Kinophile

https://kyivindependent.com/germany-delivers-patriot-air-defense-system-to-ukraine/ That's one. There's another to come, correct?

Kinda what I mean. There's "vdv" units in the flanks, I believe, but they are no longer the sorta elite units they were and are much more Mobiks than vdv.

Really sounds like the Ivan is going all in. They smell victory. That's ok, because they're now burning through the VDV-alt troops.

Lots of good ground stuff, but man, the UAF is lagging behind. I'd suspect Zaluzhni is waiting for the Patriots to be up and running before he attempts anything.

Exactly. Putin needs a counter to every major player. Another thing I keep in mind is that Putin operates in a very filtered world. Prig was able to yell about capturing the admin building in Bahkmut, with photos of flags and guys standing in the ruins. MoD had nothing comparable. My bet is that photos and looking at a map carry a lot of weight with an OG like Putin. Actually military analysis and understanding the tactical context is not something he does. So Priggy Boi had something "concrete" to point to, but Gerasimov had Vuhledar hanging around his neck. One guy can squawk about "success" while the other can only keep shtumm.

Yah that's what I read yesterday. One tank drove onto another. Holy crap the crew in the victim tank must have completely brownied their shorts, lol

I seem to remember a whole posse of posters saying Prig was a gonner, stick a fork in 'em and flip him over, he's done... Just teasing, the Prig deserves a long painful death. But a cunning little **** like him doesn't get to where he is and get taken down by the Russian MoD, of all people.

"Do You not believe in the existence of Paint?"

I've vacillitated between weather UKR can/should take Crimea. Generally I've been of the mind that Ukraine must take it, but the operation, now or in a year, could break the back of the war effort. But the longer it's left there untouched the tougher it gets to crack. So UKR should take Crimea, but I'm doubtful it can. The lack of even air parity is a critical failing and until the PSU can give the Ivan a rough handling over and on Crimea then a land assault is just suicidal. There's an issue with a corrosion campaign, that being the sheer, open flat distance from Perekop to Sevastopol. You could degrade the city and port to rubble, take out the local AA/AD but you still need to cross that gigantic firing range. The ultimate prerequisite to Crimea is destroying the Kerch bridge, then achieving air dominance. It will take a minimum of a year for the PSU to get to parity of local effects. Do Crimea, for all the talk, is about two years away, barring a full on RUS land forces collapse. Pushing to Crimea won't do much, strategically. Better to cut the land corridor between Crimea and Donbass, in a place far enough that Crimea won't suck attention and resources. This suggests Melitopol is the furthest West the ZSU should go.

https://www.molfar.global/en-blog/electronic-warfare-equipment-of-russian-occupiers @Haiduk aleady posted the graph

https://www.wired.com/story/fast-forward-ukraines-quest-for-homegrown-ai-drones-to-take-on-russia/

Quite

The Kremlin certainly thinks so

WTH is that t62? with the crosses? From BBCs page here.

Nah, I'm still not convinced. Bottle up Crimea creates a "situation", not a media win. No one in the general public knows or cares about Melitopol. It's a purely military objective. Western People hear "Melitopol" and they say, "oh, that horrible theatre bombing* and Ukraine says, " nono that's Mariupol", and then Western pundits will say: Zelensky, and the Ukrainian war effort, needs a clear, easily messaged and instantly understood geopolitical & moral win that they can use to shore up Western support and, ideally, beat Putin over the head with. Bottling Crimea and putting Melitopol (no, not Mariupol) under a logistics interdiction campaign does not fit that nominal criteria. It's too vague, there's no immediate emotive effect and it takes too long to explain. Thinking that the 2023 ZSU offensive(s) will be purely military in nature is a fallacy, I personally believe.

Melitopol has had partisan activity since it fell, no? Despite multiple sweeps increasingly severe repression the activity has continued. This implies a fundamental and widespread resistance no matter what the occupiers do, and suggests that a reinforced, well lead, sustained and timed surge in partisan activity could amplify local ZSU successes. Reviewing the Resistance prep for the Normandy lanndings would be a good example. That wasn't classic partisan though. They fought a traditional urban fight with very army-like force structure. This is true, and idea's fatal weakness Tbh. A weak point in your suggestion is still that there's no simple, clear geopolitical "Win" for Zelensky to point to and, critically, use to shore up Western support for 2024. An operation that doesn't give that, no matter how militarily effective, will be a geopolitical waste. Mariupol, though, would do a LOT to remind the West of Why They Fight. Can you imagine the power of a Zekensky visit to the Mariupol theater? That horrific event probably did more to active western support than anything else. [battlefront.com fixed editing problems]

True. Yes, but that's my earlier point above - the objectives taken/secured were clear and easy to explain. Bahkmut was always a hard one to explain, other than Dont Give Them An Inch for free. Plus Bahkmut ground on and on. Kherson really seemed to be outlasting its initial welcome by the end. Bottling up Crimea is all well and good and very sound militarily but its not a definitive, simple-to-grasp achievement for Zelenksy to point to. To be clear, you're saying tie off Crimea from the northern land end, (opposite perekop and Syvash), clear out the land between that and Melitopol and ideally isolate/choke off Melitopol, without a direct assault? Yes youre beating up a bunch of Russian forces, but they're nothing critical. The real teeth are in the center of the front and they'll be untouched. If they reinforce Melitopol or extend its defenses then ZSU has a real problem. For Crimea to be cut off, the ZSU also also needs to cut down between Melitopol and Mariupol.

I'm very curious how the Russian/Wagner forces would manage if suddenly thrown on the defensive. They are heavily formatted to offense, they don't seem to have deep logistical sustainment capacity and they are not well lead except at the bleeding edge. Is a ZSU counter offensive between SiversDonetsk and Donetsk proper feasible? The attack wouldn't have a definitive geographic object other than cutting GLOCS N/S, would be punching directly into the maw of the bear and pushes RUS forces back onto existing LOCS and bases, helping them strengthen their defense as they fall back. So not great. But they would be able to inderdict GLOCS of both Donetsk and Luhansk... If the ZSUs 2023 strategic objective is gutting the fighting heart of the Russian expeditionary army, then destroying the forces between Severodonetsk & Donetsk would achieve that. The cost could be very high but as Perun says, Russian trend line go down right now, whereas ZSU is very much trend line go up. Trashing a bunch of Mobiks and tier 2 units around Melitopol gives the ZSU more territory to defend, leaves the higher quality core of the Russian army in Ukraine still intact and creates Melitopol as an unresolved operational problem. Two very significant results of the Kharkiv and Kherson operations is that they solved their generating geographic problems - Kherson fell, giving Ukraine the Dnepr and Kharkiv was secured, blockading Russia back into the Donbass. Attacking South but not taking Melitopol doesn't solve a particular geographic objective. It enhances the damage ZSU can do to Russian logistics (absolutely not to be sneezed at) but leaves the AFRF intact, gives the ZSU a lot more territory to defend, clean up and watch and burdens Ukraine with the additional population support. Basically I suspect that reconquering territory is actually not in Ukraines long term interest - as Steve himself said several times before, the ZSU needs to kill as many of the right Russians as possible. Im not convinced that will be done in a limited land grab operation around Melitopol.

600 seems unlikely. That would definitely have popped up clear on a lot of peoples radars.

But no. Boris Johnson Still, seems the RUS weren't fully BS...

@Battlefront.com What do you (and others of course) think of ZSUs chances at taking Melitopol? You've outlined essentially creating it into a Kherson - almost cut off, almost isolated, with a nice attractive Golden Bridge for the Ivan to exit out eastwards. Is Melitopol worth a direct assault "off the March"? Does the ZSU have the forces? Would a siege/is landing of the city become a thorn in the Offensive, tying down a lot of needed units?

Yah, I loved the last paragraph : "The Russians clean out the prisons, form companies and battalions, stick a few rifles in the hands of the prisoners and march them off to the attack. They take unbelievable losses -- maybe they achieve something and maybe they don'tbut in either case the Russians say to themselves "Well, at least we are rid of our criminals." ...