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Anonymous_Jonze

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Posts posted by Anonymous_Jonze

    Berlin CMRT Map

    in Combat Mission Red Thunder

    Posted

    On 1/16/2023 at 6:36 AM, NPye said:

    Ok i'm getting really pissed off, just before xmas for some reason Red Thunder stopped working on my Mac, Everything was still there and i'd backed up everyday anyway, s all good there, So i decided to reinstall the original software, It downloaded ok but everytime i try and install it I get an ERROR -36 cancel the download, so I thought ok I'll reinstall the Mac OS, which is what I did, tried again and the same error appears???? Then CMBN stopped working also???? I'm left with Final blitzkrieg. I reinstalled CMBN which was ok but when I go to the register new product it doesn't go to the usual option to add the code... it just runs through the Terminal commands and do nothing...FFS.

    So I got no RT or BN, any ideas people, I can't even play my own MODS ffs LOL

    I'd talk to @BFCElvisabout this one

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    2022 Mid Year Update

    in Combat Mission - General Discussion

    Posted

    4 hours ago, Simcoe said:

    What is everyone most looking forward to in 2023?

    I know it's a pipe dream but I'm really hoping the new Black Sea module comes out this year. If only to have the massive maps and battalion level operations of Cold War. The VDV would be really interesting to play in a more fluid meeting engagement. Not as excited for the Marines since they don't seem to be as different compared to the US Army.

    games coming to Steam doesn't interest me that much.

    A new Final Blitzkrieg module would be pretty fun. I would like a scenario where the US has to race across Germany from town to town while the Germans gather a scratch force to defend. And what if the Soviets got involved...

    Finally, I don't expect it to happen but if a new Cold War module comes out this year I'll scream like a school girl. British and Bundeswehr forces would be sufficient for me. I don't see the East Germans being very different from the Soviets.

    What is everyone else looking forward to?

    The next CMFB module. Pershing tanks! 

    1

    Berlin CMRT Map

    in Combat Mission Red Thunder

    Posted

    4 hours ago, NPye said:

    Cheers bud, it sounds like i've accidentally added an earlier version in the final folder. Cheers i'll post the most updated one when I can. Cheers

    No problem. Once again cheers to the amount of work you and your team have done. This feels like an expansion pack to RT not a mod! 

    2

    Berlin CMRT Map

    in Combat Mission Red Thunder

    Posted

    7 minutes ago, NPye said:

    May do if you have a really old computer, but runs great on most plus you can change the quality settings?? Try it bud when it comes out.

    Will do! Very impressive work! I have a decent rig, but I think were all really needing some optimization from Battlefront. 

    0

    How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

    in Combat Mission Black Sea

    Posted · Edited by Anonymous_Jonze

    4 hours ago, Beleg85 said:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCcph9srHSw&t=4333s


    There is an interesting interview with Polish volunteer sergeant fighting in Ukraine. It is one and a half month old and unfortunatelly no ENG subtitles are available, but there are interesting tactical and organizational details from the ground that are nevertheless relevant and worth to share here. Some are already known, but since he is unusually vocal (within Opsec) plus has a lot of practice it may be worth to bring them on this board:

    1.The guy serves as platoon commander (practically down to 12 men + 5 absent) from April. His men are in Separate Special Battalion serving as "Battle Detachment" (re: all kind of missions including SF ones) subordinated to one of the regular brigades, probably mainly at Kharkiv front (undisclosed).


    2. Those multinational experienced guys (US, Frenchmen, Poles, Ukrainians and several others) have clearly very different tasks than most common infantry fighting in the trenches- they serve as "fire brigade" in case Russians attacks will brake through. They see periods of very intense fighting, much more than most common soldiers. Interestingly, he claims it is common practice to form such ad hoc local QRF at the brigade and sometimes battalion level. After some time such units are treated as "specialists", taken out of regular order of battle and if having good reputation may be "borrowed" to other brigades for special tasks. Thus they are almost constantly in fight, experiencing problems with fatigue and lack of sleep.


    3. Their equipment reflects that- he started with AK 74, but know uses Grot rifle and M14 for sniper tasks, good quality vests and uniforms. He claims many soldiers he served with, including Americans, will prefer those weapons to M4's that are also in use but have reputation of being too fragile in frontline conditions, difficult to keep clean and prone to jamming. He says US M67 granades are also used, but have 5-sec. delay that is way too long in battlefield conditions (mind- probably assaults), so most soldiers in line prefer old F1. It is interesting that he participated in some "water-environment" sabotage missions deep behind enemy lines (planting explosives) armed chiefly with his 9mm pistol.
    Entire platoon also have two sets of NVG's for entire unit, which they found very lucky to have- common soldiers rarely have such items.


    4. Battlefield effectiveness of AT weapons is also widely different from theoretical. AT-4's serve at max. 150 m but usually closer, NLAW's 6-800 m (platoon get a lot of NLAW's but they had no spare batteries, which shocked soldiers who considered it a sabotage on behalf of "unmentioned" provider state; it almost get them killed). Team's sole Javelin set is effective up to 1500m in practice, but only if line of vision is unobstructed, and similarly they have great problem possessing only pair of batteries- thus they need to allow armour get closer than theoretical range. Infantry is rather vulnarable to RU tanks, since they improved tactics to "shoot and scoot" from 2kms afar, behind practical range of a Javelin: "Unlike at early campaigns, they rarely go into open and creatively use cover and concealment now, preferring their famous carrousel tactics."


    5. His and other platoons often do infiltration tactics; it is also visibly different between regular Ukrainians units and Territorial Defence that former prefer aggresive forms of defences- active patrolling, inflitrations, ambushes etc. while latter stick to their trenches, which they nonetheless hold valiantly. His platoon would penetrate several kms deep inside enemy lines on fairly regular basis. They usually move by pickups and technicals- after engagement they instantly mount them and drive at very high speeds, which is dangerous by itself [I also heard from several other accounts that number of common driving accidents due to enforced speed is very high in this war, especially directly behind the front]. Also despite many people demanding Ukrainians getting on the offensive (material was recorded before it) he says this small tactic is exteremely costly for Russians, so we should not expect in this war "massess of armour that will break the front, which will lead to nothing, them being sorrounded and suffering extra casualties". Instead they kill Russians at very high rate every day, devastate their logistics and only later will be able to penetrate the front [Nice practical translation of @TheCaptain theories about "attrition to manouvre" and internal fractures that lead to RU collapse].


    6. As a rule they were often outnumbered and almost always outgunned; it stand out that front is often very thinly manned and soldiers dispersed, like a weak team solely holding even large village. Russians also visibly improved their tactic over time- they tried night infiltration, learned how to sneak over the minefields and tried to lure his team in the open. Still, his opinion on them as soldiers is low. There are very detailed desciptions of small unit actions, for example when his platoon defended a village against Russian assault for two sleepless nights, resulting only in 29 eliminated Russians and BMP.


    7. Very high regard for Ukrainian determination- especially in June, he says army was basically holding only on its morale and sheer middle finger energy. Even "QRF" elite units in his sector lacked any heavy weapons except several rusty RPG's, they were constantly observed by several drones at once and subjected to constant artillery barrage. Still, they usually defeated muscovite assaults. In one such actions they were aided on flank with 7-man Ukrainian recon team from HQ, armed only with small weapons that successfully stand against armoured assault. Visible recogntition of morale as deciding factor here; for example cases of wounded soldiers leaving hospitals to join collegues at the front are common.


    8.Very often they participated in "emergency" missions to plug the whole or counterattack; in one of such they have 17 men to stop expected massive assault of entire BTG and were suddenly joined by colonel, who took rifle and manned the trench with them (attack didn't came in the end). High opinion of Ukrainian officers, who usually share the same burden as common soldiers, in contrast to Russian practices. Also international troops who get this far are only crack volunteers with right psyche determined to stay in the fight- despite witnessing fires no NATO soldier ever ecnountered they get used to this situation and learned how to behave. He notes that other volunteers, not less professional, brave or skilled in direct combat, simply did not have nerves to be in this kind of war and left [another common thrope- even long wartime service in NATO armies did not provide them with adequate experience against heavy fires].


    9. This soldier, just as many other volunteers and Ukrainians, is visibly shocked by bestiality of Russian way of war- it is beyond just Bucha and Irpien, but in every village and town atrocities are common, there are also often civilians lying dead in countryside or murdered on roads. He descibes a situation when Russians purposfully shoot passing cars but initially targeting only backseats. Drivers speed up to escape, they take the turn and meet a hidden defence point when they are frontally gunned down in group. This way many cars created a barricade from vehicles and dead civilians that blocked the road in case of Ukrainian advance. Such behaviour of course only stiffened Ukrainian morale.


    Ok, sorry for long post. There is another interview with sgt. Krzysztof X that came out several days ago when he give details of offensive in Kharkiv, if you will be interested I may sum up his experiences.

    Great descriptions! I wish the whole video had english subs... : (

    0

    How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?

    in Combat Mission Black Sea

    Posted

    31 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Oh boy, this is not very inspired leadership.  It also is further insight into the chaos surrounding the mobilization.  Which is another fun thing about this... Russia had 7 months to prepare for mobilization.  It seems to me they didn't more than 7 hours of thought into it.  The most I think they did was prepare lists of who to grab, solicited bribes to take names off, and so on.

    This particular unit is supposed to be in training for a month.  Whether that's for real or just something to tell them so they don't run away on Day 1, no way to know for sure.  It could be that a certain portion of the newly mobilized were thrown into combat within a day or two just to stop Ukraine's gains in Kharkiv and Kherson, while others are at least getting a tiny bit of training to serve as a second wave.

    You'd think they'd have learned from the 2nd Army Corps's apparent combat uselessness.

    Steve

    What an absolute sh@tshow

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