Terrorist commando raid KO's Harriers in Afghanistan

[Bigduke6]

And I shall go point by point, as sequential progression appeals to me. (a/k/a it's easy to move on to point "2" if you remember point "1" comes right before it)

I don't find the report that most, not all, but most of the incidents are motivated by personal grievance difficult to believe on its face. Men in that part of the world are highly protective of their personal dignity and honor, which is fine but can become a problem when you are trying to instill military discipline on them. They also tend to react violently to perceived slights, as anyone who has been watching the news in the past few days can understand. I find the idea that you are a more accurate source of information on the subject than NATO amusing. Not being involved in a conflict does not mean you are a dispassionate observer, it just means you're an observer. If you can provide something that is not purely speculative I'm willing to listen.

Well, how about the fact that green-on-blue incidents this year are, more or less, about triple what they were last year? Have Afghan men suddenly become three times more sensitive? Or NATO trainers three times more insensitive?

If I get you right, you believe the combat organization involved in the conflict, in this case NATO, in its statements is a more reliable means of learning about the actual progress of a conflict, than just looking at the evidence available and using one's brain to judge the information on its own merits.

Without getting into whether that amuses me or no, because I am not sure I understand your point precisely, wouldn't it then logically follow that the Taliban are an equally reliable source? And indeed, if the question is about the progress and effectiveness of Taliban operations, a better one than NATO?

The Taliban have said that infiltrating the ANA and using turncoats to attack NATO is one of their strategies, and further that the strategy is successful. The Taliban is just as much at war as NATO, heck, probably more so. It's their country and their operation. Why should we not believe them?

Me, I take neither NATO nor Taliban at face value. I assume both will lie to achieve their war aims.

That's assuming that creating a modern state was the primary reason. It was not. There are plenty of failed states around the world, but we are not invading all of them and we did not invade Afghanistan because of an overwhelming desire to improve it's sewage treatment systems. We went there because the organization that carried out the 9/11 attacks -- and many others previously and subsequently -- was there.

I think that's where your argument fails. The mission was to punish attackers. It was not, people carrying Al-Quaeda membership cards and only those with membership paid in full. We went in targeting the terrorists, their friends, their trainers, their neighbors, the people that sheltered them, and even in some case people who just didn't jump fast enough to help us attack the people we wanted to attack. The stated goal was to create a situation where such an attack could never happen again, and more specifically, to make it so that Afghanistan would no longer be a terrorist haven. A stated midway task in that strategy, was the removal of the Taliban from power.

To do that, the Taliban would have to be not just ousted, but eliminated as an effective organization. Further, that whatever replaced them could keep the lid on Afghanistan enough so that Other Bad Guys would not set up their in a land of chaos and laws sold to the highest bidder, at some point down the road. It is precisely in these subsequent tasks that the mission became impossible. We had the capacity to start the war, but we lacked the capacity to finish it.

Our stated goals cannot be achieved, in Afghanistan, unless an effective and legitimate state apparatus, be it dictatorship, democracy, or just a happy confederation of tribal clans receiving regular protection payments, is imposed on the country. Without nation-building the place reverts to chaos the moment the blue troops leave.

(As, I suspect, we will see in about two years.)

You are focusing exclusively on the nation building aspect in order to frame the larger narrative from the most negative perspective. My guess is that the professional officers in the NATO forces have a more nuanced view of the situation than you appear to. You freely toss around words such as "beaten", "defeated" and "failure" in relation to the NATO efforts, but the political and military situation is too complex to be characterized by absolute declarations of total victory or abject defeat.

As mentioned above, Afghanistan was not invaded in order to transform it into some kind of south central Asian version of Las Vegas. We were primary concerned with destroying al-Qaida*, or at least destroying al-Qaida'a ability to continue carrying out attacks on us (and by "us" I mean the West in general, not just the United States). In that we have been largely successful.

Have we? One of the prerequisites for terror attacks in the West is anger and militancy in the non-west. I think we can agree that the suicide attacks hitting NATO troops right now, are driven substantially by those motivations.

In a way deploying troops to Afghanistan long-term was one of the best things the jihad could have happen to it. It gave the faithful a clear and present infidel danger, and placed infidel troops in reach of almost a bottomless number of angry young men.

I do not call that a smart strategic move, and I think it is even stupider when the stated goal is creating a secure Afghanistan, a fool's task if there ever was one. I do not believe NATO can succeed where the Soviet and British empires failed. To my knowledge, the last outside force to impose peace on Afghanistan was the Mongols; they suppressed resistance by murdering entire cities. That's not a strategy NATO can follow, and I see no other strategies that can work.

Voltaire's line on history applies here, I think.

I focus on nation-building, because without that, Afghanistan remains a place where Islamic extremist groups may find a home, and a place where the Taliban remains a powerful political player. I see no reason to believe that will not become the case in the near future. But then, I don't accept a NATO statement "we're still on track" without evidence to back it up.

Right now it seems likely that Afghanistan in the near future is looking at effective partition between the Pashtun areas dominated by the Taliban and the rest of the country run by the corrupt government. That is less than ideal, but I think we can live with it. After all, we're not there to conquer the place (it would have been in some ways far simpler if we had been). We've been able to effectively attrit the remnants of al-Qaida in Pakistan from over the border, and if the Taliban are foolish enough to let them back in Afghanistan in significant force I don't see any reason we can't do the same there as long as we maintain access to near-by bases.

That isn't a win, exactly, but it's not really a defeat either. In fact, I feel confident stating that no matter what happens from here on out it is very unlikely we are going to be "beaten" or "defeated" because to a significant degree we have already won. Now you could certainly argue that from a purely cost/benefit analysts perspective it would have been wiser to call it good enough and left years ago, and I wouldn't disagree with that.

If that is the outcome then I would argue that is a clear failure to achieve the stated goals. A corrupt Uzbek/Tajik/Hazara federation in the north, and more honest but fundamentalist Pathan/Taliban entity in the south is a recipe for civil war, chaos, warlords, and organized crime; at that's before Beijing, Dehli, Islamabad, and Tehran - just to name the local neighbors - start trying to skew things to their advantage.

What near-by bases are you talking about? We're getting kicked out of Kyrgyzstan in 2014, and I don't think the Iranians or the Pakistanis would be very enthusiastic about opening their air space to US aircraft operating out of Iraq.

To me it's all starting to look all Saigon 1975; we say to the regime we've installed "Don't worry, if the bad guys attack after we leave we'll send you air, and then we don't."

[Vanir Ausf B]

Well, how about the fact that green-on-blue incidents this year are, more or less, about triple what they were last year? Have Afghan men suddenly become three times more sensitive? Or NATO trainers three times more insensitive?

That was an example of one possible reason. There are countless possible others. I don't pretend to know what all the actual reasons are.

The report I saw put the ratio of Taliban related green on blue attacks at about 1/4 of the total. If you believe this is not correct then tell us what the real ratio is.

If I get you right, you believe the combat organization involved in the conflict, in this case NATO, in its statements is a more reliable means of learning about the actual progress of a conflict, than just looking at the evidence available and using one's brain to judge the information on its own merits.

It would be more accurate to say that I don't believe there is enough evidence for us to judge either way. But if you can tell me what the true ratio is I will reconsider. So far all you've put forth is that we should not believe what NATO tells us, whatever that may be, because it comes from NATO, but should believe what you tell us instead because it comes from you.

The Taliban have said that infiltrating the ANA and using turncoats to attack NATO is one of their strategies, and further that the strategy is successful. The Taliban is just as much at war as NATO, heck, probably more so. It's their country and their operation. Why should we not believe them?

Does not the NATO statement that 1/4 (roughly) of the incidents are Taliban related constitute a confirmation that the Taliban are using it as a strategy? Seems to me that is does. I see no conflict between the two statements.

The stated goal was to create a situation where such an attack could never happen again, and more specifically, to make it so that Afghanistan would no longer be a terrorist haven. A stated midway task in that strategy, was the removal of the Taliban from power.

To do that, the Taliban would have to be not just ousted, but eliminated as an effective organization.

How many al-Qaida training camps are there in Afghanistan presently? Whatever their presence is, it's a fraction of what it once was.

What near-by bases are you talking about? We're getting kicked out of Kyrgyzstan in 2014, and I don't think the Iranians or the Pakistanis would be very enthusiastic about opening their air space to US aircraft operating out of Iraq.

We'll see. It's not the first time they've said that.

To me it's all starting to look all Saigon 1975; we say to the regime we've installed "Don't worry, if the bad guys attack after we leave we'll send you air, and then we don't."

So let's be clear. You think the Taliban is going to win the war outright. They will overrun the country, let al-Qaida set up shop and they will party like it's 1999 all over again. Is that correct?

[Stalins Organ]

I think that the Taliban are going to "win" - the current Afghan Govt (from this distance) seems corrupt and incapable of obtaining the "moral support" of hte population.

the Taliban, OTOH, seem to be able to use terror and violence and religion to secure motivated support from enough of the population to matter.

so to me it seems completely analagous to vietnam, where the Govt exists solely while it has vast amounts of support from overseas - and once that is gone (end of 2014??) it is just a matter of time until it falls.

whethe or not AQ then end up basing themselves in Afghanistan again, and, if so to what extent, is another question entirely.

but IMO the west should not have bothered trying to set up democracy there - "we" should "just" have smashed the Taliban, put in a minimal effort to set up another Govt, and gotten out. then if hte Taliban go the AQ way again they get smashed again - as often as required until they get the message, or the population gets sick enough of it to be motivated to not let it happen, or every 10-20 years otherwise.

[Michael Emrys]

but IMO the west should not have bothered trying to set up democracy there - "we" should "just" have smashed the Taliban' date=' put in a minimal effort to set up another Govt, and gotten out. then if hte Taliban go the AQ way again they get smashed again - as often as required until they get the message, or the population gets sick enough of it to be motivated to not let it happen, or every 10-20 years otherwise.[/quote']

At the moment, I confess I can't think of a more cost effective (in terms of both money, matériel, and lives) strategy than that. Until the Afghanis decide on their own, out of their own experience, that they don't want the Taliban or any organization like the Taliban, there isn't much we can do to keep them from growing back.

Michael

[Vanir Ausf B]

International support isn't going to dry up after 2014. I don't know where the assumption that it will comes from. In fact NATO hasn't even said it will be out by 2014, only that they intend to transition from a combat role to a support role. South Vietnam was invaded and conquered by the North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong. There will be no Case–Church Amendment for Afghanistan. NATO air cover means that it is nearly impossible for the Taliban to effectively transition to a conventional military campaign. It's hard to capture and control territory with IEDs and suicide bombers, especially in the northern non-Pashtun provinces where the civilian populace is more likely to have relatives in the ANA than in the Taliban.

[gunnergoz]

Taking out as many bad guys as possible in a sudden, devastating and overwhelming attack, then pulling out when you have accomplished that, is one thing. Sticking around trying to make friendlies out of the rest of them in a culture where foreigners are either the enemy or the prey, is another, as in asking for trouble for as long as you remain in country.

[Bigduke6]

It would be more accurate to say that I don't believe there is enough evidence for us to judge either way. But if you can tell me what the true ratio is I will reconsider. So far all you've put forth is that we should not believe what NATO tells us, whatever that may be, because it comes from NATO, but should believe what you tell us instead because it comes from you.

Does not the NATO statement that 1/4 (roughly) of the incidents are Taliban related constitute a confirmation that the Taliban are using it as a strategy? Seems to me that is does. I see no conflict between the two statements.

No, you misunderstand me. I say we should not take NATO statements at face value and accept them uncritically.

I can't tell you what the "true ratio" is, but again, green-on-blue incidents have tripled and NATO has stopped most joint operations with the ANA because of that. We can take as a fact that, on an individual basis, relative cultural sensitivity on the part of ANA and NATO personnel has not changed overnight. But the amount of green-on-blue incidents has, in a big way. The Taliban have said they have been infiltrating the ANA for some time and that instigating green-on-blue incidents is part of their campaign strategy.

I think this is compelling enough to call the NATO assertion that one in four incidents is Taliban-linked into question. But I also think we won't agree on this.

But that's not the only issue to be discussed, of course. Rasmussen said shortly after the announcement of the halt of joint ops with the ANA, that the security handover plan was still on track and that the country would be secure in 2014 once NATO forces (for the most part) leave.

That's a pretty clear statement. To my mind, it is another NATO statement flatly contradicted by the evidence, and common sense.

In my personal considered opinion, it is ludicrous to assert that, after something like 5-6 years of really trying to make the ANA a viable force, and now that it is not trustworthy enough to operate jointly with NATO, that in 18 -24 months the ANA will be made reliable. The force is too large, the country is too big, and it is reasonable to assume that as the NATO exit deadline approaches, Taliban penetration of the ANA will increase.

Already we can state as a fact: "NATO has a poor grasp of the real degree of Taliban penetration of the ANA, for it seems that the only way NATO seems to find out about Taliban operatives, is when ANA soldiers open fire on their NATO colleagues." Eighteen months is not nearly enough time to purge the ANA of Taliban operatives, recruit and vet replacements, and create a viable force.

Further, I would in the strongest terms question NATO's ability even to purge the ANA, as it would be the corrupt Karzai regime that would be doing the prosecution.

At the same time NATO forces already are drawing down; that is reduced force capacity and pretty much for all of recorded history the moment the occupying force in Afghanistan reduces force imprint, the insurgents reassert control over the wavering provinces, starting with the most remote and heading towards Kabul.

But Rasmussen says the handover plan is on track. He is the boss of NATO. Do you believe him?

How many al-Qaida training camps are there in Afghanistan presently? Whatever their presence is, it's a fraction of what it once was.

That's nice. If the campaign to do that created millions more irate Muslims and so also created an international fringe of several thousand young men willing to carry out terror attacks against citizens of Western nations, providing some one tells them how to do it, then I do not call that a reasonable return.

In exchange for "eliminating" Al Quaeda (well, reducing substantially) we have made our country the legitimate object of a world-wide jihad for any nut job who wants to fight in Islam's name. Would you call that a positive?

So let's be clear. You think the Taliban is going to win the war outright. They will overrun the country, let al-Qaida set up shop and they will party like it's 1999 all over again. Is that correct?

I'm not sure of the end state. I think once the West leaves the Karzai regime will crumble and there will be some form of civil war. The Taliban may win but they may splinter and they may be badly damaged in the conflict. But in any case, Afghanistan will become an even more lawless place with plenty of valleys run by bandits and drug lords or religious nuts, or any combination of the above, that an Islamic extremist group might well find protection from.

What I am sure of is that the West is on a fool's errand, they cannot secure the country given resources available, and they are perforce wasting lives and treasure.

You say time will tell.

The West has been at this for a decade and they're bailing. The last "surge" troops left Afghanistan yesterday, it was in the news wires.

I say time has told.

[Vanir Ausf B]

No, you misunderstand me. I say we should not take NATO statements at face value and accept them uncritically.

I can't tell you what the "true ratio" is, but again, green-on-blue incidents have tripled and NATO has stopped most joint operations with the ANA because of that. We can take as a fact that, on an individual basis, relative cultural sensitivity on the part of ANA and NATO personnel has not changed overnight. But the amount of green-on-blue incidents has, in a big way. The Taliban have said they have been infiltrating the ANA for some time and that instigating green-on-blue incidents is part of their campaign strategy.

I think this is compelling enough to call the NATO assertion that one in four incidents is Taliban-linked into question. But I also think we won't agree on this.

Although relative cultural sensitivity may not have changed, the atmosphere in which the cultural interaction takes place almost certainly has. The attacks create distrust and suspicion which makes interaction more difficult, which in turn creates the conditions for negative experiences. Essentially the attacks themselves cause a snowball effect.

And of course there is always the copycat effect.

But that's not the only issue to be discussed, of course. Rasmussen said shortly after the announcement of the halt of joint ops with the ANA, that the security handover plan was still on track and that the country would be secure in 2014 once NATO forces (for the most part) leave.

That's a pretty clear statement. To my mind, it is another NATO statement flatly contradicted by the evidence, and common sense.

I don't think that uncritically accepting everything NATO says as the unvarnished truth was ever the issue.

In my personal considered opinion, it is ludicrous to assert that, after something like 5-6 years of really trying to make the ANA a viable force, and now that it is not trustworthy enough to operate jointly with NATO, that in 18 -24 months the ANA will be made reliable. The force is too large, the country is too big, and it is reasonable to assume that as the NATO exit deadline approaches, Taliban penetration of the ANA will increase.

Reliable for what? Viable for what? To kill every last Taliban in the country? Of course not. Viable for keeping the Taliban from overrunning the non-Pashtun areas of the country? I think so, as long as they have support. Remember, when the Taliban were driven from power in 2001 it wasn't the 1st Infantry Division doing the driving out. It was primarily the Northern Alliance and some bribed warlords, with imbedded special forces teams. The Taliban's ability to stand up to any conventional force in large operations is extremely limited.

At the same time NATO forces already are drawing down; that is reduced force capacity and pretty much for all of recorded history the moment the occupying force in Afghanistan reduces force imprint, the insurgents reassert control over the wavering provinces, starting with the most remote and heading towards Kabul.

I've already said I think we are looking at a defacto partition.

But Rasmussen says the handover plan is on track. He is the boss of NATO. Do you believe him?

No. But then again, the "track" was created primarily with domestic political concerns in mind so it's not surprising that events in Afghanistan are not being cooperative.

That's nice. If the campaign to do that created millions more irate Muslims and so also created an international fringe of several thousand young men willing to carry out terror attacks against citizens of Western nations, providing some one tells them how to do it, then I do not call that a reasonable return.

Did this actually happen? I've seen far more protests over a Youtube video than I have over Afghanistan.

In exchange for "eliminating" Al Quaeda (well, reducing substantially) we have made our country the legitimate object of a world-wide jihad for any nut job who wants to fight in Islam's name. Would you call that a positive?

I would call that a hypothetical. Muslims who are into violent world-wide jihad have a belief system that did not originate from events in Afghanistan and predates our involvement there.

I'm not sure of the end state. I think once the West leaves the Karzai regime will crumble and there will be some form of civil war. The Taliban may win but they may splinter and they may be badly damaged in the conflict. But in any case, Afghanistan will become an even more lawless place with plenty of valleys run by bandits and drug lords or religious nuts, or any combination of the above, that an Islamic extremist group might well find protection from.

All perfectly reasonable. But it's also predicated on happening after the West leaves. When is that? We are drawing down, but contrary to popular belief there is no timetable for complete withdrawal.

What I am sure of is that the West is on a fool's errand, they cannot secure the country given resources available, and they are perforce wasting lives and treasure.

You say time will tell.

The West has been at this for a decade and they're bailing. The last "surge" troops left Afghanistan yesterday, it was in the news wires.

I say time has told.

Hmm, I'm not sure what the withdrawal of the surge troops has to do with the discussion. As I'm sure you are aware, a date for the withdrawal of those troops was set before they had even deployed. That was done purely for domestic political consumption*. Their withdrawal is indicative of nothing other than that their withdrawal date has arrived and they have been withdrawn as scheduled.

* Specifically, it was a sop thrown by President Obama to the anti-war wing of his party. Much grumbling has resulted.

[Bigduke6]

I don't think that uncritically accepting everything NATO says as the unvarnished truth was ever the issue.

Well I must have misunderstood you, because I thought you accepted the NATO assertion that 1 out of 4 green-on-blue incidents was Taliban-related, and the others not.

[Vanir Ausf B]

I do accept it as plausible, just not uncritically.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Oh, and one more thing that I neglected to mention earlier. NATO may often put a positive spin on assessments that are essentially judgement calls, i.e. how's the war going, but they typically do not fudge numbers. We are arguing over a number.

[gunnergoz]

Just heard from a friend who is stationed on the base and was there during the raid. The raid was furthered by a blowing sandstorm which apparently blinded many surveillance cameras. That sounds like either canny TB planning or really good luck, but my bet is on the former. The UK's QRF took 5 hours to get to the scene. The raid took place on their side of the base. My friend, not a Marine himself, thinks things would have gone differently if the raid had been tried on the USMC side of the base.

[Bigduke6]

Oh, and one more thing that I neglected to mention earlier. NATO may often put a positive spin on assessments that are essentially judgement calls, i.e. how's the war going, but they typically do not fudge numbers. We are arguing over a number.

I would say: NATO probably does not fudge numbers that can be checked relatively easily by an independent agency. This would normally be the media but it could be the political opposition or citizens' groups or the lower levels of the military itself. The obvious example would be soldiers killed; it is a very sensitive issue and even though it certainly would be in NATO strategic interest to put out lower casualty figures, than actual, it would be almost impossible to do without getting caught, and getting caught would be a huge PR disaster. So those numbers I believe.

Numbers like "ANA personnel trained to combat effectiveness" or "Estimated Taliban killed" or "Provinces under Karzai government control" are not so easily checked independently, and I would not trust NATO declarations on these data as far as I could throw it. NATO has every incentive to put out the most positive number possible, that cannot be easily contradicted.

In some cases their definitions are highly suspect, for instance, they for years now have told us a specific number ANA forces are online and can reliably be trusted to provide security, but now we have a NATO hold on joint operations with any ANA. (Again, unless a BG or higher signs off on the op.) So what are we to make of past NATO statements about the ANA? Were they lying intentionally, or just incapable of telling reliable ANA from unreliable ANA? To what extent has the rot set it? How many of these past joint operations, where they call in the media to watch the ANA clear a village or patrol in the mountains or operate checkpoints or whatever it is, were in fact dog and pony shows having nothing to do with actual ANA capacity? We obviously don't know. So I would say the NATO number on mission-capable ANA is highly suspect. Even if, and this is a if not just big but of Biblical proportion, NATO were to be an incredibly honorable and professional bureacracy practically free of traditional military careerism and CYA, NATO has a very big incentive not just to put out rose-colored numbers, but to make rose-colored judgements that create the assumptions build those numbers.

Further, what about the things NATO simply doesn't know? If they say, well, Wardak province is now more or less peaceful and under reliable Karzai government control, and shut down NATO outposts there, then how are we - the people who are paying for this brilliant military operation - to know whether (a) the Taliban aren't waltzing in there the moment night falls and the Karzai people lock their doors or ( the Taliban haven't already cut a deal/intimidate the local Karzai people so the Karzai local officials just lie about their control of the region to Kabul and NATO or my personal favorite © the Taliban have come in, killed all the local Karzai people or put them to flight, and the Karzai government knows it but it just lies about the province's reliability to NATO?

Yet our civilian policy-makers, and the general public, who pay them, are supposed to make informed decisions on how well the hearts-and-minds campaign is going, based on our military's estimate of how peaceful or violent it is in the Afghan sticks? It gets to the point where any NATO assertion about any security status, where NATO troops are not physically located, becomes inherently absurd. They don't know, they have no reliable way of finding out because their sources of information are limited and those that do exist often lie.

So what are we to make of Rasmussen declarations like "we're on track with the security handover". How could that possibly be based on anything but wishful thinking? Are we to take his statements at face value, just because he's in charge of NATO? Does he think we're stupid?

Gunnergoz, thanks for the note on the sandstorm. If I had to guess I would agree with you, it seems to me like the Taliban is intelligent and patient enough to wait for the right weather to pull off a raid like this.

I also think it's possible that, if the British reaction forces are less efficient than the Marines' at this base - which I would say is possible but far from a given - then that may well have been something the Taliban factored in when planning the raid as well. It seems like they had enough information to know where to breach the perimeter and where to send the assault teams. The might have also had enough information to figure out, that hitting the British side of the base for whatever reason would give the assault teams more time. But of course we can't say that for sure.

But knowledge of the British QRF capacity or no, that's more evidence the assault teams were in US uniforms not by accident, but as part of a well-thought-out plan. It is just a smart move, if you are going to raid a NATO base, to do it at night, and to send dudes dressed in the uniform of one of the coalition members, and then have hit an area where troops where another coalition member is predominant. NATO fear of blue-on-blue incidents is no secret and that's an easy way to take advantage of it.

I mentioned it before, but again, one has to give the Marines and indeed the command at the base at least some credit; no blue-on-blue casualties were reported. In the chaos that's a sign of good discipline and control, although of course we can't say how much extra damage the raiders did, because the base command was taking its time and being careful to keep from killing its own people.

[gunnergoz]

From what I read, it was Marine Harrier maintenance guys that did the initial fighting, led by the squadron CO, subsequently KIA, who led them into the fray packing only his sidearm because he'd somehow been separated from his carbine. Guts, through and through. Makes you glad the Marines are on our side. (Which, mostly, they are unless the fleet's in and its liberty call in Oolongapo. )

[Vanir Ausf B]

I would say: NATO probably does not fudge numbers that can be checked relatively easily by an independent agency. This would normally be the media but it could be the political opposition or citizens' groups or the lower levels of the military itself. The obvious example would be soldiers killed; it is a very sensitive issue and even though it certainly would be in NATO strategic interest to put out lower casualty figures, than actual, it would be almost impossible to do without getting caught, and getting caught would be a huge PR disaster. So those numbers I believe.

So numbers that are not relatively easily checked should be assumed to be manufactured until proven otherwise? I'm not going to do that.

Further, what about the things NATO simply doesn't know?

So what are we to make of Rasmussen declarations like "we're on track with the security handover". How could that possibly be based on anything but wishful thinking? Are we to take his statements at face value, just because he's in charge of NATO? Does he think we're stupid?

I prefer to judge different bits of information on their own merits as opposed to making broad assumptions. I have no problem reading one statement as implausible based on what I know and another as plausible, even from the same source.

Gunnergoz, thanks for the note on the sandstorm. If I had to guess I would agree with you, it seems to me like the Taliban is intelligent and patient enough to wait for the right weather to pull off a raid like this.

They also rode into the base on the backs of sandworms.

[Bigduke6]

So numbers that are not relatively easily checked should be assumed to be manufactured until proven otherwise? I'm not going to do that.

Then you will be manipulated by liars.

[Stalins Organ]

International support isn't going to dry up after 2014. I don't know where the assumption that it will comes from. In fact NATO hasn't even said it will be out by 2014, only that they intend to transition from a combat role to a support role.

And the difference is what?? Do you REALLY think the ANA will be capable of resisting the Taliban on its own without ISAF combat forces?

South Vietnam was invaded and conquered by the North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong.

The VC had been wiped out - the Taliban have not.

You use IEDs and suicide bombers to destroy the government infrastructure and the willingness of people to be part of it and/or obey it. If the govt can't function then the Taliban can take over quite easily - as has been demonstrated in places like Waziristan.

Assymetric warfare again.

[Vanir Ausf B]

Then you will be manipulated by liars.

Just because I don't automatically assume something is false doesn't mean I uncritically accept it as true. I've made this point before, and I think you are being deliberately obtuse.

[Vanir Ausf B]

And the difference is what?? Do you REALLY think the ANA will be capable of resisting the Taliban on its own without ISAF combat forces?

Without any ISAF help? No. But with air support and a small number of special forces teams on the ground, yes. And I think that because that is essentialy how the Taliban were driven from power in 2001.

The VC had been wiped out - the Taliban have not.

You use IEDs and suicide bombers to destroy the government infrastructure and the willingness of people to be part of it and/or obey it. If the govt can't function then the Taliban can take over quite easily - as has been demonstrated in places like Waziristan.

Assymetric warfare again.

Perhaps in the Pashtun areas where they have support from most of the civilian population. Not so much in the Northern areas. Even in the 90's when the Taliban was stronger than today and it's opposition weaker they never were able to control the whole country.

[Stalins Organ]

Small groups of special forces??? Really?? so that would be NOT withdrawing all COMBAT support then? And in fact tha wold be an admission of failure of course.........an entirely perdictable one IMO...one which fully accords with what I believe the situation is - that the ANA and Govt cannot survive without foreign COMBAT support.

Those Pashtun areas that were not controlled by the Taliban amounted to how much of Afghanistan in 2001??

Air strikes aer useless unless the Taliban decides to engage in some vaguely conventional warfare. It is entirely possible that they may make het mistake of doing so again.........but they do not need to IMO - as they did through the 1990's I see them as infiltrating the cities, subverting the Govt, and generally turning Afghanistan into a hell hole of intrigue, death, poverty and ignorance again.

How does this war end? - 5 mb pdf from CSIS, which says, in part exec summary:

This "transition" is already underway, but no one can yet predict how the withdrawal of US and other NATO/ISAF combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014 will play out over time. It is not clear how the US and its NATO/ISAF allies will actually manage the withdrawal of their forces. It is not clear how much continuing support aid donors will provide to Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond, or whether the coming massive cuts in military spending and aid will trigger a major recession or depression during a period when outside troops will leave and Afghanistan’s weak government and forces must go through another election.

The fact is that the problems I have outlined are well known, and no-one actually knows how they will be solved. Airstrikes and small elite forces do not sound like a real solution to me.

As an aside and completely unrelated, the "this is not a solution reminds me of someone saying that 22mm armour was not a solution to getting a medium velocity 45mm gun into a suitable position to kill enemy tanks in 1941!

[Vanir Ausf B]

Small groups of special forces??? Really?? so that would be NOT withdrawing all COMBAT support then?

Well, yeah. Where did you get the idea that we were planning to withdraw everyone?

The plan for 2014

The plan for 2014 is much less clear. It will be highly dependent on the post-2014 plan, which is still in the early stages of negotiations with the Karzai administration. However, assuming a deal is reached, a 2014 plan is likely to include the following elements.

The US force level will drop to between 10,000 and 20,000 troops. They will consist of Special Forces, counterterrorism forces, and military training personnel. They will be deployed to a small number of bases around the country. US/ISAF troops will continue their training of ANSF soldiers. Counterterrorism forces will concentrate mostly on high-value targets.

The ANSF will be responsible for security operations for all of Afghanistan, including army and police functions. The ANSF will be maintained at 352,000 troops. It is possible, however, that plans will be put in place to begin cutting the number to 230,000 troops starting after 2014.

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/03/us_withdrawal_from_a.php

Those Pashtun areas that were not controlled by the Taliban amounted to how much of Afghanistan in 2001??

You mean the non-Pashtun areas. About 1/3.

Air strikes aer useless unless the Taliban decides to engage in some vaguely conventional warfare. It is entirely possible that they may make het mistake of doing so again.........but they do not need to IMO - as they did through the 1990's I see them as infiltrating the cities, subverting the Govt, and generally turning Afghanistan into a hell hole of intrigue, death, poverty and ignorance again.

Um, you seem to be under the mistaken impression that the Taliban made their gains in the 90s though an asymmetrical insurgency campaign similar to the one they are waging today. That is not how it happened. They operated as a fairly conventional military force.

And it is worth noting that the Taliban were actually losing the war against the Afghan government up until support from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began flowing in.

[Stalins Organ]

I didn't say that the west was planning to withdraw "everyone" - I said:

so to me it seems completely analagous to vietnam, where the Govt exists solely while it has vast amounts of support from overseas - and once that is gone (end of 2014??) it is just a matter of time until it falls.

for me at least, small combat groups are not "vast amounts of support" - perhaps you read that differently.

Yes they operated in the 1990's as a fairly conventinal force - against other fairly conventional forces - alboth sides being what we would probably describe as being "irregular" - but they have not done that for 10 years now - I suspect they may have changed their tactics.

AFAIK Pakistan and militant moslems from around the world still seem to be supporting the Taliban

[Vanir Ausf B]

for me at least, small combat groups are not "vast amounts of support" - perhaps you read that differently.

Why would you suppose that only "vast" amounts of support will prevent the Taliban from doing something that they were unable to do in the 90s against a foe that had less-than-vast amounts of support?

Yes they operated in the 1990's as a fairly conventinal force - against other fairly conventional forces - alboth sides being what we would probably describe as being "irregular" - but they have not done that for 10 years now - I suspect they may have changed their tactics.

They have because they had to, not because they wanted to. And the point remains that they have no means of capturing and controlling territory outside of their ethnic areas without resorting to a more conventional posture.

AFAIK Pakistan and militant moslems from around the world still seem to be supporting the Taliban

They do, but to a lesser degree than in the 90s.

[John Kettler]

gunnergoz,

Hadn't heard this and am, frankly, shocked. Not only is it a terrible loss on a bunch of levels, but it indicates serious base security issues and involves aircraft of a type so scarce we had to buy spares from the British when they retired their Harriers and cannibalized them to keep ours flying. Are there any replacement Harriers to be had?

Regards,

John Kettler

[Bigduke6]

Just because I don't automatically assume something is false doesn't mean I uncritically accept it as true. I've made this point before, and I think you are being deliberately obtuse.

If I am obtuse, it is an unintentional accident.

You and I agree a critical approach to information coming out of Afghanistan is important. Further, you and I agree NATO is one of the sources of that information.

So I'll repeat the question: Do you believe Rasmussen when he says the security handover plan is still on track?

If you do believe him, even in general terms, why?

As you have probably gathered, I have concluded (not assumed from the get go, concluded, as in "after weighing the evidence available and making a considered judgement)" that NATO has little idea of the situation in the country, or that they are willfully handing the people that pay their salaries a load of bull hockey.