BTR

Those battalion level battlegroups keep coming up (again), yet there are no pictures. Vim's comment presented to me before was discussed earlier.

This is getting nailbiting with air support getting inbout. What do you estimate US own air defences to be?

We can all have powerfantasies can we?

That was one of the main reasons I wanted to become a vehicle operator actually. My Father was a career officer in the 336th Naval infantry brigade back in the 80's, so I heard plenty horror stories not to use feet as my main locomotion in the army.

Peeling potatoes is a supreme way to occupy a soldier. Everyone knows that a soldier with free time is a disaster waiting to happen.

2010-2011 BTR-80 Operator (Driver), western military district. If we go by "oh crap" moments, three APC's sinking into a bog one after another because our CO decided to play the tactician would be one of the best. Taking them out wasn't as fun as getting stuck though.

Some silly claims going around here. Someone said 4 x Russian battalion tactical groups involved in ukraine in summer? That’s roughly 3200 men without additional logistical support. People throwing numbers around like that better give at least some sourcing. I have no knowledge or proof even a fraction of that was ever deployed. For a force this size it certainly is impossible to keep a low visibility, there must at least be some sort of video or photo documentation. Also, I would greatly appreciate proof of monetary incentive for Russian servicemen to go operational in Ukraine. People seem to be confusing the amount of Russian Nationals involved in this conflict for members of Russian military. No one is denying logistical, advisory and limited SF support to the separatists, but further claims seem a little tinfoil hat-like with no actual proof. I don’t see the claim of Polish snipers as foolish. Other nationals were seen in various battalions, most notable example of that being a Swedish citizen in Azov. Looking at a plethora of mercenaries deployed in various conflicts, having radical polish citizens fight alongside radicalised ukrainians for whatever reasons (russophobia or else) is not something unlikely. Further comments on how we are bias by nature because we live in a country that puts something on state-sponsored TV is insulting. Moreover, I’ve seen that episode, and all points of views were presented, from the most liberal, to most hardline like you’ve seen ripped out of context. Some of you live in countries which were witch-hunting WMD’s for some time in certain countries, yet we somehow restrain of bringing that into valid and otherwise interesting discussion. Ikalugin is in the middle of putting together a good, in-depth analysis of what the force composition from the russian side would be, so I’ll defer to him until he sends it to me (Do it nao ).

Thanks, mind you that I am basing my percentage from desired 1M force. Actual numbers vary by season, but currently sit at around 800K+ actual personnel.

My reply got eaten by the internet. In reply to Steve's comment about the current act allowing foreign citizens to sign contracts with RA. In summary -That was possible for roughly 10 years, with the first iteration of this act signed in 2001. -New act adjusts the notion that foreign citizens cannot be deployed to combat zones. There are other minor adjustments as well. -It is in no way considered to be the primary medium of increasing the numbers of professionals in RA. -To illustrate, in 2011 we had 107 foreigners in the whole of RA under contract. -To further illustrate, the amount of professionals currently in RA (Q4 2014) is 295K (29.5% of total armed forces). -Plans are to have 352K by Q4 of next year and 425K by Q4 of 2017 (might be useful for some of your scenarios). -A yearly increase has been a steady 50K for some years now. Current numbers and plans are taken from an interview with Chief of General Staff. -Conclusion, in no way current adjustments to already existing acts are a sign of professionalizing failing or numbers not being sufficient. Media spins on the story are irrelevant.

In effect, it makes sense for vehicles other than MBT's. Mobile artillery, APC's and other light vehicle for covert operations and any other vehicles you don't want seen which won't participate in direct engagement. I think this image here demonstrates the best use for Nakidka:

Very nice post H1nd!

As in ethnically or as in active RA service? With T-72B being in service for almost 32 years, the pool of personnel that is capable of operating it is significantly larger than current active Russian servicemen. Even Chechens had active tanks in operation during first and second campaign with half-rained crews.

People keep bringing up separatist failures at securing Donetsk airport. Separatists have a very limited amount of essentially everything, ranging from armored transports (APC's/IFV's) to guided munitions needed to secure what is a fortified bunker with underground tunnels surrounded by absolutely flat terrain. Against them is a poorly supplied, but fairly well supported entrenched infantry. Their support included tanks and, up until late autumn, IFV's. To be noted, the Ukrainian side could not secure the airport even with grossly larger numbers and better equipment earlier this year essentially for the same reason. Separatists fortified their portion of the airport surrounded by flat terrain. With the additions of irregular forces to CMBS I'm sure this would be an interesting scenario to build and try.

Quite interested to see people generally considering that Summer-Autumn operation in Ukraine involved actual Russian military personnel beyond the SF/Advisers currently present there. I'm happy to see confirmation of that though. Also quite interesting to see people considering stated numbers for mobilization waves and desired outcomes as actual manpower. Historically, actual number of combatants to declared numbers in the Ukrainian army have varied greatly. Ukraine has no effective air-power, and fairly limited G2A capabilities. Any confrontation with Ukraine would play out by the gulf scenario, where RuAF would be used as the driving force in the conflict.

Which is a massive assumption given that no back-story has been provided on how the T-90AM appears in-game. Given that it has Constellation-2M links, along domestic radios, Arena and TGM's, I wouldn't think it's a foreign contract being pulled. 2A82 is then something plausible, just as the whole T-90AM as a vehicle is in CMBS. Many things have been said about M829A4, none of them concrete enough to point us towards a frontal 1 hit kill currently present. Relikt not being current tech is a matter of perspective I suppose. Some say Armata armoring is next-gen, which put's relikt being current generation tech.

Which is fairly inaccurate. Firstly, what time-frame are we talking about? A ) 1994-1995 or B )1999-2000? If it is A- The realities of Grozny were the following: -In a two days delayed response local civilian population was told to leave the city (a sizable number chose to stay); -Heavily fortified positions across the whole city; -5-12K enemy combatants in the area to 12K troops available (1:2.4 at best and 1:1 at worst is hardly enough to assault a city successfully); -No sizable local guerrilla support; -Air support was not available for the first two days of the operation. If it is B- -It was an enemy state capital with no accountable local support; -Evacuation corridors were provided a month before the initial assault; -Most of supporting actions for the monthly duration of the blockade were performed with Air instead of Artillery (which leads me to believe the same would be done in Ukraine).

Sounds likely. Also Dniepr river present a major logistical obstacle for both sides of the conflict. Seizing large crossing points without their destruction sound like a valid objectives.

Looking at it now, thanks.

I would think that RA would strive to achieve dominance outside major population centers, blockading roads, bases and other important objectives like they did in Crimea. All that while using local support with SF aid/integration to try and dominate cities in key areas (admin buildings, power plants etc). Shelling cities indiscriminately, like someone above me said is nonsensical since it deleverages whatever limited local support the RA has to achieve success inside cities. Limited use of artillery on hard-points within cities that wouldn't support RA enough to warrant SF deployment only is debatable though. I personally still see air power as a more accurate and adequate method of combating hard-points inside population centers.

Sure, but just as I haven't used T-90MS in my diagram, I've got no authority on how M892A4 performs. Speculatively though, I've seen various protection numbers for the MS floating from 750, to outlandish 900mm KE RHA on glacis. Conversely I believe M892A4 achieved some ~800mm RHA in test environment (i.e. optimal conditions and impact angle), correct me if I'm wrong thought. 750mm on T-90MS is a rather pessimistic estimate, considering T-90A has some glacis areas approaching 710mm already. There are two things I can extrapolate from that - one is that M892A3 (if it is included in CMBS) cannot penetrate T-90MS, and that a penetration with M892A4 isn't all that "sure" as some might believe. Strange you can't see it, I believe I spoilered it and it shows just fine over here . T-90S(A) is structurally equal to T-90(A), and there isn't any substantial protection of the interior carousel, at least not substantial enough to stop a direct DU impact. One can argue that the carousel is protected by the tank itself, sitting in the lower center-most point of the vehicle. T-90MS however, does have some proper armoring on it's external ammo compartment, nothing on the levels of handling a direct DU hit thought. More importantly, blowout panels are present. Turret separation due to combat action on proper production models isn't that common actually. From 08/08/08 conflict, where all the T-72(AV/B)'s had K-1, out of total 65 lost Georgian tanks, 15 were destroyed in combat, 20 were destroyed after the conflict and 30 were taken as trophies. Out of the 15 tanks lost in combat five had their turret removed. 1 due to airstrike, 1 due to being abandoned and then detonated from inside, 3 due to RPG hits. As a side-note, do T-90MA's in CMBS have 2A46M-5 or 2A82?

Hi there, I feel some people overestimate how "juicy" the interior really is. the actually juicy interiors are quite well protected frontally, and, dissected, represent a very small portion of the actual tank. No crew would bring anything more than an auto-loader-full of ammo to actual combat, unless they got themselves ambushed while travelling. I drew a little approximate picture for you on a T-90S. Red's what makes the boom, yellow what doesn't make boom unless it's a very aggressive HEAT penetration. As for rounds, M892A3 I recall was specifically geared towards Kontakt-5 which provided it's performance against latest current T-XX line-up. How will it fare against Relikt is unknown.