panzersaurkrautwerfer

Helicopter landings are pretty much suicidal on occupied LZs so transport helicopters have not been modeled. There's the ability to use the sort of troops that'd arrive on a helicopter, but you set them up on the map beforehand vs fast roping in or something which is about how it should work anyway.

Edited for less hostile/brevity In a nutshell, the issue is the Stryker BCT is expected these days to be the middle-weight flex option. It's on paper better able to keep up with armored formations during Full Spectrum, but offers all the firepower you could possibly need in COIN. As the case is, the COIN part it does all right at. No dispute there, but I will counter that I feel when it comes to COIN, it is not much better than an IBCT that's been kitted out with MRAPs. On the conventional front, it sucks. Really, really sucks. And the NTC experiments were pretty unambiguous about that, and modern FTXes have pretty well confirmed it. The recon is bad, the MGS doesn't handle tanks at all, the AT capability on the offensive is not up to the job, the maintenance and recovery is totally lacking for any sort of intensity. This is old news. The problem is the Army is still pretending something like 2 CR in Germany is going to be able to go into a fight with a near-peer like Russia and not just get a lot of Americans killed. And the whole rational for the SBCT originally was something beefier than light infantry, but faster deploying than armor formations given the problems with 1991 (Airborne units effectively an angry speed bump to even a third world army, heavy units arriving over the course of months). But the SBCT is not up to that task. It deploys fairly fast, but in practicality, the weapons available are not much better than the IBCT's (especially at current allocation, and the Stryker ATGM isn't much better than a TOW HMMWV). If we're going to have a force that can deploy fast enough to be relevant we have to sacrifice some of the speed of the SBCT, to regain some of the armor of the older heavy formations. Also in a realistic term, the MGS did a great disservice by killing the AGS and other light tank programs. The Army is just now starting to try to find a light tankish thing to plug into the hole the Sheridan (flawed as it was) left.

Nothing wrong with being weird. I compulsively rename units in QB after units I'd been assigned to. I like keeping a timeline though. It keeps me on track if I'm 23 minutes in, and I really need to start accepting risk vs making ultra sure every Russian is dead on objective A.

I don't go quite as far as you do, but I'll often do out doodles and ponder troops to task sort of exercises when I'm out and about.

I've still got grit in my teeth from a Memorial Day drive by from a M4A1, M18, and M3 Stuart (and a M1A1 from the WA National Guard for good measure). While I'm quite taken by CMBS, I've got a World War Two itch that cannot be scratched (no, really, I can't get CMBN to work right on this computer). Fingers crossed for progress reports and release soon.

Given my chance, I'd go full Sparky and turn the whole Stryker family into artificial reefs. Then I'd go back to the AGS type platform and develop the following full track variants: 1. Light Tank with 105 MM, possible Javelin mount for killing MBTs 2. Fire Support/Scout vehicle with 40 MM autocannon and some sort of expanded capability Javelin (bigger rocket motor for more range, possibly larger warhead) in dual or quad mount. 3. APC with modular weapons mount capable of accepting M240, MK-19, M2 or a light-weight 20 MM. Also ability to accept infantry-Javelin tubes to mount and fire same. Possibly accept smaller passenger count in exchange for smaller lighter vehicle. 4. "Support" model of the APC with no weapons station (sans mount for flex type MG), and open bay for various specialty equipment (mortars, CP, etc). I don't intend this to be "modular" in the sense that you could make a mortar carrier with an allen wrench and 45 minutes, but that the base model PC would be effectively the same/nearly the same minus the equipment for the specialty role. As far as common features: Having a vehicle that's able to be airdropped/roll off the plane ready to kill is a waste of time. We're simply not going to commit transports in an area dangerous enough to require a vehicle to roll off a C-130 laying waste to VC surging over the tarmac. On the other hand, building a vehicle designed to be "assembled" on the receiving end with fairly modest tools could allow for a high degree of deployability. It worked rather handily with M24s and similar light tanks historically. Modular armor arrays and a basic "naked" hull APS system. The big mistake of the FCS was building a vehicle to replace all other vehicles, and relying on technology that wasn't a one for one good analog with the replaced technology (so early APS for heavy armor plate). Using a similar model to replace the Stryker is superior however, as the base level armor and protective systems would be on par with a Stryker, while the add on passive, active, and organic APS would instead represent a marked increase in protection. Tacit acceptance of smaller passenger count. The constant infantry insistence in stuffing 9 dismounts in an APC is cute and all, but the compromises it imposes on the vehicle itself have never really ended well outside of having a full rifle squad in each vehicle. Acceptance of CVRT sort of commonality, like a shared suspension and drive system, but otherwise allowing vehicles to be built as needed vs trying to make everything fit in a Stryker/M113 shaped box. Light "naked" weight being a priority. Surviability is good, but Strykers right now already sink up to their hubs on modest terrain. Offering commanders on the ground the choice of "light" or "heavy" performance would make a very flexible formation capable of both being "heavy" COIN forces, or able to hold their own in a conventional fight. If I had to MTOE it, i'd go with effectively a Stryker Company with a one for one replacement of Strykers with the only "differences" being the old MGS platoon returning with the FSV/Scout model vehicles instead. Battalion would operate a light tank company (10 vehicles, 1 CO track, 3 platoons of 3, intention either being to divy up like the MGS was supposed to be, or concentrated for traditional armor missions). Of course the biggest change would be returning the maintenance element back to the Battalion/Company teams as what the hell was that about. CAV would be still four vehicles, just 2 FSV/scout, 2 APC models. Possibly augmented by small/light motorized vehicles to move dismounted teams to and from OPs (motorcycles, some sort of ATV thing). Anyway. Not going full sparky. The M113 needs to be dead. The Stryker wasn't a bad idea as a concept, but the evolution of the vehicle, and the design considerations that went into making it a wheeled platform/the "new world order"* mentality generated something that marginally accomplishes mission. *Not the lizard one. The 1990's vision of how the US Army was going to operate, and the sort of threats and considerations that went with it.

There's really two arguments in terms of ATGMs on vehicles: 1. It allows more offensive employment of ATGMs. While the vehicle cannot do as much when the missile is being shot, it's a lot more rapid to go to a short halt and pop off an ATGM, than dismount the ATGM because ohcraptank. Also in that regard it means your dismounted rifle element doesn't have to carry a few dozen extra pounds of ATGM launcher and missiles everywhere it goes dismounted because it has mobile organic AT. 2. The scale of ATGM can be significantly better than the ATGM carried by the dismount. Even if it lacks the F&F and top attack of the Javelin, the TOW-2B is still a much more potent missile than the majority of infantry portable ATGM systems. Additionally, with most systems the IFV with an ATGM is much less sensitive to supressive fires.

Concur. If there's a feature that seems to do the least utility with a very high price in time and money (and maintenance complexity), it's that auto driver option. More interesting that if there's a practical functioning Russian auto-driver system, even if it is simply follow the leader, it'd be much better as a bolt-on, or even redone crew cab for logistical vehicles than a combat platform. It'd do a lot to reduce the number of required logistics vehicle drivers, and allow "more" to move with "less." The US has done a lot with this simply for this reason, that logistical tail is a giant manpower suck, and having a resupply operation that simply needs some security element and no other human element would be ideal.

Think it's something designed to support either a short crew or possibly allow the Armata to be used as a UGV if I was going to conjecture.

Nah. It'd have to be going pretty fast or else it's just going to move the point of impact a bit. Through the driver's hatch vs through the commander's hatch. The sort of "sagger drill" moves you make to dodge missiles are done at pretty high speed, and a movement started with a sabot in the air is going to do exactly nothing* Which again brings to mind an entire company worth of Armatas going CRAZY because of rocket salvo. *At extreme range a last minute move can cause a miss, but it's usually something like the vehicle started to change direction somewhere between lasing and firing, but the actual perception of the direction change occurred at the instant of firing. Which is to say until the tank or tank crew is capable of precognition, dodging a sabot by turning is not a helpful tactic.

Which is to say some sort of Ukrainian irregulars in the fictional scenario are not unlikely, and would be good to model. Having a "high" tier one that's well funded, and a "low" tier one fitted out with scavenged weapons would allow for a variety of scenarios, and matches up pretty well with the way unconventional dudes were modeled in CMSF. I don't really. I just think it'd be a neat low(er)-effort inclusion. Direct action raids are something CMBS can really do already just fine, but it's a bit odd to have a scenario where an errant rifle squad/platoon somehow has worked its way into an an ADA Battery/logistics park/command node. A semi-generic (or just narrowly defined "The SEALs/Marine SOF/Delta had other engagements, so all you've got is regular Army SOF") special forces team would fix this. It'd also be good for modeling a Green Beret type team working alongside the various uncon forces. If there were to be an unconventional module, a few SOF teams would be nice additions to the original MTOE forces.

New standard for "best thing" is canned beer, fyi.

Re: automatic driver nonsense The state of the art is not there yet. Not to mention it opens the possibly amusing door to simply decoying highly automated tanks into precarious positions, or "suppression" via a host of fairly cheap decoys (given the sort of reaction/flight times there has to be a very proactive "OH GOD MISSILE LAUNCH" determination pretty early in the process, simply something that behaved somewhat like a missile, especially a top attack one could cause the crew fits while the autodriver tried to save them through a series of decoy launches. Hell, thinking about it it'd be a neat trick to put on an Abrams, get lased, pops off a reasonable Javelin early launch proxy, and the Armata crew is suddenly losing it's shot. I have to wonder a what havoc you could do with a decoy volley against a company).

Think they'd still be worth including in either/both of the following formats: 1. Ukrainian elements still active in the east after the Russians push through (as all of the scenarios have an initially successful Russian offensive) 2. The low tier former volunteer units that might now be better controlled, but still less equipped than the standard units.

Same could be said for Syria.

Eh. Ghadafi was weaker than ever, and even if he'd won this one it'd only be seeding the roots of the next one. That also ignores the sort of extremist element that wound up in Libya anyway. A slappy fight between ISIS wish they could be, and the Libyan Army (another oxymoron) is at least one of the more likely outcomes. I still contend it was a matter of time. Either way it should stand as a tacit example of unintended consequence and third order effects.

So that's the case, western technology has to hit that level of economical miniaturization. And looking at PATRIOT, ABM, and other advanced systems.... Yeah it's not there. It's really really not there. The system as described and portrayed does not reflect whats ready for primetime, or even merely the cutting edge. Oh it totally is. Just the question is if it's "THE ARMATA MAY EAT ALL ABRAMS FOR BREAKFAST RATIO 4.5 IN ACCORDANCE WITH 5 YEAR PLAN ON RUSSIAN POWER SUPREME" (but hey it's actually just designed to provide dramatic overmatch to likely threats like ex-Soviet designs but gotta keep up apperances brah) or it's actually intended to be super ultra tank supreme. The first is not unreasonable, the second is difficult to put a lot of faith in given the reliance on external innovation, limited resources, and the maturity of some of the systems involved. It's not just a large system, it's a system in which literally every part of the platform is designed to achieve that missile in the air time. It's the difference between a can opener and the can opener on a swiss army knife. The can opener can 100% afford to comprise all other factors to open a can and thus achieve maximum can efficiency. The can opener on the swiss army knife is constricted by a wide variety of things to make it able to both open cans, and still be able to carry out non-can opening tasks. The sort of performance to make a VLS guided hardkill projectile reasonable is something accomplished by something MUCH bigger, and MUCH more powerful and VERY expensive that isn't also trying to be a high performance direct fire weapons system. It'd be a neat trick to miniaturize it, but frankly no one is there yet, and it's doubtful the Russians are any closer than any number of better funded, just as advanced or more advanced military R&D programs.

The Abrams is strongly resistant to Kornet from most angles. It isn't immune, and the Iraqi armor arrays are like, 1986 levels at this point. Interesting to note the rest of the hits don't really appear to much to the tank in later videos though. In terms of logistics....I think it's more the lack of parts and ammunition. They've likely got enough 100, 115, and 125 MM from Syrian stocks, and that's not uncommon stuff on the foreign market....but finding Abrams spare parts, or 120 MM NATO type rounds is going to be hard. Also much harder to find mechanics or operators for (finding enough jihadist M1 crewmen and mechanics from all sources would be hard, but doubtless there's a lot more available jihadist guys with T-55 experience). Not to mention ISIS isn't exactly conducting armor maneuver warfare.

The big difference though is even a tank firing at max effective range is going to only give you about four seconds to hit with a KE type projectile (with average shots being made much closer), and not much longer for other direct fire type weapons. For ATGMs it might be as long as 30 seconds which is why solving that problem has never been especially difficult, but still somewhat problematic if that threat is coming along a weird vector. Additionally when looking at other interceptor type systems, the sheer cost involved is usually not small to put it mildly. This cost is usually mitigated somewhat by the value of what's being protected (Carrier Battle Group, 30 KM worth of battlespace, etc), but to build something small enough to mount on a tank, and not just that, build several thousand of them that are robust enough to be shot a few times and not fail....that is again, we're looking into the sort of distant future systems over tomorrow's equipment. This high tech spacetank stuff only really makes sense if the Armata is being built to challenge Western tanks. The assessments of it being a neighbor bullying tank I find, are much more reasonable, and much less based in faith in the All Father Putin (May His Iron Fist Restore the Empire)

I'd be down with the scissor type bridges/bull dozers for pushing stuff out of the way (especially dozer tanks!) but the pontoon bridges and tank fighting positions are a big more elaborate than you'd have time for in a CM session (pontoon bridges take anywhere from 1-3 hours depending on the width, depth, speed, and condition of exit/entrance banks, hull down positions can take 40-90 minutes depending on terrain and tools. Hull scrapes aren't as bad, but that's like maybe hiding the lower hull on a good day). The scissor bridge would be cool though. That'd let us go over AT ditches and the like in a pinch, and bulldozer type activities are always handy.

It still needs to be big enough, or powerful enough to do a number on something going very fast, or trigger a missile. There's a practical limit on that much. Also given the sort of speeds and "smart" required for guided APS....you're starting to talk about 2040 type designs vs 2020

I think Libya was self breaking. You can make the argument that Iraq would have potentially limped on for another decade or so (but I'm fairly sure the Arab Spring would have killed it) but for American intervention. Libya as misguided as that was, was going to happen if NATO bombed it or not. More likely than not it'd just wind up looking amateur hour Syria (which is pretty much what it's doing now anyway!).

The difference is the LOSAT was capable of sufficient speed to be designed to function as a kinetic energy weapon. It was a missile that traveled fast enough to bypass any APS or jamming systems of the day, and ignore ERA, that fit on a HMMWV. The 9M123 on the other hand, is just a very fast conventional missile that's still subject to APS, ERA, and the like. Re: APS The rose colored glasses went out of style some years ago. Need does not indicate capability. Re: The economy stupid It still boggles my mind. The limiting factor to Russian military ambitions has been economic. The Russian economy is doing poorly and the Russian government is cutting into stuff it shouldn't to maintain the semblance of functionality. The fact this is occurring somehow magically doesn't apply because it's the Armata! The Armata cannot fail because it's Comrade Armata! The Armata could very well meet all standards and the like. But it will be at the expense of something else, and Russia's running out of it's children's futures to burn.

Another thing with mentioning is that smoothbores have significantly better barrel life on top of the round performance stuff mentioned earlier. Additionally the accuracy problems of a near to past end of life smoothbore tube are less pronounced than when rifling goes bad. It was, but the reality of the shot was that someone in a Leo 2/M1/Mervaka could have made it too. It wasn't a special rifled barrel thing, it was the opportunity of a totally exposed enemy tank that was stationary, plus a crew that was skilled enough to work around some of the stuff that's less optimal at range (the laser especially, the farther it goes, the less "certain" it can be).

I wouldn't consider anyone I've ever worked with on the "regular" side of the army to qualify for elite. That's what veteran-crack represents well, very well trained, or very experienced regular troops. A "green" well trained SOF team fits well within the "crack" or perhaps just "veteran" ratings. We don't need to make a separate class of soldiers, with separate ratings, balance, magic numbers etc. If we wanted to include SOF type teams, the best route is just to meet in the proverbial middle between "elite" rated regular troops as a stand in, or building a complex SOF simulation based upon tacsop uberleet stealth skills, they're just troops with special tools, and we'll leave it up to the scenario designer to tailor the various skill ratings to properly match the performance required.