The_MonkeyKing
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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing
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Seems the equipment was lost to Russian territory (at least for the duration of the photo op).
To me, this makes it less likely any neighboring breaches were successful and the equipment would have been left under Ukrainian control to recover later on.
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14 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
No, recon should be doing their job and finding the minefield edges (hell they have multi-spectral cameras) and then a breaching operation is designed to:
1. Establish a Force in Place on the friendly side to establish fire and overmatch. In this day and age we would be talking UAS and deep fire support
2. Breaching teams - so explosive line charges. Lengths vary but hundreds of meters.
3. Bridge head force - to secure far side
4. Break out force - to break out.
5. In place and trafficking force to stay on the obstacle to keep it open for follow on ech.
The KA -52 is an AD problem that should be sorted before on tries to breach.
Cannot solve the helicopter problem within contested or mutually denied airspace.
Those things scoot and fire >10km away from "hull down" positions.
This is one way NATO would have handled large Soviet formations with extensive AA.
Fortunately these are not even close to the threat and volume of us army rotatory wing.
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38 minutes ago, danfrodo said:
So clearly the losing of some vehicles is the end of world. Or it is not. Or maybe.
The question is what is currently being gained by the men & equipment all over the various axes of attack. How much of RU arty stockpile has been used up and how much of it hit by CB? How much of RU strength was in the first lines of defense that have been breached? How's morale farther back? How much are the remaining lines mined & manned?
How that helicopters are causing damage, will UKR be able to get more AD in the fight when & where it's needed?
Now close are UKR forces to being able to unhinge sections of RU defenses w/o fighting for them -- meaning flanking RU forces such that they retreat on their own (as mentioned above by Steve).
DAN/CA -- I was also thinking of EL Alamein for these operations. Knowing germans were in a world of scarcity, Monty (who I generally dislike) calculated that if he kept pushing they would break. Took 10 days + a major change in plan (moving mobile forces to the north end of line) but once broken the germans were disasterously unhinged.
And what happens if UKR just reaches Tokmak -- the east-west rail line is thereby cut. Very very serious for RU forces to the west of there.
I don't think people are shocked of the losses, but the way those losses happened.
The biggest unknowns where how these yet to meet forces would perform. Yearly indicators now point to somewhat competent Russians and struggling Ukrainians.
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27 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
I think we can all agree with that statement. Here is what I see from the evidence and discussion here:
1. Two deminers (Leopard and BMR-2) led the way for a large column of (mostly) Bradleys.
2. Sensibly, two deminers were used along the same path so as to reduce the chance of leaving an intact mine in the path.
3. At some point the column was taken under directed fire. It would appear a Bradley was destroyed by a Russian ATGM from an attack helicopter from perhaps 10km away (as predicted here).
4. General confusion, artillery, other ATGM strikes... I don't know what... happened and the column decided to retreat.
5. The Leopard dropped its plow and wound up backing up into an already destroyed Bradley. It either became stuck or was hit or something, but the crew abandoned it.
6. With the path blocked by destroyed/disabled vehicles, some of the Brads turned around and tried to go around the blockage. In doing so they drove into uncleared fields, taking their chances of hitting a mine vs. being hit standing still.
7. Unfortunately, this was a very dense minefield and lots more were disabled due to mines, though we have no idea what other fires were going on at the time so it's unclear if this is the only thing that took out additional Brads.
8. The ramps are down on most of the Brads, indicating that the dismounts managed to get out. I did not see any bodies scattered around, which seems to indicate that mines were the primary cause or destruction and not artillery or ATGMs.
It's easy to armchair general this thing to death, but I think it is OK to conclude that this was a flawed plan that the Russians were able to exploit.
I see the primary flaw being that there was a single safe path for at least 8x Bradleys. Someone should have asked the question "what happens if we come under fire and one or more vehicles are disabled? How do we maneuver out of a kill sack in the middle of a minefield?" If someone had asked this question then the answer should have been "we take catastrophic losses for no gain". That should have prompted a reassessment of the wisdom of conducting the attack in this way.
I do not understand why the paths weren't plowed while the Brads waited. If the mine clearers came under directed fire they had more of a chance of escaping without a bunch of Brads blocking their way. And if they were lost in the effort, it would be just them instead of them AND 2x Platoon's worth of IFVs.
The narrative is still confused and the context very fuzzy still (we have other Leos and Brads near treelines. Was this the same action and took place before this? I think so). However, this was a botched attack that gives the Russians a major propaganda win. Not that I think propaganda victories win wars, but it sure doesn't help Ukraine to have this out there right now.
Steve
One Finnish officer's speculation:
"Well, those 3 Bradleys have driven into the minefield without clearance help. Later, a trench was cleared for that mine band that was detected in this way with a clearing wagon, but the opening was affected by artillery or PST and the opening was blocked by damaging/destroying the other two wagons"
source: https://twitter.com/MMaenpaa1/status/1667161427059130372
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15 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Well that is what a minefield breaching operation going very wrong looks like.
Before everyone freaks out the vehicles that kept pushing are supposed to do that. Backing out is just asking to die and impossible to do in column, he saw the RA prove this over and over again. If your breaching vehicle takes a hit - and that appears to be the Leo, you keep pushing even if it means taking casualties. We would do the exact same thing. I mean what are the options? Stop, wait for help or talk things over while the enemy kills you inside a minefield? Back out along the one cleared path…while the enemy kills you in a minefield? Nope you push. Difference between the UA and the RA is that the Leo has a mine plow on the front (which is odd, that is the deep end of clearance, they should be sticking with rollers). The RA was just straight pushing.
Interesting perspective. Quite a contrarian opinion to many, for example, Finnish officer commentators.
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5 minutes ago, Kraft said:
I specifially mentioned, i know losses are invitable, what im talking about is vuhledar style attacks, that achieve nothing but kill crews.
Driving over it the first time, ok, a 2nd time? Right next to the other killed vehicles? People had a good laugh when Russia did it now this falls under a normal, expected per the book military command?
Inb4: i know its not the whole front.. - but does that excuse this?
Exactly. Losses are expected.
These sort of losses should never happen
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This is not looking good at all. In any way.
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but still I am worried
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44 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:
This (second video) looks like a KA-52 hit on a Bradley. Note that the vehicle fires an ATGM just before it is hit.
Napkin math says the missile was launched over >10km away. Not much to do than take the hit while in contested airspace and on the offensive in that terrain.
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4 hours ago, DesertFox said:
This guy aint be getting much sleep the next days. Thats for sure.
This geoconfirmed map is quite good. Large volume of timestamped and linked footage geolocated
https://geoconfirmed.org/ukraine
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My summary of some more interesting points of the episode:
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We are now beyond shaping operations or probes. This is the main operation, but the main effort is still unknown.
- We are seeing multiple brigade lever operations in the south
- Operations are likely to develop over weeks or even months
- We are seeing some of the main new formations being committed
- Directions other than the south are likely just being conducted by local formations and so are unlikely to amount to much in the big picture.
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The "land bridge" connecting Crimea to Russia is not as important as often talked about. Especially in terms of military operations.
- Most forces resupplied directly from Russia or Crimea. There is not a lot of traffic across this "land bridge".
- We must remember there was 2014-2017 when Russia had Ukraine and didn't have the Bridge yet.
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Long-range fires (storm shadow)
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It remains to be seen what is the actual impact of this capability.
- With some time we are going to be getting an answer on how much giving the ATACMS would have had or not had effect.
- The problem is not comparable to just giving Ukraine a "longer stick" as often stated.
- Russia has done a lot more than just move its stockpiles and CC out of the GMLRS range. Russia is hardening potential targets and decentralization its systems.
- Already clear we are not seeing the "HIMARS effect" from last year. Meaning huge stockpile explosions.
- The effect of longer-range fires is likely going to be lots of downstream effects. Like Russia being unable to mass fires like it has before.
- GLSDB ammo combined with Ukraine reaching Crimea will be interesting
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It remains to be seen what is the actual impact of this capability.
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Mike is more optimistic than before for Ukrainian success
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Russia again has a chronic manpower problem
- The only fix, mobilization seems to be politically off the table.
- Russia suffered big losses in the winter
- Ukraine has waited for more equipment, training, and weather and rushed things too soon.
- Ukraine has gotten new capabilities as well
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Russia again has a chronic manpower problem
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We are now beyond shaping operations or probes. This is the main operation, but the main effort is still unknown.
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7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
I have been pulled away and will be for the next couple weeks but if anyone can take a hard look at these videos (and there will be more), keep an eye out, and look closely for RA indirect and direct fires. From what I can see, this minefield was not being covered by RA fires (but I could be wrong, there could be ATGM and PGM). Minefields not effectively covered by fire are actually good news on the larger picture because it means the defender does not have enough troop density to do it, and cannot react fast enough for counter actions.
Again, it is not just about what is there, it is also about what is not there but should be.
I have noted the same.
Footage coming out from Russians this week has mostly been Ukrainian troops driving to mines under sparse indirect fire.
Same case for most footage coming from Ukrainian offensives around Bakhmut in the recent weeks. No significant indirect fires.
Also, analysts from War on the Rocks and ISW say most defensive positions are covered by 120mm mortar fires. Bigger guns are in reserves.
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Just now, hcrof said:
Painful to watch, but hopefully an mrap will mean the passengers and crew are all ok. I would certainly rather be riding in a maxpro than a BMP over a potential minefield!
Difficult situation for a Ukrainian force. It is probably a light infantry force equipped only with MRAP vehicles, lacking any demining capacity not to even mention protected mobile demining capacity. Lack of skills and experience in offensive operations makes the situation even worse.
Then this force is given an attack mission in that terrain against fortified positions.
An offensive operation like this from the western respective should never be conducted with that force.
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Ukrainians seem to be as eager to drive into mines as were the Russians in the winter.
Yes I know, all the regular caveats apply, but still hurts my hopium-filled brain to see this from the Ukrainians.
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1 minute ago, dan/california said:
You sir, are simply brilliant! The protected zone must of course include the nuclear plant.
The video is was probably taken by the guy who set off the charges. Can he go to the Haugue for that?
For the aid mission "intervention" it is also irrelevant who or what blew the dam.
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Time to start a humanitarian aid operation secured by a significant military operation. Park US Navy offshore and secure the airspace.
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Interview with former CIA Intelligence Officer Marc Polymeropoulos, some interesting points on the US support especially. An extremely frustrating situation for him.
AI-generated summary:
Key insights
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"The Russians...have been managed to do is bleed...in a staggering...military operation." - The Ukrainians have been successful in bleeding the Russians in a military operation, despite initial skepticism about their strategy.
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The U.S intelligence community assesses that the Russians have lost a total of a hundred thousand casualties, which is an order of magnitude not seen since the fight in the Pacific.
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The loss of Wagner Fighters is a catastrophic loss for the Russian side in Ukraine, and bleeding the Russians dry is the strategy for the Ukrainians to mount their own counteroffensive.
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There are elements at the National Security Council level that don't want to give Ukraine the tools to completely defeat Russia, for fear of catastrophic collapse of the Russian military and potential use of tactical nukes or strategic weapons.
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The idea of keeping Putin in power for stability is crazy and immoral, even if some analysts compare it to keeping Saddam in power after the first Gulf War.
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The US government's aid to Ukraine is not just about supporting democracy, but also about protecting American interests in the region.
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The idea of giving just enough help to get to the negotiating table in Ukraine is immoral and frustrating for those on the ground who have lost loved ones.
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The decisions made at high levels of government have real consequences for the lives of people in Ukraine.
full summary with timestamps:
QuoteThe American media's coverage of the war in Ukraine is one-sided and lazy, and it is important to listen to the Ukrainian perspective in the conflict while balancing pragmatism and decency in creating effective policies.
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00:00
The American media's coverage of the war in Ukraine is one-sided and lazy, while the speaker emphasizes the importance of listening to the Ukrainian perspective in the conflict.
- Get 20% off a monthly or annual membership with the DSR Network in May, which includes an ad-free listening experience, exclusive bonus content, an evening members-only newsletter, and access to a members-only Slack community.
- Michael Weiss is joined by Mark Palmeropolis, a former CIA officer, to discuss the current state of US-Russia relations.
- The speaker and Mark discuss the Western pessimism towards Ukraine's chances of a successful counter-offensive, but the speaker disagrees based on conversations with Ukrainian officials.
- The American media's coverage of the war in Ukraine is lazy and one-sided due to their sources being in the U.S Administration, and a better approach would be to talk to people who have been to Ukraine and have firsthand knowledge of the situation.
- The American media provides a one-sided view based on the national security establishment's armchair analysis, while on-the-ground reporting from Ukraine offers a different perspective, highlighting the failure of the US national security media.
- The speaker emphasizes the importance of listening to the Ukrainian perspective in the conflict and highlights the success of their military strategy in bleeding the Russians.
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08:28 The Russians have suffered a significant loss of 100,000 casualties in their attempts to capture Bachman, with the Ukrainian estimation of Russia's capability differing from that of the Americans.
- The Russians have suffered a significant number of casualties in their attempts to capture Bachman, with the US intelligence community estimating a loss of 100,000 since December.
- The loss of Wagner Fighters in World War II is a catastrophic blow for the Russian side, and the Ukrainian estimation of Russia's capability differs from that of the Americans.
- The American commentariat is beginning to question whether they got it wrong and the Ukrainians got it right in their counter-offensive strategy, but leaked intelligence should be viewed as a snapshot in time and may not be as significant in the current situation.
- The speaker discusses how building relationships and trust with Ukraine through training and resources helped in the February 24th incident, highlighting the importance of putting in the "plumbing" for future success.
- The speaker believes that the Ukrainian military is more capable than given credit for and that US policymakers should prepare for the possibility of a catastrophic Russian collapse.
- The speaker expresses surprise at someone's satisfaction with Ramstein meetings and discusses various global concerns, including China's yeast schemes and Germany's attitude towards their past actions.
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16:08
The fear of a catastrophic collapse of the Russian military is preventing Ukraine from receiving the necessary tools to defeat Russia, but President Biden is making final decisions on providing weapons despite dissenting views within the NSC.
- There are elements at the National Security Council level and beyond that don't want to give Ukraine the tools to completely defeat Russia due to fear of a catastrophic collapse of the Russian military and potential repercussions in Moscow.
- Russia is still unpredictable and a black box, leading to paranoia and fear in policy, as we cannot predict the next sequence of events.
- Keeping Putin in power for stability is immoral and those advocating for it lack real world experience.
- President Biden makes final decisions on providing weapons to Ukraine despite dissenting views within the NSC.
- The Ukrainian government closely follows the domestic political scene in America and there are worries about some elements in the GOP particularly in the house, and the notion that the US will determine its support for Ukraine based on the success of their offensive is putting too much pressure on them.
- Lean into the difficulty and do more to support Ukraine in order to give them what they need to win.
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21:56
The fight against terrorism requires perseverance, while media attention can influence political action towards Ukraine, and the aid given to Ukraine needs to be compared to the wire-guided anti-tank missile.
- The offensive against terrorism will be bloody and difficult, but we must lean into it and not give up.
- Making noise in the media and complaining about the lack of action towards Ukraine can influence influential people in the Senate and House to take action.
- Comparison between the wire-guided anti-tank missile and the current aid given to Ukraine is significant.
- Giving just enough support to indigenous partners to get them to the negotiating table is immoral and frustrating for those on the ground who know it's not enough.
- A Human Rights Watch representative's explanation of US policy regarding the use of chemical weapons in Syria was met with disgust by a Syrian civilian who questioned why the US only cared about chemical weapons and not other forms of violence.
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26:27
American policy makers need to balance pragmatism and decency by combining the perspectives of both action-oriented individuals and academics to create effective policies.
- American policy making is dominated by Ivy League-educated individuals who view the world as a game of Risk and lack engagement with people on the ground, requiring a balance of pragmatism and decency.
- Combining the perspectives of both action-oriented individuals and academics is necessary for creating effective policies, as demonstrated by the former deputy director of the CIA.
- The speaker, who ran a paramilitary base in eastern Afghanistan, believes that if the US leaves Afghanistan, the country will not be stable despite all the efforts put in by the US and indigenous forces.
- American tentativeness towards Ukraine is due to the psychological effect of losing wars, causing a fear of victory, despite the fact that Ukraine's fight for liberation is not a war of choice and is supported by the majority of Ukrainians.
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29:37
Returning soldiers struggle to adjust to civilian life, decisions made at high levels of government affect real people, Ukrainian pilots can fly F-16s effectively in a short time, and journalists reporting from war zones have a similar experience to CIA case officers.
- Returning from a war zone to a mundane life in America can be difficult for soldiers who struggle to adjust to the stark contrast in environments.
- Real people's lives are gravely affected by decisions made at high levels of government, and while majoritarian influence can have an impact, there are other stakeholders involved and the price we're paying for our actions towards Ukraine is unclear.
- Assessments of Ukrainian pilots show they can fly F-16s effectively in as little as one month, despite claims it could take years, and Israeli airstrikes on Syria suggest Assad's air defense systems are not as formidable as claimed.
- Journalists reporting from war zones have a similar experience to CIA case officers in terms of meeting sources and witnessing horrific events, but it is against US law for journalists to work as cover for the agency.
- Martin and Clarissa Ward had a great discussion and both have served in the business, with Martin having reviewed her book.
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34:23 US journalists need to diversify their sources to avoid an echo chamber, while the US intelligence community is uncertain about the recent drone attack and Ukrainians have the capability to act in their own war.
- Journalists in the United States rely too much on U.S sources and administration, creating an echo chamber and a narrative that is not fact-based.
- It's important to recognize the limitations of personal experience and avoid tunnel vision and confirmation bias when consuming news.
- US intelligence community's confidence levels are not high enough to determine who is responsible for the recent drone attack, but they know something and authorized disclosures will be made if it is a false flag.
- Ukrainians have the capability to act in their own war, despite being warned not to by other countries.
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38:08
Former CIA officer and MSNBC contributor is back to promote their podcast.
- The speaker welcomes back a guest, compliments their haircut, introduces them as a former CIA officer and MSNBC contributor, and promotes their podcast.
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25 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Nice use of AI. What will you do with all your time freed up from manually summarizing Kofman's videos?
The overview was good, though not much jumped out at me. This one, though, did...
Interesting. Kofman is Ukrainian and speaks both Russian and Ukrainian languages. He's been to Ukraine more times than probably even he can count and I presume to Russia many times as well. He also gets paid to study this stuff on a full time basis, including access to information the general public would struggle to experience. And yet...
Steve
More time for me to play around with other AI tools...
The tool is great. Still doesn't match doing it partially manually and just AI-aided to raise points that are particularly interesting to this forum's audience and past discussions.
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and summarily brought to you by Eightify: Youtube Summary with ChatGPT
INSIGHTS:
Military Strategy and Tactics in the War in Ukraine-
There is still a tremendous amount we don't know about the war in Ukraine and we have to revise the story time and time again.
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The Russian military invasion of Ukraine was structured to marry up with an intelligence operation, drawing inspiration from historical Soviet operations and borrowing aspects from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, but ultimately failed due to incorrect assumptions and lack of preparation for sustained war.
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The Ukrainian military was more capable than the Russian forces given credit for and had a strong will to fight, with critical support from Ukrainian civil society and volunteers who stalled the Russian advance at critical points.
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Russian military pursues a war of attrition due to a deficit of manpower and a lack of good replacements for their initial losses, leveraging their advantage in firepower to bleed out Ukrainian forces.
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Despite exhaustion and casualties, Ukrainian forces have done well in stabilizing their lines and building out reserves, making the Russian military vulnerable heading into winter.
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The state of the war in Ukraine is at an inflection point, with wars proceeding in phases and having operational pauses.
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Despite the daunting task of facing Russian entrenchments and fortifications, the Russian military has created the best conditions for the Ukraine offensive.
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The Ukrainian military has taken significant losses and expanded their force mobilization, while the Russian military has taken even greater losses and also substantially refilled their force mobilization, leading to uncertainty about how these forces will match up in the upcoming fight.
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The biggest challenge in the war in Ukraine is not the current offensive, but what follows it, as history shows that conventional wars between states tend to last for several years.
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"Generally large conventional Wars. Like this can't be explained by any one small specific Factor."
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The definition of victory in the Ukrainian conflict is complex and goes beyond just territorial liberation, with the real war aims being to return to pre-2014 borders.
Political and Diplomatic Challenges in the War in Ukraine
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The challenge for the West is to determine which countries and political establishments are truly invested in attaining a military victory for Ukraine versus those who only support offensive operations for negotiation purposes.
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"We forget there's a whole other planet out there and actually most of the people live in the rest of that world and the rest of that world is actually very economically significant right and those people have views and we don't check in with them nearly as often as we should."
FULL TIMESTAMPED SUMMARY:QuoteThe Russian invasion of Ukraine was poorly planned and ultimately failed due to wrong assumptions and lack of preparedness, while Ukraine plans a major offensive operation with Western military assistance and the outcome remains uncertain.
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00:00 The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was poorly planned and unrealistic, with assumptions of little resistance and a quick decisive phase, ultimately failing due to wrong assumptions and lack of preparedness for sustained war.
- Michael Kaufman, director of the Russian studies program at the Center for Naval Analysis, will discuss the state of the war in Ukraine and how we got to this point.
- The initial Russian military operation in Ukraine was heavily premised on assumptions about the ease of a rapid regime change operation, rather than planning for a sizable Ukrainian military resistance.
- Ukraine is a large, industrialized country with a strong military that has undergone significant evolution since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the Russian invasion strategy relies heavily on intelligence operations and infiltrators.
- The Russian military invasion of Ukraine was structured to marry up with an intelligence operation, heavily influenced by historical Soviet and US campaigns, with assumptions of little resistance, a small force, and a quick decisive phase, but ultimately failed due to wrong assumptions, lack of preparedness for sustained war, and confusion among troops.
- The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was a poorly planned and unrealistic campaign that exposed weaknesses in the Russian military, while the Ukrainian military and civil society proved to be more capable and resilient than expected.
- The outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine was not predetermined and was a close run thing due to the lack of preparation and false sense of security on the Ukrainian side, with individual choices shaping the outcome.
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16:42
Ukrainian and Russian forces engage in a war of attrition, with Ukraine receiving Western military assistance and planning a major offensive operation.
- The Russian military focuses on a campaign in the northern part of Donbas to take key cities of Sylvan and chromatorsk, dividing the Ukrainian-held territory by a river.
- The Russian military pursues a war of attrition due to a deficit of manpower, while the Ukrainian military is mobilized and defended with Western intelligence and military assistance, eventually acquiring Highmark systems to degrade the Russian artillery advantage and turn the initiative to their side in August.
- Ukrainian forces conduct consecutive offensives, creating an opening in the Northeast region of Harkiv and advancing in the Southwest along the Nepro river, pressuring the Russian military to withdraw and consolidate their lines.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces entrench and mobilize in Ukraine, with a significant battle taking place in Bakmut, which becomes politically important despite its strategic insignificance.
- The battle for Bakmuc in Ukraine has resulted in significant losses for both sides, with the Russian military using Wagner forces primarily recruited from Russian prisons, and while the Ukrainian military has effectively defended most areas, Wagner has taken around 80-90% of the city and flanks, with the battle still ongoing.
- Ukraine and Western countries are planning a major offensive operation, with Ukraine setting aside a force of freshly mobilized troops equipped and trained by Western countries, and the United States providing significant artillery ammunition to help enable the operation despite the daunting task of facing Russian entrenchments and fortifications.
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30:18 The Ukrainian military plans a months-long offensive to break Russian lines, but the outcome and aftermath remain uncertain.
- The military has likely depleted their resources and morale, which is an important factor in offensive operations, but difficult to measure accurately.
- The Ukrainian military is planning a months-long operation to liberate territory and demonstrate their ability to break Russian lines, but both sides have undergone significant attrition and mobilization, making it difficult to predict the outcome of the upcoming fight.
- The biggest challenge is not what will happen in the offensive, but what will follow it, as history shows that conventional wars tend to be either short or last for several years, even if negotiations begin.
- The challenge for the West is that defeat for Russia is not the same as victory for Ukraine, and after this offensive operation, it will be revelatory to see which countries are truly invested in attaining a military victory for Ukraine versus those who invested in supporting the offensive operation for negotiations.
- The speaker invites questions on the topics discussed in the presentation.
- The Russian military and government have learned from their failure in the war with Ukraine, but there are differing opinions on the conclusions they may be drawing.
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39:48
Russia's military reform plan is unlikely to work
- Leaders tend to reason by historical analogy, but they often overlook the fact that great powers can lose wars too.
- The Russian military leadership is planning to reform the military in a Soviet direction with large formations and mobilization of old Soviet gear, but it is unlikely to work due to Russia's lack of resources and capacity to recreate the Soviet military.
- The assassination of a member of the Ukrainian peace delegation in March 2022 did not have a significant impact on the peace negotiations, as the Russian leadership lost leverage over Ukraine's political establishment and the public became aware of the atrocities committed by the Russian military.
- Russia's mobilization for war includes a broad age range of conscripts, with a focus on rural regions due to demographic distribution and political reasons.
- The challenge in following the Ukrainian conflict is that we know far less about Ukrainian forces than Russian forces due to operational security and the focus on studying adversaries rather than allies.
- Social media is not a reliable source for understanding the war in Ukraine due to missing observation problems and interpretation issues, and it is important to visit the country to gain a better understanding of the history, culture, and military tactics.
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57:12 Russia has not used nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine, but the collapse of their military could potentially lead to a debate on their use.
- The Russian military did not heavily focus on coup-proofing policies, but instead was concerned with potential subversion and restoring Soviet military structures.
- The problems with the Russian military establishment stem from the lack of punishment for incompetence and the replacement of competent individuals with loyal ones, leading to poor decision-making and ineffective strategies.
- The victory and defeat in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia are interrelated but not necessarily overlapping, and the deployment of tactical nukes by Russia would depend on the success of Ukraine's offensive and the thresholds crossed.
- Russia has not yet used nuclear weapons in the war with Ukraine due to conditions-based decision-making, uncertainty about the cost and consequences, and the belief that they are still winning the war.
- The collapse of the Russian military in Ukraine could potentially lead to a debate or presentation of using nuclear weapons as an alternative course of action, but it is uncertain if they would actually do it.
- Nuclear use is not inevitable, but ignoring the risks and utility of nuclear weapons is also not a good lesson to teach.
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01:07:36 Russia's goal in invading Ukraine was to install a friendly regime, occupy most of Ukraine, and destroy its sovereignty, while Wagner, a Russian private military company, competes with the Russian military causing infighting and a lack of coordination.
- Russia's strategic goals in invading Ukraine were to install a Russian-friendly regime, occupy most of Ukraine, potentially create a Union state between Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, and destroy Ukrainian sovereignty to make it a politically controlled dependency.
- Russian leadership's current objective is to control the territories they tried to annex in September and destroy Ukraine's viability as a state, and negotiations may lead to a rearman period and continuation of the war.
- Wagner, a force composed of experienced soldiers with a different military culture from the regular Russian military, has become heavily dependent on mobilized personnel from occupied regions in Ukraine and has been working alongside the Russian airborne in the war, particularly in fighting around bahut.
- Wagner, a Russian private military company, competes with the Russian military and recruits from a disposable assault force, causing infighting and a lack of coordination, while also vying for attention from Russian political leadership.
- Infighting between Wagner and the Russian military has led to poor quality forces on the flanks of Buckmut, allowing the Ukrainian military to counter-attack and gain advantages, with no unity of effort or command on this particular front.
- The speaker does not believe anyone is worried about the state of the destroyed city and takes a few more questions.
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01:20:37 The impact of sanctions on Russia's economy is causing sustainability problems for the budget and export controls will make the economy more autarkic, while Russia's transition to a wartime economy will lead to technological backwardness and expensive workarounds.
- The impact of sanctions on the Russian economy had a big initial shock but didn't have a lot of strategic effects, and the challenge that Russia faces is export controls are going to make the Russian economy much more autarkic, simplistic, and more like Iran's.
- Slowly transitioning to a wartime economy, North Korea will increasingly lose access to Western goods and parts, leading to expensive workarounds and technological backwardness, but the effects of sanctions take years to fully manifest.
- The Russian economy faces major problems with state spending and revenue generation due to the decrease in energy exports from sanctions, which will eventually create a sustainability problem for the budget.
- Political establishments should learn that conventional wars are costly, rarely short, and come down to attrition, and they should be sure that it's something they really want to do.
- The degradation of the Russian military's combat power and offensive potential has made it incapable of conducting large-scale operations, highlighting the importance of force quality and reconstitution for Ukraine with Western assistance.
- Putin's regime has been focused on demobilization and keeping the public out of the political space, making it difficult to transition towards mobilization, but efforts to mobilize society have led to a change in the character of the regime.
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01:29:57 Russian propaganda has a greater impact on non-Western countries, while the rest of the world has diverse views on globalization.
- Russian propaganda has had a greater impact on non-Western countries where they have been more successful in spreading misinformation through platforms that are not necessarily objective.
- The rest of the world's views on globalization are more diverse and economically significant than those in Western countries, and it's important to check in with them more often.
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19 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:
I hope the big countries like the USA, France, and Germany are starting to get some pressure to match the pre capita commitments of many small/medium European countries.
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pretty clear DPICM to me
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How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Footage of the Bradley battle UKR POV:
source (I cropped it): https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/145l0wp/same_battler_from_0806_from_afu_bradley_pow/