ArmouredTopHat

What Ukraine needs / wants might not necessarily be what NATO countries need or want, there is a very different level of capability and access to said capability on display. Literally different goals in mind. NATO forces fight with the realistic assumption of a strong air contingent for instance with all the support it offers. Ukraine does not have that.
If my ideas are not clear, allow me to clarify:

1. I agree there is a shift, but I do not see it being a drastic one, just a continuation of trends people were aware of served with a slice of reality. 

2. Western forces -are- adapting. We are already seeing changes to force makeup that will be implemented in a matter of years. This is pretty fast for a peacetime force. 

2.b No one is saying this is entirely down to ineptitude, but it clearly plays a part, especially with the Russians when they had so many on paper advantages that they cannot leverage properly. As with all things the answer is far more complicated. Technology plays a part in this just as much as doctrine and incompetence. 

3. As highlighted, EVERYONE is taking notes here, there is plenty of evidence shown in the last few pages here alone that different forces in NATO are actively using the conflict to draw up changes to force structure. the US is literally gaining active experience RIGHT NOW that tells them what systems are working to intercept drones and what are not in Syria. 

4. I'm sorry but what? Based on what evidence? The whole reason we saw a triumph in western approach to war in the Gulf was because we have mostly kept ahead with adaptations' understand if some wrong lessons were learned (the whole need for stocks for high intensity conflict is the main point I guess)  Are you referring to the Chinese ability to build lots of drones that's more a product of their cheap industrial labour pool instead of any particular military innovation? Western military companies are clearly on the cutting edge of pretty much every major military technology. I entirely agree there is an issue of scale that needs to be addressed, but why are you acting like China holds actual parity in terms of technology when they literally self admit to being behind?
So, here is my broad take / vision on things for the future overall. For the record I am typing when I can, there is a lot to answer here but I will do my best. I do find it unfair for you to say that I have not posted evidence though, the last....6 or so posts I made all included plenty of links for you to enjoy.

Future considerations for NATO armed forces.
New generation of vehicles required that are better protected from all around attack, especially with regards to IFVs, APCs and Tanks, a true shift away from cold war era chassis and designs that seem increasingly unfit for purpose. APS should be a new standard of protection and needs to become more widely integrated.
  Together with this, we should be keenly exploring practical applications for UGVs to supplement and potentially even replace certain roles down the line. Doctrine should be overhauled to reflect this should they prove viable.
  Close range air defence needs to prioritise drones and a means for cheap disposal. Layers required to combat drones from the UAV recon level to the FPV. 
  The development and deployment of counter-drone technologies, such as anti-drone rifles, jamming devices, and radar systems, have become crucial in defending against drone threats and should be viewed as a top priority. 
  Adjustment on force makeup to include more organic drone capability both for recon and strike potential, at least platoon based if not squad level. Presumably tied in to more effective battlefield management systems.
  Heavy usage on loitering munitions as a means of leveraging infantry firepower, with traditional artillery aspects for battalion fire support backing. Mortars used to be the go to for infantry firepower on the company / Battalion level but I wonder if they are simply too exposed to do so given the threat of drone / loitering munitions.
  Overall emphasis on a flexible command and control alongside ISR capability, while also acknowledging that you need the means to move forward to take the fight to the enemy while also dominating them with firepower and superior recon capability. FPV munitions are not the correct solution for every problem. 
  Recognition that EWAR needs to became a focal point for force structures, present in as many levels as possible all the way to the squads (Though in practicality were looking at platoon or company level for most systems)
  Understanding that drones should be viewed as a munition to be disposable and replaceable. Drone losses are high in Ukraine and thus platforms need to be cheap and effective.
  Recognition that denying drone / recon capability is now a priority, be it through soft or hardkill measures. Utterly key to maintaining mobile mechanised warfare by denying enemy fires the ability to target you effectively. 
  Upholding of strengths of NATO force structure that remain relevant, perhaps even more so in this evolving environment. Squads / platoons on the ground need to be able to make important decisions quickly and have the tools to do so. 
  Reassessment of reserve concepts, especially with regards to ammunition. We should be planning for the means to stock months / years worth of ammunition, not days, together with the ability to fabricate more readily. South Korean approach is sorely needed here.
  Defence as well as Offense are equally important. Assets for attack need appropriate protection while maintaining fire supremacy.
  Mine sweeping technology and measures need a major overhaul. One of the few areas we should be actually learning from the Russians with their heavy emphasis on sapper / pioneer / engineering units. Mines were the problem strangling mechanised movements well before FPVs become relevant on the battlefield.  Improvements made to exercise and innovations that reflect a Ukraine conflict and can simulate it to allow NATO forces realistic preparation for a conflict with Russia. 
 As I said before I agree on a lot of points. I will personally want to see Ukrainians come to NATO countries after the war and help with new combat exercises in perfecting what works best and what does not. There is a golden opportunity here and it should not be wasted. A lot of the above points ARE being actively discussed or acted on now as we speak, at least according to some sources. 

Assessment of Ukraine war
Ukraine serves as an example that Nations need to maintain high levels of military readiness and adaptable defence strategies to deter potential aggressors.
  The ability to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield is vital. Both Ukraine and its supporters have had to innovate continuously and have broadly enjoyed an advantage most of the time.
  Technology is king, something the West already understood well but its more important than ever here, this could be quantified in so many ways, from how a battery of grads are relatively worthless in comparison to a couple of HIMARS platforms to how ancient T-62s are being turned into glorified sheds because they simply cannot do much else. I think people focus a little too much on FPVs when in reality I would place higher emphasis on the NATO hardware Ukraine got that gave them new and unique capability. HIMARS for example was far more dramatic in my view when it came to actively shaping Russian operations (and blowing a lot of stuff up) Both are equally critical to Ukraine winning.
  The use of drones, cyber warfare, and advanced surveillance technology has played a critical role. Both sides have leveraged technology to gain tactical advantages and disrupt enemy operations. Key takeaway in staying just ahead of the opponent when it comes to things like jamming frequencies to prevent loss of effectiveness for drone platforms. Ukraine needs to maintain this as best they can and so far seems to be doing so.
  What should Ukraine do? I think they have already at least partially found the solution that works for them best. IE maintain drone advantage while steadily reforming their military to a western approach supplemented with more and more NATO kit (perhaps with some sprinkle of soviet doctrine in areas where applicable / suitable) Continuous training (And refinement of that training) of Ukrainian forces, along with the continued acquisition of advanced weaponry and equipment from allies, is crucial.
  The West in the meantime needs to continue their support and build up their military industries to supply it. This is happening at least, even if its sluggish. 

My tank is running on empty here, but I will address a few more points before I roll over and perish. The Ukrainian army was not exactly prepared or adequate by any means in 2014, that's really the key difference. Competent large scale manoeuvre and coordination eroded fast when unprepared and overconfident Russian columns were getting ambushed in 2022 by far more determined soldiers with better equipment, organisation and preparation than in 2014. This was covered in detail here already.
 
This does not remove the competencies of NATO, especially when they are pretty actively involved with helping / taking notes at the same time. We -do- know better than either party when it comes to high technology systems and their effective application. Its very much a two way street of lessons to be learned. 
 
Did you listen to the podcast? Because I feel like you did not. 
 
This is simply not true, there has been a wide degree of suggestions made both on this forum and elsewhere as to what is going on. The short answer is that its complicated. Russian failings are down to everything from politics, corruption, equipment, technology, doctrine and Ukrainian resistance. I thought this was obvious at this point. No one key reason exists here. I personally think the corruption and political interference are hampering them severely at this point. Given how much this has been beaten to death at this point I wont go into further detail. 
 
I will not detract from your credentials, you clearly have experience and expertise on the subject that make for very valuable input, but this does not entitle you or anyone into thinking 'my way or the high way', not does it mean everything you think is necessarily right. We need to be more pragmatic than that when arm chairing these things. 

I think thats about all I can handle for now. Ill try to reply to other posts when I can. 

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

They literally did though, a slew of smaller drones were developed in that time space by numerous defence companies. The whole concept of FPV was largely spearheaded by western defence companies in the first place. The innovation Ukraine did was taking off the shelf civilian drones and strapping RPG warheads to them. 
 
While an individual prediction about the war and its outcome may have been accurate, the multifaceted nature of international relations and the constraints faced by policymakers often result in a more complex reality. The assertion that the West "chose" not to be prepared oversimplifies the situation and ignores the nuanced decision-making processes and constraints involved in such matters. The complexity of international relations and the unpredictability of state actors (Especially Russia) make definitive predictions challenging, even for experts. You did predict something correctly, that doesn't mean it was perhaps the obvious outcome to expect. 
 
The US had no operational need to develop something like an FPV to address a gap in its capability because it did not have one, it has / had everything it needed. Like most militaries, it had its own innovation priorities. US companies also did largely develop the systems in drones so widely used in the first place as well. The innovation is very much there.
I literally specified that counter CUAS and denial of ISR is a priority that needs to be addressed, IE constraining the ability of the enemy to see your concentration or logistics. There are a plethora of ideas tabled to address logistical vulnerability, from drone dropped supply missions to simply having redundancy in the system. This is something that is literally being actively talked about right now.
 
Why are we concluding that modern airpower is constrained based on this war? Ukraine has / is flying essentially 80s jets and the Russian VKS is a **** show that has very little actual capability beyond bomb tossing and stand off. This is not comparable in the slightest to the terrifying ability of NATO airpower, which literally features thousands of airframes with a wide amount of capability, including that of proficient SEAD ops, not to mention highly trained pilots. If the Ukrainians can hit Russian AD with HARM missiles fired on their least effective setting, what do you imagine a dedicated SEAD campaign featuring purpose built wild weasels craft can do, all to deploy numerous strike packages onto target? If you replaced the VKS with not even 20% of NATOs airpower capability you would see profound differences and a probably collapse of UA defences. Given the hilariously poor performance of Russian AD so far, NATO airpower would simply slaughter them and they know it.

As for the navy...do I really need to address this? Its been the highlight of Russian incompetency and corruption. We did see the leaked documents showing the readiness level of the Moskva before it was sunk here right? The challenges faced by Russia in projecting both air and naval power conflict are not due to a "forgetting" of military principles but rather the result of effective Ukrainian defences, geographical constraints, and the inherent complexity of modern multidomain warfare combined with the poor state of both branches. The VKS wishes it could do even a shred of what NATO based airpower can do. 
 
I literally said the same sort of thing about how its going to take some time to unpack everything. My assertions are simply theoretical as explanations based on what we know, it may not be the full picture but I would wager its pretty close. Point I am trying to make is that the Russians were having major difficulties before the plethora of FPVs as an example. I am just as curious as you are to see just what has been doing the most 'damage' for lack of a better word. 

To conclude, I do agree with you on a number of points, but I simply believe that wiping the slate clean is a bad idea. 

How many times do I have to say that poor performance from the VKS is down to a multitude of factors that happen to include them being poorly suited to the task at hand and suffering from corruption. Its. Not. The. Sole. Reason. 
USVs had nothing to do with the Mosvka sinking. Russian naval activity has had no clear objective outside of flinging missiles at targets of opportunity and has been beset by equipment and training problems. This is literally well documented. 
Again, this is getting pretty tiring. I have repeatedly said incompetence and corruption plays a PART of the reason the Russians have lacked success. Please actually read what I am saying and stop assuming I am just going 'Russians suck'. Its genuinely getting irritating at this point. 
 
I welcome rethinks and relooks, but I find you readily dismiss technologies which are both practical and in use right now. I literally keep saying that many of your points are valid, my problem is with the notion that throw everything else into the bin on a whim. I personally think its better to pursue all areas of possibility. Why not develop more loitering munitions while also seeking out APS for instance. We really should be covering all angles. 
 
I specifically said western firms created the idea of FPV drones and that recently western firms have made smaller drones. Stop putting words in my mouth please. The west has at least ensured a ready supply of components make its way to Ukraine, though much of the building effort remains reliant on fund raising, something that probably could do with looking at. Though at least some Western countries are waking up to this:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-supply-more-than-10000-drones-to-ukraine

In terms of smaller drones, there are literally dozens. Black Hornet, ScanEagle, Puma, Dragoneye, Aladin, Aeryon, InstantEye Mk-2 Gen3, Wasp AE and Drone40 to name just a few that have been developed and fielded though not a lot have obviously gone to Ukraine. 
 

Again, I apologise if my argument is getting incoherent, I'm just a little worn down by this point. I meant to say the US was not exactly looking for an FPV munition capability due to being more or less satisfied by their current capability. That's not to say they were thus not seeking to innovate at all, its just an explanation to why it was not seriously pursued despite the technology being there.  As for the rest, fair point. I'm kind of out of juice at this point.
 
 
Honestly? Fair enough. I misread on my sources and it looks like most of the attempt reforms were post Chechen war. Though I would point out that Russian military reforms post 2008 failed to address problems that are now biting them hard in Ukraine. 



Honestly probably going to drop out of this line of discussion overall as its clear we have a difference of opinion that's getting increasingly hostile, at least I feel it is. I'm happy to leave it at wait and see. I thank you both for the discussion, but maybe work on being a little less...abrasive with your assertions. You two acting like you know better than literally dozens of countries and their military apparatuses is...quite something, even if you bring up some very good points. Maybe you are both right and all those people are wrong, in which case my god were doomed. 

They literally did though, a slew of smaller drones were developed in that time space by numerous defence companies. The whole concept of FPV was largely spearheaded by western defence companies in the first place. The innovation Ukraine did was taking off the shelf civilian drones and strapping RPG warheads to them. 
 
While an individual prediction about the war and its outcome may have been accurate, the multifaceted nature of international relations and the constraints faced by policymakers often result in a more complex reality. The assertion that the West "chose" not to be prepared oversimplifies the situation and ignores the nuanced decision-making processes and constraints involved in such matters. The complexity of international relations and the unpredictability of state actors (Especially Russia) make definitive predictions challenging, even for experts. You did predict something correctly, that doesn't mean it was perhaps the obvious outcome to expect. 
 
The US had no operational need to develop something like an FPV to address a gap in its capability because it did not have one, it has / had everything it needed. Like most militaries, it had its own innovation priorities. US companies also did largely develop the systems in drones so widely used in the first place as well. The innovation is very much there.
I literally specified that counter CUAS and denial of ISR is a priority that needs to be addressed, IE constraining the ability of the enemy to see your concentration or logistics. There are a plethora of ideas tabled to address logistical vulnerability, from drone dropped supply missions to simply having redundancy in the system. This is something that is literally being actively talked about right now.
 
Why are we concluding that modern airpower is constrained based on this war? Ukraine has / is flying essentially 80s jets and the Russian VKS is a **** show that has very little actual capability beyond bomb tossing and stand off. This is not comparable in the slightest to the terrifying ability of NATO airpower, which literally features thousands of airframes with a wide amount of capability, including that of proficient SEAD ops, not to mention highly trained pilots. If the Ukrainians can hit Russian AD with HARM missiles fired on their least effective setting, what do you imagine a dedicated SEAD campaign featuring purpose built wild weasels craft can do, all to deploy numerous strike packages onto target? If you replaced the VKS with not even 20% of NATOs airpower capability you would see profound differences and a probably collapse of UA defences. Given the hilariously poor performance of Russian AD so far, NATO airpower would simply slaughter them and they know it.

As for the navy...do I really need to address this? Its been the highlight of Russian incompetency and corruption. We did see the leaked documents showing the readiness level of the Moskva before it was sunk here right? The challenges faced by Russia in projecting both air and naval power conflict are not due to a "forgetting" of military principles but rather the result of effective Ukrainian defences, geographical constraints, and the inherent complexity of modern multidomain warfare combined with the poor state of both branches. The VKS wishes it could do even a shred of what NATO based airpower can do. 
 
I literally said the same sort of thing about how its going to take some time to unpack everything. My assertions are simply theoretical as explanations based on what we know, it may not be the full picture but I would wager its pretty close. Point I am trying to make is that the Russians were having major difficulties before the plethora of FPVs as an example. I am just as curious as you are to see just what has been doing the most 'damage' for lack of a better word. 

To conclude, I do agree with you on a number of points, but I simply believe that wiping the slate clean is a bad idea. 

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

Too much credit is given to Putin for these things. All Western populations have varying degrees of people with these attitudes brought about by our own government policies and wealth distribution.
You don't have chunks of Western political parties praising/making excuses for Putin because he has conned them. They are simply the same type of people. Democracies just do a better job overall of keeping the rabid communist/fascist/klepocrats out of power and more under control if they get there.

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

What Ukraine needs / wants might not necessarily be what NATO countries need or want, there is a very different level of capability and access to said capability on display. Literally different goals in mind. NATO forces fight with the realistic assumption of a strong air contingent for instance with all the support it offers. Ukraine does not have that.
If my ideas are not clear, allow me to clarify:

1. I agree there is a shift, but I do not see it being a drastic one, just a continuation of trends people were aware of served with a slice of reality. 

2. Western forces -are- adapting. We are already seeing changes to force makeup that will be implemented in a matter of years. This is pretty fast for a peacetime force. 

2.b No one is saying this is entirely down to ineptitude, but it clearly plays a part, especially with the Russians when they had so many on paper advantages that they cannot leverage properly. As with all things the answer is far more complicated. Technology plays a part in this just as much as doctrine and incompetence. 

3. As highlighted, EVERYONE is taking notes here, there is plenty of evidence shown in the last few pages here alone that different forces in NATO are actively using the conflict to draw up changes to force structure. the US is literally gaining active experience RIGHT NOW that tells them what systems are working to intercept drones and what are not in Syria. 

4. I'm sorry but what? Based on what evidence? The whole reason we saw a triumph in western approach to war in the Gulf was because we have mostly kept ahead with adaptations' understand if some wrong lessons were learned (the whole need for stocks for high intensity conflict is the main point I guess)  Are you referring to the Chinese ability to build lots of drones that's more a product of their cheap industrial labour pool instead of any particular military innovation? Western military companies are clearly on the cutting edge of pretty much every major military technology. I entirely agree there is an issue of scale that needs to be addressed, but why are you acting like China holds actual parity in terms of technology when they literally self admit to being behind?
So, here is my broad take / vision on things for the future overall. For the record I am typing when I can, there is a lot to answer here but I will do my best. I do find it unfair for you to say that I have not posted evidence though, the last....6 or so posts I made all included plenty of links for you to enjoy.

Future considerations for NATO armed forces.
New generation of vehicles required that are better protected from all around attack, especially with regards to IFVs, APCs and Tanks, a true shift away from cold war era chassis and designs that seem increasingly unfit for purpose. APS should be a new standard of protection and needs to become more widely integrated.
  Together with this, we should be keenly exploring practical applications for UGVs to supplement and potentially even replace certain roles down the line. Doctrine should be overhauled to reflect this should they prove viable.
  Close range air defence needs to prioritise drones and a means for cheap disposal. Layers required to combat drones from the UAV recon level to the FPV. 
  The development and deployment of counter-drone technologies, such as anti-drone rifles, jamming devices, and radar systems, have become crucial in defending against drone threats and should be viewed as a top priority. 
  Adjustment on force makeup to include more organic drone capability both for recon and strike potential, at least platoon based if not squad level. Presumably tied in to more effective battlefield management systems.
  Heavy usage on loitering munitions as a means of leveraging infantry firepower, with traditional artillery aspects for battalion fire support backing. Mortars used to be the go to for infantry firepower on the company / Battalion level but I wonder if they are simply too exposed to do so given the threat of drone / loitering munitions.
  Overall emphasis on a flexible command and control alongside ISR capability, while also acknowledging that you need the means to move forward to take the fight to the enemy while also dominating them with firepower and superior recon capability. FPV munitions are not the correct solution for every problem. 
  Recognition that EWAR needs to became a focal point for force structures, present in as many levels as possible all the way to the squads (Though in practicality were looking at platoon or company level for most systems)
  Understanding that drones should be viewed as a munition to be disposable and replaceable. Drone losses are high in Ukraine and thus platforms need to be cheap and effective.
  Recognition that denying drone / recon capability is now a priority, be it through soft or hardkill measures. Utterly key to maintaining mobile mechanised warfare by denying enemy fires the ability to target you effectively. 
  Upholding of strengths of NATO force structure that remain relevant, perhaps even more so in this evolving environment. Squads / platoons on the ground need to be able to make important decisions quickly and have the tools to do so. 
  Reassessment of reserve concepts, especially with regards to ammunition. We should be planning for the means to stock months / years worth of ammunition, not days, together with the ability to fabricate more readily. South Korean approach is sorely needed here.
  Defence as well as Offense are equally important. Assets for attack need appropriate protection while maintaining fire supremacy.
  Mine sweeping technology and measures need a major overhaul. One of the few areas we should be actually learning from the Russians with their heavy emphasis on sapper / pioneer / engineering units. Mines were the problem strangling mechanised movements well before FPVs become relevant on the battlefield.  Improvements made to exercise and innovations that reflect a Ukraine conflict and can simulate it to allow NATO forces realistic preparation for a conflict with Russia. 
 As I said before I agree on a lot of points. I will personally want to see Ukrainians come to NATO countries after the war and help with new combat exercises in perfecting what works best and what does not. There is a golden opportunity here and it should not be wasted. A lot of the above points ARE being actively discussed or acted on now as we speak, at least according to some sources. 

Assessment of Ukraine war
Ukraine serves as an example that Nations need to maintain high levels of military readiness and adaptable defence strategies to deter potential aggressors.
  The ability to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield is vital. Both Ukraine and its supporters have had to innovate continuously and have broadly enjoyed an advantage most of the time.
  Technology is king, something the West already understood well but its more important than ever here, this could be quantified in so many ways, from how a battery of grads are relatively worthless in comparison to a couple of HIMARS platforms to how ancient T-62s are being turned into glorified sheds because they simply cannot do much else. I think people focus a little too much on FPVs when in reality I would place higher emphasis on the NATO hardware Ukraine got that gave them new and unique capability. HIMARS for example was far more dramatic in my view when it came to actively shaping Russian operations (and blowing a lot of stuff up) Both are equally critical to Ukraine winning.
  The use of drones, cyber warfare, and advanced surveillance technology has played a critical role. Both sides have leveraged technology to gain tactical advantages and disrupt enemy operations. Key takeaway in staying just ahead of the opponent when it comes to things like jamming frequencies to prevent loss of effectiveness for drone platforms. Ukraine needs to maintain this as best they can and so far seems to be doing so.
  What should Ukraine do? I think they have already at least partially found the solution that works for them best. IE maintain drone advantage while steadily reforming their military to a western approach supplemented with more and more NATO kit (perhaps with some sprinkle of soviet doctrine in areas where applicable / suitable) Continuous training (And refinement of that training) of Ukrainian forces, along with the continued acquisition of advanced weaponry and equipment from allies, is crucial.
  The West in the meantime needs to continue their support and build up their military industries to supply it. This is happening at least, even if its sluggish. 

My tank is running on empty here, but I will address a few more points before I roll over and perish. The Ukrainian army was not exactly prepared or adequate by any means in 2014, that's really the key difference. Competent large scale manoeuvre and coordination eroded fast when unprepared and overconfident Russian columns were getting ambushed in 2022 by far more determined soldiers with better equipment, organisation and preparation than in 2014. This was covered in detail here already.
 
This does not remove the competencies of NATO, especially when they are pretty actively involved with helping / taking notes at the same time. We -do- know better than either party when it comes to high technology systems and their effective application. Its very much a two way street of lessons to be learned. 
 
Did you listen to the podcast? Because I feel like you did not. 
 
This is simply not true, there has been a wide degree of suggestions made both on this forum and elsewhere as to what is going on. The short answer is that its complicated. Russian failings are down to everything from politics, corruption, equipment, technology, doctrine and Ukrainian resistance. I thought this was obvious at this point. No one key reason exists here. I personally think the corruption and political interference are hampering them severely at this point. Given how much this has been beaten to death at this point I wont go into further detail. 
 
I will not detract from your credentials, you clearly have experience and expertise on the subject that make for very valuable input, but this does not entitle you or anyone into thinking 'my way or the high way', not does it mean everything you think is necessarily right. We need to be more pragmatic than that when arm chairing these things. 

I think thats about all I can handle for now. Ill try to reply to other posts when I can. 

I haven't been following the back and forth with all this stuff, but the idea that western militaries aren't adapting to shifts in warfare seems a bit of a stretch to me.  At least in terms of the US military.  I get that this is in your wheelhouse, and you apparently are very passionate about it - and that's a good thing.  I hope I'm not misrepresenting your beliefs or arguments and I absolutely respect your opinion.  However, one could make the argument that the US is at the leading edge of the changing face of warfare.  I'm not sure when Canada first knew what a drone was, but the US has been using drones since the 1990s. 
The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (often referred to as the Predator drone) is an American remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) built by General Atomics that was used primarily by the United States Air Force (USAF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Conceived in the early 1990s for aerial reconnaissance and forward observation roles, the Predator carries cameras and other sensors. It was modified and upgraded to carry and fire two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or other munitions. The aircraft entered service in 1995, and saw combat in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the NATO intervention in Bosnia, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, the Iraq War, Yemen, the 2011 Libyan civil war, the 2014 intervention in Syria, and Somalia.
Granted these were recon drones, but the US came up with the FPS drone with a warhead in 2012
Designed by the United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) and developed by the United States Army,[7] The Switchblade was designed to assist US troops in responding to enemy ambushes in Afghanistan. Close air support takes time to arrive, is costly to operate, and risks collateral damage in urban areas. Troop-carried guided missiles, such as the FGM-148 Javelin, are also significantly larger, heavier, and more expensive, and only a few, if any, are carried on a typical patrol. Human-portable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like the Raven or Puma can spot threats but lack weapons. The backpackable, relatively inexpensive Switchblade has sensors to help spot enemy fighters and an explosive warhead to attack them from above, which is especially helpful in dug-in positions like rooftops or ridge lines.
On July 29, 2011, the U.S. Army awarded AeroVironment a $4.9 million contract for "rapid fielding" of an unspecified number of Switchblades to forces in Afghanistan.[8][9][10] On March 20, 2012, the Army added $5.1 million, totaling $10 million.[11]
So yeah, the US is fully aware of drones and has been using them for decades.  Now did the US Army anticipate the full impact that these drones are having on the current battlefield?  I'm not sure - probably not, but I'm pretty confident that someone in the US Military had a stray thought of what might be possible so the idea that Western Military's are sitting back with mouth agape going 'wow, what the heck is going on in Ukraine?  I've neither seen such a thing nor anticipated such a thing!' is just crazy to me.  Maybe a review of the drones currently in use by the various branches of the US Military could be instructive (from Wikipedia).  It's not like the US Military doesn't know what a drone is.
Current MQ-1C Gray Eagle RQ-4 Global Hawk MQ-4C Triton RQ-7 Shadow MQ-8B Fire Scout/MQ-8C Fire Scout MQ-9 Reaper CQ-10 Snowgoose RQ-11 Raven RQ-12 Wasp MQ-19 Aerosonde RQ-20 Puma RQ-21 Blackjack RQ-170 Sentinel RQ-180 Altius-600 Black Hornet Nano Coyote Jump 20 VTOL Snipe NAV Switchblade Stalker ScanEagle Northrop Grumman Bat Phoenix Ghost Future MQ-25 Stingray  
One might make the argument that the US Army was already anticipating the current environment to some extent with the Future Combat System way back in 2003.  I put some stuff in red below (from Wikipedia)
Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the United States Army's principal modernization program from 2003 to early 2009.[1] Formally launched in 2003, FCS was envisioned to create new brigades equipped with new manned and unmanned vehicles linked by an unprecedented fast and flexible battlefield network. The U.S. Army claimed it was their "most ambitious and far-reaching modernization" program since World War II.[2] Between 1995 and 2009, $32 billion was expended on programs such as this, "with little to show for it".[3]
One of the programs that came out of the $32 billion expenditure was the concept of tracking friendly ("blue") forces on the field via a GPS-enabled computer system known as Blue Force Tracking (BFT). The concept of BFT was implemented by the US Army through the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) platform. The FBCB2 system in particular and the BFT system in general have won numerous awards and accolades, including: recognition in 2001 as one of the five best-managed software programs in the entire U.S. Government,[4] the 2003 Institute for Defense and Government Advancement's award for most innovative U.S. Government program,[5] the 2003 Federal Computer Week Monticello Award (given in recognition of an information system that has a direct, meaningful impact on human lives), and the Battlespace Information 2005 "Best Program in Support of Coalition Operations".[6] The proof-of-concept success of FBCB2, its extensive testing during Operation Foal Eagle (FE 99, FE 00), its certification at the Fort Irwin National Training Center, and its proven field usage in live combat operations spanning over a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to BFT adoption by many users including the United States Marine Corps, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy ground-based expeditionary forces (e.g., United States Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC) and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) units), the United Kingdom, and German Soldier System IdZ-ES+.
In April and May 2009, Pentagon and army officials announced that the FCS vehicle-development effort would be canceled. The rest of the FCS effort would be swept into a new, pan-army program called the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization Program.[7]
Oh, and the end of the tank because of the use of Javelins on the battlefield?  One would assume that since the US makes the Javelin, the US Army would be aware of its capabilities and how it impacts the battlefield.  Whether or not the US Military anticipated how it might operate if on the receiving end of all these drones and Javelins is an open question.  However, I'm not sure that you are giving enough credit to how powerful the US Military is - by itself without even adding in any allies.  Could China cause some issues?  Recent reports of missiles with fuel cells filled with water aside, on paper maybe China would be an issue, but that would doubtless primarily be a naval and air conflict.  If Russia fought the US and NATO, Russia would be pounded into dust.  There is no scenario where NATO fights Russia and it turns into Trench Warfare where nobody can advance and drones rule the battlefield to the detriment of NATO.  That's not even accounting for the leadership advantage that NATO holds.  If NATO holds air supremacy then guess what happens to all your logistics trains?  Guess what happens to all your artillery batteries?  Can FPV drones have an impact for Russia?  Sure, but let's not get carried away and assume that NATO is going to get stuck in trench warfare.  I can't sit here today and rule it out completely, but the odds are not in favor of that sort of an outcome.  You dismiss Iraqi capabilities, but they were widely regarded as having some of the most numerous and capable air defenses in the world at the time and look how much good it did them.  I am confident that the US Military can adapt appropriately to the shifts warfare.  
 
 
 

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

The Russians are not really reforming though, they went back to basics and seem to be largely improvising at this point. They very much are 'doing it wrong' when they remain incapable of large scale assaults and instead seem set on smaller, managed and regular attacks that allow Ukraine to focus its UAS and limited firepower to best effect. I simply do not understand why they do this when broader attacks might open up more holes in the front and constrain Ukrainian abilities to focus reserves. I suspect its due to the declining quality and quantity of Russian reserves as well as the command and control issues as well as political will from behind that insists on these regular, wasteful attacks. 

We saw their lack of coordination right from the onset of the war, and I remain convinced the Russian army is simply incapable of large scale attacks that might actually bring about some more mobile warfare. This is a core failure of the Russian army and there is no signs of it being fixed alongside their other systemic issues that hamper their effectiveness so much. Its been literally years since we saw any Russian exploitation of a front, something Ukraine was able to achieve with the lightest of mechanised forces in Kharkiv. They were having these issues before FPVs became so prevalent on the front, so it cannot be down to the harsh operational environment entirely. 

I think its very fair for the west to announce that the Russians are doing it wrong, because they are still being limited in numerous respects quite needlessly. Rigid top down command structures, the lack of an empowered NCO system. These things are actively biting the Russians in the *** even before the increasingly polarisation of training and equipment, all of which is decayed by a truly appalling and intrinsic corruption issue. There are obvious limits to NATO criticisms, and I remain so very angry that the NATO response to Ukrainians getting caught in minefields was 'go around them'. NATO are not going to get everything right and they MUST take the lessons learned in this war to heart. This is where I agree very heavily with Battlefront and yourself on this issue. The evidence so far does point to NATO watching closely, time will tell if we see significant changes in consequence. 
 
Who exactly is doing this? China is the only potential that springs to mind and I am very suspicious about their stated capabilities when they feature some of the same issues the Russians do. Not to call them a paper tiger but as I stated before, they feel themselves that they are behind the curve and are still catching up to NATO, let alone trying to surpass them. 
10th Mountain division are a light infantry unit, not special forces. They are the ones dealing with the constant drone attacks. As the podcast states they are also the most experienced US unit when it comes to drone attacks and have learned valuable information in the process that is even now being actively disseminated through the rest of the Army. 
 
Russian military reform as we saw was literally their only option outside of doing nothing. They struggled enough with such a steady process and even then it did not work properly. There was no way in hell they could of even attempted anything more radical with the powers that be in the Russian state, let alone things like corruption getting in the way. Its simply not the kind of environment where you can flip a table and reset everything, not when some general does not get to steal funding for whatever project he was working on. 
 
Forgive me but this seems a little...arrogant? Assuming that your viewpoint is right and incontrovertible is exactly the kind of issue your claiming is prevalent in the military. Militaries need to be a little more pragmatic than that in my view. Is it not fair to point out that that what we consider the future for military organisation could very well change entirely, or shift back to something more familiar? This sort of stuff is hard to predict. I again need to make it clear, I agree with you on a lot here, I just think its a little silly to deride numerous countries entire military systems based on your sole opinion. You guys are not the only ones coming up with great ideas!

 

Hmmm really...
That's like me losing all my money at a casino and saying at least I won the napkin & free box of matches they gave me while pissing away all my life savings....
 

Yeah.
In hindsight, the End of History idea of forever peace after the Cold War ended was a combination of naive, stupid, corrupt and evil. Of course the Russia would eventually attack again. Of course other empires will rise and start attacking neighbors. Of course they did. They always do. Nothing lasts forever, there is always another war behind the corner.
Yet we did spend decades lying to ourselves and making ourselves vulnerable.
But this pales with how the West failed to defend itself against enemy information operations. Putin managed to cause untold suffering and destruction by orchestrating Brexit and Trump. But our own ideology of "marketplace of idea" and "censorship is bad" stops West from being capable of defending itself, and it will lead to our destruction. And there is no need for enemies of West to even do anything anymore, it will just snowball from here into fall od West by itself (see what US Supreme Court did in last few years).
The nuclear war would at least be quick.
...
As for the war being a stupid idea. If it's stupid and it works, it's not stupid. Russia got a lot of territory in exchange for few hundred thousand dead and little economic hiccup - and they will get to keep it forever. They got few million new people to enslave and exploit.
Yes, it's not as good as what they wanted, but still a win.

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

A drone based regiment is very much fascinating to see. 

To make it clear, I do broadly agree with most of TheCapt's points, especially when it comes to complacency and procurement issues within western MICs and how drones / ISR with range emphasis are going to be a primary focus for future military planning. I guess we have a different in degree of action required I suppose. 

Really I just think he's being a little bit harsh on our forbearers who did not have the benefit of hindsight to immediately adopt things that seem so obvious to us now, or the fact that our governments are primarily a civilian entity and not military with very different priorities at times. There are complexities involved that explain why humans are not always going to instantly innovate even if its logical, and its not always a military bureaucracy getting in the way. This is why I prefer practical approaches. 

Its been an enjoyable debate for sure that's certainly made me think a lot on some things. 

In terms of FPV/loiter munitions, I would entirely agree. Switchblade seems grossly expensive for far less capability than a cheap FPV. 

Has there been any interest for mass produced FPV units anywhere in the West?

I also view the Gulf war as a clear case of Western doctrine working vs a country that at least tried to work with soviet doctrine, not to mention the intricacies of western approaches like a strong NCO system and Mission command tactical approaches that give NATO armies such flexibility and 'soft power' in the field. These I feel remain especially relevant if not more so in conflict given the fast acting status of warfare, and we see that as Ukraine steadily tries to shift from its soviet doctrine to one more western aligned with regards to such concepts. I view top down military systems increasingly obsolete for this very reason.

Certainly we hear a lot how the younger Ukrainian leaders frequently clash with the older figures who are more soviet approach focussed. The Soviet system is simply too rigid for even this relatively static warfare due to command decisions requiring speedy responses. We saw this quickly with how sluggish the Russian ability to direct artillery or airstrikes onto valuable targets, something that's taken them literal years to fix and even then its still only caught a handful of valuable Ukrainian assets. The fact it two two years for Russia to actually visually destroy a single HIMARs system for instance spoke a lot about the inflexibility of such doctrine and how damaging it was in the field. 

Yeah, the comment was tongue in cheek. I come to praise the TopHat, for avoidance of doubt.
And I think he's on to something re 1991. Air power dominated and overmatched or not, Desert Storm was the 'prime time' test of AirLand Battle, which while designed for Fulda Gap, took very useful note of the learnings from the Arab-Israeli wars (and to a limited extent the Iran-Iraq war) and refined it for years in the NTC.
This was indeed something new for the Big Green Machine, not just Alamein with smart bombs.