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The_MonkeyKing

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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing

  1. 26 minutes ago, Carolus said:

    How useful are ATACMS for Ukraine without the permission to target installations in Russia?

    Is the bigger warhead such an advantage?

    Or does it just increase the number of missiles that Ukraine has available?

    Because correct if I'm wrong, but isn't basically everything in Ukraine in Stormshadow / SCALP range?

    With Russian territory remaining off limits to Western weapons, what could Ukraine shoot that it isn't already shooting?

    Not that I am against ATACMS but I would love to know how it would change Ukrainian abilities if Russian logistics and war factories behind its border are basically safe (the Ukrainian long-range drones and saboteurs have not been able to affect much so far).

    Mainly just more long-range munitions.

    Compared to storm shadow capability, ATACMS might be easier to intercept (this is unknown but possible S300/S400 can intercept them like they can other ballistic missiles), and ATACMS has a better ability to saturate target areas with the cluster warheads, for example taking out helicopter forward operating bases. 

  2. 19 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

    So then ... is this correct interpretation of their significance?
     

     

    The fact they are DPICM doesn't matter. The fact that are artillery ammo and there are a lot of them immediately available, that is what matters.

    Kofman clearly stated this.on the resent podcasts.

  3. 5 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    Forgive them Lord, for they know not what they are talking about.  

    But seriously can we not jump on the “THIS WILL SWEEP THE RUSSIANS FROM THE EARTH!!!” band wagon again.  And then when they do not result in immediate Ukrainian victory over a weekend we don’t have to do the “OMG Ukraine is DOOOMED because my favourite weapon/system/vehicle of the week is not chasing the Russians back to Moscow!!”

    Indeed.

    I just couldn't resist making that joke on CMCW

  4. 6 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Most of this looks correct to me.  The one thing I'd quibble with is singling out artillery ammunition as "the sand in the hourglass".  For sure it is, but it isn't the only one.  Picture several hourglasses turned upside down.  The first one to run out effectively ends the counter offensive.  One of those hourglasses is Russian manpower, another one is Russian artillery systems, yet another is Russian logistics, still another is Russia's internal stability.

    Our problem is we don't know how much sand is left in any of them, but we do have a sense of how much is left in the artillery munitions supply hourglass.  Therefore, they (and us here) are focusing on it more than the others.

    You zoomed out there quite a bit, hah

    I toke that as meaning the likely first hourglass to run out on the Ukrainian offensive potential.

     

    There was also discussion on the "zoomed out" level like the economy likely limiting military decisions on mobilizations. For example, if Russians mobilize 500k to extend warfighting potential for another year this might cause such a shock on the economic level that on the whole Russia's warfighting potential shortens/shrinks. 

    These sorts of long wars come to attrition and on the most "zoomed out" level we have to start comparing the GDP and population bases of the sides. And that comes to about 100:1 against Russia...

  5. 2 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

     

    comments from yesterday: 

    • The Offensive clearly progressing slower than expected. This is stated also by the Ukrainian president.
    • the initial assaults failed to achieve their objectives. For example, creating conditions to commit reserves to breach the main lines and exploit
    • now we are in an attritional phase and we are likely to see alternating phases of attrition and attempts to advance, enabled by the attrition.
    • both sides use artillery decisively and then exploit
      • artillery ammunition as "the sand it the hourglass".
      • it is significant how much artillery ammo Ukrainian use to achieve any given goal
    • artillery production rates are going to become more and more important
      • seems like this is going to towards equality between the sides in the long run

    To add, later in the Q&A section:

    Kofman states provision of cluster munitions is the single most decisive thing the US can do in the short term and will have a significant effect on the battlefield. 

    It is not necessary to take the efficiency of the DPICM into account for their significance. The significance comes from the million(s) of new shells being available for the Ukrainians. This takes them off from the "shell hourglass" and enables Ukraine to approach these offensives with more freedom.

    Of course, he included a snarky comment on how Europe was the main obstacle to this provision and also the main reason for the need to make this provision, given the Europeans made the needed artillery production decisions only 13 months into this war.

  6.  

    comments from yesterday: 

    • The Offensive clearly progressing slower than expected. This is stated also by the Ukrainian president.
    • the initial assaults failed to achieve their objectives. For example, creating conditions to commit reserves to breach the main lines and exploit
    • now we are in an attritional phase and we are likely to see alternating phases of attrition and attempts to advance, enabled by the attrition.
    • both sides use artillery decisively and then exploit
      • artillery ammunition as "the sand it the hourglass".
      • it is significant how much artillery ammo Ukrainian use to achieve any given goal
    • artillery production rates are going to become more and more important
      • seems like this is going to towards equality between the sides in the long run
  7. 26 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

    You were expecting 1940/1944 or Gulf War rates of advance in an offensive against prepared fortifications while the Ukrainian usual method of attack is "artillery attacks, infantry occupies" (almost always since Kharkiv, i.e. for about a year) and they are attacking with slight advantage  in men, parity in artillery and inferiority in the air? But why?

    Apologies in advance if this comes across as aggressive, I am not trying to be insulting, just am honestly baffled on what basis this could be expected to be anything but a bloody slog (with some possibility of breakthrough after a few months of that) and would be interested to hear your reasoning.

    I was not expecting anything like "1940/1944 or Gulf War".

    I was expecting faster progress in reaching the first villages and closing the distance to the main lines of defense. It also seems Ukrainians were expecting faster progress, they have said so themselves. 

  8. 14 minutes ago, dan/california said:

    Flanking the the Russians out of Robtyne would be pretty significant.

    image.thumb.png.e7813da2cada4ee59faccdf2f2cf79c5.png

    I don't know how taking this green could be significant in any way.

    This is something I would have expected to fall within the first days or hours of the counter-attack if I was asked a couple of months ago

  9. 25 minutes ago, Splinty said:

    My Bradley ran over an unexploded cluster munition after the ground war in Desert Storm. It did explode, but the only damage was to one of the rubber track pads. Having said that, I wouldn't want to step on one. It would probably remove or shatter a foot.

    I still wonder how sensitive these things are. Sure if you drive over it with a tank... haha

  10. 3 hours ago, cesmonkey said:

     

    https://www.reuters.com/world/us-expected-provide-cluster-munitions-ukraine-nyt-2023-07-06/

    "In the aid package, which is expected to be well above $500 million in value, Ukraine will receive munitions for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), Bradley fighting vehicles and Stryker armored personnel carriers, one of the officials said."

    Seems this is happening for sure now.

     

    Question about cluster weapons: Doctrinally how would the US have treated areas hit by DPICM or other cluster weapons? Or how was it done in the gulf war? Would US forces operate and maneuver normally in these areas?

    I suspect the dud are nowhere near as dangerous as mines...

  11. 5 minutes ago, dan/california said:

    It is time for NATO to make the redlines even clearer, and MEAN IT. If anything, happens at the plant, and i do mean anything, Article 5 should be declared, and NATO planes should start killing every Russian soldier in Ukraine. And they should keep dong it until they all are dead or gone. If Russia wants a wider war, give it to them, and sink every surface ship in the Russian navy, just for starters. 

    Let's say the reactors get into an "accident" that causes a meltdown and there are zero casualties. Small emissions like in a three-mile island, that do not even demand evacuations.

    End result is Ukraine lost its largest power plant and future cleanup operation, with a cost of tens of billions. 

    I don't see Russia seeing any escalation risk here. I don't either 

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