Kaunitz

@ Bulletpoint Just a short note, as I'm in a hurry. You're right on the angles. Some calculations: angle of impact on the ground (perfectly flat surface): muzzle height = 1.5m @50m --> 1.718° @100m --> 0.865° @500m --> 0.173° @1000m --> 0.0859° muzzle height = 2m @50m --> 2.291° @100m -->1.146° @500m --> 0.229° @1000m --> 0.115° Effect of inaccuracy. Suppose that inaccuracy adds +/- 0.1 degree: firing at target at 500m: muzzle height 1.5m: short (+0.1°) --> hits 186m long (-0.1°) --> hits 1177m muzzle height 2m: short --> hits 348m long --> hits 888m firing at target at 100m muzzle height 1.5m: short (+0.1°) --> hits 89m long (-0.1°) --> hits 112m muzzle height 2m: short --> hits 91m long --> hits 109m So you're correct that the difference in accuracy caused by the differences in muzzle height are probably not that big, or, more specifically, that a muzzle with higher elevation is not significantly more accurate (it will still hit closer to the target, but not close enough as even minor deviations lead to shots going far off the mark at those flat angles...). And overall, these calculations also show that even slight deviations from the perfect gun-elevation will make the shells over- or undershoot by a lot. That's why I say that generally speaking, main guns have a hard time to hit flat target (no houses, trees) s if they're on the same height level. Firing upwards or downwards on a target, by contrast, gives guns more wiggle-room. My feeling might be much more related to being allowed to area fire on = seeing the ground of squares. Here the higher elevation might matter indeed as your LOS will travel on above the level of most micro-terrain for longer distances. PS: All calculations were based on the assumption that main guns (unlike small arms) on "area fire" target the ground, not a point slightly above ground level.

A point to consider when using MGs: Like for all other weapons, the rate of fire depends on the distance to the target, even for area fire. If you order a unit to area-fire, the soldiers will first "aim" at the target, the duration of which depends amongst others on the distance to the target (ca. 1 second per 100m) and then fire (the MGs typically fire 2 bursts). So, if you're aiming at a square relatively close to the MG in order to get some grazing fire going, the rate of fire will generally be higher than you want it to be. I find this to be a bit of a problem with most automatic weapons, to be honest. MGs often fire at exaggerated rates ("target light" doesn't help). If you don't want them to burn through their ammo too fast (leading to an extremely dangerous reload-intervall very soon), you can use target briefly, which is not a perfect solution either (the enemy will be un-surpressed/un-pinned after a few seconds...). I think MGs are a bit in a tough position, unable to provide the sustained reliable suppression they should. Generally speaking, I also find it very, very hard in CM to "set up" units (like MGs). Even with concealment and crawling, they're spotted easily by the enemy. Not even to mention what happens once they open fire - instantly spotted (or identified by the player by looking at the direction of the tracers...). Somehow I believe it was more tricky to pin down the exact locations of the enemies in reality.

My recent H2H game taught me the differences between self-propelled ATguns (or tank-destroyers) and proper tanks in an infantry support role the hard way. I thought it would be interesting to discuss the topic and share some experiences here. If possible, though, I'd like to keep the discussion based on gameplay, not on real doctrines. I'm not really an expert, when it comes to definitions. For easyness' sake (disregarding that the two types discussed here were probably more differentiated based on their tactical and operational deployment rather than by technical intricacies?), let's just say that: A tank has a turret and at least 1 MG (more often 1 turret and one hull MG). Most tanks in CM have ample supply of both, HE and AP ammo. In CM, it's usually much more expensive than a sp. ATgun A sp. ATgun has no turret (and the traversable angle of the gun is often very limited) and no MG. Most sp. ATguns in CM are focused on AP ammo and carry only few HE rounds (with some exceptions, e.g. SU 76M). An ATgun is usually much cheaper than a tank. Now a few thoughts: In an assault, you often want to lay down fire on several positions within a single turn at slightly varying angles to your vehicle's front. Because of its turret, the tank is so much better at this. As the whole vehicle needs to point in the direction of the shot, a spATg would need to approach in a curved, snake-like line or, alternatively, stand still for long intervalls to turn on its tracks. Any errors in planning the movement can be fatal, as the spATg might not fire at all if you fail to give it enough time to turn (pay attention to the turning stat of your vehicle!!). The tank, by contrast, can go in a straight line and fire at any angle. For the same reason, the tank is much superior to the spATg in what could be called "corner situations" - these are the typical situations in which you want to go in one direction, but fire in another direction. For example, take a crossroad in a village - you know there is an enemy position around the corner. The tank can rotate its turret while still in cover, then expose itself and fire almost immediately at 90°. The spATg would need to expose itself, then rotate slowly on its tracks, and only then could it fire. So, for any kind of close combat and corner situation, the tank is superior. In many cases in CM, main guns - the only weapon spATguns have - are tricky to use. The main gun is more dependent on proper aiming (and on confirmed contacts, for that matter). If your target is positioned somewhere around the same height as your muzzle, you will run into troubles. The main gun's HE shells are effective only if they actually hit something - either the ground or an obstacle. If they miss, they often have no effect on the intended target whatsoever, depending on the lay of the land. E.g. if the opponent is behind a gentle ridge, almost at the same height as your muzzle, and the surroundings are flat, it can be very hard to get a valid area target anywhere close to the suspected contact. Shots aimed too low will do nothing as the target is in cover behind the ridge. Shots aimed too high will sail over the heads of the target harmlessly. Note that this problem is most notable on flat terrain with main guns that are located close to the ground (vehicles with low silhouettes) and therefore may affect spATguns more than tanks. Main guns in turrets are located "higher" and can therefore see over terrain much better and area-target spots more accurately/easily - on a flat surface, the target will be positioned lower than the gun, making it easier for the gun to hit somewhere close to it. Positioning yourself somewhere higher than your target (on a hill) can solve the problem, if you're lucky enough to find such an elevation on the map. NOTE: I wished that assault guns with low velocity/curved trajectory weapons would get some kind of bonus here. I really think they should be allowed to target reverse slope areas (like mortars). The MG, by contrast, is less dependent on actually hitting the target in order to be "effective". So this is a big plus for tanks. With a tank, you can try to get the turret-MG in a position where it can deliver grazing fire (bullets traveling close to the ground over flat terrain), which allows you to strafe areas (far beyond your MG's line of sight) that are hard to hit with your main gun. Tanks would be even better if the game allowed you to use their hull-MG for area-fire commands (unless hull-down, the hull MG, being closer to the ground level, can often achieve grazing fire more easily than the turret MG whose fire will be directed "downwards", hitting the ground instead of traveling on at dangerous grazing height).

Small (easy to oversee) ridges bare of concealment that cannot be flanked/evaded are the worst kind of thing, especially if there are no hills around to take a look what's behind them. A few ideas: Have a TRP - my latest game reminded me of that. If there are reverse slopes on the map, buy that TRP. 30 pts is still cheaper than the squad you're going to loose if you crest that ridge without smoke. As far as I know, onmap mortars can also target reverse slopes, so if the ridge/hill is not too steep, you should at least be able to lay down a smoke screen that lets you crest the ridge even if you don't have a TRP. The problem when going over the ridge with infantry is that the enemy usually is waiting for you - he's prone and stationary (good spotting, hard to spot), while your guys are moving upright (bad spotting, easy to spot).This is especially true if there is no concealment on the ridge. With vehicles, you have a very similar problem (hidden + stationary versus moving). With infantry, consider crawling over the ridge if some concealment is available. Even if you suffer casualties, they will be more limited. The big downside is that it will slow you down horribly, which increases the danger of an artillery strike if you're detected. In modern titles, this is obviously more risky as better spotting devices are available (IR/heat detection). PS: Don't fire!!! (unless you're already detected by many enemy positions). Soldiers are spotted individually. Even if one gets spotted and shot, the rest of the squad might be safe - by firing, they give away their position. When you really have to push, I think it's a good idea to take a look first. Crawl some infantry up the ridge, use the hide command to stay low, un-hide your infantry for a few turns so that they can just look over the ridge (some guys will kneel). Crawl a bit further and unhide to risk another look, etc. This increases the area you're exposing yourself to and you can observe in little increments. At some point you will have gained a picture of what's awaiting you in the dead ground on the other side. Needless to say that this takes lots and lots of time. Next, share this information (via C2) with the troops who are going to push. For the actual push, make sure that all assets crest the ridge at the same time to throw the enemy's fire into chaos (that's why I find crawling is not the method for infantry to push over a ridge) and reduce your units' total time of exposure. Area fire at the targets that you've been scouting. Try to get to the depression on the other side of the ridge fast - often the top of the ridge is exposed to many enemy positions. With vehicles, shooting and scooting can be usefull. First scout for targets with infantry as described above. Then drive up your tanks/vehicles in hulldown positions for 10 seconds or so, either with a target arc on an identified target or an area fire order. After 10 seconds, your vehicles need to reverse back behind the ridge. Unless the enemy is very close and experienced, 10 seconds should give you a chance to retreat back into cover before the enemy can spot and zero-in on you. This is especially true against ATGMs who travel at relatively slow speed. For your next shoot & scoot, pick a different spot (the enemy will still have a suspected contact on your former position). As with infantry scouting, fight as little of the enemy at any time, expose yourself little by little. Again, fighting like this takes a lot of time. More time than many scenarios would give to you.

List of known, major (game engine) bugs infantry behaviour under any kind of shelling (even if in perfect cover, units decide to leave their cover to run around in the open and get killed like headless chicken) - this really is a major issue contacts shared via C2 are never updated ( http://community.battlefront.com/topic/126539-test-indicates-c2-contact-sharing-is-broken-when-enemy-moves/?tab=comments#comment-1739798 )

Hypothetically, I suppose that a dismounted position would be easier to camouflage against ground and, especially, air observation? The first type of observation shouldn't happen to your mortars in a CM game. The second type of observation doesn't really matter in CM? (Do you know, however, how air assets in CM titles pick their targets?)

I agree that the situations to use it are very rare. But they exist. E.g. I want to quickly move a column of SPGs (no MGs of their own to do the job) down a road through an extensive wood. Option 1: Dismount and lead with the infantry on both flanks. --> Safe, but it will take you 20 minutes. Also, if spotted, you're an excellent target for artillery. Option 2: Risk parts of the force as an advance guard, the rest follows at safe distance. DIsmount in time if advance guard gets ambushed. --> Not as safe, but faster. A cunning opponent might still trigger the ambush so that he hits the body of the column. Option 3: Suppress the immediate surroundings with fire provided by the tank riders while racing down the road as fast as possible. Takes lots of ammo, but with a few trucks in the force, that's not that big a problem.

Weren't the flak towers just evaded? Why would you try to attack these things on the ground?

Interesting! Thanks for the info! Afaik though, the engine can't handle firing ports (e.g. in modern titles with the IFVs)? I've been playing CM for a long time, but I've come across this just now, analyzing why my squad was so bunched up in my current H2H game. I guess most of you already know (lol)? In the crew/infantry UI-window, there is a maximum of three columns. For infantry, these columns actually represent squares occupied by the unit. The first/left column shows you the soldiers that are positioned on the "primary square" of the unit, the second/center column those positioned on the "secondary square" (if any) and the third/right column those on the "tertiary square" (if any). The "combine squad" order lets you concentrate more soldiers on fewer squares. E.g. with the "combine squad" order, you can fill up empty slots in the first and second column with soldiers from the third to reduce the unit's footprint from 3 to 2 squares. Note that you can observe how the individual soldiers from the third column will move over to their new square/column individually. Each column can hold up to 7 soldiers. So, if your unit is stronger than 7 soldiers, it will take up 2 squares. Finally a tip: When splitting squads, make sure you never end up with a "7 men on one square" unit. It's horribly bunched up.

If I understand you correctly, you say that the SU 76M should have an AA machine gun on it? In the game, it doesn't. If you let the crew bail out, one of them got a SMG, the others have pistols. With a MG, the SU 76M would be even better than it already is (but if it is AA, oriented to the rear, it's not that usefull...). It has a very good offroad stat, its gun has enough punch to knock out enemy tanks, and it's also an excellent infantry support weapon as it carries lots of HE rounds (and can communicate with the infantry quickly thanks to the open compartment?). For the very low pricepoint, it's an excellent unit!

Yep, no difficulties understanding the language itself, it's just that some phrases are not entirely clear in their meaning and I have a few troubles here and there with some terms that are taken for granted and probably described in more detail in other manuals. E.g. in pt. 28, what's the difference between "Sturm" (lit. assault) and "Einbrechen" (lit. bursting in)? They're obviously not synonymous. I suppose that the former refers to a quick dash to the enemy position, the latter the final process of "entering" the enemy position/trenchline? From my understanding, "limited target" (pts. 32, 35 in night attacks) seems to refer to a situation, deviating from the usual "quickly exploit a success" idea (pt. 31), in which the platoon is supposed to take one position and NOT proceed any further. It's an "assault and hold", not an "assault here and then continue the attack as you see fit". The manual clearly states that the fire squad is set up to defend the position, not to cover further attacks. I guess that this is why continous assaults are deemed too risky during night: Improvising an assault over terrain that has not been reconnoitred in daylight is dangerous to say the least. In another manual, I was wondering about the term "niedergekämpft" (maybe best translated as "overpowered"). Does it mean that the enemy has clearly been (permanently) knocked out or just supressed? It's a bit woolly. But I guess you couldn't really tell the enemy's exact condition on the battlefield anyway.

8.3%! Thanks a lot! So morale effects take into account the % of casualties, squad size matters! Very interesting!

Here is a list of tiny details I've been unaware of and that are not described in the manual. I came upon them more or less by accident. Even though they're of minor importance, I think it's a good idea to note them down, also to show how detailed the game really is! Feel free to add your own tiny discoveries! When buying the mechanized/motorized version of a force, the organic (i.e. bought as part of a formation) trucks sometimes carry special extra ammunition. If part of an AT-gun unit, they carry extra AT-gun ammo (e.g. for the Soviet 45mm AT-gun: 4x HE, 16x AP, 2x cannister). If bought for other unit types, soviet trucks labeled as "(weapons)" come with additional extra ammo for the light mortar and the AT-rifles (24x 50mm mortar rounds, 50xAT rifle rounds). Even though you can't tell from their ingame appearance/UI, soviet AT-hunter teams (3men) do have AT capabilities. They are listed as carrying "6 grenades". What the game does not tell you (also no special symbols in the equipment UI-slots) is that 4 of these 6 grenades are anti-tank-grenades. The team leader carries two ordinary HE grenades on him while each of the remaining two soldiers carries 2 AT grenades. You need to be really close to use them (within 10m?). So they're like breach teams with detonation charges, just cheaper. On the Soviet SU 76M (self propelled AT gun), you get some standard extra ammo that is automatically shared with infantry units close by (710x 7.62mm rounds). There is no need for the "acquire" command. Maybe it's meant for the weapons of the crew - the manual mentions that they can somehow fire their weapons in self-defence? The enclosed SUs also have extra ammo - I need to test if they also share it.

It's a pity. I'd be interested in it as well. I have to admit my electronic library is constantly growing. A hard disk is just more space-efficient than a shelf. I will keep my eyes open for a copy . It's frustrating that buying stuff from sellers indirectly via amazon often refuses international shipping. grrrrr Sounds very interesting! Thanks for the tip! It's also rather rare/pricey, it seems. I've found one store online which offers it at a reasonable price, but I'm sceptical about that site (I'm not going to support any site that flogs nazi nostalgia).

Here is my clumsy translation of the first few pages, more to follow: The assault-platoon in the grenadier-company I. General remarks Based on the experiences in the war, a new structure and new armament is required for the grenadier-companies, both for the attack and the defence. The partition of grenadier companies into assault-platoons allows their unitary and flexible/swift employment. [? pretty general remark] With its new structure, namely two assault-squads and a fire-squad, as well as with its new armament, the assault-platoon will fulfill a very clearly defined role. The uniform armament of the squads facilitates their lead, so that even young and inexperienced squad leaders who have not finished their full training, can lead them into battle more readily. The adoption of the assault rifle 44 [Sturmgewehr 44] increases firepower and the manoeuverability of the squads. The withdrawal of grenade-launchers and sharpshooters from the squads relieves them of specialists. It allows the grenade-launchers to be concentrated on the platoon-level and the sharpshooters on the company-level. II. Structure of the assault-platoon [you can compare it to the diagrams on p. 15 of the electronic document] 5. The assault platoon consists of: the platoon leader the platoon HQ team, including the grenade launcher team 2 assault squads (7 men each) 1 fire squad (7 men) 2 infantry carts (Jf. 8), coupled, 1 horse, 1 operator/rider 1 backup/reserve/supply [?] cart (“Feldwagen oder Panjewagen”), two-horse, 1 operator/rider 6. The platoon HQ team consists of: 2 messengers/runners 1 litter bearer/medic 1 Grenade-launcher-team (3 grenadiers) [probably this means 3 tubes], one of the greandiers is teamleader; The concentration of the grenadiers at the platoon-leader increases the effectiveness of fire and allows them to be used in a concentrated/focused manner 7. The assault squad consists of 1 squadleader and 7 soldiers. The soldiers are equipped with assault rifles 44. They are to engage in close combat and are equipped with plenty of ammunition and grenades. One of the soldiers is second-in-command of the squad leader. 8. The fire squad consists of 2 light MG teams. The squad leader is in command of the squad as a whole and one of the MGs in particular. His second-in-command commands the other MG. Each MG is crewed by a gunner (“Schütze 1”) and two ammo-bearers (“Munitionsschützen”). The first [=standard?] ammunition-allotment is 720 rounds for each assault-rifle 44. On them, the soldiers are to carry 6 magazines for a total of 180 rounds (30 rounds per magazine). III. The assault platoon in combat General principles 9. In the attack, it’s the assault platoon’s task to wipe out the last resistance of the enemy. In the defence, the assault platoon defeats the final assault of the enemy. 10. The assault platoon can accomplish any task, both in the defence and in the attack. 11. The assault platoon is best used for the following tasks: For assault and recon missions, for combat in rough/difficult (lit. hard to oversee) terrain, for missions during night or in foggy weather In the defence as a mobile reserve for the counter-attack and the protection of open flanks For the pursuit of the enemy and as an advance guard, riding on Stugs, trucks/cars or tanks; As rearguards in retreat actions, or for combat “im Zwischenfeld” (?) as a hunter-platoon of a ski-unit or as a ski-equipped part of a winter unit [… I don’t know how to translate all the special terms – generally it refers to their usage on skis] 12. The assault platoon is the smallest tactical combat unit of the grenadier-company. The individual deployment of assault squads or the fire squad is an exception. Attack 13. In all combat conditions, the completely hidden, hunter-like (“jägermäßige”) approach into the rear or a flank of the enemy and the sudden, overwhelming and surprising employment of fire at short distance is the key to success. 14. When approching, the platoon leader leads his assault platoon close to the enemy, evading fire combat. 15. Proper assessment of the terrain is required prior to any action. Every opportunity of concealment needs to be taken. It’s not that important to reach the forming up point for the final assault as fast as possible, [but – is missing] to reach it undetected by the enemy and without any casualties. 16. The assault platoon opens fire as late/close as possible and needs to make even more use of the support fire of heavy weapons [to cover its movement, obviously] than before. It’s not the assault-platoon’s task to use [it’s own] suppressive fire to get/manoeuvre within large or medium distance to the enemy. 17. To advance, the assault platoon evades enemy fire zones, exploits even the smallest cover, and crosses areas observed by the enemy in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”). Very narrow but deep formations as well as spreading out a lot helps reduce casualties. Any method of advance that does not offer good targets to the enemy is suitable. 18. When crossing open areas in a trickling manner (“Vortröpfeln”), the intervalls between the men (or pairs of men) are to be set between 0.5 and 5 minutes. The objective area for the manoeuvre needs to be determined beforehand. An energetic squadleader should be picked to be “Schießender” (lit. firer). He oversees the manoeuvre, and ensures that the men move from one waypoint to the next in irregular intervals. (see example attachment 3) 19. Only if all other means (support by heavy weapons, terrain, fog/smoke, darkness) fail, the assault platoon may stop its forward movement and advance by fire [so that means providing its own suppressive fire]. 20. Concentrated fire by all supporting weapons needs to be exploited for a swift and cohesive advance. 21. When assaulting, one or both assault squads are to be deployed in front/attack. The fire squad and the grenadier-team are following closely. They provide fire-support wherever the enemy is still resisting. Assault squads roll up enemy trenches (“stoßtruppartig”). See the details about rolling up trenches in “Merkblatt 25/3: Instruction for close combat and grenade-training”, Nr. 73-86) 22. If the fire support delivered by the company or battalion proves insufficient for the assault, the platoon leader needs to employ his fire squad and the grenadier-team for fire support or suppressive fire. 23. The platoon leader needs to plan the attack according to H.Dv.130/2a Nr. 458-463. 24. The combat-plan needs to consider the following questions: Where do I need to go? What/who is preventing me from going there? How/where do I launch the assault? From where and when can the assault be supported by the fire squad? 25. The combat-plan then needs to be broken down into individual orders: a) To the fire squad: Fireposition – where?, Target – where? Fire support – how? (time to open fire, duration of fire); Follow up – when? Where? b) To the assault squad: Target of the assault – where? How to approach? How to assault? c) For the grenadier-team: Follow up – to whom? (advance together with the assault squad or stay with the fire squad?) – fire position – where? Target, where? Ammo-consumption 26. This is how the assault squad is to be used on the attack: a) When conducting a two pronged attack [“zangenförmiger Angriff”], the fire squad and both assault squads are to be used in a way so that they don’t lose their communication with each other b) The grenade-launcher team follows the assault squads to support them in the attack and in the assault against targets that pop up surprisingly c) The assignment of the grenade-launcher-team to the fire squad is an exception and depends on the terrain and the distance to the target d) Holding back one of the assault squads as a reserve of flank-guard to support the fire squad is the exception 27. Assault and fire squads complement each other even if there is no explicit order for it. The light MGs of the fire squad always need to cover the assault squads, even when they [the MGs] are advancing in alternate bounds. The assault platoon’s squads act upon signals or shouts. 28. The platoon leader takes in hand all the preparations for the assault. He is the first to charge forward, motivating his soldiers to do the same, and assaults with the assault squads. During the assault itself, a lively fire of all of the platoon’s weapons is employed, as well as loud and continous cheering. The assault-rifle 44 is fired on the move, the enemy needs to be drowned in fire. In the first phase of the assault [? not sure; “beim Sturm”], the soldiers are to fire aimed single shots in quick succession, in the second phase [? not sure; “beim Einbrechen”] bursts (2-3 rounds). 29. The big effect that the assault rifle 44 has on morale needs to be exploited for a quick assault sprint into the enemy line/position. When approaching close to the target, going prone and throwing grenades often leads to unneccessary casualties and threatens the success of the action. 30. After the successful assault, the fire squad and the grenade launcher team follow up without orders. 31. After the successful assault, the platoon-leader reorganizes his platoon for the next assault. Any success needs to be exploited further. The enemy must not be given time to reorganize his defences. 32. If the assault was directed at a limited target [so the platoon is supposed not to exploit a success with continous attacks?], the platoon leader sets up a defence of the conquered position with the two light MGs of the fire squad and the grenade-launcher team. They (the MGs + grenade launchers) ensure that the position is not lost to a counter attack, even if no explicit order is given. 33. Due to its quick readiness to fire and its high firepower, the assault rifle 44 is of particular use in the night attack. Assault-platoons are to be used in the first line. Moonlit nights and snow are favourable conditions for a night attack. 34. A night attack requires a very detailed attack- and fire plan. The attack needs to proceed according to the very strict plan. It is impossible to redirect the attack on the fly. 35. Night attacks are always conducted against a limited target. The enemy position is taken by a surprising dash/assault by the asssault squads in line [? “in breiter Front”, on a broad front], with continous fire of all soldiers. The fire squad follows up closely. Defence a) The assault platoon in the main defensive line ("Hauptkampflinie") 36. When the assault platoon is used in defence at the front line, it deploys in a way to defend the position. 37. For defending a large front, the light MG from the reserve [? “Gerätereserve” - the diagrams at the end of the document show it being transported on the horse cart] is to be used [in addition to the other MGs, obviously]. It is to be manned by the ammo-bearers of the fire-squad. The platoon leader decides where to position the fire squad, either deploying it in individual nests over the platoon sector, or, depending on the terrain, he might use concentrations of the light MGs and the assault squads. All MG positions need to be fortified as “fighting nests” and equipped with anti tank weapons. Additional anti tank weapons (Panzerfausts, blinding devices, mines, Molotov cocktails) are to be distributed all over the position, readily available for every man. 38. The grenade-launcher team needs to cover those folds in the terrain that cannot be reached by the fire of the light MGs and the assault rifles 44. It supplements the effect of grenades to cover the dead angles in front of the position. The grenade-launcher team has to be mobile. 39. The counter-attack-reserve of the platoon leader consists of one assault squad. If the sector is very large, however, the counter-attack-reserve only consists of the platoon leader and a few soldiers. Counter-attacks in various situations/in different directions need to be preplanned and practiced. 40. On the defence, one needs to consider daytime and nighttime positions (setup of pickets, organization of the sentry duties, coordination with other observation posts close-by). b) The assault platoon as a counter-attack-reserve 41. Usually, a battalion’s or regiment’s counter-attack-reserve is made up of its assault platoons (fire extinguisher!). 42. The assault platoons that are deployed in the rear area of the front (“in der Tiefe des Hauptkampffeldes”) need to be set up in a way so that their fire squads can destroy any breakthroughs by the enemy and support the assault squads’ counter attack. 43. If the whole assault platoon counter-attacks, the fire squad is to be used as the fire-reserve of the platoon leader in the re-conquered position. [?] 44. Counter-attacks have to be conducted against the flanks or rear of the enemy, along the main line of defence (“Hauptkampflinie”). The faster/earlier the assault platoons counter-attack, the better their chance for success, even if the enemy is in superior strength. Therefore, the platoon-leader needs to make his own decision [on his own initiative] if/when to counter-attack. 45. Fire by all weapons and any means available are applied in order to destroy an enemy breaktrough and overrun it with a swift counter-attack. The counter-attack is to be carried out with all guns blazing, reckless personal commitment, and continous cheering.

Hm, but I would let the riders fire obliquely to the front/flank of the vehicle, not directly to the flank. And they have SMGs! I think it could work to keep at least the heads of Panzerfaust 30s down. It would surely need some testing and experimenting with different vehicle speeds (the slower, the more time for suppression to build up).

Also, the usual "trick" to fire in a direction with prone infantry doesn't work that well with large squads that occupy 2 squares. In most terrain types, prone infantry can't see that far and therefore has problems to fire. So what I do is to area-target a square at a very close distance, and if the terrain is flat, the prone infantry's fire can be very effective even without clear LOS. With large squads, this does not work as well because only the soldiers located on the "primary square" of the unit will fire according to the line of fire. The other soldiers (positioned on the "secondary sqaure") will fire at the targeted square's center from their current position. So you end up with an X fire pattern, with some of the fires deviating about 45° of the intended line of fire.

As I'm preparing for a Red Thunder match, I want to point out a tiny, positive side-effect of my suggestion to allow multiple "target briefly" orders being chained together in one turn: It would also make tank-riders more usefull. Right now, soldiers riding on tanks can only be assigned one area-target per turn/minute. That makes it rather impossible for them to cover the tank with suppressive fire, e.g. when the tank moves along the edge of a wood. With multiple target briefly commands, they could keep firing in the same "direction" while moving, not on the same "point", if you understand what I mean. Ideally, they should spray the edge of the wood continously.

Thanks for the answer, 76mm! Indeed Jason Marks books seem to be just what I've been looking for. Island of Fire is available at a reasonable price. Martin Nevshemal's Objective Ponyri sounds interesting too, but is rather rare ($$$). May I ask you for the title of your MAK companion book?

Good example, but the enemy hMG was badly positioned and isolated. In a proper defence, the approach to the hMG would be covered by other positions - e.g. behind the house to the left or in a house further to the rear/left (cannot be reached by your cover team), in the little wood to the right. It's the tunnel vision that can give you a bloody nose in CM if you try to advance by fire and manoeuvre. Also, I wonder whether the fire team actually fired? Trading fire with a hMG with some rifles usually doesn't end very well for the rifles. ^^ (Unless the very short range here helped the rifles. The MG is deployed within 110m of a wood that provides excellent cover for attackers to approach) Personally, I find it too risky to just suppress the one position I'm aware of and manoeuvre against it, keeping my fingers crossed that there are no other enemy positions. It's much safer to suppress all potential positions within the line-of-sight-sector and only then start to move. Ammo traded for fewer casualties! Of course you need much more firepower to pull this off. Sometimes, I get the impression that the whole "fire & manoeuvre" for infantry was just propaganda to give the infantryman the idea they can win. Yah! You can do it! If the enemy is isolated and offers his flanks, and if there is no enemy armor around, and if artillery doesn't hit you! No really, you can do it! I guess CM has spoilt me *thousand yard stare*

May I ask if anyone can point me to detailed studies/narrations of WWII engagements (doesn't need to be Eastern Front)? Eyewitness accounts are surely interesting, but they fail to give you a detailed, "tactical-technical" picture of the actions. I'd really be interested in a micro-history, so to speak, of an engagement. Like my attempt to figure out what happened during the battle of Gerbini (see Fortress Italy forum), but in a professional way. I'm looking for something like John A. Cash, Seven Firefights in Vietnam, but for World War II. Or something like this: https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/smallunit/smallunit-fm.htm I suppose regimetnal histories would be a good start. As these are neither cheaply nor easily available, can you recommend any in particular?

Facing many buildings, it's tough for sure. But assault guns (/assault howitzers) are very usefull to demolish a few buildings here and there. Urban warfare is no fun. What you could try in order to thwart an ambush is to blast through buildings with engineers (units would sometimes mousehole through a whole block of buidlings!), use smoke to get your assault gun into position and kaboom the enemy ambush position or wait for nightfall (haha!). In a real war, you' could aslo try to evade the ambush spot by moving through the cellars/canals. What makes urban settings so frustrating in CM is that you don't know yet where the enemy will be. It's always the initial approach to contact.

Some informative videos about mid/later 20th century snipers: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=24LRnE6HwVo (British 1/2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bbq9NMoZv2c (British 2/2) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U3NVoz7UIyI (US) I think that the employment of snipers seems to requires a somewhat static front line. Snipers need time to get into position, observe and hit. They affect the "daily life", so to speak. CM matches, on the other hand, are the opposite of "daily life" in a war. They're about the extraordinary, very short action-moments, deliberate attacks. Therefore, there is little place for snipers in CM games. A sniper is not really usefull to take ground, which is what CM matches are about. Also, the fire signature seems to give the sniper's position away too easily. See how my snipers got obliterated: https://youtu.be/ke4SbGZ7LJE?t=94 (infantry got a suspected contact on them, BMPs solved that issue with HE - but okay, the snipers were not dug-in (which would have given their position away even earlier?))

I agree with your second post, but disagree with your first post. My infantry is always split up because their main role is to assault at very short range whatever is left of the enemy after the heavy calibresand automatic long range fire from vehicles or hMGs have hit/suppressed him. Before it is in assault range, infantry's main task is to advance within assault range with as few casualties as possible - this usually means not getting involved in any fire fights, i.e. not being the closed fist (in any way it turns out that the fist is very squishy and vulnerable against virtually anything). 1-2 grenades will do for a house and I don't need the entire squad for 1-2 grenades. Way of the sneaky little finger!

Well what you're saying here is not the opposite. Rather, we seem to be agreeing. I've said that it handicaps the attack, but not that the attack per se is underpowered. I'm an avid activist for more/better fortifications and implementing measures to decrease the infantry casualty rate. In fact an increase of area-suppression should also help to reduce casualties. And, as you've also mentioned, it can also be very usefull for the defender, whose knowledge of the exact whereabouts of the enemy is usually not that clear. A larger area of suppression could help to pin down the guys that "must be moving somewhere around these bushes".