Kinophile

I believe we identified and discussed this around when Kharkiv blew up, we noted the massive advantage of interior lines favoured the ZSU? The simple distance and logistical difficulties linking between the two AOs, for the Russians, was operationally significant at a Theatre level. I think It essentially forced the Russians to fight two very disconnected fights, yet for the Ukrainians they could push and pull forces relatively easily? Not necessarily directly swapping in for the other, but they could redirect the flow of gear and men far more easily. It would certainly suggest they needed to really throw something serious at the Ivan in Kherson, from D1 to get them to focus and commit to the defense. A lot of their "best" airborne etc were in Kherson, which was perfect.

Yah but Cheney sold them tech is not the same as the dept of technical knowledge and sheer MIC size as the Sov/RUS MIC. Sure it's decrepit in many parts and essentially incompetent in actually fielding truly new ideas (the Armata is a perfectly sensible concept in isolation) but what it already knows how to build, it can still build. Nukes strapped to ICBMs are a very grandfathered-in technology that Russia needs absolutely no one else for to build them. Also, they have a whole insanity* of them so even if (and very possibly no "if") they have widespead systemic issues, they still have just so many that it would be daft to take a chance on them not working. I mean, they fire one and Oh No it's a dud. So... Fire 5 more to make sure. Why not? *my personal answer to *"what is a group of nuclear weapons called?"

You missed the point. He's talking about a criminal mindset within a mafia structure. Putin does not care about the average Russian Army soldier, so corruption runs rampant and the Mobil at the bottom gets shafted. He very much does care about the Nuclear Deterrent. Mess with something important to the Capo di Capo and you buy yourself a parabolic sightseeing trip out the nearest window. It's wishfull thinking to put the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent in the same bracket as the Russian Army. Sure there will be maintenance and upkeep issues, but nukes and missiles are old hat to the Russian MIC. No matter how incompetent the RU A is, their guns still fire, shells still explode and they're still a very dangerous foe. And this is an instrument that Putin doesn't give two damp farts about.

Agree with all but not the bold. In Kherson At least initially, UKR seemed to go full assault but rapidly bogged down into a very solid defence network, where the Russians seemed to turn the tables on them, trading tactical distance for operational time. The units forming the RUS lines were no joke and heavily armed, but as you essentially note, a fixed defence faces inevitable destruction. So the ZSU pinned the Ivans in place and relentlessly corroded their rear areas. The next assault phase at Kherson seemed to be several months later when cracks finally became exploitable and direct assaults were useful. Then full on frontal assaults had good effect. So essentially they do run large frontage frontal assaults but in general, and certainly still dependent on local command quality, they are far more smart about it than the majority of Russian command cadres. They're more flexible and patient. But Russia has its smart tactical leaders also. I think when UKR tries an attack and runs into someone smart on te other end they are far more likely and far quicker to call off the op a d switch emphasis, locus, tactics or even drop it altogether. But Russian attacks, man, they're the bloody gift that just keeps on giving.

Fivehead?

Count commercial production crews in there. Holy ****, Client & Agency are always Soooooo insightful into the Escher-like creative cul du sac they boxed us into during prep, then have SO MANY QUESTIONS and are SO CONFUSED WHY THIS IS SO SLOW and then have SO MANY GREAT "BUT WHAT IF WE DO THIS-"... Ohh those little ideas they have. Soooooooo USEFUL.

From ISW, ref Bryan's raid: "They seek him here, they seek him there, Those Ruskies seek him everywhere! Is he in heaven or is he in Wimbledon? That demned elusive Boris Johnson!

They did this too just before Kharkiv (for sure) and Kherson (I think).

Ref Bahkmut... Well I know almost nothing about the real situation and I'm not military but.. The folks leading this defense are the same officer cadres that defeated Kyiv, retook Kherson, led the Kharkiv offensive, crushed the Siversky-Donets crossing, etc. They've fought the Ivan every inch of the Bakhmut AO so far without the defending forces falling apart, and any actual retreat seems like it'll be controlled and careful. My bet is on Ukraine.

This has a lot of echoes of the credit crunch before the Great Recession. (not suggesting global impact btw, there will be some local to RU but the rest, we'll keep on getting fat

Putin loves himself an utterly ridiculous false flag op... It's the addiction he can't give up...

@HaidukA more out there idea could be FSB penetration of the group and suggestion of this little jaunt. SBU isnt exactly clean as a whistle, even now.

ref UV...I'm certainly interested and I've laid my pros for him/them. There are some odd details but not yet internal discrepancies. Certainly I'd prefer an actual Ukrainian blog... We'll see.

Some things to note from that article: Drones & Terrain won the battle for UKR. UKR was ready for the attacks and executed the plans well,. and without Drones probably could have done a lot of damage. But the early & constant surveillance was the winner. RUS dronage was inadequate/incompetent or was countered by UKR. Terrain was pretty much perfect for a long distance slaughter of armor (eg the cited MBT up 3Km from the kill zone and fired indirectly into it, correct fire per drone feedback). Drones identified the approaching columns, maintained visuals on the effects on target and also corrected UKR indirect tank fire into the columns - ie indirect not just against traditional geographic targets but into a mobile situation (albeit coralled and fenced in). --- I would not be surprised at all if every UKR western tank from the brigades training up right now arrived into battle with their own stock of drones. Tanks that can indirect fire off their own surveillance, communicate to each other about those effects and correct each other from NLOS...yeow.

Interesting if the NATO forces have a hidden hollowing out like the AFRF but for different mentalities (unrealistic cost curing v. systemic corruption).

hmmm. The suffering of the civilian population is a real issue. A long siege that messes with logistics will need to harm the food supply of almost 2 million people. By contrast Kherson was 250K+ ish, deep in hostile territory and itself under constant attack by someone. In Crimea, the food stocks have been uninterrupted, there's plenty of room to disperse supply points, the civilian supply network is more wide spread and connective with Russia proper, etc, etc. As noted by others, Kherson fell because the heavy attrition and logistics cost defending it overwhelmed the choked-off GLOCs supplying it. Per Steve's point, the Crimean coast, while rough and awkward in many parts, is still completely landable at many points on the Azov & Black Sea shores. Dropping the Kherch does a lot to impact battlefield conditions further north, because moving heavy military equipment is not easy, but Crimea's population and garrison itself could be realistically supplied by sea alone. They'd be hungrier, sure, but not starving. A classic siege of sealing off Crimea from the world is probably not the answer here, from a sheer scale, force absorption and civilian destruction POV. Seeing as UKR already has a handy-dandy tool in its box, how could they apply corrosive warfare without going Siege of Leningrad?

I see. Hes mentioned pinning units and targets using phones (never once mentions PDA). I assume the Kropyva /Delta apps are device agnostic (but Android)? I think each time hes asked for fires throughout the blog its been by phone.

https://ukrainevolunteer297689472.wordpress.com/2023/02/27/western-artillery-is-light-years-better/ Scroll almost 2/3rds Down, he indicates 10 mins for fires support first shot time on target (correct phrase?). Seems long, Esp compared to CMBS with its wizardlike 1min impact times for 155....?

Sorry for your troubles. Do you have Russian artillery destroying your cities, Russian missiles murdering civilians in their apartments, Russian criminals torturing, raping and murdering women and children, has NZ lost tens of thousands of its people to military action in an utterly pointless invasion? No? Then maybe whine about your nonsense above somewhere else. You got it good and you don't even know it.

Interestingly, the first photo shows palletization. The second photo...naturalization (with the elements)

Or, UKR could threaten Crimea, encouraging RUS to reinforce it, and not with ****ty units either. This could weaken/loosen defenses elsewhere, plus concentrating desired targets into a smaller AO. Kherson 2.0 for sure. A nice aspect is that once UKR properly drop the bridge then RUS has a serious problem on its hands, and no way could it retreat unmolested like Kherson. The best part though is that UKR doesn't actually need to finally assault or take Crimea. They just need to sufficiently threaten it (and maintain the threat/degradation) so that RUS unbalances its operational forces structure, sticking important numbers of useful units south into an operational cul-de-sac and logistical chokepoint. Cut the access points and let Crimea wither on the vine while the Ukes go off to kick the living **** out the mobiks south of Donetsk.

Hodges DOES read this thread, I know it!

Come now! Oh ye of little faith... EDIT: Damn you, Beleg!!

I do wonder what the US Mil concluded from OPFOR testing the BTG in the NTC, ie what effective counters (assuming decent OPFOR C2 and air parity).

Thats actually pretty informative, as an analogy - not from a military pov but a political. With losses this bad, and a situation deteriorating this relentlessly, to be able to hide, obfuscate and suppress the impact on society requires an enormous domestic investment. Can you imagine how ruined the US gov would be by now? Massive political rioting, Congress going insane, Presidential impeachments left, right and center, Supreme Court assassinations, militia combat with National Guard, etc etc. This is the kind of enforced and prolonged disaster and losses that would cause a civil war in the initiating 'democratic 'society. But Russian society is not democratic in any sense of the word. Autocrats always think they have limitless domestic power, that they should just keep buttoning down. In many countries that has limits that fairly quickly start to show up - but the apathy at large in Russian society is delaying that crisis point. Putin is doing enough to suppress and things are nowhere near bad enough at home for average Russians to risk everything and everyone they know in open rebellion. I personally never bought the idea that Putin's system would fall due to this war, as the Russian Army has the strategic safe haven of its own borders. Putin himself, possibly. But not the system. At its primary mission, suppression of domestic disagreement, the System is operating smoothly, well funded, has coherent leadership and is unthreatened by external forces.