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FancyCat

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Everything posted by FancyCat

  1. Confirmation Ukraine is in the middle of Shevchenkove.
  2. I think one of the worst things the Russian military could do is just abandon, not sabotage, not destroy their ammo, their vehicles, their goddamn self-propelled artillery guns to be recovered by a enemy that literally speaks and understands your language and uses the same hardware as you do. There's a half decent chance those things might be firing at Kupyansk right now.
  3. Eh, Russia's descent into autocracy is not something existing for dozens of years, the repression only stepped up following the invasion, and again, this is like the President of the Brooklyn borough speaking up, only much more minor cause Brooklyn has way more people than this little council. I mean, recall all those protests, that died down or got repressed, yet their end output is the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg look no closer to even those big protests restarting akin to the start of the war. Something important to consider, local and regional elites will in any scenario, either the most extreme, or more minor unrest, will gain more power and independence, when looking at whether scenarios like becoming a new republic of the federation or independence or more decentralized authority, we must consider whether the elites will benefit. Kaliningrad, i don't see any reason for the local elites to move away from Moscow, main reason if nothing else, that the entire existence of the oblast is to serve as a warm water trade port and base for the Baltic Fleet. It's already been laid out that Kaliningrad has no way to get closer to the rest of Europe, and its main purpose is facilitating Russian-EU trade, and EU-Russian geopolitical maneuvering. What use does a newly independent Kaliningrad need with a navy (if it even sided with the new country), none, so right there, the economy takes a hit. What point does it serve for a port that facilitates the transfer of goods between the rest of Russia and Europe and the world to cut off one of its arms? None. Sure, maybe the local elites ask Moscow for a greater share of the profits, but that is easily handled via enactment of the restoration of the Federation treaties with it added or some such and such but hardly a breakup scenario. As Kamil noted, and I do think hes makes good sense, the main reason for any sort of separatism or breakup is likely the elites having to deal smaller and smaller shares of the economic pie, and acting in their own self-interest. Yet, as we note, most of these potential states are poor subjects for setting out as a independent state, the least necessary consideration would be ocean or foreign land access, and the Northern Sea route where maybe one day a arctic state may use for ocean access requires still ice breaker escorts and specialized vessels. Something else to note, that I believe Kamil touched upon, the regional and local elites still cycle back to the metropoles. They are still mainly appointed and connected with them, despite overseeing territories far, far away from Moscow. What's the point in ruling over some useless land if you can no longer send your money and wealth to invest in the metropoles?
  4. I looked it up, the Smolninskoye council, is a little town council, that oversees 75k residents in St. Petersburg. Its not even a raion. It would be like if the Scranton, PA city council condemned Joe Biden, and called for him to be impeached, and is just as impactful as this call by the Smolninskoye council, which is not impactful whatsoever. shame, but its a nothingburger.
  5. Actually, I think its quite useful for Ukraine to retake this area, very crap map i drew below, Ukraine significantly lowers the frontage needed to keep garrisoned in the event of a full successful takeover of the Izyum region. The red lines are what I would envision UKR lines following mop up of Russian forces, the green is the logistical hub for the Russians how it worked, the pink are rivers, blue the pre-offensive front line. As you can see, with Ukraine taking Kupyansk, not only does Russia lose the rail hub and must bring supplies from the East and further away, Ukraine can anchor a defense from the Donets river, then via Shevchenkove and I see on google maps, another river along the red line between the Oskii and Donets river, so basically, Ukraine can absolutely move troops off this region elsewhere since it needs less forces to oversee river crossings. Also, with the loss of Izyum, any future aspirations for seizing Kharkiv, or Slovyansk are now basically dead. Furthermore, with Izyum retaken, Ukraine can move into Lyman, and there is also another river beside Lyman where Ukraine can anchor another defensive line. Basically, taking Izyum and reducing the Russian forces there opens up the paths to retaking the rest of Kharkiv oblast or firmly denying the "liberation of the DPR" de jure borders.
  6. Well, lets not underestimate Russia, the ground forces may be useless, but VVS can probably fly sorties from squadrons allocated to Kherson without much a issue, the fact that UKR AD is such that this advance has not been seriously disturbed by airpower is very encouraging on the part of UKR AD and their advancing units which requires serious coordination to not leave the advancing units uncovered and easy to be destroyed.
  7. Ukrainians correct me, this is referring to the Izium Raion? Google maps says this is the Raion borders.
  8. I wonder if the Russians in Kherson know how bad it's going in Kharkiv? I wonder how the LNR and DPR forces elsewhere like seeing the Russians blame them for the breakthroughs? Morale must be in the dirt by now.
  9. With how **** their supply and logistics were in the more movement phrase of the war, I bet a ton of looting was necessary just to feed themselves.
  10. From CIT, they list the following potential reserve units that can be redeployed to counter: https://te.legra.ph/Sitrep-for-September-6-09-07
  11. Is it really a find if Zelensky announces it in a speech? Seriously, how the hell did Ukraine move the elite, most advanced units and experienced personnel of the ZSU into position without waking the Russians the hell up?!?! Placed into context, Def Mon map shows that the pushes into Ozerne, and Staryi Karyan, that i recall many a Russian mil blogger being disdainful of "little boats" of UKR going into town quickly to put a flag and run, are actually prep points for a launch into cutting off the Izyum retreat east.
  12. It is just amazing, I'm not sure if anyone saw that Ukraine was capable of launching two major offensives at once two or even a month ago. (I'm not sure that I want to say this is a localized or recon in force, this clearly has planning and operational depth in it, the distances here are greater than any previously by Ukraine, yes Russia may not have enough defense in depth but Ukraine would need to assemble the supply and reserve units to do things like encircle towns for bypassing) One, sure, but two? Either Russia has basically stripped Izyum of everything, or Ukraine has piled a lot in this area (or both!). What about intel wise? How did Russia ignore Izyum building up? Why did they remove so much from Kharkiv for the Donbas and Kherson? ISR wise, we have been saying that Ukraine and Russia see everything the other does, yet that seemingly has not translated into Russia being able to prevent being hoodwinked by Ukraine time and time again, from Kherson, to Kharkiv, one gets the feeling that Ukraine has been psyoping the Russians really ****ing good and ISR is only useful if you can process it, take conclusions from it, and if Ukraine psyops has been causing them to underestimate Ukraine, it must be really good cause Russia is looking at utter collapse in Kharkiv. You know, I feel like their psyops is affecting me personally. Did anyone on this thread, if asked a month ago, "Could Ukraine advance 20km against Russia?" For example, the distance between Vysokopillya and Novovoznesens'ke is 10km, and took several days of fighting for Ukraine to advance, meanwhile, in the span of less than a day? we have UKR forces making a 17km move from Volokhiv Yar to outskirts of Shevchenkove.
  13. What happened to air support? Like, sure, Russian fire support maybe got overrun or the front line units were not prepared for a offensive by Ukraine, but what about air support, is there literally no ability for the VVS to stop these spearheads? There is a report indicating they are skipping Shevchenkove and heading straight for Kupyansk, Izyum is basically gone in that scenario, if they reach the Oskii, both Kharkiv, and Slovyansk are basically free from being flanked, Ukraine will have very strong defensive lines in the area, and can then redirect freed up units for Donetsk or whatever else they feel like attacking. Amazing, anyone recall when Russia was first pushing into Izyum and people were hoping that Ukraine could actually cut off the Russian advance via Kupyansk but sadly, Ukraine was firmly on the defensive? It is astounding to see a few months later, Ukraine being really close to cutting Izyum and doing so via such a high speed maneuver. This is literally new, in terms of territorial control we have seen since months ago. Amazing.
  14. Did Ukraine take the towns east of Balaklya? If so, with both major roads leading from Balaklya taken and UKR spearheads moving forward, for Russian units to voluntarily leave the city, that would be a horrible tactical mistake, their best bet is hunkering down in the city and fighting on until Russia pushes reserves and hopefully pushes Ukraine back. In that sense, its not particularly important for Ukraine to take the town especially if the two pincers moving on Shevchenkove from west and south take the town and Ukraine can supply their offensive units via Kharkiv.
  15. We were also wondering if Ukraine has the ability to use a armored thrust to penetrate enemy frontage with ability to push forward with mopping up units behind it....looks like Kharkiv confirms that Ukraine is still capable of those sort of offensives. Obviously, the comparisons are near superficial, but I'm getting a lot of Stalingrad vibes, undermanned frontlines with second rate troops (no offensive Romanians but you were undermanned, underequipped, and overly extended) getting overrun by a mechanized spearhead that managed to assemble without interference from a high command overly focused elsewhere.
  16. You know Russian and pro-russian sources are going to freak out if Ukraine really did conduct a envelopment of the city and trapped substantial units inside. One, Kherson was supposed to take most of UKR reserves. Two, say UKR was desperately trying to launch offensives all along the front line to gain ground to keep Western support, these offensives should not be encircling Russian units in fortified strategic points like Balakleya, but more akin to the grinding battles in Kherson that Russians are boasting are grinding the ZSU down to nothing. Three, even if the ZSU had the forces to conduct a encirclement, the VVS should have destroyed those pincers, and the artillery should be mopping them up. That all of these should fail, will probably explode a few blood clots in their heads.
  17. Tbh, while it is gross to let it occur, allowing Russia to export it's energy is key to ensuring the world's most vulnerable get by. Luckily, the nature of the Russian military makes it very affected by sanctions so if the West can trade "under the table" where we look the other way on energy, and China, India, and anyone else, stays very diligent sanction wise and Russia stays starved of high tech military hardware. Oh and if anyone wants to sell over some Soviet munitions to Ukraine like Pakistan, please go right ahead. (Btw, pretty sure UK MoD flights from Pakistan to Poland delivered those 122mm shells spotted recently) Also, it has worked out well, European LNG supply is meeting what it needs to get thru the winter. Could Ukraine use more supplies and support? Of course. But if Europe had escalated too fast and high, Putin would have cut the gas supply way more earlier and damaged the supply more. What the west has supplied under these escalatory restraints imposed by Russia has been well picked and well used by Ukraine to paralyze their offensive capabilities. As long as Ukraine keeps getting financial and military support from the EU which underpins the Ukrainian economy and government, tho I'm sure it's not great for Ukrainians to watch Russia trade so much money, we know that their ability to use it in actuality is vastly limited, (Also corruption seems to be just eating the hell outta them), Russia exporting their energy is not the biggest danger for Ukraine. What is important is keeping Ukraine afloat economically, and militarily. If that means allowing Russia to export energy to keep Western economics churning, as long as they keep Ukraine floating financially, it's a fair trade off. Certainly NATO continues to ramp up their efforts for the long term support of Ukraine, plans are underway by the UK to expand the training of Ukrainians from 3 to 5 weeks. NATO training of Ukrainians is taking place across Europe with broad participation from NATO members. Could it be more and faster? Yes of course. End of the day, the trend line for Western support to Ukraine remains up and up. It is essential for the West to keep Russia from panicking. Not in the sense, don't keep support at a minimum to force a stalemate, but don't freak Putin out. It's evident that Russia, Putin, the General Staff, they got their brains screwed wrong and whatever punishment inflicted by Ukraine is assisted by strategic blunders chosen by Russia. For example, instead of Russia freaking out over 200 Bradley and other APCs/IFVs to be sent to Ukraine, Russia laughs at 12 miserable HIMARS, and a few SPGs and 100 artillery pieces. And what do we have now? A huge Russian force paralyzed on the wrong side of the river, cause Russia simply did not consider Ukraine's ability to use the limited Western aid to be substantial. Putin seems to be acting under the impression still that Ukraine won't fight, can't fight, isn't smart enough to win. The decision making that drove Russia to launch a full scale invasion of Ukraine, those decision makers are still at the helm, likely with the same faulty mindsets that drove this war.
  18. Might be a decent chance they are referring to: https://maps.app.goo.gl/aNEUGcJnqfAZ4aMz8
  19. It is interesting to see who can shift their thinking to how both Russia and Ukraine are operating, and those who remain behind. I recall France had issued their own updates on the frontline in Ukraine, similar to the UK MoD, which many pro-Russians used to dispute the rosy outlook of UK MoD and these dropped off hard after a while, anyone know if they just stopped issuing updates or what?
  20. Nothing about the amount of ammo explosions across occupied Ukraine, nor the strikes on Crimea indicates UKR lack of ISR and partisan operators so big doubt Ukraine cannot locate the pumping stations or pipelines. Big doubt, maybe these Poles are assuming too much that Russia is equal to NATO still? The photos of Russian ammo stockpiles show the same piled up easily explodable deathtraps give very little indication Russia is changing their logistics operations or is capable of doing so.
  21. A reminder, betrayal of blood means a harsher response than say, some random people off the street choosing to go to another restaurant. Russian discourse on blood, isn't merely to emphasize the position of familiarity, it's also to justify the brutality of their repression as proper punishment for Ukrainian betrayal of their blood ties. Think about honor killings, being done by members of the victims' family, despite the closeness one would assume of the family members. The familiarity is nothing more than justification for control.
  22. The 2nd tweet, geolocation evidence from /r/combatfootage indicates these are UKR forces getting hit.
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