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The_MonkeyKing

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Posts posted by The_MonkeyKing

  1. 23 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

    My feelings exactly.  I rolled my eyes when I read WotR summary posted by Monkey King.  I don't like doing that, but well... here's why:

    I've been saying this since the start of the operation, but they left out the fact that "elite" infantry were not used.  So I stand by my position that what Russia learned was that throwing unsupported cannon fodder at prepared Ukrainian units doesn't achieve much.  Otherwise, how is this attack any different than other large scale attacks in the past, with possible addition of more air strikes?

    And I take issue with the difficulty of launching multiple battalion sized attacks in multiple locations.  It's actually VERY easy to do this.  What is extremely difficult is doing it successfully.  Russia just proved that, once again, issuing unrealistic orders and forcing zombie troops to pursue them is not a winning capability. They've been doing this THE ENTIRE WAR and they are NOT LEARNING from it.  If Russia was truly learning from their past losses is that they don't have a force that is capable of offensive action without taking massive losses in the process.

    Contrast this with Ukraine.  They tried large scale multiple battalion coordinated attacks and found that they weren't up to the challenge.  Ukraine, therefore, learned and learned quickly to go back to something it was competent at... company sized attacks with very limited objectives.

    And why is this "worrying"?  Nobody expected Russia to still be using the same exact tactics as it did in February 2022, so why is it "worrying" that they have made some changes 1.75 years into the war that wound up being just as ineffective as the ones that came before them?  That eventually they will figure something out?

    What the HELL is a military analyst doing making a statement like this?  Battle of the Bulge and Spring Awakening at least proved that Nazi Germany were not on the ropes?  My god... sometimes I wonder if they think about what they say before saying it.

    Russia still has a lot of combat power.  Fact.  But what about the possibility that Russia is desperate and this is the best that it can come up with?  To me, that is the sign of the invader being "on the ropes".

    As for the rest of it (Ukraine's counter offensive is about to, or already has, culminated) looks fine to me.  It's pretty clear that the offensive stalled out early and has only made progress through intelligent grinding attacks which, not surprisingly, have pretty clearly exceeded Ukraine's ability to sustain momentum.  The landings on the left bank of the Dnepr are the equivalent of Russia's attack on Avdiivka from what I can tell.  They are hoping to distract rather than to open up a new front.

    Steve

    Featured analysts on "War and the Rocks" see significant development in Russian tactics in the recent Avdiivka offensive.

    Not significant improvement enough to turn an offensive that might have been doomed to fail no matter the people behind it into victory. They see that the coordination and implementation of forces was a significant step up from anything we have seen for a long while from the Russians.

    If the trend continues and Russians keep being able to learn and raise the quality of their force it will have an impact next year. 

  2. 49 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    Let’s not make too long leaps here. (And I know you are just summarizing)  Russia may have reserves.  Or it may well have taken risks along line units as well.  Avdiivka was a tactical offensive, that failed - not D Day.  Russia is learning, there is no arguing that.  The question is: are they learning at a competitive rate compared to the UA?

    UA takes ground continuously for months = “well ya but it isn’t fast enough”

    RA does a post mortem twitch = “Holy Crap, it is the end of days!”

    Yeah, I agree.

    There is the possibility of this being some Russian last attempt to try to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat, by gaining the initiative or at least moving the fight to Adviivka from the south.

    But I am doubtful, more likely this is not "last attempt" but just "an attempt"

  3. 15 minutes ago, cesmonkey said:

    Russian telegrammer Two Majors claims Ukraine is moving 3 units to the Avdiivka region:
    https://t.me/dva_majors/27658
     

     

    similar worry about this on the "War on the Rocks"

    Some pointers from the episode:

    • Russian attack on Avdiivka is worrying. Russia has learned. The use of combined arms was on a completely different level than last year (artillery, air force, mechanized forces) and the scale was increased from companies to battalions. Even when it was a failure it was still a big improvement, as we have seen with Ukraine these types of operations are extremely hard to conduct even from competent and motivated forces. If this trend continues, there is cause for concern.
    • Avdiivka shows that Russia feels it is in a strong position, at least proves that Russia is not on the ropes.
    • Avdiivka risks becoming a new winter Bakhmut, i.e. a grinding, consuming battle.
    • The culmination of Ukraine's offensive phase is around the corner.
    • We will probably see the "last show" of this offensive within weeks. The likely goal is a breakthrough that would threaten Tokmak.
    • The goals of the UKR offensives were not achieved. The political leadership announced the goals publicly at the beginning (minimum goal Tokmak, Bakhmut and Melitopol as maximalist obj.).
    • Ukraine gets high marks for a good exchange ratio over the summer operation, especially taking into account the environment. Still, the substantial Russian losses seem to be sustainable for them.
    • Now the eyes are on next year.
    • Russia is going to have to conduct another major mobilization if it wants to "keep up the phase".
    • Russian ammunition sources should not be underestimated. Iran, North Korea, etc. Russia has invested significantly in the war economy of these countries and its own. (note that this Ukrainian summer offensive was also carried out with E-Korean stocks) A significant challenge vs. Western production capacity.
    • Next year, it will be challenging for the West to continue the same level of support as this summer, to enable Ukraine to keep the initiative.
    • The political situation in the United States really becoming worrying.
    • At the political level, complacency has spread in Europe and the United States that Russia is losing and cannot continue the war. The situation is the opposite, the West now has to make expensive decisions for a long war. Russia has resources and resilience as we have seen this year.
  4. 6 hours ago, Kinophile said:

    https://frontelligence.substack.com/p/from-impact-to-assessment-the-luhansk

    Tatarigami has a substack. It's quite decent. 

    Another successful ATACMS strike, this time on a Luhansk airfield

    image.thumb.png.3aece656c17dbaaa0d52c3a103da7b76.png

    image.thumb.png.aa4d733753bee4d2f73defb8fd9f5336.png

    Too bad we are seeing these strikes only now at the end of the Ukrainian offensive season. Probably these will be a big help for the awaited "last push" of the current southern campaign before culmination and mud season. 

  5. Thread recommended by Michael Kofman: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1714715790153248909.html

    image.thumb.png.79a74e1f3643bda8b6465fbf9b6a2637.png

    Even though the first attacks were repelled, Russia will likely attack in this direction again in the future. There aren't many similar targets elsewhere. Progress will probably be slow, naturally depending on how much resources Russia will direct into capturing Avdiivka. 9/ 

    In Bakhmut, Russians eventually switched from active flanking efforts into capturing the city block by block. If the Russians are fixated on capturing Avdiivka, there can be a long and difficult battle ahead, as Ukrainians are likely just as determined to hold it. 10/ 

    In the long run, Ukraine may need to solve the encirclement threat with a counterattack. Especially the northern direction can develop into a real issue. Russians don’t need to advance far in order to make the situation more complicated for AFU. The distances are short. 11/ 

    There are some worrying features, even though Ukraine managed to repel Russians for now.

    Russia proved two things. It tried to take the initiative in a relatively fresh direction. Secondly, it still has reserves to do it, even though many have claimed the opposite. 12/ 

    Even though it seems Russians have learned some lessions from previous offensives, for example from Vuhledar, the tactical outcome of the offensive in Avdiivka was still a failure. This, however, indicates that Russia aims to actively learn and adapt. 13/

     

  6. 5 hours ago, The_MonkeyKing said:

    image.thumb.png.526dd4ce68ffc55a3dd8870a20cf02d1.png

    https://yle.fi/a/74-20054483

     

    By early information, likely an attack on Estonia-Finland gas pipeline yesterday. 

     

    image.png.304ca2a5332fd6fb04da0ec299dcfc6e.png

    Mainly problem for Estonia. Finlands and Estonia's shared LNG-terminal is situated in Finland and this pipe is used for transfers to Estonia. 

    story develops 

    image.thumb.png.00a4df8095a2529ad988b0060a4ff9b8.png

    https://www.jordskjelv.no/meldinger/seismic-signal-detected-in-vicinity-of-gas-pipelines-in-the-eastern-baltic-sea 

    Seems the world is too desensitized and busy with other crises to notice Russia blow up active energy and communication infrastructure of two NATO countries.

  7. https://kyivindependent.com/reuters-us-public-support-for-providing-arms-to-ukraine-declines/

    Reuters: US public support for providing arms to Ukraine declines

    The two-day poll, which concluded on Oct. 4, revealed that only 41% of respondents agreed with the statement that Washington "should provide weapons to Ukraine," while 35% disagreed, and the remainder were uncertain.

     

    for reference War in Afghanistan support over time:
    image.png.713cff8f6330ab0617d09e261c9b615e.png

    https://genzmilitary.com/2019/06/19/the-afghanistan-war-over-time/

  8. 35 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    We want the one above “breakthrough”.  Ignore “encircled”.  Breakout, is regaining freedom of movement and therefore tempo, therefore creating decision superiority and expanding options spaces.  Last Fall we saw UA breakout battle, we want that.  Enough of these tactical breakthroughs adding up as the RA system erodes might just do it yet.

    Yeah, now the first "magic word" has been achieved, that being breakthrough. The word has been in the news for the whole summer prematurely.

    Now "Breakout" might not even be something Ukraine is going to try. If they see it as too risky and choose to keep endlessly pushing the Russians back as they have seen best so far.

  9. 1 hour ago, Jr Buck Private said:

    When you see those cluster munitions go off in a big circle like that it seems to me that it's dispersal is too big, but then I figure I'd be full of holes if were standing in the middle of that circle.   Hard to tell though.   Probably need to ask some Russians.     

    Also remember these are not designed to be shot in single shells sniping but as a barrages.

  10. 4 hours ago, Sojourner said:

    Nearly 100 Leopard 1 tanks stored in the open as Switzerland rejects transfer to Ukraine

    "Almost 100 Swiss-made Leopard 1 tanks are being stored out in the open in Italy following Switzerland's refusal to allow their transfer to Ukraine, Swiss public broadcasting organization RSI reported on Aug. 26."

    main-3.jpeg

    https://kyivindependent.com/media-nearly-100-leopard-1-tanks-stored-in-the-open-as-switzerland-rejects-transfer-to-ukraine/

    I'm waiting to see pictures of bread lines in Moscow.

     

    Germans are working on a deal where Greece sends 100 of their Leopard 1 to Ukraine and Germany buys and refurbishes these 100 ex-Italian Leopard 1 for Greece in return.

    win-win? or something like that...

  11. M26 for MLRS/HIMARS when?

    I cannot see any reason not to, now that 155mm DPICM and depleted uranium APFSDS-T are already being sent... I guess it is just only a matter of time and critical need.

    newest number I found was from 2006
    image.png.6f0adebe3717ab376d8d97df8408bbba.png

    https://www.hrw.org/news/2006/08/18/cluster-munition-questions-and-answers-m26-rocket#:~:text=The U.S. stockpiles 369%2C576 M26 rockets in its active inventory.

  12. 35 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    And so it begins.  The first knock-down fight in the US Congress over Ukraine funding is about to start:

    https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/4172076-conservatives-set-to-battle-over-ukraine-funding/

    For the sake of non-US posters here, I am going to describe what the situation is without inserting my personal political beliefs.  I ask that any responses to this be without political commentary.  There is absolutely no need for it and I'm going to be disappointed with anybody who can not refrain from "putting a sock in it" and keeping this thread from going off the rails.

    So, on the assumption that this crowd is both mature enough and interested enough in sticking to a fact based discussion...

    This is something that many people, including Americans, do not appreciate about the US political system.  If the leader of a chamber doesn't want to take up legislation proposed by the other (or the President), things instantly become very, very messy.  It doesn't matter if the overwhelming majority of the chamber (all parties) would vote in favor of it, the leader doesn't have to do anything to make a vote happen. 

    This is especially true of the Republican House which has, for several decades, refused to bring forward legislation for a vote if it can't be passed by Republicans alone.  Meaning, if the Republican caucus in the House is 50.00001% not in favor of something, no vote will be called EVEN IF the Democrats and Independents are 100% in favor of it.  Actually, especially if they are 100% in favor of it (no Republican leadership would survive such an event).  But lately, due to the internal instability of the Republican party generally, and the House caucus specifically, it doesn't even get to that point. 

    The leadership is vulnerable to being voted out and so all it takes is a solid minority to be opposed to something and the leadership buckles in order to stay in its positions.  At the moment there's about 70 (32% of total) House Republicans that are on the record of not being in favor of sending more aid to Ukraine.  Of that, a sizeable chunk (unknown, but likely 20%+ of total) are predisposed to threatening to seek new leadership over this and other issues.  The last leadership election was the most contentious and prolonged in US history, something that the current leadership is well aware of.

    The bottomline here is that the Republican House leadership is in a bind.  They either do what the minority of their party wants or get tossed out of their leadership positions.  This effectively means about 10% of the membership of Congress control national policy.  The Founding Fathers referred to it as the "tyranny of the minority" and they tried to ensure it didn't happen.  Obviously there's a few checks and balances missing in order to do that.

    Nobody knows what is going to happen next, but whatever it is won't be as beneficial to Ukraine as it has been before.  This was predicted as soon as the Republicans took over the previous session (the one that was about to end) in both House and Senate worked together across party lines to buy Ukraine some time.  That time, unfortunately, has run out.

    Steve

    There are ways if there is will.

    Example that lend lease act that was passed for Ukraine.

    I am sure there are also many many other more "creative" ways like black budgets.

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