FancyCat

Twitter replies indicate this was stupid on the part of the Russian tank moving in the video.

Ukraine has been remarkably restrained in attacking across the border, but i could see raids across the border in response, hopefully Ukraine clamps down on loosely commanded units.

a twitter reply says the Toplovsky monastery is in Crimea, sounds pretty likely this man is from Crimea.

On one hand escalation is bad, on the other, these Russian missiles launched by Russian aircraft from Russian territory are bombarding all of Ukraine.... Interesting how varied these attacks are. Also, quite good we have these high-level bodies returning home for burial, pilots are valuable personnel for Ukraine to kill.

Russia has been forming a 3rd Army Corps, Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod region, alleged by Ukraine, that CIT confirmed.

Ugh, horrible someone could get conscripted into fighting their own country.

If Russia makes moves to reinvade Ukraine from new directions, I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine gets more reaching ammo with permission to fire into Russia. The barrier on strikes on Russian territory is truly broken, with civilian deaths, drone strikes, helicopters, missiles, etc. War has truly arrived to the border areas, and there does not seem to be a swell in support for Putin, at least not such to allow mobilization, without somehow stabbing Putin as a result.

Hopefully, the biggest effect of the salient ending is that Ukraine can cycle these units to the rear, especially with Russia opting to enter a operational pause.

Galeev had a recent thread that was interesting, where he talks about the banning of aid to the separatists by Russians akin to the civil society efforts to support the war effort by Ukrainians we have seen. Galeev's thread is a bit too long and rambling but he suggests something I wanted to highlight. Russia seeks to prevent any civil society from developing, even positive pro-war ones like aid networks to pro-Russian units in Donbas since it bypasses existing power networks and can be beyond the government's influence. Also I guess we shouldn't underestimate the importance of skimming off the top of the military shipments to the republics from Russia that would be harder thru informal networks like aid groups. I think the point made by many that mobilization is a significant destabilizing factor is important here, destabilization could allow the empowerment of suppressed groups more easily, including people like Girkin who want to go hardline on Ukraine, but the Kremlin found them hard to leash so purged them in the Donbas. Certainly Girkin would have a better chance of attaining a position of authority when Russia is mobilized then right now.

Kherson has been showing heavy fire. Wonder if it's another localized push or a actual offensive. If I were Zelensky (you know, I dunno what Zelensky decides, does he do a lot of input or control over the military?), I would want Kherson before the fall mud. Give Russia and the separatists something to ponder as they wait for the next offensive.

I have several ideas. 1. The Russian General Staff is stupid. 2. Didn't Russia redeploy units from Izyum when that bogged down to the SD front? Maybe the effort of sending them all the way to Popasna was too much distance for these exterior movements. 3. Ukraine may not have been putting a PR spin when stating they lured the Russians inside SD. The question is how did they override Russian strategic mindset into a scenario instead of a classic envelopment, Russia tried to push into SD for a good while and then failed. https://www.scribblemaps.com/maps/view/2022051301800/nBT8ffpeGH Def Mon has a map you can bring up his frontlines from present to June 02. Quick glance at wiki shows that the offensive into the city began May 27, Popasna, it was taken May 7th. The city offensive began without enclosing the pocket, or pushing into Lysychans'k from south or north, so clearly something caused the General Staff to order pushes into SD instead of reinforcing Popasna push. By June 2nd to 10th, they started pushing the flanks again. with Def Mon showing the collapse at Zolote on June 20th. Most likely, Ukraine probably indicated that morale and units in SD were collapsing, and somehow led Russia to think a quick rush into the city would let them take it, cross into Lysychansk and complete the "liberation of Luhansk Oblast". But that does not explain why not simply push units into Popasna and encircle the SD defenders and if their morale was low, cause the breakdown of the Ukrainian units that way? I recall Russian propaganda stating several things, one, morale of UKR units in SD was low, Two, UKR civilian government was overriding military command with instructions to reinforce the SD salient. But that still does not explain why not cut off the cities, instead of the frontal pushes? 4. Perhaps the intent was that Russia had a opportunity due to low UKR morale in the city, that a offensive would give benefits attacking head on, to one, draw in UKR forces to reinforce the pocket since Zelensky the drug fiend, was intent on preserving his power that would diminish had the cities fallen, (instead of drawing forces into the flanks had Russia attacked again from Popasna, Russia would engage and force Ukraine to battle in the city while preparing the envelopment)(maybe they heard all that talk about Ukraine fighting really well in cities and decided to do a Stalingrad, lure Ukraine into the cities) two, potentially cause a collapse in both cities and easy push into the rest of the pocket, three, maybe the Russian General Staff overestimated themselves and underestimated Ukraine? One thing to note, part of the reason why it took a month, is Russian ability to redeploy, move units, gather for a push, may be trash at this point. We say why did it take a month for Russia to move on to Popasna, there is a possibility Russia quickly realized they were engaged in stupid battles in SD, but the movement to get units to Popasna takes way longer than we expect. Russia may have had their own plans for making Ukraine suffer in the pocket, but quickly ran into the reality their units are being ground into paste, had Russia had better formations, maybe the plan to lure Ukraine into the pocket and then hit and encircle might have gone well, except they dont have the mass and speed they once did, and in reality, Russia was doing their best to encircle, but can no longer perform these actions. I think its a mix of both, Ukraine may have acted like the pocket was easy pickings, Russia may have decided to go for a push for the city to draw in Ukraine to a battle on favorable ground, and then conduct a encirclement, but reality hit them that they no longer have the operational capability for that so instead of parading POWs thru SD, Ukraine withdraws in good order.

Thread, long so click it, apparently Russia did attempt to try and stage counter battery on Snake Island, but as we know, failed before the order to evacuate. Apparently Russia released a PR vid of the evacuation, what a small island.

Bravo to Slovakia, they have according to wiki, 9 to 11 MiG-29s, while not all will probably be sent, anything to replace losses is great. Apparently for security reasons from both Ukraine and Slovakia, elaboration will not be provided.

Seems to be that the missiles got shot down, with debris causing damage in civilian areas in both Kursk, and Belgorod, so looks like Russian AD is improving. I am not familiar with operating ranges for helicopters, someone in this thread had stated Chornobaivka, Kherson International Airport, was being used for helicopters despite being in range of artillery due to the infeasibility of other sites, so are you saying Ukraine can prevent the usage of helicopter assets by striking these bases since they can't be based further away? HIMARS able to do so? Or does the firing method from the helicopters allow them to be based further away beyond HIMAR range?

Best not to impact Russian grain exports, which if restricted would only raise food prices and cause instability worldwide, which is not beneficial for the West. As far as I'm concerned, the main point of the sanctions should remain impacting the ability of Russia to import, they can export all they want, money is worthless if they cannot buy the materials needed to maintain their economy.

Oh I forgot, Ukraine has a shortage of IFVs no? Russia has vehicles, old but a IFV is a IFV. Until NATO gets the shipments going, Ukraine probably does not have enough IFVs for its needs. Reviewing https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html I don’t think the current pledge amount is enough tho….

I should rightfully apologize to all Ukrainians, I had earlier said that the West is in the driver’s seat, with Putin responding….ehh, I think I’m actually quite wrong. Right now, more than Putin, more than the West, it is clearly Ukraine in the driver’s seat, and who all eyes need to be fixed for the next stages of the war. I had mentioned before that in my opinion, time is not firmly on Ukraine’s side, and I still think that is true, and for those same reasons as previously, mainly that the West remains a reactionary force in the conflict (for example, the weapon exchanges really boil down to Ukraine asking for something, suffering, and then the west hands it over), and Russia looks increasingly unable to do much of any offensive action, whether or not Russia keeps pushing or stops, comes down to exactly what Ukraine’s offensive potential really is. Up until now, Ukraine has only conducted local offensives, or shown capability for taking small amounts of territory, and so far seems unable to make conclusive strokes that Russia can’t counter somewhat at least. Ukrainian artillery is important, but same as Russian artillery, it can’t take land. Whether or not Russia holds, plenty has been said why and why not it’s viable, but really, at this point, the biggest question to answering the ability for Russia to remain in the war long-term, is now dependent on Ukraine illustrating offensive capability. if Ukraine cannot conduct offensives on a large-scale potential, we need to throw out I think a lot of assumptions about Russian longevity in a WWI type conflict where infantry and counters and multipliers for infantry remain the base for offensive and defensive action. What do I mean? For example, the mechanized unit that crossed into Davydiv Brid that got beat up by Russian air power, and all the examples of Russian mechanized spearheads without accompanying infantry that got bogged down, unless Ukraine somehow figures out a way for mechanized units not to get wrecked by air power (those Gepards have not proven themselves yet and as far as I can tell, nothing Ukraine has Soviet wise existing as proved able to counter and NATO don’t got jack either relying on airpower), or Russia gets more infantry to facilitate mechanized movement (might be time to say not happening) effectively means infantry need to lead first. So first off, both Russia and Ukraine are unable to utilize armor or fast moving spearheads. Next, air power, neither Russia or Ukraine has the capability to knock the other Air Force out of the sky, and so aside from safe zones out of the frontlines, aircraft will on both sides retain the ability to blunt offensive action. Artillery, I mean that is the killer of infantry, I don’t have much to say except we might need to review WWI, as both sides will use artillery to disrupt enemy groupings, and despite superior Ukrainian artillery, Russia still has a lot more artillery and with basically air power not a massive factor in reducing enemy groupings in the rear, it looks a lot more WWI to me in a sense. Unless Ukraine gets F-16s and the U.S gives it substantial training in SEAD, or Ukrainian artillery can effectively destroy Russian artillery in a given sector for offensive actions, it’s pretty WWI like right now. Ukraine may need to decide for offensive action, that gathering mass of the superior artillery is required, but that certainly opens possibilities for Russian search and destroy operations, and opening up vulnerabilities in other sectors for Russian forward movement. Or maybe Ukraine has a armored reserve waiting to be unleashed at the right moment, but I still dunno how Ukraine prevents Russian artillery from disrupting this, or air attacks forcing them from the field. might be best to state I know nothing of military matters, so if I’m wrong, I will be the first to agree with you. If Russian forces cannot collapse due to Ukrainian inability to exploit openings in the front with mechanized units, and sure, Russian artillery might be reduced to conserving ammo for countering Ukrainian offensive actions, but that still means Russia looks pretty able to stop a Ukrainian offensive or slow it to a crawl, which not only enables Russia to reinforce, but conduct countering actions on other sections, and preventing any morale loss from spreading, a key requirement for collapse, and while manpower wise, Ukraine can eventually outclass Russia due to lack of mobilization, we need to seriously consider that NATO is not equipped for supplying for a grinding, attritional warfare with large numbers of infantry. That is what, one-two years of waiting for NATO ramp up? Russia might actually be able to mobilize and certainly Russia has enough equipment from existing stocks to equip them somewhat, but probably better than Ukraine. And I’ll repeat again my belief, Ukraine must take Kherson as soon as possible. No ifs, no but “ time is on their side”, Ukraine has not shown offensive capability to retake territory, and victory, either a short term end of war collapse of Russian forces or long term grinding victory is not going to occur if Russia thinks it can keep what it occupies, and Kherson remains the heart of that thinking. Ukraine retakes Kherson, the collapse of the Russian army will be far closer than every ammo dump burning in Donbas. Retake Kherson and Crimea will panic, and you spur more dissent in Russia than any number of bodies arriving from Ukraine.

Russian decentralization has been trash. Russian generals getting popped at the frontlines cause their subordinates ain’t gonna move otherwise. Russia couldn’t suppress artillery operating from the shoreline and lost multiple AA systems cause they can’t coordinate air coverage and suppressive fire from the navy to protect Snake Island. Russian logistics are tied to rail lines, and nothing about the flood of videos and photos from the rear inspires confidence little birds loyal to Ukraine won’t tell on their positions. Not to mention NATO ISR. Decentralization requires personnel, something Russia lacks severely. Pure survival means decentralization will come, but I just don’t see Russia being able to able to decentralize enough to negate himars.

More info in the thread, included more detailed zoomed in maps of each front.

Thread that lays out Russia's failure to keep Snake Island. The fact that Russia cannot stop artillery that in photos looks like its on the beach, from shelling Snake Island is arguably a significant failure. Also, holy ****, I did not realize the UAF has less than 100 aircraft, wtf, why isn't the Russian Air Force just flooding the entire airspace with planes....decent point to be made, if Russia can't strike artillery firing from the beaches, it sure as hell can't target inland with any reasonable accuracy.

Or he gambles that the West and Ukraine blink first.

They captured a Caesar? Edit: gah, what I get for posting a reply without finishing to the current posts.

Not sure how the people at Bellingcat haven't lost their minds refuting Russian lies but they have a thread answering some Russian bull**** on the mall rocket attack and their site expands on it. Of the most important thing to know, neither the mall nor the factory near it were legitimate military targets.

The danger of a one sided ceasefire by Putin is there, but, especially I think following the visit of Scholz and Macron to Kiev, there is some more leeway for Ukraine to tell Putin to shove off any ceasefire and keep operations going. One way to deter it is to keep attacking over the border. It's very routine these attacks now, yet Russia cannot declare ceasefires if Ukraine still threatens the safety of Russia in it's borders. Assuming Ukraine wouldnt want a ceasefire. They may decide to want one for a temporary respite but I doubt it. I hope Ukraine got their forces out the city, not sure what to make of these reports they still hold and intend on defending the city. Maybe they are cut off, but I think there's some slack left for units to leave no?