF personnel presently there must look like.

[Michael Emrys]

Imagine what big fat juicy morsels the 100,000+ ISAF personnel presently there must look like.

The difference might be that 100,00 might be capable of defending themselves, but 1,000—especially if the ANA is indifferent to defending them (or even hostile)—might not.

Michael

[Bigduke6]

If by "return" you mean commit 100,000 troops, I completely agree. But keeping a few thousand in country in a support role is not a problem politically. Once the steady drip of casualties dries up the issue will subside into the background.

If those few thousand can keep the Karzai regime in place. Otherwise the whole thing comes down like a house of cards.

Considering the work it takes to keep that government propped up with more than a 100 grand NATO types in country, and the less-than-sterling performance of the ANA so far, I'd call that a pretty big "if".

[Vanir Ausf B]

If those few thousand can keep the Karzai regime in place. Otherwise the whole thing comes down like a house of cards.

As you have likely gathered by me previous posts, I don't agree. Karzai will go eventually, and probably his regime. Everyone is not going to suddenly jump up and join the Taliban.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The difference might be that 100,00 might be capable of defending themselves, but 1,000—especially if the ANA is indifferent to defending them (or even hostile)—might not.

I've been a little loose with my terminology. It will be more than a "few" thousand. There will be at least 10,000 because that is what the Pentagon considers the minimum for force protection. And I don't think the ANA will be indifferent to protecting their air support

[gunnergoz]

I for one will not mourn for the collapsed Afghan government we paid through the teeth for as US taxpayers, and got nothing in return from except a pretty sobering collection of returning caskets.

Of all the things that I resent about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the things (besides the human cost) that I resent the most, is that my tax dollars having gone directly into the pockets of warlords, criminals and drug cartels in the idiotic assumption that these people would further America's aims instead of their own.

[Bigduke6]

Yeah, I doubt we're going to come to a common opinion on this one. As for me, collapse of the Karzai regime and Afghanistan's return to a hothouse for violence and extremist groups, would be a failure of US policy.

Although, come to think of it, the both of us seem to think the Taliban are going to improve their position in the coming chaos, but neither of us see the Taliban as a dominant force capaple of ruling the country effectively.

In other news, did any one see the report on who the raiders killed? One of them was the squadron commander, a major. He's identified as Lt. Col. Christopher 'Otis' Raible

So ya gotta wonder:

- Was Raible just in the wrong place at the wrong time?

- Is it possible Raible got killed because he decided he needed to lead the QRF?

- Or did the Taliban target him?

We can't rule out any option, but at least you have to consider the possibility the Taliban targeted him. They appear to be pretty good at identifying local government officials they want murdered, and then assassinating them. You have to believe the would have had the idea to target the guy when they were planning this thing.

A cynical extra piece of iffy evidence is, as nearly as I can tell the circumstances of his death have not been publicized. Those of us suspicious of official sources of information might take this as support to the argument the way he died is not something the Marines want publicized. But that's really cynical and I don't want to argue that it's proof.

But if the raiders actually went onto a US base and killed the squadron commander intentionally...man, that's scary.

As you have likely gathered by me previous posts, I don't agree. Karzai will go eventually, and probably his regime. Everyone is not going to suddenly jump up and join the Taliban.

[Vanir Ausf B]

So ya gotta wonder:

- Was Raible just in the wrong place at the wrong time?

- Is it possible Raible got killed because he decided he needed to lead the QRF?

- Or did the Taliban target him?

We can't rule out any option, but at least you have to consider the possibility the Taliban targeted him.

According to this account we actually can rule out some options. Raible was a mile away from where the attackers entered the base and he drove to the fighting. So the answer is B.

[Bigduke6]

Yep, that is enough evidence to exclude option three. Even if you assume the military had an interest in feeding the story to the WP, and that what he did was heroicized at least somewhat, it seems pretty impossible that he was on the Taliban target list. Seems like a brave guy, RIP.

[Michael Emrys]

Seems like a brave guy, RIP.

My impression—admittedly based on incomplete evidence, but still—is that he fully lived up to the expectations of Marine leadership. Brave guy indeed.

Michael

[gunnergoz]

I mentioned the CO and the source for the story about him in post #19 in this thread but you guys were so caught up arguing, it must have gone right by you. The article makes an interesting read.

[Vanir Ausf B]

The article referenced in post 19 mentions his death but gives no details.