The_MonkeyKing
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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing
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Good news is 150km range GLSDB bad news is in nine months
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On 4/19/2022 at 8:44 AM, The_MonkeyKing said:
Could Leo1 become the main "lend-lease" tank to Ukraine? There are tons and tons of them available in the west. There must be uniformity in the heavy weapons supplied to Ukraine or it will be a logistical circus out there. So my view is M113 and Leo1 should become the main weapons of the Ukrainian military..
Main question here is how does the Ukraine T-64 APFSDS ammo compare to best Leo1 APFSDS ammo available? According to my quick amateur research 3BM42 is the main Ukraine APFSDS ammo at the moment. Penetration similar to best 105mm ammo available. But these both will still struggle with Russian modern armor frontally. Still clearly "good enough".
So the tank is clearly good enough, there are lot of them and their logistics available to the west, they are "bad" enough to hand over without losing wests own capabilities.
Seems like my Leo1 + M113 timeline is coming true. Thankfully these will be supplemented with Bradley/CV90/marder1 and Leo2/Chal2/Abrams.
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3 hours ago, Harmon Rabb said:
https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1620435396890099714?cxt=HHwWhIDU0Y7a-PwsAAAA
The governments of Hungary and Austria never fail to disappoint since this war started.
By the way last a checked Ukraine is on the European continent, but now I'm being nit picky. I know when people speak of Europe these days they often mean EU members.
Austria is doing quite well in terms of aid. They are just keeping to their neutrality so no weapons.
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23 minutes ago, poesel said:
Btw, no comments on this?
I remember some other leader being scolded here for saying the same thing in more words. Or did Biden just misunderstand the question?
That sort of comment is not worth noticing. The lines has been so far that options are open but at the moment no decisions or actions on F-16. Identically to Abrams couple weeks ago, it was a "no" until it became a "yes".
relates:
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1 hour ago, dan/california said:
Good video on breaching operations.
This is excellent!
Now think of doing that within heavily contested airspace and without fires deeper than 80km.
Well, Finns do it(myself have participated in such exercise) but indeed requires getting fires supremacy in the area including deep in the rear and totally deny the sky for the enemy.
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2 hours ago, DesertFox said:
If true, I´m interested to learn how long the Orcs can sustain that. About 9/2022 was the date when the Mobiks were starting to show up, if I´m not mistaken.
I would love to see photo verified manpower losses
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Finally seeing some airburst.
Out of curiosity I wonder what is up with the spread pattern.
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8 hours ago, poesel said:
I feel a bit neglected: now that we deliver the tanks, nobody is interested in Germany anymore!
Yeah I don't think we really have to worry about Germany anymore. This was the last handbrake they really had.
The next hurdles will be interceptor aircraft and longer range precision fires. Germany really has neither that would be relevant for Ukraine. Of course they might object but they don't have to and cannot take the leading role like with the leopards.
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Finally someone puting this in nice short writing. TLDR modern Abrams is not that different from Leopard in terms of logistics and sustainment:
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2 hours ago, Combatintman said:
@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour. To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour. Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have. Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup. According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
The more I think about it more strange does it soundline.
How can Finland make mechanised forces in 6mos for dismounts, 12mo for tank crew, 12mo for all NCOs and platoon leaders? (company commander and above are professional in mech forces)
Must be related to that company CO and "sergeant" are professional career soldiers.
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Just now, The_Capt said:
Actually in this equation when one of those factors is less than zero it starts to drag down the rest. So if one rolls out with skill as 0.5, you have just shot quantity and tech-quality in the foot.
As to “more in depth”, look guys the resumes of some people sharing here could (and do) charge a hefty fee for this stuff. If you want a complete breakdown of conversion training from Levels 1-7 we are beyond the scope of an Internet forum discussion. In fact some of our peers are getting paid a lot to set this up for the UA right now. You can trust us, or it is a big internet out there with a lot of manuals and training stuff lying around.
Indeed, that is why "good enough", haha.
Good enough would be probably little less than what the Finnish military gets in training. That is 6 months for mech infantry (3months basic how to be soldier and 3 months of mech infantry training).
12 months for tankers (3months basic how to be soldier, 3 months of tank equipment course and last 6 months of how to fight as mech force)
In UKR case you can leave out the "3months basic how to be soldier" part from both and when you leave out all the peace time stuff and holidays you can get both down at least by third.
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46 minutes ago, Combatintman said:
@Shady_Side - to add to my previous post and to provide a documented example of converting from one armoured platform to another, the British Army until fairly recently used to do a thing called 'Arms Plotting' which saw regiments re-role every few years - in the case of infantry from light role, to mechanised, to armoured infantry and in the case of the Royal Armoured Corps from formation reconnaissance to armour. To give a flavour of what it takes to as you put it "they will be starting with crews that already know the fundamentals of armored combat" the links below will take you to the Regimental Journal of the Life Guards for 1980 and 1981 which describe the regiment's conversion from formation reconnaissance to armour. Bear in mind that this regiment used to change roles about every six years so anybody in the regiment with longer time in than that would have been familiar with Chieftain rather than jumping straight into one from scratch, a luxury Ukrainian tank crews will not have. Now I accept that the timescales to convert the regiment would be longer back then because of the demands of peacetime soldiering such as: handing over the old camp and equipment; taking over the new camp and equipment; booking training areas; letting soldiers go on leave; area cleaning; site guards; and, marching up and down the square but the bottom line is that the Life Guards took about a year to convert properly to Chieftain to the point where the regiment was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Battlegroup. According to the 1981 journal, B Squadron took four months to fully convert to the point that it was capable of fighting effectively as an all-arms Squadron Group.
Very interesting information!
Then we come to the point of "good enough". Lets take into account mass, skill and tech-quality. If it would be equation: combat effectiveness = quantity x skill x tech-quality. This would mean we can live with smaller value on skill part when the other two are compensated enough to account for this. We also are compromising on the skill part to get better timing strategically. It helps that Russian equation is not looking good at all especially in the skill part.
Also there is the "on the job" training and the commanders can take this into account by starting with operations with a really stacked deck in Ukrainian favor.
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"It's good news that NATO members will provide modern tanks to Ukraine. Tanks remain a critical component in ground warfare, and Ukraine has the most experienced tank crews in the world. However, we should be realistic about what these deliveries mean.
Ukraine's goal is to retake all of its territory occupied by Russia. Breaking through well-prepared defensive lines (and exploiting success) is difficult without significant combined arms advantages, and Ukraine is unlikely to have air superiority.
Challenger 2, Leopard 2, and Abrams are more survivable and have better optics and fire control systems. That will give Ukrainian tankers an advantage in tank-on-tank fights and other engagements, and tank crews will be more likely to survive (and keep fighting).
These new tanks also open up a new line of ammunition available to Ukraine, which is critical since they have been using tanks as artillery. Procuring 3 new types of tanks will be a logistical headache, but it will also give them more options for replacing future tank losses.
Tanks will undoubtedly play a key role in Ukraine's future offensives as in Kharkiv and Kherson. The new tanks will increase Kyiv's chances for success but not guarantee it. They are just one component of combined arms, and can only partially compensate for other weaknesses.
Personally, I think deliveries of new IFVs and APCs, like the Bradley and Stryker, are more significant than tanks because Ukraine lacks enough IFVs/APCs and the relative improvement of a Bradley/Stryker over BMP-1/MRAP is even greater than Leopard 2 over many Ukrainian tanks.
The question is whether the decision by NATO to provide tanks signals that the alliance may be willing to consider other systems needed by Ukraine in the future. These tanks are also another step in the Ukrainian military being equipped with NATO weapons.
So this is good news, but NATO tanks are not a silver bullet. If NATO's goal is to help Kyiv so that it can retake all of its territory, this will likely need to include other systems like fighters and ATACMS to improve Ukraine's combined arms capabilities even more.
This is particularly true if continued attrition in Bakhmut and elsewhere along the front weakens Ukrainian units that will need to be available for offensives later this year. "
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20 minutes ago, Lethaface said:
Ok to stay on tanks
One thing which I think will be interesting to see unfold is who exactly sends what kind of tanks. Leo2A6 is much more capable compared to 2A4. The same goes for M1A2SEPv2 (or 3) vs the M1A1SA.If countries send old junk (2A4 / M1A1SA) they might as well (finance) send upgraded T-72s, or probably preferably. FWIW CMSF(2) shows that the Turms-T package isn't much worse compared to the Leo2A4. Especially with some decent ERA and modern /good ammo (which does exist, but not in CMSF).
AFAIK that was what US, Czechia and NL (maybe others) decided upon a couple of months ago, but I haven't seen deliveries / whatever of those yet. A couple of hundred of those are imo still much better for Ukraine compared to a few dozen of Leo2A4s, especially because they already use the platform. Same thing probably goes for the PT-91s.If I was on the tank bandwagon I'd be pushing for these tanks to be shipped to Ukraine yesterday, all of m (and cooperate on replacing capability based on a shared platform). All the old 2A4 etc could be upgraded in the meantime while eventually Ukraine joins the same shared platform as the rest. From a logistics, effectiveness and efficiency POV that seems superior imo.
But I guess PR wise there was more to win with the 'free Leopard' campaign. /rant :D.those two are not mutually exclusive
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1 minute ago, Huba said:
I wonder how will they solve the IFF though - after removing the NATO equipment from both ground-based radars, and I assume from the aircraft, they will be left with what exactly?
Air space deconfliction existed before IFF was even invented. At least in Finland IFF is just the very last safeguard in a long sequence of procedures and safeguards. Something has already gone horribly wrong if AA operator ever needs to rely on the IFF.
Yes, it is hard and it is almost its whole field of military science.
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14 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:
Exactly. The hustle never stops.
I would think fighter jets are going to be a way easier thing to get going than mechanized force equipment was.
Interceptor fighters are just a part of air defense. Just s supplementary capability to the western AA systems being given. And off course AA+Interceptors is more cost efficient than going the same with pure ground based systems.
Only possible escalatory capability would be giving them long range strike capacity. But that can be given with ground based systems as well and I am sure you can jerry-rig JASSM to a MIG.
Best case would be to get same that Finland is going with its air force. It is the other half of air defence with additionally acting as long range strike platform.
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This is the biggest news this year for the war. And there is big competitions so that is saing much:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/24/us/politics/pentagon-ukraine-ammunition.html
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36 minutes ago, danfrodo said:
great news! Now the question I have is what do we expect these to provide once in battle in May/June? My perception is that there's much better survivability. Much better optics. So in an actual fight I'd expect that these would have some higher chance of surviving ATGM or tank hit than the current T64/72/80s. Also I'd expect the better spotting to play a big role in getting ordnance onto targets quickly and thereby reducing the amount of incoming ATGM/tank fire.
Do y'all think these perceptions are true? I understand that these aren't wonder weapons. I just wonder how much better a combined arms attack would be w these as compared to current soviet tanks.
Yeah, not wonder weapons. They are just going to give a significant edge. They are going to be a superior system to anything that Russia has. Against a T90M the gap might not be huge(depending on the exact models) in all aspects but as a whole it is a big gap.
RUS seems to have significant lack of modernized armored equipment. They will mostly be facing the tech they were designed to overmatch against. This would result in outcomes like seen in the gulf war in terms of tank to tank battles that happened.
With these you are likely to find the target first, shoot first, penetrate and even get a way with being hit yourself. Ruskies will be in inverted situation on all these points.
A true overmatch would be newest model APS equipped MBTs. That would be on the level of driving to the highest spot and shooting away. (not literally)
There is also a large fleet of "unaccounted for" modern RUS tanks. Maybe these are going to be pulled to the front if they exist at all. (of course if we have 50% loss rate in visually confirmed total loss, that might mean the actually operational loss rate is closer to 100%)
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2 minutes ago, Kinophile said:
Seems to be happening by the looks of it.
These level of "rumors" have rarely turned out false in this war.
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Just now, Bulletpoint said:
If that guy thought about it for a moment, he might realise there's a big difference between escalating something alone and with friends. Article 5 is not enough here - its language is pretty vague.
The best possible solution is that both the US and the various European countries unite to support Ukraine with tanks and the supplies they need.
Yeah, makes you wonder why Germany has not taken this stance. Or at least has had a historical PR failure in the matter...
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8 minutes ago, Der Zeitgeist said:
"The Scholz effect"
"The Scholz effect"
The effect created by Scholzing in which the desired outcome of Scholzing gets reversed because of external factors.
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https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/manpower-materiel-and-the-coming-decisive-phase-in-ukraine/
In his latest discussion with Ryan on the war in Ukraine, Mike Kofman explains why the coming spring and summer will be strategically decisive. He also offers his analysis on the Russian command reshuffle, new Western kit, and the grinding battle for Bakhmut.
Bulletpoints:
- Bakhmut, on the ground Russians have made progress. Difficult grinding fight. Odds about 50/50 that Russia takes Bakhmut in the coming weeks, BUT it doesn't matter which way it ends. What will matter are the casualties on both sides. We need to consider the risk UKR is losing higher quality troops while RUS is mostly using expendable troops.
- Fighting in Bakhmut might indeed be the smartest thing to do for the Ukrainians. Is there a spot that is more advantageous? There is criticism of UKR accepting this grinding fight, but Ukraine might not be able choose a better fight at the moment.
- It is an important open question how much RUS is experiencing or going to experience shell hunger and its causes. We know the RUS shell usage has gone down but the reasons are unclear (smaller need now?, lack of supply lines?, lack of stockpiles? ...). We will know more when the fighting again widens and intensifies.
- RUS primary goals remain in taking the Dombas
- On the tank debate: The classifications of weapons (is it a tank or not or offensive weapon or not) depends on the needs of the policy. "It is what you make of it" It is a offensive weapon if the policies require it to be and it is not if the it needs to be policy constrained.
- About the Challenger 2s actually the AS90 is way more important. Western country giving significant percentage if its modern system.
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Heading to 2023 there is a quest to make Ukraine succeed in offensive operations under these new constraints. Constraints: RUS has the manpower advantage and next set of fights are going to be more difficult.
- Increase the qualitative advantage of Ukraine (better equipment and equipment for new formations)
- Equipment and manpower grind has to be avoided. RUS could sustain this for some time
- Develop and increase the UKR precision strike abilities. Shift
- Ukraine has mostly fought this as an artillery war. This is a costly and attrition approach as seen in Kherson. West is unlikely to be able to supply UKR with enough of overmatch of a fires advantage to win in this way. Even at this rate the ammunition and barrel consumption is hard to sustain.
- Combined arms training. The fix for the point above is to give UKR the skill and equipment to do mobile warfare. This is clearly now being pursued.
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Spring and summer look to become decisive. Next offensive UKR has a good opportunity to show that it can still advance under these new conditions. There will be lots of people eager to call stalemate
- Unlike in Kherson&Harkiv now in the next offensive UKR has a very real risk of RUS counter offensive if they fail or fall short. RUS offensive capacity is constrained but now there is a real risk. Lets be frank the Kherson offensive didn't start off well, this time around there will be risks if that happens.
- It is not clear what is happening with the forces. Have UKR managed to set aside enough units for offensive operations? What is going on with the RUS mobilization? Very little information on the Russian new forces, most like a lot of them are for rotational proposes.
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This war going nuclear is matter of two points:
- Cascading failure and collapse of the Russian force and the campaign. Koffman sees this as low probability event.
- what Putin decides to do in the above situation. This probability is pretty hard to judge.
- talk about internal struggle between the RUS war leadership
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RUS
- In Bakhmut interesting to see the changed tactics of no armor, only infantry and artillery. Also the artillery ammo is being rationed or having shortages. They are clearly preserving their mech forces.
- RUS is likely not going to announce 500k man mobilization . It never ended, it is going to keep happening in the background. Also there is no way of sustaining such force increase.
- The war aims are going to stay inside Donbass. So forget about these fanciful plans being talked about in the press.
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Counter thread from a Finnish analyst to that Germany did nothing wrong thread:
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
How is this so hard for the europeans?
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/waffenhilfe-fuer-die-ukraine-kanzler-olaf-scholz-redet-den-panzer-partnern-ins-gewissen-a-9a1da89b-0b76-4c2d-a93a-d7116dca071f
Here is a free to read paper in finnish (translate works): https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009371956.html?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=toimitus-dlvr
THE EXPORT OF LEOPARD 2 battle tanks to Ukraine is in trouble, says the German newspaper Der Spiegel . According to the magazine, only very few countries have committed to give their tanks to Ukraine.
With these prospects, Ukraine will not receive enough Leopard 2 tanks to arm two Ukrainian tank battalions. The strength of one battalion is 31 tanks.
According to Der Spiegel, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius organized a video conference last week, where no EU country committed to concrete promises regarding the number of 2A6 tanks.
Even Holland, which promised carriages in public, did not promise anything.
The German Chancellor's Office still hopes that, with the cooperation of the countries, wagons for the needs of the two battalions will be gathered by the end of March. The lack of commitments has still caused German officials to hesitate.
"The only Leopards that will really be ready with trained crews at the end of March are the Bundeswehr [German Armed Forces] tanks," one expert told Der Spiegel.