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Would you care to show me where the EFPs fall under Russian MTOE? Neither an MRAP, or a HMMWV will react positively to much more than limited HMG fire. That much is a fact, ATGMs, tank fire, autocannons all will ruin them just as hard. Against small arms they're both about as robust. The MRAP type of vehicles deals with IEDs quite well, but in CMBS there's no Russian Motor Rifle Regiments out placing pressure plate EFPs, or strapping 152 MM artillery shells under highway overpasses. It just is not any more survivable against most threats, and even further it comes with appalling drawbacks in mobility and a massive size. The MRAP is a great COIN vehicle. The HMMWV is the much better choice for the majority of light truck type missions however.

Despite the fact it was selected to be the standard attack helicopter in 2008 or so? Sure seems like there's a lot of Hinds still chugging around. Again, I've never argued for sure 100% Aramta will fail and none will ever enter service, but we've seen a model of the first tier units getting a few units, then few to none arriving for a while. For many vehicles and platforms that are "Standard" quite a few of them simply never are, and remain limited purchases because surprise, Russia's economy is still about where it was when the Black Eagle was too expensive. One is an attempt to make the next Russian tank that failed because it did not match the Russian ability to field the platform. The KA-50 is a Russian platform that was selected for service, had early models made for testing, then languished in development hell for lack of funding before becoming more or less obsolete in its original formation, and becoming the basis of a very limited procurement platform, MI-28 is, as I said "the" attack helicopter despite all them Hinds. They're all good models of where the Aramata could go The lack of strategy is about the only real difference, but there's still a very weak Russian economy, and there's still a very high tech platform with a whole host of new issues to overcome.

I never got my mitts on a Caiman to be honest, I just worked wtih MAXPROs and RG-31/33s. For me maintenance nightmare they all were, with their very limited mobility (you could go on the highway, and some of the larger roads, but we had a whole platoon get mobility killed by a field once (that our QRF in HMMWVs simply drove all over), and putting them into the muhallas was like watching a hippo crawl into a soupcan all made the "MRAP" as a tactical vehicle sort of marginal. Also rollovers. And recovery was a pain (like you needed a 10 ton wrecker, the MTV based ones we got downrange couldn't hack it). Also getting out of one was a clownshow if you needed to do it quickly, we weren't in a "hot" spot by any stretch of the imagination, but a HMMWV convoy was spitting out dismounts like .5 seconds after it identified the need to do so. MRAPs you just sort of sat there and waited 30 seconds before someone's boots hit the ground. Also within our organization at least, it only really added two to three dismounts to your total force (we either rolled in four HMMWVs with the VC and back passengers dismounting, or three MRAPs, which eliminated the need for one HMMWV crew). Weapons mounted were same as HMMWVs etc. They're really good for taking people and small cargo up and down MSRs that are going to be seeded with IEDs, or for EOD type stuff were secondary devices are pretty likely. But I'd go as far as to guess even the Caiman is simply really good at the previous tasks, and of less utility otherwise.

The SGT York and MBT-70 are still well illustrative of the US procurement system because both are problems that might have change a bit, but have not really gone away. The Black Eagle, KA-50, MI-28 etc, etc are all still really good examples of high end Soviet/Russian stuff that either does not come to fruition at all, or is accepted as the "standard" platform but still in practice amounts to a fraction of the fleet. If something had dramatically changed about Russian procurement, or the Russian economy then you'd have a point, but time and time alone does not render a point moot, and the same factors that made the Black Eagle fantasy strongly influence Russian procurement today.

The reason you see them in Iraq and Afghanistan has to do with the fact they're designed to handle IEDs and the like. Korea is a good illustration because of all US Brigade Combat Teams, it's the only one that realistically could be in a shooting war within the span of hours. In a conventional shooting war (like the one portrayed in CMBS), MRAP style vehicles are pretty bad. They're big and heavy, do not like going off road, don't carry enough cargo, don't carry weapons much better than HMMWVs, and in terms of direct fire type weapons systems, they're not really much better armored than a uparmored HMMWV. So to that end the wheeled vehicles in Korea were a transitioning mix of the old unarmored HMMWVs, with the various uparmored models. The MRAPs were again offered to replace some of the HMMWVs, but they're a really poor fit to someone who's not planning on fighting insurgents in Iraq/Afghanistan.

It's keeping some for COIN type missions, but keeping the HMMWVs for many others. There's supposed to be some sort of HMMWV replacement on the horizon, but for all the roles modeled in CMBS the uparmored HMMWV is correct, while MRAPs are not* Not quite. As discussed in other threads, the salvo o' unguided rockets is usually retained for more important targets, or fired well ahead and outside of CMBS ranges. The ATACMS type missiles, or guided rockets are also usually used on things that are higher level targets (artillery parks, C2 nodes, supply points) vs combat elements deployed forward. Danger close is also dependent on round, so in actuality for rockets it's 2000 meters for planning purposes (which again, danger close is not a strict rule, but it is a good guide on the inherent danger of said weapons). *When I was in Korea we received a shipment of them, more or less open for any unit that felt they could use them. After several months passed with no such takers the MRAPs disappeared to artificial reefs or something.

Turret ejection charge. It refers to the tendency of T-72 turrets to pop off and fly some distance if the autoloader's rounds cook off. Like, BBC, CNN etc get a lot of military stuff wrong, but that's because most of the time they're simply not at all educated in military matters outside having watched "The Longest Day" once. They get it wrong because often they do not know better, and they're still capable of filtering blatent propoganda sometimes, or asking uncomfortable questions. Russia's media is a wholly state owned and operated enterprise. It's only purpose is to belt out Russia power supreme HATO dogs lust for intercourse with our mother soil Latvia wants to join Russia! at max volume. It tends to dramatic stinkers like SU-24s shutting down the entire US fleet and half the dastardly HATO military resigning because Russia will kill all with microwave Putin-gun, while CNN simply cannot tell a tank from some brands of large SUVs, but will still raise the WTF flag if polite men in ACUs suddenly appear in British Columbia to prevent French Canadian Nazi-Racists from harming our Anglo-heritage brothers!

Purely in a "Modest Proposal" sense it's because they're not real tanks, it's just going to be hundreds of parade float quality vehicles driven around by folks who are sworn to secrecy to present the illusion of the Armata being successful. Exporting them would let other folks in on the terrible truth. I think it's sort of a silly thing. The sort of "crew is unconscious, but okay!" hits are rare, and given that all crewmen at in the same box now, seems like they'll all be okay or all be goo. The remote operation stuff makes more sense in terms of being able to operate the tank as sort of a defacto remote controlled turret, but it does not look extensive enough to support that (although that might just be the limitations of technology). I missed the original Battle Cruiser 3000 fracas, but the follow on Smart behavior remains the gift that keeps giving.

Thank god. Terrible vehicles. Neat. It was not game breaking but it did feel a bit off.

Weirdness. I could have sworn it kept the reverse command. I tend to play in real time though so honestly could be I've just got my memory all mangled/I tend to kick into micromanage overdrive once contact is made anyway.

If you'll note I was talking about some more general families of vehicles. As the case is Armata falls more into "sharing a lot of the same parts" but well into the "we're basically building a whole series of mostly different vehicles all at the same time." It's a tank designed by Derek Smart! WATCH OUT!

When setting up in a defensive position prior to the game kicking off, use the target command to check your LOS. If you're hull down (spotter is partial/hull down etc), then great! Also worth considering is placing your vehicles fully behind cover, and using another spotter (like an infantry team camped out in a building) to let you know when the enemy has entered your tank's fields of fire. Then generously apply 3# from my next set of tips. In terms of sneaky sneaky vehicles getting pot shots at you: 1. Back up. Aint no reason to go forward or stay in a fight you're having problems with. 2. If you've got them, send a UAV to that area. Even if you just know where the target is, vs the UAV seeing it, dropping a 2 salvo battery barrage on his hidey hole will make anything but an MBT a bit less functional, and it'll make a lot of the cover go away. 3. Learn to love the "hunt" command. If you're pretty sure where a target is, but not quite sure how far out of cover you need to be to waste him, use the "hunt" command to clear your cover, but then a reverse command back into cover. For vehicles the thing will creep into engagement window, let fly, and then back right on up to safety. Often that extra .5 meters that gets the target into LOS, but not the full meter that gets you fully into enemy LOS is what will save the day and let you red mist some things. This can also be repeated many times, so you vehicle will advance to kill something/the end of the hunt command, and then reverse once one of the previous conditions are met. Human players might get smart, but it's hard on the TAC AI, and often will cause all but the best used/Javelin type ATGMs to wiff.

All designs are inherently compromises. Those compromises are usually best aligned against the task at hand for the platform you're designing. A tank is heavy because it needs armor to do its job. A scout vehicle is lightly armored to keep its weight and size down so it can move quickly around the battlefield, etc. When you share a common fleet of vehicles you start making design comprises that overlap often to the detriment of the overall platform. You have a hull that's trying to make the room you need for an SPG while it's also trying to keep a low profile for the tank model. Your engine placement is optimal for SPGs and tanks, but it means the APC/IFV version either is modified enough to not really be part of the same vehicle family, or your troops are flopping out the top of the vehicle and over the sides. Etc, etc, etc. Stryker doesn't violate this too badly because at the end of the day, looking at all the different models the only really "weird" ones that are not conventional modified APC roles is the MGS (which is a bit of a dud because it's a cannon mounted on a wheeled APC, go figure). The FCS failed dramatically because it was trying to leverage technology to bypass a lot of the stuff that traditionally made shared hulls and such problematic (namely in terms of "electronic" active armor and such allowing for a tank-like platform that could have IFV level passive arrays), with said technology either being immature, or simply unable to deliver on the sort of protection required. Ultimately when it comes down to making the better mousetrap, on paper it sounds great if it can also be a badger trap, blender, and home entertainment system, but each step you make to turn the mousetrap into a better badger trap makes it less optimal as a mousetrap, while in turn the blender parts don't do much to help it be a home entertainment system. Which isn't to say there is not a total lack of merit. A "heavy" APC will share a lot with a tank in terms of everything but main gun and carrying troops, if you're willing to accept a massive turret you can use tank hulls to make an okay SPG. At the same time if you built a HAPC or a SPG from the trackpads up, they'd likely be superior performers to the "swiss army hull" design. It might be worth pondering that the "everything new, and from Armata" design has less to do with Russian strength and more to do with Russian economic weakness. They're not going to get an HAPC unless it has some huge parts commonality with other tanks. There's no money for a distinct SPG, or improved hull for one, but there is if we design it to fit the new tank Russia desperately needs given the state of its fleet. Basically it's a huge gamble that the core system pays off, or maybe even leveraging the real possibility that one platform may fail dramatically (unmanned tank turret will attempt to kill any red headed persons within FOV without crew input), but still leave some salvageable spin offs (but the IFV turret only aims at redheads, it doesn't shoot so that's okay).

This is right up there with the battery drain ultimate defeat murderlasers. I feel stupider just by knowing out there someone believe this is possible.

Again it's the difference between "turns T-90 crews into goo 95% of the time!" and "Turns T-90 crews into goo 80% of the time!" As pointed out, the newer model Leo 2s with the longer barrels are about on part with the later model US rounds in terms of penetration, just at the expense of a larger weapons system. You won't get the same firey death effect as often but in so many words a T-90 struck by a Leo 2A6+ is going to be fairly dead vs ultra dead.

Think maybe you meant Centurion? Chieftain is like fevered dreams fantasy for 1944, Centurion is just the Comet all growed up. It's like that old cliche definition of insanity. Nothing has changed about Soviet/Russian arms procurement. The process isn't fixed, the economy isn't better etc, etc. Expecting the Armata program (and Afganit, and Boomerang, and PAK-FA, and the MI-28 etc, etc, etc) to somehow work better than the T-95, Black Eagle, etc etc just because this time it's got an unmanned turret and is a whole family of vehicles! is pretty out there. We've been down this road before and I'm sure we'll go down it again.

Wish it was more consistent. I'm never quite sure what's going to happen if I send a Bradley up over a berm with armor downrange.

I think that's why I really don't like the idea of it. There's the Russian claims that it is the ultimate tank that will destroy all other tanks 100%+2 and then there's not really much else on the matter. The T-90s and BMP-3s in CMSF were no big deal because broadly we knew what they could do. I'm leery of either having the mega Armata as a semi-fictional ultratank/IFV/whatever, or having constant whining on the forum because it can be destroyed in the first place with graphs and references in Russian showing how it is invincible to everything including smaller nuclear devices to support how unstoppable it is. If there's more data, which doubtless will emerge if it gets closer to service it ought to be not as much fiction, but right now it's like all those 90's simulators that inserted the T-95 based on some drunken drawings, or to give a high tier threat rather than have an accurate representation of Russian military hardware.

Yes. Oh f'ing god yes. Especially on a totally new AFV. If this was a T-90AM2 or something I wouldn't be so doubtful, but the Armata is a whole host of systems that have never been used together, or in the real world. Then you toss in an unconventional design, then you add on a not so great Russian economy, then you add on all the usual operational hiccups that go with fielding even fairly modest new equipment (even the M1A2 SEP V2 suffered a lower than desired maintenance readiness rate simply because the number of spare parts for the new systems hadn't caught up to the demand quite yet during the initial fielding), it just all makes the "HERE ARE SOME FOR PARADE!" a dubious milestone. Once we see mechanic training get started, or crews get pulled from the rest of the Russian tank fleet to learn how to operate the Armata so they can become Armata instructors, then we can start thinking in terms of being 1-2 years out from having an operational unit. But two years from vehicles that might or might not be operational prototypes? Little bit loco.

I've never understood the lack of ATGMs on IFVs. Even something simple like a Milan strapped to one of the hatches goes a long ways. Same deal with Strykers, wouldn't be a stretch to strap Javelins to the RWS, the allocation of TOW-Strykers to BDE level always struck me as weird (especially considering the historical M113 formations which kept its AT assets as a Company sized element allocation to the Battalion vs Company sized element for the Brigade).

Re: Fantasy I think it's just a matter of definitions, but the point is likely for 2017, fully operational Armatas, Boomerang etc in combat ready units is pretty fantasy. It's more real than an E-100 but just as real as the MBT-70, SGT York, and many other similar programs ever were. In the future it might become not-fantasy, but operational and in service by 2017 is by most accounts quite fantasy.

I'd be happier with an "upgun" ICV in every platoon with a 20/30 MM on a RWS type mount, then a 40 MM variant with a larger full on unmanned turret basically replacing the MGS one for one at the Company. The sort of airburst thing Bofors has done with their 40 MM makes it look attractive, and it ought to make anything short of a tank pretty swiss cheese pretty fast.

19Ks coming off of MGSes were the worst. We were a M1A2 SEP v2 company, and received a wide range of folks from different backgrounds, but receiving guys who'd never been off of M1A1s, guys who hadn't seen a tank since basic training all were uniformly easier to work with than trying to deprogram all the stupid stuff the MGS teaches you to do wrong. RUMMIT last time I heard about it was they were taking tankers off of the platform for just that reason. Think it's the same answer as with the Armata. If it's in service shortly then I imagine it'd sneak in with the "future thingy" module that's been rumored and hinted about.

Re: Javelin Operator It's what's known as an "ASI" or additional skill identifier. It's a short class anyone can take usually offered at the various training installations (although mobile trainer teams are pretty common). In practice slots are usually reserved to ensure jav equipped units are at or above MTOE. It's not a hard weapon to operate however and plenty of "Javelin Operators" downrange have the twenty minute version of the class before using it effectively.

LAV-25 is based on a earlier iteration of the vehicle, a lot smaller, less armor, less room for everything. From the get go the Stryker was always intended to be primarily a "carrier" vehicle and to that end, the need to fit a complete squad into the infantry version was viewed as essential. To that end the LAV-25 can carry about 6 "cold war" soldiers (no body armor and somesuch, basically rifle and Kpot with LBE, more practically it can cram in fourish), which made it a bit of a non-starter. The need for some sort of direct fire support platform for the Strkyer formations was always known, and the MGS was supposed to provide that at a Company level. In practice it has had some success, but always the following problems: 1. In many COIN missions, 105 MM is just too much gun 2. A very limited ammo supply (a whole platoon of MGS carries about 1.5 Abrams in ammo) 3. In conventional missions, it has neither the armor, or firepower to serve as a real maneuver platform. The autocannon armed version will likely be a better choice for direct fire support, both as a dedicated platform, and as a "upgun" Stryker modification.