ikalugin

This is uncertain. There are two possibilities - either a single BDE has been expanded into a Div or an all new Div has been formed. Either way it is about expanding overall force vs re organising it within the same manpower or equipment pool. What we do know for sure is that the new divisions would use new basing fascilities and thus, in my opinion, they would be most likely all new formations. If I find out, I would reflect it in my article about Russian Armed Forces expansion. Interesting note, the 3 new units (there are 4 divisions in formation, with 1 TD in Center - Chelyabinsk area but that TD is known to be expanded out of a tnk BDE) need a lot of new equipment, ~650 in tanks alone. p.s. in manpower terms, if a BDE is expanded into a Div, we are talking about atleast ~50 percent growth (from under 4.5k to 10k).

I am working on it, but sadly the progress is slow. Meanwhile: http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3430116 Russia is forming another motorised rifle division, now in Smolensk area. It would be a part of 1st Grds Tnk Army (which already has 2 divisions - 1 MRD and 1 TD), construction of basing fascilities and formation are set to be completed by the middle of the next year. The division would have 3 MRRs 1 TR 1 AR 1 ADR and other assets. The division follows the patern of 2 other divisions which are being formed - in Rostov and Voronezh areas, those would have their basing and formation completed by December, 2016. (there were additional units and formations formed elsewhere, but those 3 are directly relevant to CMBS)

I don't plan to monitor other topics. So if you plan to discuss something with me, please either do it here or in PMs.

Ok, I would look into it. On a separate note. Remember how Iskander-M next year replaces last Tochka-U in the missile BDEs? I wonder where the launchers and Tochka-U stocks would go, considering how Ukraine's BMD capabilities are marginal at best. Here is the table for how many (Tochka, not Tochka-U) missiles you need to destroy typical targets:

What would you like to see in an article (in eng) about Ukrainian Armed Forces equipment procurement (2014-2016) and R&D?

In the grim dark future when my report is complete and published you could discuss it at your leasure. At the moment, personally, I have very little interest in discussing anything in multiple threads, in fact this is the only thread that I post in now adays on the only forum that I am active on.

That is the military balance data for 2016 (there are additional T72s and T80s this does not account for). Same data for 2013 was 1100 tanks. Same comparison of the two reports provides ~50 percent equipment losses on average.

Cheating is difficult, because you 1) don't know when or where you are going prior to the more 2) if the move is long range it is unlikely that you would have local contacts in the training area. The long range deployments are done mostly by rail. This allows troops to train for strategic re deployments, as those are done mostly by rail here and the difference between a 300 and 3000km move is fairly minor.

We could independetly make lists of repaired and newly built equipment items and then compare them. How does this sound?

That is footage of a competition, not an exercise. Readiness exercises are now done without warning, over unfamiliar terrain, after the long marches (ie by marching units several thousands of km to a semi randomly selected exercise area). There are also such exercises with the reservists.

I don't think that we have met on these forums so to speak (while I do visit this thread now, I don't visit others), but I would welcome any constructive input. We may have differing views on the matter however, we would see how it goes.

I guess you are interested. Long story cut short - Ukrainian Defense Industry did not fill the losses, much less allowed additional equipment for Armed Forces (and paramilitary forces) expansion. This is so because the production plans were not executed, nor is there any evidence that the situation would improve in the relevant time frame. I would make a detailed post about this later, citing relevant sources.

Ok, I would be looking into making an infographic on the lines of the Iskander one made by a comrade of mine. The problem is that such activity can be viewed as illegal, thus I would consult before publishing it, to be on the safe side. Not exactly, the plan is to: - spread contract troops around the units as specialists (already done). - build up contract troops only BTGs in the units (1-2 currently per unit). - increase the ammount of contract troops only BTGs untill a number of units are contract troops only (in process, as conscripts are retained some units would retain conscripts in some of their BTGs). Then you use different BTGs for different missions within the Unit's mission.

https://hasstef.cartodb.com/viz/bf38e8bc-3dc9-11e6-855e-0e3a376473ab/public_map Iskander-M unit deployment map, by of one of my online comrades using open sources. Red - BDEs not rearmed with Iskander series (ie those that retain tochkas), there is another BDE set expected this year. In addition to 1 BDE and 1 Divizion (battalion) sets ordered pre 2011, 10 more were ordered in 2011 for total of 11 1/3 BDE sets. Note, where Iskanders are actually permanently deployed. We may produce another map, with new units and formations.

That is the old plan, look into the 2015 correction.

Nuclear payload requires specialist modifications for the launcher and missile (namely - climate control for the warhead). Such systems, to my best knowledge, were never seen on the launchers, nor were they ever mentioned in any reports. Thus it is highly unlikely that Iskander-M has a nuclear payload of any kind. Also, Iskander-M launcher cannot take full length (and thus INF-treaty violating) cruise missiles, it is too short. p.s. you forgot SCUDs. I can go to the reasons behind nukes being everywhere, but they would be too boring

If you compare 2013 and 2016 inventories you get ~50 percent decrease on average, I can break it down by category. If you read 2014 and 2015 reports on the end of the year results, you would see complete failure of Ukrainian defense industry - the most obvious being Oplots (0-5 produced per year, depending on how you count them, meaning that there are more Armatas out there than Oplots). Are you talking about Brigade's subunits (currently there are 1-2 purely contract BTGs per unit such as BDE or Div which have conscripts in other subunits, in the future with the growth of the contract force there would be purelly contract units)? The idea is two fold: - spread some contract troops around as specialists (ie NCOs). - reform subunits (starting with 1 BTG) with contract troops, by 2021 the plan is to continue this untill a number of BDEs do not have any conscripts in them (some conscripts would be retained in the Ground Forces). What is wrong with it? Are you interested in formation of new units/expansion of old units, military construction? This is CMBS relevant, as there is atleast 1 additional Army type formation (most likely - 2) that is availiable for the CMBS timeline.

Anything on the russian military stuff? Btw, while we are in OT, did you see the reports on the state of Ukrainian defense industries in 2014 and 2015, on the inventory status (such as via comparison of 2013 and 2016 inventories)?

To nitpick - there is no evidence I am aware of that Iskander-M (ie - the quasi ballistic missile) has any non conventional payloads.

About economics, they are OT in my opinion, unless you can illustrate that Russian State would collapse in the relevant time frame. And when you discuss stuff like changes in reserves or company debt, please supply (direct) sources, as things are often misreported.

Ok, from 2014 and 2015 reports, in those years: - total of ~59k servicemen returned to combat training from guard duty and ~40k civilian personel were optimised due to optimisation of infrastructure (transfer of various stuff to civilian authorities, centralisation of storage). (majority of data comes from 2015 report, it is possible that more manpower was freed up). About growth: 2015-2020 plan proposes a ~1/6 growth in total manpower (through additional contract troops being hired), with Ground forces growing by ~1/3. The growth of the Ground Forces comes from both the growth of the Armed Forces in general and from internal optimisation. I can add stuff about activation of new units and formations, if you are interested, as well as known infrastructure projects (which define basing).

Pension fund is separate from the budget. The policy stays, security related spending has priority. Still, we are going into OT. Are you interested in additional data on the Russian Armed Forces ongoing expansion?

Then your point was irrelevant to the discussion at hand, unless you believe that the cuts in the social expenditures (or other events) would lead to collapse of Russian state in the relevant time frame.

In addition, If I may quote CINC Ground Forces (in interview to the Red Star, 29.09.2015): "Уже в настоящее время в каждом из общевойсковых соединений созданы 1-2 батальонные тактические группы, полностью укомплектованные военнослужащими по контракту, представляющие собой мотострелковые (танковые) батальоны, усиленные танковыми (мотострелковыми) подразделениями, артиллерией, подразделениями ПВО, разведки, инженерных войск, РХБ защиты." Translation (by your trully): "At this time every combined arms unit {Brigade, Division, etc - by the translator} of Ground Forces we have 1-2 battalion tactical groups, fully stocked with contract troops (ie no conscripts), which are motorised rifle (or tank) battalions, reinforced with tank (motorised rifle) subunits, artillery, air defense, recon, engeniering troops, chemical defense troops." Note the use of contract troops - destribution between units, vs concentration in "elite" units.

The expansion was planned before the drops in oil prices and so far (2014, 2015 and to some extend 2016) the data supports that the plans were not cut, if anything they were expanded. As the CSIS report says - we are preparing for a large scale war, not local hybrid operations. Defense (and other critical) spending was and is balanced against stable (ie non oil/gas) incomes. Thus defense (and other critical) spending is not dependent on the oil prices. Thus defense spending would be maintained, if anything in 2015 there was a surplus of money (~1T rubles), due to delays in a number of procurement programs. That is, unless you believe that the entirety (state reports, news items, etc) of reporting on Russian Armed Forces (and Ground Forces as a subset of those) expansion (formation of new units, expansion of existing units, hiring of new contract troops etc) in 2014 and 2015 (and to an extend - 2016) is falsified. You can read about other developments in BTR's post.