Zeleban

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that I already wrote that from the 7th Airborne Division in this direction, until recently there were essentially only three battalions (171st separate air assault battalion, 104th separate tank battalion and 162nd separate reconnaissance battalion). The main forces of the division (3 of its air assault regiments) were, at one time, transferred “near Verbovoe” to take part in flank counterattacks against the advancing Ukrainian group.
Well, now, given the fact that with the “flank counterattacks” in the Tokmak direction, nothing meaningful happened anyway, and the Ukrainian marines staged a fatal counter-strike for the Russian motorized rifles and mobs in the Dnieper floodplains, Monsieur Teplinsky clearly demanded from his “senior commanders” return this formation of airborne troops “back” to him. Let me remind you that the regular position of this general is commander of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation.
However, the fact is that the Russian command is now unable to pull out the main forces of the 7th Airborne Division from under Verbovoy in the Tokmak direction “purely physically.” The division's 108th and 247th air assault regiments are closely involved in the fighting. And the 56th Airborne Regiment, which has already been reorganized “almost anew” 2 times, can send “to Teplinsky” right now no more than 2 of its battalions. Although, probably, “a little later,” this Feodosian rabble will go to the Dnieper in full force (if it hasn’t already).
As for the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 2 of its motorized rifle regiments are ALREADY involved - the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment is still unsuccessfully trying to push our marines back from Krynki to the flooded areas, and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is probably included in the second echelon of the tactical group operating along the line Peschanka - Podstepnoe, north of the village of Radensk, somewhere southwest of the village of Chelburda. At least one small infantry regiment and another tank regiment (tp) of this division are also “roaming somewhere.”
A month ago there was information about the tank regiment that it was continuing to be “reformed” in northern Crimea, and the motorized rifle regiment was allegedly concentrated in the area of Skadovsk.
Be that as it may, the enemy will soon be forced to “deal with the problem of Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the Dnieper. After all, if they leave this issue to chance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will still be able to get a section of coastline on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of Russian artillery will not reach. It’s not for me to explain to you what it will be.
Naturally, it still has to be reliably covered from the air. On this score, I also have certain, far from unfounded (judging by the information coming from the troops) hopes.

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:
You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.
But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.
As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:
- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.
- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.
- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.
– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.
In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:
 
- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;
- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.
Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”
 
We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:
You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.
But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.
As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:
- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.
- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.
- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.
– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.
In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:
 
- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;
- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.
Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”
 
We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that I already wrote that from the 7th Airborne Division in this direction, until recently there were essentially only three battalions (171st separate air assault battalion, 104th separate tank battalion and 162nd separate reconnaissance battalion). The main forces of the division (3 of its air assault regiments) were, at one time, transferred “near Verbovoe” to take part in flank counterattacks against the advancing Ukrainian group.
Well, now, given the fact that with the “flank counterattacks” in the Tokmak direction, nothing meaningful happened anyway, and the Ukrainian marines staged a fatal counter-strike for the Russian motorized rifles and mobs in the Dnieper floodplains, Monsieur Teplinsky clearly demanded from his “senior commanders” return this formation of airborne troops “back” to him. Let me remind you that the regular position of this general is commander of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation.
However, the fact is that the Russian command is now unable to pull out the main forces of the 7th Airborne Division from under Verbovoy in the Tokmak direction “purely physically.” The division's 108th and 247th air assault regiments are closely involved in the fighting. And the 56th Airborne Regiment, which has already been reorganized “almost anew” 2 times, can send “to Teplinsky” right now no more than 2 of its battalions. Although, probably, “a little later,” this Feodosian rabble will go to the Dnieper in full force (if it hasn’t already).
As for the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 2 of its motorized rifle regiments are ALREADY involved - the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment is still unsuccessfully trying to push our marines back from Krynki to the flooded areas, and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is probably included in the second echelon of the tactical group operating along the line Peschanka - Podstepnoe, north of the village of Radensk, somewhere southwest of the village of Chelburda. At least one small infantry regiment and another tank regiment (tp) of this division are also “roaming somewhere.”
A month ago there was information about the tank regiment that it was continuing to be “reformed” in northern Crimea, and the motorized rifle regiment was allegedly concentrated in the area of Skadovsk.
Be that as it may, the enemy will soon be forced to “deal with the problem of Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the Dnieper. After all, if they leave this issue to chance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will still be able to get a section of coastline on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of Russian artillery will not reach. It’s not for me to explain to you what it will be.
Naturally, it still has to be reliably covered from the air. On this score, I also have certain, far from unfounded (judging by the information coming from the troops) hopes.

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

For those who have forgotten, let me remind you that I already wrote that from the 7th Airborne Division in this direction, until recently there were essentially only three battalions (171st separate air assault battalion, 104th separate tank battalion and 162nd separate reconnaissance battalion). The main forces of the division (3 of its air assault regiments) were, at one time, transferred “near Verbovoe” to take part in flank counterattacks against the advancing Ukrainian group.
Well, now, given the fact that with the “flank counterattacks” in the Tokmak direction, nothing meaningful happened anyway, and the Ukrainian marines staged a fatal counter-strike for the Russian motorized rifles and mobs in the Dnieper floodplains, Monsieur Teplinsky clearly demanded from his “senior commanders” return this formation of airborne troops “back” to him. Let me remind you that the regular position of this general is commander of the airborne troops of the Russian Federation.
However, the fact is that the Russian command is now unable to pull out the main forces of the 7th Airborne Division from under Verbovoy in the Tokmak direction “purely physically.” The division's 108th and 247th air assault regiments are closely involved in the fighting. And the 56th Airborne Regiment, which has already been reorganized “almost anew” 2 times, can send “to Teplinsky” right now no more than 2 of its battalions. Although, probably, “a little later,” this Feodosian rabble will go to the Dnieper in full force (if it hasn’t already).
As for the 70th Motorized Rifle Division, 2 of its motorized rifle regiments are ALREADY involved - the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment is still unsuccessfully trying to push our marines back from Krynki to the flooded areas, and the 28th Motorized Rifle Regiment is probably included in the second echelon of the tactical group operating along the line Peschanka - Podstepnoe, north of the village of Radensk, somewhere southwest of the village of Chelburda. At least one small infantry regiment and another tank regiment (tp) of this division are also “roaming somewhere.”
A month ago there was information about the tank regiment that it was continuing to be “reformed” in northern Crimea, and the motorized rifle regiment was allegedly concentrated in the area of Skadovsk.
Be that as it may, the enemy will soon be forced to “deal with the problem of Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the Dnieper. After all, if they leave this issue to chance, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will still be able to get a section of coastline on the right bank of the river, where the bulk of Russian artillery will not reach. It’s not for me to explain to you what it will be.
Naturally, it still has to be reliably covered from the air. On this score, I also have certain, far from unfounded (judging by the information coming from the troops) hopes.

The situation on the left bank of the Dnieper from Konstantin Mashovets:
You can treat the active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the left bank of the Dnieper in any way you like. Consider this a “PR gamble with blood”, a pointless waste of resources, or seriously consider the possibility of a “breakthrough to Crimea” in this direction.
But so far, real events indicate that the Russian command in the Crimean-Tavrian direction, at least, received a significant “headache” that was clearly not planned by them. This is already a fact, no matter how you evaluate and interpret it.
As far as I understand, everything there is going exactly “according to plan”, however, obviously not to the Russian one:
- At least 2 tactical bridgeheads of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the area of the road and railway Antonov bridges have already turned into 1, but more than the previous two. Moreover, apparently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding him quite tightly.
- In the area of the village of Krynki, units of the enemy’s 26th motorized rifle regiment apparently still hold part of the forest south of the village and the north-eastern part of the village itself, but the situation there for the Russians is clearly developing, somehow “in the wrong direction.” Moreover, even the Storm-Z, driven from the direction of Korsunok, does not help. In turn, several units of the 144th separate motorized rifle brigade of the Russians tried to “probe the Ukrainian bridgehead” in this area, as they say, head-on, impudently, but it turned out unsuccessfully for them.
- In at least 2 places, the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the section between Oleshki and Novaya Kakhovka managed to cut the coastal road that goes from Novaya Kakhovka to Oleshki, which, in itself, is a little strange. But it will be even stranger if Ukrainian units go to the next road E-58. And they have such an opportunity, in which case the situation will change completely, radically.
– Along the Podstepnoe – Peschanivka line there is also some “vanity and disorder”. In the area of Chaika Island, the enemy (probably units of the 177th separate marine regiment and the 171st separate airborne assault battalion from the 7th airborne assault division) are trying to hold the first position of the main line of defense. It is quite possible that separate units of the enemy’s 205th Infantry Motorized Rifle Brigade are also involved there. But, despite this, even judging by open sources, the situation there is also heating up for the enemy, especially north of the village of Podstepnoe.
In short, the enemy somehow did not have an effective line of defense from the Dnieper flood plains. How does Teplinsky and Company react to all these events? Of course, in the typical Russian style:
 
- Transferring additional forces and assets to the “dangerous area”;
- Organizing and conducting numerous series of attacks in 24/7 mode.
Moreover, the introduction of formations, units and subunits into battle occurs in the same way as always, “as they concentrate and deploy.”
 
We are talking, first of all, about two main formations that the enemy obviously intends to use to “liquidate the Dnieper crisis” - the 70th motorized rifle division from the 18th combined arms army, as well as the 7th airborne assault division

And finally, assessments of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the part of the enemy.
Several Russian publics, more or less adequate (and therefore not very well known “in their own family”), quite unanimously came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Armed Forces had planned, organized and worked out their actions through the Dnieper in advance. I won’t point them out now, so as not to advertise the enemy, but I will point out that they argued their conclusions quite adequately:
- The Russians were unpleasantly surprised by the speed and efficiency of the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces units, especially in the area of increasing their efforts. “First, 2-3 sabotage groups are found there, then they form a platoon, and after a couple of days, when they have gained a foothold, they begin to transport mortars there and a company already appears there, and so on.”
- Also, they came to the conclusion that the Ukrainian command had found an opportunity, in some still unknown way, to ensure the replenishment of their advanced units and organize their logistical support, in sufficient quantities and with appropriate efficiency (otherwise the advanced units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not have been able to conduct intensive combat operations on the bridgeheads for a more or less long period of time, and they, in addition, manage to expand them).
- It is also obvious that the width along the front and the main areas and directions of active actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “through the Dnieper” were not chosen at all by chance. They are clearly tied to the nature of the terrain, the composition and operational formation of Russian troops, even the water level and the most successful and convenient places for landing and hidden advance in the floodplain are taken into account. The Russians come to the conclusion that they are dealing with a carefully planned and prepared, especially in the field of intelligence, operation to seize and hold bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper. Although, of course, they believe that by “restoring order” and “concentrating efforts” they have a significant chance of eliminating them.

I also remember a case when our military also presented an anti-tank grenade launcher to a Polish general, also with a tragic result. It would still be good if the West suspended military aid to Ukraine. Perhaps this will force our military to change their attitude and begin to value these supplies. Perhaps then there will be more competent and responsible military personnel in the Ukrainian army.
We are very fond of scolding the West for insufficient military assistance. But personally, I believe that the main reason for military failures at the front is the incompetence of the military at ALL official levels. Starting from the rank and file and ending with senior management (this case with Zaluzhny’s assistant demonstrates this well). The total incompetence of Ukrainians is a real scourge of our society. It manifests itself in everything: how we pass laws, how we fight crime, how we build houses and roads, how we teach our children, how we produce household items, and how we drive vehicles in the end.
Ukrainians have many advantages and, unfortunately, responsibility and competence are not one of these advantages

Oh, be glad that you didn’t have to travel on Ukrainian trains! In most of ours, these are “reserved reserved seat” type cars inherited from the USSR, model 1953, with the eternal smell of sweaty socks
David Bowie won't let me lie
https://zagge.ru/devid-boui-puteshestvoval-iz-vladivostoka-v-moskvu-v-1973/

Because missiles and fighter aircraft are really cool, especially when used for a righteous cause. 

..... Lol 
I guess this is living proof russian sewer level propaganda works?🤷 

Russia seems to be gaining a lot of initiative lately, meanwhile the Western support is slowly going away. I kind of suspect this war will not see its second anniversary.

I assure you, sire, our officials are more stupid. I won't take any "no" for answer here. 🧐 He was a  police general not military, btw., so shouldn't take bloody granade launcher as a gift anyway. Plush handcuffs, retired trained police dog, maybe 9 mm casings with "Best cop in the world" would be more appropriate.

 
But on serious note, circulation of various less-than'legal "stuff" from this war will likely be a problem in the future also within EU. And likely used in Russian propaganda against Ukraine.

I can vouch that the navy burned up excess ammo. That was the only time we got to fire full auto (Our M16s were old enough to have that option. I never was issued a rifle with three round burst. Had the old style rear sights, too).

Oh, be glad that you didn’t have to travel on Ukrainian trains! In most of ours, these are “reserved reserved seat” type cars inherited from the USSR, model 1953, with the eternal smell of sweaty socks
David Bowie won't let me lie
https://zagge.ru/devid-boui-puteshestvoval-iz-vladivostoka-v-moskvu-v-1973/

Unfortunately, “counter offensive” is just a PR move designed to demonstrate to Ukraine’s Western allies the weakness of Russia and Ukraine’s imminent victory in the war. Our president comes from show business, where PR is given special importance. The counter-offensive was very widely advertised in various media, just like a concert by revered pop stars. However, it turned out that the military operation had nothing to do with the concert.
It is very stupid to do exactly what the enemy expects from you. History teaches us a lesson again

Lots of doom and gloom here.   Also, every once in a while someone complains about their X feed not providing sufficient coverage of the war.
Both issues may be solved by following the Ukrainian Front account.  This will help to drive more relevant posts to your account, as well as getting you the daily 'good morning world' posts followed by the equally marvellous 'good night world' posts:
 

The Netherlands promises Ukraine ammunition worth €500 million (Yahoo.com)
God bless The Netherlands.
Ammo is expensive, until it is Priceless. 🙂

Exactly this!
Edit: cross posted
 

Just because you decline to fight the enemy in a unfavourable place, does not mean you get to fight him in a favourable place.
The whole draw to Bakhmut was that Putin needed that headline beyond all reason. It was the place that crippled the Russian army's offensive operations elsewhere. Let Putin have Bakhmut, and the headlines he craved, and his commanders might just have been able to pick their next spot to attack. And it wouldn't have been the easily defended hills west of Bakhmut, I can all but guarantee you that.
And there's the political angle. The long fight over Bakhmut was wildly damaging to Putin's regime internationally and within Russia. There was a pseudo-coup attempt! That's a pretty good result for Ukraine fighting for Bakhmut.
 
To me, fighting in Bakhmut is a no brainer.

Then it’s better to start from the very beginning and find out how the Russians ended up near Vasilyevka and Tokmak. Why, as it recently became clear, there was no plan for defense on the part of Crimea.
There was only a plan for “deterrent measures” - countering small groups of saboteurs