Kinophile

Oh man, the Story that Just Won't Die. It's like The Last Of Us crossed with 99 Luft Ballloon. @Grigb please return and info dump to exceed Zeleban ... We Needs You. [edit] Ninja'd by BFC!

Well... it's literally framed as colonial in rationale and justification by Putin himself, although without using the word itself (I think).

Just to highlight some positive provision by the German government, there's now 34 Gepard in Ukraine. https://mil.in.ua/en/news/germany-transferred-two-more-gepard-anti-aircraft-guns-to-ukraine/ Plus Grid help : https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/3668934-restoring-energy-infrastructure-germany-has-already-sent-334-tonnes-of-equipment-to-ukraine.html And also some practical Swiss help, even if it's just denying access to reserves: https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/17-6-milliarden-franken-russen-gelder-793972606992 and, Wot Armata Doin'? https://wavellroom.com/2023/02/10/armata-the-story-is-over/ Sweet F-all, it seems. No real surprise there.

Perhaps there was actually something afoot. But thus kind if internal congluct and maneuvers is exactly what an autocratic likes (to a degree).

Challenge accepted!

That's what I see Bahkmut et al about - pinning significant UKR forces as the attack much further north/south.

TBH, I think Cuba has a better guarantee than any piece of paper - it's location, geography and topology. It requires a massive amphibious assault against a rough shore line against prepared defence with vietnam style jungle fighting immediately after landing. Attacking Cuba is a logistical and casualty lists nightmare. With Ukraine, Russia could just walk across some fields and bingo, invasion has begun. The ZSU has turned the rest of their jaunt into a bloody farce, even so, it's relatively easy. And same with the Baltic, which is why they went for NATO.

Well this has been silly useless fun, BFC did warn you so....send us a postcard.

What utter total Tosh. Again, yet again it's trotted out as a rationale for why Russia is "justifiably" aggressive. See look at a map, look at the territory of NATO expanding inexorably eastward! What Russian leader wouldn't feel nervous and push back? All that blue! All that does is throw Eastern Europe to the Russian bear - "Good luck, hope not too many of you die! Surrender quickly, that'll help." And, as always - All those countries asked to join, and the ones that didn't got invaded by NA- wait no. By Russia. Your logic is ***-backward, literally. CEE countries applied to NATO out of fear of being invaded and everything since has Proven. Them. Right.

I'm curious about UKR command in the Donbass. There were already indications of command conflict ref Soledar, and now I've seen other rumors ref Bakhmut. Is Syrrsky the overall eastern/Donbass front commander? If not, who is? He already stepped in at Soledar,and he's no fool, so I wonder if it's quality of leadership or personality clashes that is the issue. My impression is that Fractured leadership is extremely dangerous in a defensive force, it opens cracks and delays responses, where as Attacking forces can mask the issues through sheer momentum and pressure.

So if I disagree with your above post, pointing out the obvious mistakes with links, I'll be a Putin shill?

It's a third party observation, based on interpretation of historical facts. His conclusion was that Russian forces have historically shown some serious resilience in the face of pretty crazy situations. He's not wrong, based on any cursory read of Barbarossa. Seriously, take a chill pill.

Did someone say... Balllooonnnnn? Muahahhahahaha...

Next gen gripen

It's very bad for the front line. Christ, what a post-truth shill he is. But, Yknow, he's probably putting pressure on the Pentagon to buy Starlink off him, or at least fund it. And he'll breezily do that bargaining with the lives of ZSU soldiers, the limbs of their children and the shattered husks of their cities as his coinage.

Well... Poland, right? Government stayed in existence, maintained polish military formations and even returned. But this is sliding rapidly off topic

Welcome @Sekai!

Seems excessive, Tbh...

Yeah, NATO membership is the true strategic win for Ukraine, without a doubt. @JonS well, cutting off does not imply surrender. I highly doubt Russian forces cut off between Melitopol and Crimea wouldn't fight like demons, for a good while at least. Yes there would be a lot of POWs but that's the point - capture is as good as a kill. UKR can release back into Russia once the war is over. Rebuild all they want, but Ukraine will be in NATO.

This touches on my final thought, as it describes the fundamental strategic advantage of the RA - it can "hide" behind its borders. The ZSU will never defeat the RA as an aggressor force, as the Russians can continuously and without harassment rebuild and reinforce from the safety of their own lands. This was the true advantage of the NVA in Vietnam and the US's only option without ground forces invading the north was strategic bombing, which failed. Ukraine faces the same situation, but there is a possible solution - prevent withdrawal. If the ZSU can cut off very large chunk(s) of the invading force from retreat to the border then it can destroy such quantities of RA units that force a strategic, national crisis - vice, failure of the actual invasion, abrupt loss of strategically significant quantities of men & material, political leadership loss of internal credibility and social loss of support to the regime. There is really only one place this cut off can happen: the Zaporizhia - Azov coast axis. So my thesis is this: It's not enough for the ZSU to keep killing Russians. They must cut off as many Russians as possible from Russia proper.

Correct, my threshold for a RA collapse is a strategic level situation, as I view it as more than the force currently engaged, I view it as a strategic entity that must suffer strategic level effects for its nature and form to begin disintegration. In theory, a strategic situation rarely pops into being (eg Nukes v Japan suddenly presented an entirely strategic problem with no possible operational response) so they are born of cumulative operational level events. We can dicker around about the major four defeats RUS suffered (eg I view Kyiv as a precipitious retreat) but you have not answered my main point: Much as Russia suffered various heavy defeats and operational collapses, the force as a whole remained cohesive, maintained enough discipline and logistical structure to shift its CoG and attempt an even heavier assault from the east. It remained integrated as an institution and supplier of violence. Each of the defeats last year, while leading logically one to the other, were unable to compound their effects into a general defeat of the invasion as a whole. The geographic separation of the initial invasion axis had a silver lining for the RUS, as defeat in Kyiv did not entail defeat in the Donbas or Kherson. To effect RA collapse will take far more than a bad defeat after bad defeat, if they are separated in their effects on time and space. That happened last year and sure, mobiks/less armor etc so maybe this time around... But... Not really? Ukraine has been killing a LOT of Russians for over a year and while there are small instances of discipline failure the Russian Army as a whole remains extant, intact, organised, directed and supplied. I don't see anything UKR can do that will affect that at a strategic level and duration to cause strategic collapse. They could effect major, reinforcing operational defeats, but they would need to happen very vlose together and entail far more than just ground victories. I've a further thought but kids, bath etc

Nah, Ben Hodges suggested it several months ago.

You have greater faith than I in the effects of HIMARS on the average Ivan. They seem to have adjusted so far. And a large operational defeat with bad strategic implications is exactly what I'm describing as needed for RA collapse.

You're playing fast and loose with the word "Collapse" , my friend! You've identified Russian Army collapse as a precursor to internal domestic chaos, and I agree. But at no point in 2022 was the Russian Army tm, as a theatre fighting force, in danger of operatipnal-level collapse. It suffered defeats because of local collapses but none of those threatened the overall operational force in themselves. Kyiv was a bad tactical, operational and strategic defeat - but the Donbass forces were not threatened and became the core of the next stage. The Sumy defeat was a domino from Kyiv, becoming pointless after the northern retreat. Kharkiv was very damaging to the northern flank of the Donbass attack but even then we suspected (and its patently clear now) UKR was never going to exploit past local theatre success. Taking Luhansk was simply out of reach of the ZSU's then-capabilities. The Kherson defeat was managed relatively well and while a bad PR moment served to stabilize the whole front, and again, the rest of the line was not in threat. Each time there has been a local defeat the rest of the operation has been fairly untouched and could hold its part while adjustments were made. None of the defeats compounded their effects across the force in general. There doesn't seem to be anything in 2023 that will break that process, except for UKR launching a massive, multi axis assault with compounding effects throughout the entire expeditionary force. Otherwise the Ivan will just suffer local defeats, absorb the damage, adjust and reconstitute and still be there next spring, ready to go once more. Your required collapse requires more than the ZSU can do this year. Can you be more descriptive of what you think the ZSU can do?

What's the major work? Hull modifications?