G.I. Joe

I'm not going to participate in this off topic discussion, but just would like to say this. Germany has learned it's lessons and is one of the most decent and democratic countries in Europe. To compare present Russian (war) crimes with German (war) crimes of the past, in order to weaken the severity of the Russian crimes is unjust.

I do agree with you that there will be a response. But for one tactical nuke, the better answer would be a no-fly zone over Ukraine. A 'tit-for-tat' nuke would not accomplish much and had mostly symbolic value. A no-fly zone would more or less end the war, and the shame would be on Russia.
It would be a huge win (in this context) if the narrative after the war is 'we dropped the bomb, but still didn't win the war'.
But I really doubt anything like that will happen.

It does say a lot when your neighbours' national anthems have titles like "Poland's Cause is Not Yet Lost" and "Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished..."

It does say a lot when your neighbours' national anthems have titles like "Poland's Cause is Not Yet Lost" and "Ukraine Has Not Yet Perished..."

You can think that, but there's not much to support it.
Your second to last sentence shows a confusion that's also common in most press reports.  Delivery systems and warheads are distinct from each other.  If the warheads don't go "boom" the delivery systems don't matter. 
Russia hasn't done a nuclear test that went "boom" since 1990.  They talk a lot, but the impression I get is that it's all powerpoint.  The latest wunderweapon is this hypersonic missile.  Without a warhead it's just a kinetic energy weapon.  It's also a non-trivial thing to do.  Russia is good at rockets - they've managed to maintain a very reliable launch program for 30 years post-USSR and have some of the most reliable launch vehicles you can get.  I have no doubt that they can make something go hypersonic.  The hard part is controlling it as a maneuver vehicle in the atmosphere, and there's no evidence that they've been able to do that.  We've spent the last 5 months looking at their "precision" guidance capability, their "advances" in armor and APS, their AD radar systems, etc, and there's not much there.  
Given that they haven't done a test that went "boom" since 1990, it's a pretty good bet that they haven't developed anything new in the warhead department.  They could possibly have developed a new fission bomb in the ~10 kT range - that's not that hard to do and they have a lot of materials laying around, but that stuff is also tracked (and leaves tracks) and I can't find anything indicating that there's anything new.  This congressional report from 2022 notes a lot of delivery system development, but given the actual resources available to Russia to do that, it's probably a lot of powerpoint and staged demos.  And delivery systems don't mean much if the warheads don't go "boom".
Warheads take a lot of maintenance.  The US spends ~$20B/year on "stockpile stewardship", which translates in real terms into "how do we make sure the bombs will explode without actually exploding one".  That's about 1/3 of the total Russian military budget.  You can make the argument that US engineers cost proportionally more, but it's a weak one. The US doesn't have anywhere near the level of corruption in the political and military budgets that Russia has, and has a lot of controls to make sure they're actually getting what they're paying for.  And the bright Russian scientists and engineers can come to the US and make US engineer and scientist salaries.  And even with all that, the US nuclear weapons development program nearly died about 20 years ago due to lack of interest from scientists and engineers not being interested in working on it (there was an NYT article or series on it that I haven't been able to find). Russia faces much worse problems in getting the technical people necessary to maintain their weapons systems and keeping them trained and making sure they're actually doing the work.  
You're correct that "it is a deadly serious national security asset that demands strict monitoring", but I suspect most of the monitoring is coming from the outside through arms control agreements (and maybe a bit of espionage), which do nothing to make sure the bombs will work, just that there aren't more than there are supposed to be and that the material is accounted for.  The corruption within Russia is pervasive enough that unless you can show me something concrete, it's likely at least as bad in the nuke maintenance department as it is with the truck tires.  At least someone is going to see if the truck tires go flat in the lot.
And as has already been pointed out (more by other posters) - a nuclear arsenal only works if it's not going "boom" outside of tests.  Actually pushing a button to launch nukes in anger is an indication that your nuclear strategy failed, because you'll stop existing less than 60 minutes later, along with your country in any meaningful sense. If Putin wanted to make a real nuclear threat, he'd set one off on a test range.  But he'd also want to be really, really sure that it went off, because if it doesn't, the threat fizzles as fast as the bomb does.

the NATO expansion as excuse for Russian serial mass murder & conquest is hilarious.  Free, sovereign nations joined NATO because they were terrified of Russia.  Russia then proves all those nations wrong by performing serial mass murder and a war of conquest on Ukraine, solely because it was the most valuable free, sovereign nation that hadn't joined NATO. 
Really, a fantasy writer couldn't dream up this stuff any better.. 

And it's worth keeping in mind the punch line to the joke that's been going around where the Russian soldier is listing to his GF or mom, depending on the version, all the losses the RA has suffered.  When asked about NATO's losses: "Oh, NATO haven't even turned up yet".  Putin really, really wants to avoid a direct conflict with NATO, especially now that he's gotten a taste.
And as far as whether Russian nukes will work or not, there are probably a bunch of analysts looking at things that The_Capt would describe as "what you don't see", like the price and availability of Helium-3 in Russia and how much power is going down the lines of whatever processing facilities who can give you a pretty good estimate of the status of the Russian nuclear arsenal.  Maybe even better than the Russians can.  Keep in mind that all those weapons were built in the Soviet years and the west went on a hiring binge from the former USSR in the early 90s.  There were physics departments adding more Russians than the Detroit Red Wings.  It cost them a couple generations of scientists and engineers - the ones who designed and built all that stuff and wanted out (and could share the details with the west) and the next generation who were in school or freshly out and came to the west.  So they lost the people with the knowledge and the people they were supposed to pass it to.

The attractions of attaining nuclear capability are complicated but put very simply, it safeguards you from a large conventional attack. A US response to the Russian use of a nuke would vary depending on how one was used. A demonstration explosion somewhere? Probably only a diplomatic offensive to pare away Russia's last remaining sort-of-friends. A mass casualty strike on a Ukrainian city or a series of tactical strikes to destroy a Ukrainian Army? Then you could expect a conventional no fly/shoot down zone and the particular obliteration of whatever Russian unit was deemed responsible. Essentially, NATO can respond with overwhelming force conventionally to anything short of a theater nuclear launch and that's what it would do.

Russia has a limited ability to escalate after they've used a nuke.  Could they use more of them?  Sure.  Would it be a good idea? Not at all - it would turn most Russia into radioactive glass.  We've already seen the asymmetry in the quality of equipment from Russia - do you think the nuclear situation is any different?  Nuclear weapons require maintenance, and there's orders of magnitude difference in the amount of money the US puts into making sure they'll work compared to what Russia spends.  And Russia has to deal with the corruption, lazyness, and brain drain factors on top of that.  Why would anybody responsible for going into a radiation environment to maintain Russian nukes bother, when they fully expect that they'll never be used?  Much easier to check the boxes and take the money.
And the US wouldn't necessarily have to respond with nukes - the response could be an overwhelming conventional strike on key Russian resources, including nuclear facilities and Putin's dacha.  Or eliminate the Russian air force?  There's a bunch of NATO stuff flying around on the Russian border - you can see the refueling tankers on ADSBExchange all the time, but you don't see the things that are being refueled.

I would not be so sure. Syria was almost zero stakes, he could leave it by a whim and nobody would even notice in Russia. But here is different, he is already too deep into that swamp. You are right Russian subjects citizens would probably buy it (largely) but his power would not be stable anymore. And of course everything depends on question: what victory.
 
Worthy read from Timothy Snyder. @panzermartin may ba a good read for you, since you are clearly struggling whom to believe (not being personal here, I understand your urge to think critically); when comes to Belarus/Ukraine/Poland topics, Snyder is one of the best adressess you can find (less so on Russia, but still holds). His wife Marcy Shore also wrote great book about Maidan I cannot recommend enough, reconstructing mentallity of the Revolution of Dignity - good antidotum for "realist"/tankies guys who want us all think that every social movement is orchestrated by global powerhouses.
 

The best info I've been able to find is that Russia launched their last film-drop satellite in 2015.  They currently have only two electro-optical satellites in orbit, both past their design lifetime, and which may or may not still be functioning.  They're literally 40 years behind - the US launched its first electro-optical satellite in 1976.  They also have no history of launching synthetic aperture radars, which would let them see through clouds.  When you see how few ISR assets they have in space, it's much more obvious why they did the anti-satellite "test" last fall that made a big mess of debris: they may have had nothing at all at risk if their two optical satellites aren't very effective.  And given that they don't seem to be able to make optical array sensors for their own UAVs, they probably aren't making them for their satellites and may have very marginal sensors on them.
The Russian space industry is good at making big things out of lots of metal and with lots of propellant - the Soyuz is one of the most reliable launch vehicles in history - but they've got nothing when it comes to electronics fab, and that's what enables the mass ISR capability.

The US really has to respond to a nuclear attack.
Post-Soviet Ukraine was born with the world's third largest nuclear arsenal.  They didn't have control over the launch/arming systems, but could have in a year or so.  Instead they voluntarily gave up the entire arsenal in return for assurances of security.  Failure to support Ukraine as much as possible (even now with conventional weapons) would basically toss out 50 years of work on non-proliferation. Not only would no state willingly disarm, but it will ensure a bunch of small (and less stable) states develop nuclear programs or work to buy nuclear weapons from other countries.  Letting even a tactical nuke go unanswered would make all that happen even faster, putting everyone on Earth at much higher risk overnight.  The current situation is already putting non-proliferation at risk - if Ukraine had kept and taken firing control of the nuclear weapons they inherited, none of this would be happening now.

Here's the problem with tactical nukes:
Say you nuke Kharkiv...and the Ukrainians still say "**** you, sovoks" and keep fighting.
You've just become the first nation to use nukes since WWII in a war of aggression. Your not-entirely-unfriendly trade partners India and China have been "no first use" states for half a century. There's every likelihood they will abandon you politically and end trading with you. The EU/US now have no compunction about a complete trade embargo if not an actual blockade and will ramp up conventional aid through the already high roof. 
For all of this you get a city you can't use and some local tactical gains. There's no calculation that makes it worthwhile if you don't believe the terror alone will get everyone to stop fighting you.

I truly admire such zen mind disconnected from morallity, knowing what we know at this stage of the war. The problem with Machiavellian wannabies is that they suddenly gets very uneasy when actually confronted with reality. Maershaimmer unexpected fall as alpha and omega of large part of security establishment is a good example of that.
Yeah, Russia doesn't have a world domination plan. Just reliving USSR, turning ca. 160 mln people into its subjects/tributaries/"neutrals", facing off several statehoods from face of the earth (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Balts if possible), turning Baltic Sea back into contested lake, braking all written pacts from last 30 years, maybe even doing small Ribberntropp-Molotov again, etc...just normal realization of somebody's national interests, business as usual (and mind you, all of these are communicates of top RUS officials).
Because let's remember West is also somewhat guilty...ehh, what was it...Palestine? Mate, you listen too much of Pope Francis.😇
Reality is:
1.Russia was among 3 top superpowers still until 2020's if only because of its size and energy connections. Putin hubris brought it down.
2.Russia borders are where Russia want them to be- everything is malleable and negotiable. That's why they genuinly convinced themselves they are on a crusade and defend themselves- no kidding, analyze their speeches or comments in the net.
3.So called "Russian world" is a modern concept devised by Putin's spin doctors. It's stiff as Breznev's walk and dead as Lenin's body. Still useful to misguide people around about their "rights" to intervene in other nation's well being. Russia has as much right to meddle into countries with Russian minority as III Reich had with "securing" sudettendeutch in Czechoslovakia.
4. Russian propaganda for western audience is actually very postmodern- it actively encourage our minds to believe in nothing and question everything. It perfectly know where weaknessess of open societies lies.
 
So, in the end- do not believe RU propaganda mate. And yes, Ukrainian/proNATO sources and accounts are also doing their own, but that proves literally nothing except that info wars are innate to any military effort.
 
PS. Oh, Russia just stated it has nothing to do with strike at Odessa port. You guys feel old yet ?😎

I think it would definitely have been a factor. In particular, the "how not to" aspects of the lessons of Vietnam were keenly felt among the U.S. officer and NCO corps. I recall General Schwarzkopf's autobiography It Doesn't Take a Hero had a lot of good first person insight into what that era was like for U.S. Army officers (also a good firsthand account of Operation Urgent Fury), but it has been ages since I read it. Over on the Air Force side of things, I highly recommend C. R. Anderegg's book Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade After Vietnam. Being in federal copyright, Sierra Hotel is legally available for free online if you don't mind an ebook in PDF format.

I continue to be astounded at how incredibly stupid RU has been on the international propaganda.  The correct way to run this war is to say this is an internal conflict since Ukraine is part of Russia.  Repeat it over and over and over and over.  Continually say how RU is not a threat to anyone.  continue to say how RU can be trusted in business dealings by keeping gas flowing. 
Instead Putin has taught us that he is a rabid dog that will never stop trying to take more territory and undermine democracies.  After Ukraine, they have stated they will conquer Poland, the Baltics, they will make Finland and Sweden pay for joining NATO, along w nuking the UK.
It's really just incredibly stupid.  The western pro-RU factions, which should be working to undermine the war effort (Tucker Carlson, et al), don't have a leg to stand on once RU starts talking about invading and nuking all of the EU.

So this post got me thinking and raises a really good set of points.  Right now we have been handing out a lot of fish on this thread.  We pull in the data, filter it, assess and then pull out analysis, which leads to some level of prediction.  What we (I) have not done is provide enough fishing rods.  Of course you guys are swimming around the internet and being exposed to all sorts of narratives, some good and some bad.  It may be helpful to arm you with some ways to do your own analysis so that while you are out there you can come at it better.
Everyone has got their own system, western military teachings all tend to cover the same ground (e.g. PMESII, OPP, whatever that thing Bil does, which must work because he keeps beating me).  Eastern approaches are different and take into account different criteria, I am not an expert on these so I will let someone else weigh in on them.  I will give you my personal system and the one I teach, see if it helps and if it does not keep looking around.
My system is pretty simply to be honest and focuses on two main areas: what is seen, what is not seen, but should be.  That first one is much easier, the second requires a lot more depth but we can walk to that.
What is Seen
I think I posted this before and @sburke lost his mind a bit.  Let me try a less-powerpointy version (seriously guys it is the message, not the medium).

Ok so this is a representation of what is essentially the western operational system.  It starts on the left with what is basically "Command" and works its way to a desired Outcome.  Everyone is focused on the "Boom"...of course you are...it is exploding!  The reality, however, is that the Target is really only in the middle of this whole thing.  It is an indicator - one of many - but it is not the only indicator.  I think everyone here gets that but they often do not know what else to look for (although some clearly do).
So the big red system on the left is often referred to as the "kill chain" (thanks for nothing Brose).  It is really the center of what we call a "targeting enterprise" and frankly we in the west are very good at this.  This is "cause" space that translates human will, through capability, into energy (and here it can get quite complex), through mediums (also crazy complex) and onto a target and foresaid "boom" (yay!).   Be it an ammo dump, shopping mall, tank or goose (I hate geese) the process is pretty much the same, and volumes have been written as to how to do this faster/better than an opponent.
The point of the big red circle is that when we see a "boom" it is important to analyze the entire Cause chain all the way back to determine 1) if that was the actual intended target or was it simply happenstance, 2) how well the chain is doing in competitive terms and 3) what is this all signaling about Will?  All of this also has to take into account context and the situation on the ground.
Cool. We now have a bead on Cause.  Effect is much harder and more important.  The big blue area is where the pay dirt really sits.  A lot of big booms are impressive, but trust me if they do not translate into that big blue space you are going nowhere loudly - and I speak from experience here.  
So the first question is "what effect is this actually happening?"  Here an effect is a "consequence of action", so for example the effect of all those HIMARS booms - who are at the end of their own kill chain - was (allegedly) to have the Russian logistics system tie it self in knots to get away from them.  Great, outstanding...but was it decisive?
Second is Decision.  I have written about the three types of decisions available in warfare (at least) - positive, negative and null.  Let's leave off the last two and just focus on the first one.  A positive decision is a "death of alternate futures".  There was a future where Russia pounded Kyviv into submission for two months in Mar-Apr 22.  The Ukrainian government tapped out because western support was being cut off from the west and Russia occupied half of Ukraine and the capital, set up a puppet government and then enjoyed an insurgency-from-hell that would last 20 years.  That future died in March when the Russians were held off and pushed back from Kyviv: it was positively Decisive.  The Russians may actually have a future where they are back at Kyviv but it won't be in Mar-Apr of 22, the reality will be very different.  The HIMARS are having an effect, that much is clear.  What is not clear is how decisive the sum of those effects are as yet.  If the Russians lose the ability for operational offensive for a significant duration (e.g. this "pause" never ends) then we can say it has been decisive, because there are dead futures on the floor.
Last are Outcomes.  "What is the difference between a Decision and an Outcome Capt?"  My personal definitions is that an Outcome is a death of options, normally strategic options.  The sum of decisions in western doctrine is supposed to lead to "Objectives" which are the "Deal Done" points in western military planning.  Frankly these have let us down in the past, so I go with Options.  If Options die, they kill off entire fields of futures....a future-cide if you will.  Here something like the entire collapse of the northern Russian front was an Outcome to my mind because the Russian strategic options space collapsed.  Same thing happened after the first week of this war as the strategic options spaces that led to a quick war also died - it is why we got all excited about it back then.  The most significant Outcome is the end of the war of course, but that Outcome is the sum of a bunch of other ones, that all loop back to Will.
So whenever something blows up, look both left and right on that spectrum, and ask a lot of questions.  How is the Cause chain doing comparatively? What is happening with Will? What is the problem with Russian Capability translating into Energy and Targets?  Really keep a close eye on the Blue circle, the indicators of the important stuff are there:  what is the actual effect?  Is this decisive?  what was the Outcome?
Ok, so that was the easy part.
What is not Seen, but should be.
While books have been written on the first part above, the second is the land of experience.  Here a deep understanding of history comes in very useful as it provides a lot of context.  This space (which I do not have a snazzy picture for) is essentially "what should be happening but is not..."  It is very tricky and takes a lot of experience to "see the blank spaces", it is where the effects should be happening but are not based on whatever time and space we are in within a given scenario.
For example, let's take the Russian cruise missiles (and this is not a beat up of @panzermartin, he is asking some good questions).  We know the Russians have a lot of missiles (https://missilethreat.csis.org/country_tax/russia/) and they had launched roughly 1000 of them in about a month at the beginning of the war.
And another report that they were at 2125 total "68 days into the war" (https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare#:~:text=Russia launched more than 1%2C100,68 days of the war.).  Now if we take "What we see" as the only indication, well this is a clearly functioning Cause chain.  Will, Capability all landing on targets.  A little shaky on the dud rate and "missing" military targets by many reports, and the Medium of UA AD has been pretty effective (then we get into competitive system effects which is a whole other thing - there are red and blue circles in collision); however, that is a lot of "boom".  The Effects we saw were a lot of damage, some of it military and the UA definitely had to react to defend itself by moving AD and C2 around.  I am not sure they have been Decisive, but we will get to that.
So that is what we saw, and on the surface 2125 incoming missiles all over the Ukraine is not small and frankly looks scary...but I only see what is missing:
A Ukrainian strategic center of gravity is the inflow of support from the western world.  We are pushing a lot of money and boom-boom over the border from Poland.  High on Russia's list of high value targets has to be to cut off that incoming support anyway possible.  They have done strikes in Lviv on training bases, so they clearly have the capability to hit.  But what are we not seeing?  I am not seeing rail infrastructure being crippled in Western Ukraine.  I am not seeing road infrastructure being destroyed faster than Ukraine can repair.  I am not seeing 30 Ukrainian ammo depots in western Ukraine being hit to cut off the supply of 155mm shells - it is what I am not seeing that is the biggest indicator something is going very wrong on the Russian side.  The Russians have the capability - range is no excuse as they could park missiles in Belarus, so why are they not using all them there 2125 missiles on what really matters?  First answer is that they are "dumb" but that is too easy.  Split Will, missiles spread across disjointed commands all lobbing on their own priorities much more likely.  Lack of ISR to consistently hit things when they need to be hit like UA ammo dumps and logistics nodes, which tend to move around...also very likely.
This is the same thing very early on in the war - why was I still seeing Ukrainian social media feeds 72 hours into this war?  All them tanks getting lit up, old ladies with balls of steel etc.  Rule #1 of country invasion: make it go dark.  Russian failed in this, it was missing and should not have been.
Wargamers have an advantage here as they play these problem sets all the time.  We have seen it a lot on this thread.  A wargamer can ask..."why did they not do this?  I would have."  
And this has nothing to do with an echo chamber either, but we do need to be careful.  For example, we have not seen UA operational offence yet, and nothing that looks like all traditional arms manoeuvre.  This one has me particularly puzzled and we are getting more data in on why this may be happening.
I will sum up by saying that in order to really filter the "reality" from opinion and BS, take all this and apply it to what we can actually see and not see.  We can build assumptions but they have to remain on speaking terms with the facts.  Once an assumption becomes a fact [edit for @Combatintman. “without sufficient validation”]  we are in trouble.  Enough facts put through the lenses of the two frameworks I give here become a trend, and it is those trends that told us that Russia was losing the first part of the war while most of the mainstream were figuring out how to deal with a Russian victory.
Good luck and surf safe.
 
 

+1 (out of reactions again)
Indeed...as in World War II and the Cold War, this is a fight to the finish between democracy and totalitarianism. And for the sake of all of humanity, democracy must win.

My thoughts exactly...I very much doubt if that is a final answer.

Probably still negotiating I imagine.

It is an incoherent video with a bunch of weirdly disconnected shots from 21 Mar - about the time the entire Northern Russian front collapsed.  That was a BM-21 as far as I can tell and that last hit on the shopping mall was a ballistic missile of some sort.  The ability of Russian missile to strike targets they can pull from Google Earth is not a clear indicator of superiority in anything.  Yes, they have a lot of long range missiles that can hit static target the size of the building...so what?  How does that lend to leap in logic that the Russians and Ukraine have deep strike parity somehow?
Type in "Russian Ammo Dump explosion" into You Tube and see what comes up.  Type it into Google and you get this:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukrainian-military-strikes-with-western-arms-disrupt-russian-supply-lines-2022-07-14/
I could post this and reference stuff posted on this thread all day long.
So let's talk "grounded in reality".  We have reports of over 30 operational high value targets being hit in Russian depth over the last couple weeks.  The Russians are being forced to react.  Their offensive operations are slow and small gains, and very costly - to the point they had to invoke a week+ long operational pause after taking a few acres in the Donbas.  UA c-btty seems to be working.  The Russian offensive has the hallmarks of stalling, just like it did in phase 1, and now we are hearing speculation on a UA Kherson offensive - after they hammered that bridge with PGM, to the point the Russians have to restrict traffic.
We have debated Russian morale and are looking for indicators one way or the other as to where it is pointing.  None of it is pointing to "good news" for the Russian system.  In fact it appears kinda sick, if these trends in desertion keep going.  The RA can still attack so they are not out of it yet but getting a weird vibe.  
Look, you want to be "the counter-thinker", cool we definitely need them.  However, come with facts.  We have been pulling assessments in from everywhere and adding our own, if you indeed have one then lay it out.  Right now I am seeing a lot of opinion and one grainy video that is running counter to about the last 200 pages.  Some questions to consider:
- How has Russian deep strike affected the UA operational system?
- How has that erosion supported the achievement of Russian operational and strategic goals.
- How has Russian deep strike affected Centers of Gravity as different levels?
- Have the Russians achieved any operational level superiority beyond massed artillery fires?  Have they eroded UA superiority.
- How has Russian deep strike opened up strategic options spaces?  (it sure as hell has for the UA).
- How has deep strike affected each sides Will?
Now if you can answer those, with some facts or even a credible professional assessment then lets hear em.
 

How can we possibly know that?  We can guess at the Russian target list but so far we have seen a lot of apartment buildings and shopping malls hit.  Ukrainian industry has been hit but  UA logistics are still up, they are pushing new capability to the front and as far as we can tell Ukrainian information architecture is running very well.  UA ISR has been impacted by EW in narrow fronts.
Meanwhile 4 bloody HIMARS appear to have forced the entire Russian operational logistical plan to push back about 100kms, and we covered the impact of that.  It has been noted by Russian milbloggers that Russia is shooting in the dark ISR-wise, and it shows.
If we compare the overall effects, I am not sure how one can put Russia and Ukraine on anywhere near even terms with respect to deep strike capability.  Russia is lobbing missiles as terror weapons, which is reinforcing western centres of gravity, while Ukraine has been hitting operational targets with precision (a bridge for f#cks sake!) to the point it has forced the Russians to shift operations.

Yep, good examples. It's the exact same problem. And frankly we all have issues with cognitive bias. It is something we all have to deal with and check ourselves for. Or at least we all should be.
What are the percentages like I wonder. Q-Anon believers (even only partial belief) seems to be under 15% (https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-so-hard-to-gauge-support-for-qanon/). What are the numbers like in Russia? I know polling is not very reliable so perhaps there is no way to know for sure. My question is, in the US (and other parts of the world) people have access to other points of view, how much access do Russian speakers in Russia have to other points of view and more accurate facts?

This is again one of those cases where, yeah, on paper Russia and the US/NATO have these two comparable systems, but the US/NATO ones are backed up by other synergistic things that act as massive force multipliers, while the Russian systems...aren't.

Looks like a modern military to protect the interest of the old Hanseatic league. Tell putin Novgorod belonged to it too.