Jump to content

Kinophile

Members
  • Posts

    4,359
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    22

Everything posted by Kinophile

  1. Gru is MoD intelligence. I highly doubt Prigster is subordinate / pushed by Gerasimov. He's more closely aligned to FSB / Siloviki
  2. In English that would be more a "Praetorian" or "Palace" unit, although Tbh that applies more within particular form of Government (eg autocratic or monarchial). Praetorian is more specifically the unit that protects the personage of the top level leadership, ie the leader and cabinet and their immediate buildings. A Palace unit would protect the physical Government (Palace, Duma, MoD, etc) and by extension the capital city. In the US, the capital is protected by the Capitol police, who are straight police, non paramilitary (nothing heavier than a few MRAPs). Perhaps our US friends can explain why it's a Capitol and not Capital...! The Government in person is protected by the Secret Service, who would be Praetorian (to me). I don't think there's a special military unit designated as a "Palace" protector. It's why on Jan 6 the DC Police asked for the National Guard, from Maryland, essentially inviting the armed forces into the seat of government. That separation is overt and deliberate, in contrast to Russia where the Kremlin is a military-political installation protected by both the MoD and the FSB, elbow to elbow,nose to nose. The King of England (wierd writing that) has a Palace guard, which would be Palace in nature if not on paper (no power but still head of state).
  3. Yah, Mizokami is a pretty run of the mill defense mouth, but the accounts here don't match his style. Weight of evidence and all that. I do hope it's true, but I wont lose any sleep if it's not.
  4. Sure, but that's still just opinion (not dissing you, just noting). Just be clear, I'm not "defending" the guy as such. I'm just more convinced that yourself in the balance of my read of his posts. There's a lot if sensible reasons for various things, details that match externalities and no internal inconsistencies. There's also none of the common failing of liars for attention, in that they cannot help themselves from increasing the drama and "interest" of what they're supposedly doing. Lies beget lies, they stack up and become ridiculous, especially if the liars feel they're (1) getting noticed or (2) not getting noticed. They can't help themselves. So either the guy is an incredibly disciplined attention-whore... or he's not lying. This guys accounts shows none of that trend, and he's been up for almost a year. The stuff is very dry and analytical. Ref photos I believe he (I'm just assuming a singular make for ease) is very conscious of digital opsec, very wary of meta data leakage and while he does take photos won't post them for that reason. IIRC at the start of the blog(which is posted by someone else) he would write out his notes, photo them, strip meta data and then post. Now he dektes his FB messages immediately.
  5. Maybe. The blogger isn't pushing anything, barely mentions subscribing and doesn't push on any other platforms (that I can find). "he" could also be a skillful composite of two people. His op descriptions are consistent, in themselves don't seem to have drawn disbelief from other Mil and seem regularly appropriate to the unit he describes - special forces battlefield recon and surveillance. His ops also track and echo local events without (obvious) plagiarism or inspiration. There's no vain glorious bs, he's pretty straightforward. He notes his limitations and is in a unit that matches his supposed experience and physicality, a relatively slow moving recon unit, with short bursts of intense activity, not an urban assault group. Another note for me is that my own father has been hillwalking, mountain walking, farming and sailing all his life. He's strong as an ox, has a very strong heart, breezed through bowel cancer (caught it very early) and is 73. He could walk the legs off me and I'm no slouch. He's sharp as a tack, watches his weight and eats healthily. The only issue is his hearing, damaged from daily exposure to loud milking machines as a dairy farmer. I doubt he's the only 70+ who's this active. An ex mill guy, watching his body since early 20s, could easily match my Da. Finally, there's a recent video interview on Twitter with a 70 UKR grandad, mortar op but also fought in the trenches. Essentially, it's possible and probable, for me, from a physical aspect, that a 70 yr life long soldier could do what he describes, if he takes care of himself, paces himself and matches an appropriate unit. The real test will be if he can be located to that Peshmerga unit he's mentioned before. If that proves out then man, he's a winner.
  6. Seneka unit says they observed the full process. This is a cut down, but no real reason for them to make something up. It could be a UKR soldier they've grabbed but then Seneka would say that, to rouse anger. My money is on battle freaked zeks finally snapping on the man driving them forward.
  7. I dunno, those don't look like shovels. The Lt probably got a bit mouthy and demanding. Anyway, one less "officer" to send men to pointless deaths and kill or maim yet more Ukrainians. Plus, once Wagner sees the video they'll find those guys and execute them. A problem solving itself. Good riddance to the lot of em.
  8. And it's also equivalently possible that they haven't learned a thing - that they're only attacking in less places due to less resources and not out of any deeper insight. If those resources increase then they might instinctively widen and increase their assault profile. This could happen mid-offensive - they start having some success, resources are increasing so they start to strike other objectives but at the cost of losing pressure on the initial primary targets or process. It wouldn't be the first time, and they're susceptible to opportunism. I don't think it's safe to conclude anything like Russia is unable to attack because it can't. You're negating the possibility of a good decision on their end, which feels dangerous. One thing I'm very wary of is assuming that their current attack format (infantry/arty centric) is how they're going to fight for the rest of the year, or even the rest of this burgeoning offensive. There's clear indications over the last 3 months that they've been holding back certain quantities of personnel and vehicles. Possibly arty ammo also. This could be basic sensible reserve building (to counter a UKR offensive), simple reconstitution of shattered units (we know of VDV being restocked and thrown back into Kremina - but not all the VDV from Kherson) and/or the building of an offensive reserve to reinforce local success and amplify exploitation. Once they achieve certain tactical opportunities they could start to incorporate those rebuilt forces and shift the nature of their assaults to more mechanized profile. If UKR defense is set for optimal effect against infabtry/arty assault (due to necessity over the last few months) then an abrupt shift at a tactical level to massed mech assault could create local successes that the UKR defenders might initially struggle to contain, due to that posture. Operational the ZSU would adapt but still, they'd be in the back foot and under increasing pressure.
  9. Not necessarily, this seems a bit of a confirmation bias conclusion. We've all noted that the Donbas push was a microcosm of the SMO - too much expected, too many attack points, too few forces to achieve the first two points. This push now doesn't have to mean that they're again trying to do too much with too little. If anything, with close to 500,000 personnel to draw on and a more focussed and simpler objective set, they are now trying to achieve something relatively realistic, in a reasonable amount of attack axis, with relatively reasonable size forces. Im not RUS STRONK UKR DOOMED. But purely objectively, this is not a simple repeat. This is different, and we'd do well to identify and isolate what makes it so.
  10. Does this mean... The balloon has gone up? . ...
  11. Yah but that's intentional, it's their business model. This is a product of circumstances to a large degree, both military (need stuff now) and political (who's running this Tijuana girl and pony show? Oh yes, all of us - simultaneously ). It's symptomatic of the diplomatic messiness that has flourished in the absence of unified EU leadership.
  12. Just ref corruption in Ukraine, its good to see movement. Pushing the civilian sector to better honesty and transparency directly aids the War effort.
  13. Man, the West support has gotten a bit incoherent. What a dogs breakfast of different platforms and logistics trains. I'm sure the UKR MoD are like "Well, thanks... But Uhh can we just stick to maybe 4 platforms...?" It's like a burger restaurant ordering beef and potatoes - and yes, getting some burgers and and few potatoes but also perfectly prepared sushi, a plate of spaghetti bolognese, 120 fresh made baguettes, two gallons of lobster bisk, 17 cans of Red Sea caviar, a truck tire, eight packs of pork chops, some yogurts, half a cake of tiramisu, some left over pizza and three-wheeled van emblazoned with Trotter Independent Traders. I mean, wtf.
  14. Exactly what I'm thinking for operational level actions, writ large.
  15. Supposedly not "just" ODS versions, further upgraded but not quite current Army either.
  16. Now we're back on track! I'm curious, what sort of current fires could achieve this? HIMARS is effective but RUS has adapted. When you say concerted what are you envisioning? Finally... Where? I'm personally all for cutting the land corridor east of Melitopol, then lacerating the Crimea logistics network west of it. But I'm not sure existing UKR force can do that yet.
  17. Info dumps of US legislative process... Maybe a link next time, with the bolded part quoted out? For some reason for me your copy paste comes out as oversized text...
  18. If there's one service that has consistently trumpeted harder than anyone about imminent war (with the bogeyman of the day), it's the USAF. In a way its quite rational - keep the civvies focused and aware, as losing the air war is the death of US military strategy. But a blow hard, Romperstomper Air General is a very limited view and mindset. He's a "hard charger", which is fine, good to have. But his analysis will always be subject to his emotions.
  19. The only way Ukraine can win is to hit the Ivan at the operational level. Ukraine has no strategic options to defeat Russia, and at a tactical level its own forces are still too similar to Russia's to give it any major or lasting advantage. True NATOization across the board is a year+ away, at best. That leaves operational, which is logistics, which has proven to be Russia's most consistent weak point, and can be amplified by major C2 decap. Ukraine cannot undertake any major offensive without a major forming process beforehand. That process cannot be countered or stalled before or during the assault. The HIMARS effect at this point has run its course, the Ivan has adapted and is surviving and solidifying. If/when Ukraine implements a new operational level effector (or better, a system of effectors) it will need to work for several months, throwing up whatever possible responses/defences RUS might have or develop. Once those have been proven useless or defeatable, then can an offensive begin. Ref system, RUS has proven it can adapt - slowly, costly adaptation but the end result is the same. But a system of different platforms, hitting Russian forces on perpendicular operational tangents would amplify effects and outcomes, and make adaptation much slower and more difficult. Into that carved out space in Russia's operational adaptability is where the assault should cut. My gut says logistics, which for Russia is railways. As for systems, I think an operational size bubble of air dominance is a good start. Cram a lot of AD into a certain region and use it to fend off RUS Air. Use those forced openings to rapidly attrit the regional RUS logistics. Interplay Air strikes with HIMARS, HIMARS 2.0, etc and really go full pyscho on their C2 hierarchy, from Col upwards. Erode a whole section of the Russian logistics zone, front to back, and its C2 from top to bottom. Initiate this when Russia has already launched its own offensive and is too commited on forces and logistics formatting to pivot quickly enough. Hit the right place and UKR can both cut out a section and undercut the Russian attack elsewhere. Essentially, let Russia commit to an attack then crunch its logistics in an area that it cannot easily cover, but is vital to the attack. Weather Ukraine can do this with its current force format and posture us another question...
  20. That one, very lucky one thing. But, he did. So, much as I despise him, I must admit he stepped up where so many did not, and stayed consistent. Fair ****s to him.
  21. this video is ridiculous - no one watches a commercial past 60s! Silly Ivans.
  22. Relevant here as supposedly the factories/workshops provided Drones to Russia.
×
×
  • Create New...