BTR

As in, in point three?

Quite an interesting piece on M829A3: http://below-the-turret-ring.blogspot.de/2016/02/m829a3-apfsds-penetration-power-common.html?m=1

Yeah, that was just a direct translation from Russian. It is anti-radiation lining. Apparently quite good against HEAT as well as Chechen campaign experience points out.

Ah yes, I forgot the main thing right :D? Grey: RHAYellow (amber): Fiberglass (Glasstextolite) Dark grey: RHA add on platesWhite: Air gapsBrown: ERA explosive componentBlue: CeramicsBlack: RubberYellow (chartreuse): Neutron lining

To kick the discussion back on its track. Here are glacis compositions for main Soviet medium and main battle tanks. Most of it is fairly common knowledge, but I never really found it amalgamated into one clear visual representation: In case BF ever decides to get their cold war theme rolling.

That is a valid point. I think the APS are modeled in their "Ideal" state having instant reaction, near instant reload times and so forth. I touched on this in the armor thread a while back.

About 2B9 and 2B9M direct fire usage (previously discussed here). Commentary from a user: Short translation: "It is impossible to lower the gun below 1º10´ of elevation. You may end up lucky and have the target above your line of fire, but what if it is below? Only after around 1km or so is it possible to come up with something. However, there were ways to adjust angles in Chechnya due to high sloping, jacks or other means". Here is the original comment:

Yup, NATO strong, Russia weak, we can all go home. In the even of occupation though: Baltic insurgency in times of occupation are Interior troops territory. Not sure how many would need to be there to reinforce military presence of the available total 170K. Insurgency strikes the hardest when there is a major cultural shock and no supporting population. Neither is the case in the Baltics, with major Russian ethnic populations in two out of the three regions that would probably be used as the base for counter-insurgency networks. Baltic population is also fairly non-reactive if we judge by post-WW2 comparisons to western Ukraine for example.

Yeah, I was about to say that the training is probably more valuable in reverse for the US rather then for Ukrainians.

Ok, if Battlefront would introduce SBR stations for the Russian army, would you then say they are not realistic for the Ukrainian side? Also, my derp in case of BTR battalions.

Back in 2011, ex deputy defense minister Popovkin claimed that NATO has an equivalent modern equipment ratio at 30-50% which would indicate that stored equipment in any and all conditions are also taken into account. I've never seen a detailed definition of what "modern is" though.

A. Type 1 is fairly standard post-soviet organization for many countries, we saw references to this as late as 2013. Perhaps 2RPK+1PKM group was an amalgamation of both combat structures. C. Got it. Formal structure it is then. We haven't picked it up in recent mentions, but I agree that formalized TOE is better. D. As above. How would you judge SBR deployment by the Ukrainian side? Would it be at least theoretically possible? E. As points C-D, formalized structure depicts special equipment. If I had my doubts about silenced pistols (I've never seen any in Ukrainian or Russian deployments), but at least some AKMSB's should be available, even if improvised with different silencers. H. Minor vehicle ey? Fine if that is the way it is seen... I. The actual TOE structure for BTR battalion depicts an old soviet one, not a 10 APC one IIRC. J. Understood.

This is not the 86th Brigade, but 86th Brigade reservists assembly.

On topic, Russian infantry in CMBS *is* under-equipped, but not in a way one would think. Infantry lacks RPG-7 and RPO carry equipment and just pull grenades out of their pockets.

Yeah, I got that it wasn't your description. This was more of a rock for RT's garden.

First correction I have to make, is that neither UVZ nor its subsidiary ChTZ are in Siberia :D.

Polish response and subsequent invasion to Russia would activate CSTO treaties bringing Belarus into the conflict, which altogether is a different scenario. Looking at the beginning of this discussion, one of the primary assumptions was that NATO wasn't involved and that Baltics were not supported. The original setting in examination were current conditions as well, and that is what I stuck with. This is an equally unrealistic scenario to that of Russia invading a NATO country. However, as I think I've managed to demonstrate, your original conclusion that the Baltics have a chance against a directed Russian aggression on their own for even the "first month" of fighting is also overly optimistic (idealistic even?). The current trend is to reinforce the Baltics, how much of it is political will which may change with administration change is very much up to question, especially with renewed ME US deployments now also being in the equation. On Baltic fleet, if you re-read my original statement, in worst case scenario it remains a force multiplier even without having to leave its mooring. A very similar situation to WW2 and the role the Baltic fleet took during the battle for Leningrad.

Naval power is going to play a role even without having to move from mooring in Kalinigrad with ranged support. Plus for your numbers game, apart from just Naval Infantry, the navy in that vicinity has one motor-rifle brigade, one rocket artillery brigade, one tube artillery brigade, one motor-rifle regiment and other supporting land formations like EWAR battalions and such. The Russian superiority in the Baltic region does not come from a numbers game, but from the fact that BDF lacks entire classes of weaponry and thus capabilities. Very limited tube artillery past 100-120mm, no MLRS as class, no counter-battery detection, no helicopter fleet (at all), no naval power, no high precision long ranged tactical weaponry, no EWAR capabilities, the list goes on. It isn't just about armor, and even there it isn't just about MBTs. 30mm autocannons are nearly ubiquitous in the Western/Southern MD forces, even on lighter APC's while they aren't proliferated if if we take the whole three Baltic armies. Again, RANDs assessment in that light sounds fairly in-line with what the current conditions are.

Quantitative assessment in this case is funny. It is impossible to qualitatively and quantitatively match equipment against a 125K strong Russian force for the entirety of supposed joint Baltic Defense Force. I am also not sure why apples and oranges are being thrown at each other, "combined Baltic military force" vs Russian ground force. What happened to air and naval parts of the equations for the Russian team? The latest conflict involving conventional forces, showed that a 13K land force (3 of them irregulars) can overwhelm a 19K land force in 4.5 days given superior intelligence and air support. Mobilization scenario over long periods (you mentioned a month) for the Baltics is not relevant here since these countries lack any strategic depth. Furthermore active and ready "BDF" forces that require no prior organization to deploy in case of an attack combine to approximately (quick look past wiki) 16+18+13 for the entire forces, Navy, Air, Ground, National Guard, Military Police, Ceremonial troops and paramilitary. RAND's assessment sounds a lot less like agenda-pushing in that light.

New batch. I've also updated first part with what we have discussed here. 2 - There are currently two types of mechanized battalions: Type 1 has 6 people in platoon command. A Platoon Leader, 2IC, medic, sniper, MG gunner and MG gunner’s aid. This type has three squads of 8: a squad Leader, IFV driver, IFV gunner, senior rifleman, AT Operator, AT aid, Rifleman (RPK) and a regular rifleman. A total of 30 men across 3 BMP’s. Type 2 has four people in platoon command: a platoon Leader, 2IC, Medic and a sniper. This type also has three squads of 8: a squad leader, IFV driver, IFV gunner, senior rifleman (RPK), AT Operator, AT aid, MG gunner (PKM) and MG gunner’s aid. All in all, 28 men across 3 BMP’s. Type 2 was to be the standard formation choice post 2012, but not all brigades could transform due to general lack of PK/M machine guns. We are slightly confused by the third crew member of every second BMP in a mechanised infantry platoon. Vehicle commander and squad commander duties always were and are one and the same. Mechanised company command HQ has an extra person in CMBS in comparison to real life personnel structure. Recon platoon is not correctly represented from what we gathered. It comprises of one command squad of two and three recon squad. Much like in RU recon platoons that we covered, first squad of six is operating the BRM-1K vehicle. To break it down, the first squad has 1 squad leader, driver, IFV gunner, senior ground radar operator, ground radar operator and a RATELO operator. Two other squads are homogenous, and consist of a squad leader, driver, IFV gunner, senior scout, one scout with AK-74, one scout with MG, one scout with an SVD. An important thing to note about these squads is that senior scout has AKMSB as his second weapon, while squad leader should have a silenced pistol as his sidearm. That also goes for the recon platoon leader. Every platoon is allocated one RPG-7 as their AT weapon. AT platoon overall looks very consistent to what we have observed in the current Ukrainian forces. However we cannot be certain, since quite a number of Brigades lack on AT platoon altogether. There is also at least one case of the AT platoon being entirely comprised of AT-4’s. We don’t posses “paper” TOE’s to confirm how the ideal picture looks. AGL operators carry AKS-74U’s. Like in RuAF, the Ukrainian military does not consider Pistols as effective combat weapons. Most battalions have BMP-2K as command vehicle and BMP-1KSh as a CnC vehicle, not MT-LB. Also, a battalion can have organic engineer, SAM or AAA squad. Mechanised battalions on BTR-70’s are still in operation in the 92nd Brigade, however their structure isn’t as depicted in CMBS. 92nd Brigade recon platoon is exactly the same as in other Mechanised Brigades, riding BMP’s and one BRM-1K. Mechanised companies comprise 10 APC’s each. We cannot guarantee that this structure is an official structure, or that this structure would be replicated in other BTR-70 armored formations (if there were any).

I'm sorry if I came over as hostile, but its just your manner of typing that ticks me :). I can live with Panzer's, I suppose I'm not as used to you yet. To switch the subject (on which we'll never agree), Russian helicopter support in CM:BS is both over and under represented. Mi-24PN was a test variant which never saw service, yet Mi-24VM (Mi-35M as referred by Ru media) isn't there along its older Mi-24V(P)/P variants are not around.

That is last year's December information Steve. Best case scenarios was $50 p/bbl, worse case scenario was $40 p/bbl with a deficit of 2.8-3% as of 2015 and 2016 (planned). I'd link the articles, but what you could do instead is do your own searches with google translate to find out what I've said is accurate (how rude of me, oh wait...). Thank you for the article you linked, a good perspective and almost a canonical example of what the liberal opposition media here views of good analysis and journalism. I must be living a different reality here though, but I suppose I am just a part of (paratranslating the article) "The lowers that are zombified and that are in lethargic sleep and don't understand that they've been put under the knife". The meat would be in the numbers though had they any referencing at all of where they got them from. Crisis in Russia? Sure, but check the Baltic dry index, everyone's in the same boat (or lack of boat really).

Correction Steve, ever since 2014, budget was balanced at 40USD p/bll, everything else was a surplus that went to Stabilization fund and/or Oil companies social programs. Not that this has anything to do with this particular thread, but oh well. I'm not proclaiming "everything is covered", but low oil prices are not the dragon everyone's painting them to be.

According to our research: Motor-rifle line infantry: CMBS has over represented Motor-rifle NVG equipment. Night scopes, usually within 2+/3 GEN, are often assigned to AT gunner, Grenadier, MG gunner and Squad Leader. Currently there are no NVG monocles in service with motor-rifle troops. We are not sure how things will change in next two years. Collimator sights (2-4 x 1PN63 per squad) are also sometimes available. This would be more widespread in higher trained infantry such as recon battalions, but high-readiness motor-rifle battalions would also be fully supplied with these devices. Motor-rifle recon infantry: From what active service personnel has informed us, a more authentic loadout would be every member having an night gun mounted optic and SL/ASL having one night binocular. There are a few possible night binoculars available for infantry which were touched upon in motor-rifle section. Better supplied recon infantry would probably have access to BN-4 (1PN98 2+ gen adopted in 2006). No news of large day optics shipments have been heard, but 1P29 and 1P78-1 have been seen in recon-like, high readiness formations alongside 1P63 collimator sight. 1-2 magnification sights per recon squad therefore seems appropriate to us. PSO-1 comes standard issue with all VSS and SVD rifles. Universal proliferation from even Afghan campaigns. We will examine VDV when it is time, but the general theme is that they are a lot better equipped with regular magnified scopes, NVG scopes and thermal scopes as well. I have no idea what MVD has.

Very good price/job done ration as well. 245.3 million USD for converting/rebuilding 30 M109A6's and 30 M99A2s into M109A7s and M99A3s.