ikalugin

Some clarifications (I don't really visit these forums anymore, but this was brought to my attention): -352k figure is for total contract troops (privates and NCOs) in the Armed Forces. This gives 1 to 1 ratio of contract troops (privates and NCOs) to conscripted troops (privates and NCOs) in the Armed Forces as of the end of the 2015. For the Ground Forces they have somewhat above ~50 percent in terms of contract troops vs conscript troops ratio. By 2021 this intends to go to figure of 80 percent of contract troops (privates and NCO), meaning that Ground Forces would become a nearly pure contract troops (privates and NCOs) force. This shows that, because Ground Forces do not include VDV, Naval Infantry, Specnaz or other forces viewed as "elite" by the western obserers, there is no special allocation to the "elite" forces, because Ground Forces not only have higher than average percentage of contract troops (privates and NCOs) in their ranks as of the end of 2015 (somewhat higher than the 50 percent average ratio for contract troops vs consript troops), but also plan to de facto go all pro (by 2021) while the overall Armed Forces would retain conscripts (with overall ratio of ~5/3 between contract troops and conscripted troops). Thus the notion of "elite" units of forces receiving contract troops or being the sole combat capable forces is no longer supported by the evidence, nor is the notion that Russian Armed Forces are being prepared to fight limited and/or hybrid wars supported by the evidence (as noted by a CSIS report: "wo trends should be emphasized. First, Russia is not modernising its military primarily to extend its capacity to pursue hybrid warfare. It is modernising conventional military capability on a large scale; the state is mobilising for war." source ) Another interesting point to note is that Ground Forces (and Russian Armed Forces overall) are expanding, Ground Forces plan to expand by ~1/3 through 2015-2021 time frame and this is done by expanding the pool of contract troops rapibly (298-352 growth in 2015, up to 499k overall by 2020). There is also a drive for internal optimsation in terms of manpower such as the transfer of infrastructure to the civilian authorities (and thus freeing manpower from guarding it, throught the reform this has provided tens of thousands in manpower terms). Sources (that are not listed in text directly, for the materials themselves ask BTR, as I do not visit these forums often): - end of 2015 report by MoD (in Russian). - interview by CINC Ground Forces (in Russian).

Even though GPV and post GPV repair approaches differ, tank repair factory is not always something stationary far in the rear, in GPW times (especially in the late years, where Soviet air and artillery superiority was clear), it was quite possible to forward deploy those assets, even though they were still centraly managed. At the same time - you should remember that mobile groupings had a high degree of autonomy, so they had their own logistics/repair assets.

What is the threshhold for inclusion into the game?

Steve, before you read any further, please do consider splitting the OT from this thread into some sort of specialised thread. I, myself, am not very comfortable with filling this thead with Op Art stuff I did specify, else, what did you discuss below in your post? What I seek at the moment is not sources to back up specific claims, but rather the core materials that formed your view on the matter, so I could access those if I have not done so already. As those materials (which I did not access at some point in the past) are (most likely) in English it would be quicker for me to access them, rather for you to access previously uknown to you materials from my side as they would be (most likely) in languages other than English. The point of excericise is to gain some common ground in such matters as terminology for example. Ok, however it would be more convenient if this debate (regarding Soviet era operational art and related matters) is kept sepate of Armata discussion. To an extend you are correct, however the lower level operations (where such replacement occurs the most) will develop in accordance to calculated plan (within a margin of error), as they are dependent on higher level of operations. Sufficient reserves, again, are pre planned from the higher level of operations. Thus such mechanism would work properly, should the user party have: - have proper scientific theory (backed up with experiments and historic experience) to calculate such things. - good high level (operational, operational-strategic) planning/command. - adequate means to execute those plans. The point is that instead of throwing green soldiers into the depleted units in the field, where there would be no time to co train and integrate such soldiers into their units, you create cohesive, integrated units. Between the operations due to lower over all levels of casualties (due to faster operational tempo) you would have a greater pool of experienced troops (especially command wise) to form the replacement units from. The reason why Soviet classical model is not applicable to Russia is not because of -throwing bodies at the problem- (WW2 stereotypes?), but because Russia no longer plans to fight a pre emptive conventional, high intensity, medium term wars on multiple fronts. It is reflected in our doctrine - by lowering the nuclear release threshhold (which does not remove the requirement for a conventional defence ofcourse, as we still need that nuclear release level above the tripwire). And now we go into the subject of losses on the Eastern Front. I would really, really try to avoid it in Armata thread. Which translations from Russian and German are you fammiliar with?

Ok, so you present your authority rather than sources. Regarding the operational art - I did not refer to present day, but rather to the Soviet era (as otherwise comparison between US and USSR is meaningless). I think the argument was lost somewhere between the walls of posts, I guess that discussion has a place elsewhere, as here it is OT. Would it be more convenient to conduct it in private (for example by the means of skype?). Your lengthy analogy is wrong - soviets do not restock the shelves (formations), they replace the fully stocked shelves themselves. Such an approach (replacement by formation) allows higher and not slower rates of operations (ie contrary to what your analogy suggests) within the operation (a limited period of time), because units could be expended at continued high rates during the operations. This (high rate expenditure) does not lead to drops in seamlessness of operations, as whole units-formations are replaced in a contninued fashion, as determined by military science (ie lifetime of those units is known well in advance). It also allows one to improve integrity of units, as they come and go to the battlefield in uniform fashion. It also decreases over all losses, as tempos of operations increase. p.s. can you access any materials in languages other than English?

No, it allows higher operational tempo (within the operation), as you could allow higher rates of losses (you just replace expended regiments/divisions/armies/fronts with fresh ones). I did mention depth, didn't I? Even if I disregard the fact that Soviets had very little need to march on Kiev, it is a front level operation, which will imply full logistic assets including tank repair plants. Recovery is done lower (than repairs), still if you look at the historic loss rates in lets say 1944 operations, you would see that tanks were turned over (ie knocked out, repaired) multiple times (7-12 times if I remeber it right) during the operation, within operational level commands (ie Tank Armies). If you look at the Cold War era structures - you would see where maintenance, basic repairs and evac services were at. And what sort of logistics assets Soviet Battalions-Regiments-Divisions had compared to Front and Army.

This sort of more applicable to units, ie regiments, rather that sub units (which battalions were).

The idea is not to push individual vehicles upwards when they break down, but for the formation to operate with a given level of reliability untill it goes out of action and goes for repairs/replenishment in it's entirety. This is true for all of the subunit-units-formations, they had a set lifetime (in wartime) and depth of expected operations. As to the firepower - derailment discussion was about Soviet doctrine. On topic (as politics were explicitely stated to be on topic): http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20150407/1057146596.html Duma says that the GPVs were not cut (overall defense relevant budget had a 5 percent cut), but some programs were delayed.

John, you really should re read Soviet Armour Since 1945, as it is not, ehem, entirely acurate.

Could you, please, be more specific (and yes I have read works by David Glantz too)? The reason why I ask is because: - it appears that we have widely different views. - you appear to be a sane, rational and educated person. - you do not appear to be military proffesional. - thus you base your opinion on some form of specialised literature. - hence to understand where you come from it would help if I read the same literature. The primary reason behind centralisation of maintenance (and logistics) was not the ability of troops to maintain their vehicles (though it did play some part) was concentration of effort. Ie you do not wish to get your logistical assets to sit idely behind economy of force troops, you want them in your active sectors. This is why logistics/maintenance, firepower and other assets were pushed upwards. It has one serious disadvantage - you cannot fight a war without mobilising, as your repair assets are on the Front level and in general are not availiable without mobilisation (with exception of Groups of Forces), this lead to severe problems in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

So I guess employement of composite armours (T64) and integrated FCS (T64B, prior to the M60A3), as well as large calibre smouthbore cannon (T62) got us mixed results, ok. Or employement of proper dual plane stabilisers and NBCR protection system with the T55A (though nuclear war did not happen, such equipment was highly desired feature of 60s and ealry 70s tanks). For the same ammount of assets (logistics and fire power wise) concentrating assets at higher levels of command is simply better - as it provides concentration of effort. The reason behind western dispersion of assets was poor operational level theory and doctrine. As a historian, which works on operational art and military science are you fammiliar with?

Would it help if I make the photos from parade myself? There are already open 3d modeling efforts going on using availiable open source data. If we are talking about combat capabilities - the gun is fairly well known (information about the round length, muzle energy is fairly availiable), what else? Mobility (general mass category and geometrical size, as well as engine power are known)? Protection (a tricky part, though this would be fairly obvious by the time parade comes)?

With the 100mm HE-FRAG in the barrel I would fire that first and then use the 30mm autocannon. The reason behind this is simple - stock BMP3s do not have TGMs in their autoloader, they are stored separately and require manual loading. Bahcha-U combat modules solves this (and many others, such as the scopes) BMP3 fire power related issues.

There are: - immages of the Armata. - videos of Armata moving around. - official order for maintaining 24 Armata vehicles (12 IFVs and 12 tnks) in the parade unit (which by the way is already being executed - you could see that from official goverment procurement system website). Still, one could pretend that those vehicles do not exist until they march on that Red Square on 9th of May.

HE-FRAG hit would probably blow of ERA plating, disable scopes, ect. Ie you may not get a full on kill, but you would disable and severely dammage the hostile IFV.

I think that all things considered - 100mm HE-FRAG is a valid option for the first shot.

There were a lot of missile systems shown on parades that never made it. Esp in 60s. Armata would go into experimental small scale usage soon (actually it sort of did - with the parade unit), so for the game purposes it would be ok to have Armata BTG (1 Armata tnk and 1 Armata IFV companies), if not large scale units, as those Armata vehicles have already been produced.

http://rostec.ru/news/3150 Interesting article.

Yes, after parade there should be sufficient photo/video footage. Back on the topic, note how little extra space (in T90 patern turret) is required to switch from the older to the newer gun:

Protection levels were around the same (higher for the T64 vs M60 comparison), munitions were comparable (untill M829A1 and more so with M829A2), C2 integration was the same (untill after 1989, when USSR did not field low tactical level C3I system - extension of Manevr-M). I think the mistake a lot of people make is comparing 90s tanks (such as the M1A2, M1A2SEP) with their munitions (M829A2, M829A3, that said M829A3 had some production issues) against the Soviet mid 80s desighns such as the T80U or T72B with their mid 80s munitions (Vant, Mango). Or in fact with late 60s-70s desighns (ie the Iraqi tanks). Sadly there is not much else to do, as Russian Armed Forces did not field any advanced desighns during that time period (such as Burlack), however such comparisons are still faulty and would not reflect the situation should Russian Armed Forces procure modern desighns (such as Armata).

Who doesn't get a digital FCS now adays? That said - I think that getting a new artillery system is also important, as no magic FCS could get rid of the gun's imperfections in their entirety.

In a way it (T72B3 vs M1A2SEP v2) is closer to T34-85 vs Pnz V, if one had to make a silly WW2 comparison.

The point I am trying to make is that it appears that you have very little idea as to how Soviets were desighning their tanks and for which reasons. The maintenance part of it is but an example - Soviet tanks were difficult to maintain in the field (doing anything other than changing oil/batteries was no easy task), because they were not intended to be maintained in the field, but rather whole sets of vehicles were intended to be sent to the rear and maintained/repaired there after a set period of time (ie when the unit was expected to sustain sufficient casualties). While the Soviet desighns were indeed relatively simple to produce and well thought out (having military science to back up the concept helped), they were by no means low tech, for example T64B for it's time was fairly revolutionary (integrated fire control system, first of the kind, TGM, ect). The only area in which Western tanks did over come the Soviet ones (and only during late cold war) were the thermals.

Russian 120mm mortars (such as Nona) have same effects as the 152mm howziters (such as Msta), but tend to offer less range.

I wonder if firing 100mm HE-FRAG would be a valid tactic.