The_MonkeyKing
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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing
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1 hour ago, hcrof said:
The UA seems to have figured something out yesterday - let's hope it continues!
Zero evidence of even one KA-52 going down during these recent southern operations.
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36 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
The most viable solution to the helicopter threat is the one noted many times above... keep smashing their bases. We saw how effective this was in Kherson in 2022, where Russians kept losing helicopters to artillery and sabotage strikes. They eventually had to pull them very far back. HIMARS forced them even further back. Storm Shadow should, theoretically, cause them even further discomfort. So much so that it seems Russia is risking keeping them within Storm Shadow range because pulling them further back effectively takes them out of the fight.
We know Ukraine can hit the bases, so why isn't it doing so? There's been no evidence that Russia has meaningful counter measures, so the risk of expending valuable munitions without a good chance of hitting doesn't seem to be the reason. My guess it's another timing issue.
Bases are notoriously hard to keep out of action. Right now Ukraine knows where they are, as the RU bloggers are moaning about. If they hit one of the bases they will likely take some out of action, but not all. The survivors will go somewhere else and Ukraine will have to figure out where. Over time this could consume a lot of Storm Shadows. Maybe they are thinking it is best to wait until the main counter offensive is underway (i.e. target rich environment) before they hit the bases.
Another thought is that Ukraine is using these early battles to figure out how to better deal with helicopter threats. Bashing their bases now will disrupt this learning process. If this is true, then it's a good indication that Ukraine doesn't think it's entirely helpless against helicopter attacks, rather it just hasn't found the right combination to counter them.
Whatever the case it, Ukraine appears to be "allowing" Russia to continue using helicopters.
Steve
I would guess it is not worth it to hit those helicopters with the current munitions available.
Those helicopter bases must be anti-air hardpoints and the helos are dispersed(in the satellites) 100m apart so it would be 1 storm shadow = one destroyed helo + what it takes to penetrate AA.
The target lists must have lots of higher priority targets for these low-availability high-demand deep strike assets.
Now GLSDB that would be nice. But still, the copter will just move 50km further back when these arrive to the theater.
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1 minute ago, Kinophile said:
IF Passed & Signedx
There was F-16 pilot funding passed 6 months ago. The government chose newer to use it (maybe changed in the last month?)
I am sure this will go the same way again.
I am also calling for more funding and not just a qualitative increase.
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23 minutes ago, Harmon Rabb said:
What am I watching? This is filmed at the 2023 St Petersburg Economic Forum apparently.
more gems:
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So this is Moscow stating it is ok for Ukrainian planes to operate out of NATO airfields?
Even Moscow is trying to get the West to realize it has absolute escalation dominance
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23 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:
I'm wondering if the main counteroffensive was ready to go, but then it was postponed at the last possible moment when the dam was blown up. Reason being that this will open up new attack directions when the reservoir dries out.
I see Ukrainian harassment operations likely here. Hard to see any main attack happening over the "river"
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On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike is joined by Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia program, and Franz Stefan-Gady, founder and chief executive officer of Gady Consulting.
https://warontherocks.com/episode/therussiacontingency/28970/ukraines-offensive-first-impressions/
my summary notes:
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Careful optimism but lots of unknowns
- Ukrainians seem to be managing well with green formations in an environment where even Western professionals would likely struggle
- progress within the realm of expectations
- nobody in the analyst community was expecting this to look like Harkiv
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The question is not "have the Ukrainians reached a certain point" but where they were planning to be at this point in time
- Mike guesses it is unlikely Ukrainians are where they hoped to be at this point but also that actually doesn't tell us much.
- how are the relative attrition and commitment of forces?
- How much Ukraine has ammo available and for how long time?
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Ukraine could choose to reinforce one of the current attacks or open a new one
- western axis is having difficulties but the eastern axis is advancing well and on a wide front
- the main effort is still to show itself. "we know it when we see it"
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Ukraine seems to be trying to get Russia to commit reserves
- This is still unclear
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We are in the attritional phase of this operation
- Transition to maneuver phase is often sudden
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Ukraine approaching the Russian mainline
- expectedly everything takes time when advancing on fortified positions.
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Russia likely aiming to make this approach attritional as possible but not to stop Ukrainians
- Russia likely trying to make the attack culminate at the mainline or shortly after it
- Early Russian hard counterattacks are surprisingly hard (and unsuccessful)
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Experienced Ukrainian units are making gains at this moment. New formations are still mostly not committed
- Ukraine is also mixing the new formations with its more experienced forces
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Ukrainian Positive indicators
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Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively
- can they isolate the battlefield?
- Ukraine seems to be winning the counter-battery war
- Ukraine seems to be learning and adapting already
- Night fighting capacity paying off
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Ukraine seems to be capable of hitting the depth of the Russian rear effectively
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Ukrainian Challenges
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Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past
- 42nd mot.rifle div. and the two Spetsnaz brigades seem to have held on the western axis
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Doing combined arms breaches without air superiority and NATO level of enablers and without total fires dominance.
- Russian rotatory aviation
- Mines
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A possible shortage of short-range air defense on the Ukraine side
- although rotatory aviation operations would be expected in any case
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Some Russian units fight stubbornly even when these same formations have disintegrated in the past
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Careful optimism but lots of unknowns
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50 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
Completely disagree with these three takes.
First two can be true if we say about 2014-2015. Further we have the same program of NATO training, a separate program of sergeant corps training. Of course, all depends from brigades command attitude and soldiers motivation to learn. Ukrainian training centers had very formal and not enough effective training program, more effective were different alternative programs, implementing with support of high command and NATO training.
But for almost five years we already had enough good sergeant corps and enough trained experienced personnel. Though, as told UKR volunteer Roman Donik, who organized alterrnative training programs for riflemen and squad leaders, combat experience without knowledges how "military machine" should work during combat, leaves this experienced serviceman not as experienced soldier, but anyway as civilian with combat experience and this is two big differences.
"Prewar UKR military doesn't exist anymore" - we have obviously heavy losses (for Ukrianian scale) in dead and wounded among soldiers, who were in real service in 2022 and among "OR-1 first category" (retired contractors, who participated in ATO/OOS and were mobilized in first months). On 24th Feb 2022 we had only 178 000 of OR-1. How much personnel we really had on 24th Feb I can't say (according to the law about Armed Forces maximum number of pesonnel, including civilian servicemen was 246 000). I can suppose real picture was about 60 % of personnel in Ground Forces units. Taking to account that conscripts were adopting experience from servicemen and mobilized veterans, and taking to account overall number of veterans in about 250 000 at least, we can't say that now we have completely rooky army without "old blood". Again, all depends from brigades and command of brigades and batatlions, more exactly from their wish to be effective unit, or to be Soviet-style formalists, for which paper work and more valuable then effectiveness, or to be Russian-style butchers with moods "if unit has low level of losses, this means the unit fights bad" (alas, during Kherson offensive theer were reports about several battalion commanders, which boasted each before other how much of their personnel was lost during direct assaults as a sign of their "hard fight")
From what I have heard of the NCO discussion, Ukraine is and was pretty far from anything like the US system. And that is what many commentators in the States referred to as being one of the reasons for success. They have/had similar effects as the Western NCO system but the system was fundamentally different.
Only stating the Ukrainian military as it was in 2021 doesn't exist anymore. No matter what you thought it was back then it is not anymore.
Losses, learning, reserve officers, expanding the force, new western training, adaptation in this war, new offensive tasks, and capacities...
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1 minute ago, Lethaface said:
There was some footage of Ru soldiers close to one pile of Bradleys, I'd normally expect those to be destroyed by now but maybe the Russians couldn't be bothered about it? Let's see.
Those could have been some daring scouts with fire under their buts
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11 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:
Pretty impressive. How thick is the top armour of those things? A Grad has 6.4 kilos of explosives.
I believe it when I see the evidence of a direct hit. That image doesn't have that
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39 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:
I noticed they tried to avoid the topic of F-16s until specifically asked.
I toke notice of that too. I would like to think this is because the US is doing a lot more than we think.
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The Tokmak axis is expanding according to the Ukrainians:
Now the infamous Bradley pile is on the Ukrainian side of the line. We have not seen Russians releasing photos where they destroy the abandoned equipment (only a couple singles). I presume most of the equipment is now on the Ukrainian side of the line and being recovered.
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Just now, Battlefront.com said:
That said, the most important thing about the NATO concept of NCOs is that they are there to provide leaderships, not just to ensure orders are carried out. This is something that can be easily instilled into new NCOs and officers, though it takes a lot of effort to make it effective in practice. I have a hunch that a rushed Ukrainian NCO is going to be inherently superior than a rushed Russian NCO, even if inferior to the average NATO NCO.
This war is all about relative strengths and weaknesses, not about ideal states. As long as Ukraine is consistently better than Russia, then that's probably good enough.
Steve
Yeah, Ukraine definitely has and has had a structure similar to "NCO" which provides leadership, initiative, and experience outside the officer core. Kofman has talked about it in detail often, it is just that it is nothing like the NATO and US "NCO system" even though it fills a similar need/role.
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Some pointers from Millie:
- combined 60 000 Ukrainians trained in the west so far
- 6 000 Ukrainians in training in the West at this moment
- The USA has trained a combined 60 000 Ukrainians in maneuver combined arms operations
- This includes 12 maneuver combined arms "Battalion tactical groups" including their entire staff
- at this moment three battalions are in training by the USA
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https://warontherocks.com/2023/06/ukraines-multiple-axes-of-attack/
UKRAINE’S MULTIPLE AXES OF ATTACK
NICK DANFORTH AND MICHAEL KOFMANJUNE 14, 2023
PODCASTS - PODCASTS - WAR ON THE ROCKSmy summary:
- very incomplete and delayed image with competing claims.
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the offensive has been going on for a week
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two main axes of advance, Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka
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another shoe might very well drop as a new axis
- Luhansk is likely to see some action
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another shoe might very well drop as a new axis
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Separate axis in Bakmut, incremental gains
- secondary priority
- grinding fight
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two main axes of advance, Tokmak and Velyka Novosilka
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So far operation is closer to Kherson than Harkiv. Still doesn't mean it won't transform into something else.
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Ukraine has not committed its main forces and has not reached the main defensive lines
- Defensives are clearly a significant factor and mechanized mobile warfare against them has proven challenging in this war
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Ukraine has not committed its main forces and has not reached the main defensive lines
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Success/failure too early to tell
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Traditionally starting days are decisive but this is not always the case. Seems not in this case here
- The key question is where Ukrainians are now in relation to where they were planning to be at this point and how is are force commitments going on both sides.
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It is clear that the rosiest predictions of this operation were incorrect.
- These people might believe they are helping by inflating expectations but they are not
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Traditionally starting days are decisive but this is not always the case. Seems not in this case here
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At this point, it is clear that the main advantage of Western equipment is survivability and night operation capacity.
- No wunderwaffe
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In the big picture, Mike thinks the technical tactical level capabilities are just one piece of a big puzzle. Names this is his biased opinion.
- It comes down to force employment
- We have only seen only a couple of the new brigades in operations in limited scope so the capacity of the new formations is still largely unknown.
- Ukraine seems to have enough ammo and probably has an advantage in artillery in the south. No longer "she'll hunger" of the beginning of the year.
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Ukraine military
- Ukraine's military has one foot in the Soviet past and one foot in "NATO".
- Wide variety between units in culture, skill, and experience
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The prewar military was nothing like many in the West described it as NATO trained ext.
- No widespread Western training, no NCO core...
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The prewar UKR military does not exist anymore
- Mobilization and coming of old Soviet reserve officers
- It is remarkable how much Ukraine's military has done given its challenges
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What happens after a Ukrainian breakthrough?
- logistics?
- Enablers?
- sustaining momentum?
- how much of the Ukrainian force is left at the moment of breakthrough?
- How will Russia be able to react?
- Russian ability to recover?
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challenges Ukraine has
- Limited amounts of engineering equipment. Breaching equipment is also often lost at first
- Ukraine has a challenge with a lack of short-range AA with the formations
- minefields
- challenges with enablers
- challenges with force employment
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units are green
- Ukraine is attaching more experienced units to these green units
- Russia has significant force density and reserves in the south
- not easy the do offensive operations when you have always been a defensive force
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On 6/12/2023 at 2:10 PM, Haiduk said:
Some our "armchair generals" already plan such things - to attack on the section Dniprorudne - Vasylivka, when the water will go further and the bottom will dry.
But historically this wasn't flat place. This was a so-called "Great Meadow" - homeland of Zaporozhian Cossaks. The region of southands small rivers, creecks, tiny lakes - it in more modern times called "Dnipro plavni" - the meadows, which flooded after snow melting.
Locals already are finding old artefacts on the bottom of reservoir. After the war it will be holiday for "dark archeologists"
Old pistole or sawn-off rifle
Likely WWII German graves washed out by water
Wrecked vessel
The place of old bridge, I can't understand where it can be... There wasn't bridge between Nikopol and Kamyanka, only a ferry. Germans tried to build, but hadn't a time, only several concrete pierces were seen from water.
And here is a fragment of German map for 1942 how looked this place, when water reservoir doesn't exist
couple days old satellite as well:
Starting to look pretty damn radical
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3 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:
I think a better question is if those special shells are even necessary in order to penetrate Russian tanks? Do they even have any tanks left at this point, let alone any that don't belong in a museum?
Availability, and 25mm&105mm definitely needs all the help possible to penetrate.
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44 minutes ago, sburke said:
The US is set to approve depleted-uranium tank shells for Ukraine, the WSJ said.
The shells are capable of blowing up Russian tank armor.
There were doubts over providing the shells for environmental and health reasons.
The US is sending depleted-uranium shells to Ukraine that are capable of penetrating Russian tank armor, the Wall Street Journal reported.
For several months the Biden administration has been debating whether to provide the shells to Ukraine following concerns over their environmental and health impacts, the outlet reported.
But an administration official said that there were now no major obstacles to providing the ammunition.
I think any moral or ethical arguments against sending equipment the West has and is planning to use itself are ridiculous
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Prominent Russian Telegram channels and military correspondents had a meeting with Putin. This indicates that he seeks alternative sources of information on the war, apart from his intelligence and military commanders. Some of these correspondents have been openly critical of Russian generals.
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Not surprising. Where on earth could they find enough 25mm, 105mm, and 120mm ext. for the hundreds and hundreds of IFVs and MBTs other than the stockpiles of Depleted Uranium shell in the US and elsewhere.
Also, the 105mm guns are going to seriously need these shells in terms of penetration.
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5 minutes ago, DesertFox said:
Yep, we don't even know if it was the deliberate decision of the Btl.CO or if he was ordered to change direction. To many unknowns to make a judgement.
However the unlucky result is, that Ivan now can take a closer look at the 2A6 and will use it for his propaganda.
https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1668543398268084224?s=20
For sure the Russians cannot capture and evac them but destroy them for sure.
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38 minutes ago, DesertFox said:
Thanks that helps with understanding. However, what I totally don't get is, why on earth the Btl. CO decided 2 times to have his Btl. move transverse in front of enemy lines. Big NO NO and I guess he, if at present still in charge, would have had a small "discussion" with Brig. CO about that. Well maybe we learn over time why this Btl. acted as it did.
I think we are way too far away to make judgments on this battle.
Sometimes in war, battalions just get waked even when no nobody makes a mistake.
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14 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
"I reconstructed and geolocated the route and losses of one of the two columns of the 47th mechanized brigade. Of course, I also used the work of other OSINT people, but many of the given locations were inaccurate and the place of the destruction of M2 and L2A6 was wrong. Freeze frames from movies added to the orientation of what was where.
This column had a difficult fate: it was surrounded by drone-corrected artillery 3x, it defeated 2 groups of mines, and finally, while overcoming the second one, it fell under the fire of Ka-52's Wihr ATGMs and ATGMs as well as artillery. Really KUDOS to the soldiers of this battalion because they went through hell that day.
P.S. location and slides from the second (west) column will be uploaded later. This is the one whose end was supposedly photoshopped."
Going 7 kilometers under drone-corrected artillery through two minefields and then getting waked by Ka-52s
source: https://twitter.com/wolski_jaros/status/1668251143552606214
More info on the battle and how the footage ties into it. Russians managed to milk a lot of information war material out of this <battalion sized action.
source: https://twitter.com/wolski_jaros?s=20
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3 minutes ago, DesertFox said:
Allegedly new package prepared for its way to UA
indeed a great thing about Strykers and Bradleys is there's plenty more where these came from!
Also, the crew survivability makes sure new personal don't need to be trained and experience can accumulate.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Agreed, but still no evidence so cannot say one way or the other