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The_MonkeyKing

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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing

  1. The Chieftain's comments and some slides from "the conference on armored vehicle design" he attended. Some big hitters presenting

    surprisingly interesting and informative video. Also on Ukraine-related matters:

    some top-pick screenshots (Especially Ukraine related):

    Ukrainian colonel presentation (some comment picks):
    - Ukraine replacing lots of donated equipment antennas with anti-jam variants
    - Old tanks like T-55 ext. have their place and are effective at what they do
    - Ukraine battle management system is a combination of "Delta" a browser-based battle management system similar to US systems in combination with Discord servers.

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  2.  

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    "Episode Notes:
    On this episode of the Russia Contingency, Mike and Rob continue their conversation about their recent research trip to Ukraine. This conversation focused on the battle for Bakhmut, the level of attrition Russian forces have faced holding the city, and talked about the need to provide Ukraine with more man-portable systems.

    The Russia Contingency is a bi-weekly podcast featuring an in-depth analysis of Russia's military power and the war in Ukraine."

  3. The full episode now out (last week they released the first 30min):

    "When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, one of its first targets was the city of Mariupol. Despite being outnumbered by—and less well equipped than—their adversaries, Ukrainian defenders held out for three months. As the Russian siege of the city intensified, Ukrainian forces defended a shrinking perimeter with a command post in the Azovstal steel plant. One of those Ukrainian defenders was Sergeant Arseniy Fedosiuk. He joins John Spencer on this episode, relaying his experience in Mariupol, exploring the unique challenges of defending urban terrain against a superior enemy, and describing what happened at the end of the three-month battle, when he was taken prisoner by Russian forces."

     

    https://mwi.westpoint.edu/defending-mariupol/

     

  4. 24 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:

    In my impression, that last sentence was a very important point for Kofman and Lee. They talked about this several times. Because of that even a succesful Ukrainian infantry attack successfully crossing a minefield and taking a position does not mean that the successful unit can be reinforced and supplied. Before it happens, the minefield, which is now at the back of new Ukrainian position, has to be cleared in the way suitable for vehicles. This also applies to medevac, which means that each casualty is carried by hand. This takes away several men from the front unit - the wounded plus up to 4 soldiers to carry him several hundred meters.

    Russians also are aware of this, so as soon as the Ukrainians take a piece of land, there is an armoured counterattack because at that point the Ukrainians are going to be dismounted infantry only with portable AT weapons. 

    Yeah, and this type of attack is so slow that Russians will expand their minefields and fortifications at least the same rate as Ukraine is advancing. Leading to never ending loop without breakthrough and exploitation. At least until force attrition breaks the cycle.

  5. 33 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

    some pointers:

    • At the start of the southern offensive, we saw the employment of multiples of single companies, not brigades
      • Ukraine is limited in its ability in embodying larger formations in an integrated way. Limited by enablers, operational environment, and experience.
    • Was to the idea of establishing new "western" brigades proven/disproven?
      • another way to go would have been to reinforce the existing experienced units with new battalions.
      • a lot of the progress in the south was made by the older experienced units
      • jury is still out but already merits questioning was this the way to go? Eighter way it was worth trying
    • Was the idea of trying to make Ukraine to fight like "us" proven?
      • Ukraine's way of war has been attritional, using fires decisively that then enables moment. Most actions have been platoon/company level where Ukraine has excelled compared to Russians. 
      • The argument has been the west does not have the ability to sustain this type of war.
      • The question is does the west then have the ability to train and sustain Ukraine in the western way of war? This would mean the enablers the western way of war requires, starting with air supremacy. The answer seems to be no.
        • might be better to improve Ukraine's ability to fight the way it is already fighting
      • Ukraine uses tanks in almost the complete opposite way than the west
        • in Ukraine's experience driving a company of tanks over a ridge is a sure way of losing a tank co.
        • Tanks are used in infantry support or indirect fire roles. Mainly in pairs. Same on the Russian side at this point
        • AT role is mainly done with ATGM infantry
        • This is what Ukraine has learned and thinks what works for them
    • Now:
      • New brigades have been bloodied and are going through some changes. This is good
      • Ukraine is adapting
      • The fight is now mainly an attritional fight with platoon/company-level infantry attacks
        • problem is this is unlikely to achieve breakthrough and exploitation
      • Mine clearing capacities are in high demand like Nammo APOBS. Now main ways are bangalores or grappling hooks. These are slow and create tiny lanes and do not enable vehicle moment.
      • Now ongoing attritional counter-battery fight seems interesting and promising for Ukraine. Still hard to judge from the outside
      • Russia is saving most capabilities and ammo for large vehicle formations. This rationing is often confused with Russia lacking artillery. 
  6. A couple of recent related podcast episodes:

    John Spencer is joined by retired Maj. Gen. Yom Tov Tamir. He served a long career in the Israel Defense Forces as an armor officer holding positions from tank commander to division commander. In 1973, he was an armor battalion commander during the Yom Kippur War. In part one of the conversations, he reflects on his career as an armor officer from a secret trip to Germany in 1964 to learn about American tanks, through his service in the 1967 Six-Day War, to the Yom Kippur War. The discussion lays the foundation for part two, which covers the role of tanks in urban warfare, including drawing lessons from the 1973 Battle of Suez City.

  7. 8 minutes ago, FancyCat said:

    short lived? this deal existed for a year according to wiki, considering the war has been ongoing for a year and 5 ish months, most of this war has had the deal as a staple, not a short lived exception. 

    One growing season is not long. But semantics.

    Grain is only a portion of the whole Ukraine sea cargo and that even that part was further constrained by the Russians.

    Ukraine has been in total sea blockade except grain shipping that was "just" constrained.

  8. 15 minutes ago, IanL said:

    Nope, pointless comparison.

    The truck bomb explosion can be huge but how much would be directed at the bridge? Beats me but a lot less than the full ride because the explosion has so many places to go that are not hurting the bridge.

    This time nearly every Kg of explosive was going to hurt that bridge either directly at the point of impact or on the under side of the road deck.

    I'm no military explosive expert but the effects of a confined explosion are significantly more powerful than an unconfined explosion. Spill a bunch of hydro carbons onto the ground and watch it go boom - it will suck to near by. Confine that inside a building or a rail car and watch it go boom and the range where your life will suck is so so much larger.

    240kg payload (that British drone) is around three GMLRS rockets worth. Remember GMLRS effects on Kherson bridge? Or effect of three Malka 203mm rounds on something concrete.

    With the latest Crimea bridge strike we are in a whole different ballpark than 240kg.

    Very well might be 10x less than the truck bomb öast year but also has to be 10x larger than that British drone with 240kg payload.

  9. 5 minutes ago, IanL said:

    Even if we go with the Russian numbers a truck bomb exploding in the open above the road deck is way less effective than one that gets up close and personal with a support pillar and goes of in a confined space under the road deck.

    Comparing raw explosive yield is utterly pointless between the two contexts.

    Not "pointless" when you compare the aftermath of the latest strike. No matter the placing, it is going to take multiple tons of explosives to get those results.

    It would be a different story if there were just pillars blowing up ext

     

     

  10. 2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Yup, this is what I said above.  Someone seems to be exaggerating the Russian forces in the northern part of the eastern theater.  100,000 is a scary number without context, but the context appears to be that it's mostly what they had before with some new forces added to the mix.  But those forces should be in the south...

    Exactly!  Let's say for the sake of argument that Russia added 20,000 to the Luhansk area.  That is, for sure, a significant increase in combat power for that area.  But where did they all come from?  The south, either directly or as a result of the diversion of new units.  Which is why we're seeing mounting evidence that the south is undermanned.

    It seems pretty apparent that Russia made a calculation that they could cut the southern force down to the bone in order to increase its potential elsewhere.  This is almost exactly what they did last year when the stole everything from Kharkiv/Luhansk to beef up Kherson.  The difference is that they didn't build up massive fortified lines in Kherson thus allowing Ukraine's rather modest forces to take back huge amounts of territory very quickly with relatively light losses (initially).  It seems Russia is thinking minefields and trenches are enough to avoid a repeat this year of what happened last year.

    I agree that Russia's fortifying the south has successfully precluded a repeat of Kharkiv/Luhansk for Ukraine.  No easy victory in the south vs. easy victory last year in the north (we anticipated that months ago).  However, Russia doesn't appear to have learned that it kinda sucks on the offense and Ukraine is a real nasty opponent on the defense.  The attack in Luhansk is likely to stall out and wind up being very costly without much to show for it (reminder that I even predicted this would happen to Ukraine if it went on the offensive there).  Meanwhile in the south, Ukraine is showing that it is very good on offense and Russia's has so far only shown itself capable of  bleeding out behind minefields.

    Eventually the south will change character into something resembling Kharkiv/Kherson more so than it does now.  As we've been saying for eons... minefields are only effective when they are defended.  Russia seems headed towards not being able to do that.

    Steve

    Yeah, indeed

    This war is becoming less exciting to follow by the day. Especially in daily/weekly bases.

    Strong trends are forming and the uncertainties are disappearing, leaving mostly "known unknowns".

    This is a good sign.

  11. Great general wrap-up of the situation according to Rob Lee, Michael Kofman, Konrad Muzyka "crew"

    unroll the tweet(s): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html

    Quote

    New🧵: @konrad_muzyka , @RALee85 , @KofmanMichael,& I spent some time this month visiting the frontlines in Ukraine to gain new insights into the ongoing counteroffensive & the war overall. Here are some general observations.
    Image
    (Note: More detailed analysis will be coming out by all of us in the coming weeks.)

    First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch). 
    Counteroffensive:

    1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon & company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications: 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 
    2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc. 
    2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress. 
    3.) 🇺🇦 forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. 
    4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is 🇺🇦s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. 
    Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. 
    5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. 
    Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months. 
    6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage. 
    Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks.There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind re. any potential tac. impact of delivery of ATACMs.) 
    Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline. 
    7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine. 
    8.) Russian artillery rationing is real & happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses. 
    9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration. 
    Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the 🇺🇦s IMO). 
    10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale. 
    (Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.)

    Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st 🇷🇺 minefield. 
    11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines. 
    12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks. 
    13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying & tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian C2. 
    14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent & morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied & older men called up for service now. 
    15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline. 
    16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition & hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. (Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains.) 
    But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance. 

     

  12.  

    (the tweeter is a Ukrainian officer)

    This recent Luhansk scare has as little to do with reality as the winter scare of "new 500k Russian army" starting a major reinvasion at the beginning of this year had. 

    I am just going to say, a couple of months ago Ukraine did its damnedest to get Russia to commit forces up north. 

  13. 46 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

    I don't know the credibility of the source, but this is being repeated by some Russian telegrammers:

     

    That thing has a 240 kg payload. 

    Last year bridge explosion had around 22 tons of explosives (this figure is from Russians)

    This time the explosion seems to have been a bit smaller but still in the same ballpark as last time

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