panzersaurkrautwerfer

I always thought it looked kinda scared. Like it was confused what it was doing out of the motorpool or something. On the other hand: Always though the loaded for bear plow tanks looked cool. Like they didn't need tank olympics or some fruity pride parade to look cool. It's a machine made to put holes in Uralvagonzavod products, conduct corrective actions on enemy dismounts, rapidly accelerate the process of things making the natural progression from hot to cold and give zero pelvic gyrations about much else.

Dunno man. Until the 80's NATO's plan was really more or less "if Russians in West Germany equal to or greater than 1, launch nuclear weapons." The early 80's covers when that had started to shift, but at the point where the new plans and equipment really hadn't changed the balance too much, while the late 80's gets into the realm in which the shoe is firmly on the other foot. Some sort of "We watched Patton too many times while slightly boozed and made a 1946 module that covers both a continued World War Two, and a hypothetical outbreak of war with the USSR and the western Allies" for the upcoming Bulge game would be cool however.

I'd prefer later 80's. However doing a game that is Fulda Gap 1982 and then having a module that brings the scenario forward to 1989 would be something I'd still go in for.

Nah. The movie hyped up a lot of the friction in the Bradley design, it wasn't nearly so nutragous as portrayed, and the counter-Bradley crew had some pretty stupid ideas too (namely either a APC that could take direct fire from tanks, OR something cheap and low capability that was going to basically try to beat the Soviets with numerical superiority because you KNOW the American people would have loved that). As the case is actually the M2/M3 has worked out pretty well at what it was supposed to do, and the upgrades have kept it pretty relevant.

They're different tools for different missions. Mech infantry is AWESOME if you're worried about tactical/operational mobility, or dealing with enemy forces that have vehicles of their own. Light infantry is a great tool for contingency operations, or working in prohibitive terrain. Or in a stupid analogy, golf carts and cars do a lot of the same stuff, but there's very different missions for both, and the relative cheapness of the golf cart does not matter if the golf cart cannot accomplish the "going on the highway" mission you need to accomplish to get groceries. Conversely the 69' El Camino is a very poor, very expensive choice to move around the golf course/old folks home. There's some minor overlap in mission, but time and time again the biggest mistake you can make with infantry is mistaking mech and light infantry for interchangeable formations. The Bradley is more steel less smart. The various upgrades are digital, but a lot of the on board stuff is still the finest in 1989 analog systems. Stryker is all wizzbang from tires to RWS.

When in COIN, worry about collateral damage. When at war, worry about ending the mission with artillery rounds unfired.

Artillery still occasionally drops short for a variety of reasons (water-compromised powder, idiot FDC, etc). Could be they were willing to risk having PD type shells falling short but not VT. Also howitzer fire is still fairly low angle, higher trees might trip some of the lower flying shells. Really in principal you try to avoid shells going over friendly troops. Likely no VT is just a way to reduce the risk a bit.

Apocal summed it up best. Light infantry is great if you need to force project "something" quickly all over the world. It's a good unit to use as the heavy lifter for COIN type operations, peace keeping, or deterrence type missions. In terms of warfighting, it's pretty slow, and relies a lot on what supporting assets it brings to the fight. The Stryker concept really is an attempt to address both of those issues, giving increased mobility and support to a boot-centric force. There's still a future for IBCTs, it's just one that's focused much more on fighting insurgents and the like than possible confrontations with near peer threats.

As Apocal points out, nah. It's a big part of the Fire Support Officer's job at Brigade/Battalion levels. Basically you want to be able to mass as much fire on a target at once. By separating the air and the artillery by elevation or terrain/graphic control measures/etc you can have both assets in operation. These are things that basically are part of the minutes leading up to the strike, it's the fires cell or something hashing out who's where, the aviation approaching whatever safe attack by fire position via an air corridor etc etc.

Short answer: In a full spectrum type conflict light infantry would clear complicated objectives that were isolated by mech forces, secure terrain and conduct air insertions. They're not going to charge at BMPs but they'd be hard to dig out when defending and free up higher capability forces. In CMBS your IBCT type troops should be defending or attacking like forces. No way around it.

It's not just timing. It can also be accomplished by making a variety of measures. Easiest to describe is simply keeping aviation higher than the flight path of indirect fires, or offsetting the aviation approach and exfil from target area to not enter artillery occupied air space. It's something that requires some work but aviation and artillery is not mutually exclusive.

Simply because I <3 off topic: 1. I think the Tiger was actually not that bad of an idea. It was conceived of at a time in which there wasn't a significant resource scarcity, and it was planned for and used in a reasonable manner (as a specialized heavy tank). On the battlefield it was quite good, although it was certainly a maintenance whore (three steps worse than a mere hanger queen). 2. The Panther was very much a case of someone being told to accomplish "y" and instead going out and accomplishing "4." The real peril of the T-34, if there was any was a fairly plentiful, easy to produce tank with reasonable performance (same with the Sherman really). While the Panther started off as an attempt to make a German T-34....it ended up as an exemplar of everything that was bad about the German procurement process (complex, mechanical unreliable, poor version control, expensive, high performing...but not enough to counteract the enemy's equipment or numbers in the wider sense). 3. The Tiger II was terribad, as were all the various super-mega whatever armored vehicle the Germans cranked out. Tactically it was quite scary, technically a mess, and again, building a very good tank to smash the enemy's inferior tanks is cool. But as Steve pointed out it really doesn't matter terribly much if you only have a handful of them, and the enemy is able to mass armor elsewhere effectively. Something either needs to be good enough that it really can trade 1:5 losses and have it mean something, or still available in enough numbers to have the superiority mean something above the tactical level. It also needs to be part of a larger military structure capable of protecting and supporting that weapons system (which is something German logistics and air power/defense was not up to the task of).

As long as it looks absolutely nothing like the GCV. Looking back at that project, it's readily apparent whoever was running the program had missed the point of IFVs or even APCs in general. Which is something I'm worrying we're simply rushing back towards, less something designed to be part of a combined armor team, and more a tracked MRAP-Stryker hybrid to safely move troops through Baghdad circa 2006, and continue to provide job security for General Dynamics/BAE/etc maintenance teams well into 2050.

Ditto. I don't doubt that the Bulat is working as intended simply because it seems like Battlefront wouldn't totally mess up the optics like that....but I'd like to hear more about the system and why it's assessed to have poor optics. T-64BV though, yeah not surprised.

I'm not sure if I buy off on the component thing. By most measures Soviet HE was not markedly more potent shell for shell, and ammunition cookoff remained a threat in all tanks regardless of nationality. The T-34 did stuff a lot of crew, fuel, and ammunition into a very tiny place which is much the same problem faced by T-55, T-62, T-72 etc etc crewmen into the modern era, and the survival rates for those crews remains quite poor regardless of HE filler. On the other hand the Sherman had a fair amount of space for rounds to rattle around without causing a catastrophic explosion. Even in the case of brewing up, the larger interior gave more space for a crew to successfully escape a tank that's about to start burning, while getting out of a T-34 in a hurry just wasn't happening.

It's like calling someone who inprocessed successfully at basic training "trained and combat ready!" Early stuff has been completed, testing is underway. That testing is not yet complete and a final production vehicles does not yet exist is pretty solidly into the realm of "untested" and "unproven"

Yeah. Most of the stuff I have indicates zero Chinese armor outside of captured vehicles, it just gets fuzzy in that some replacements were received by the NKPA for lost armor, but certainly not to the degree where the 400 or so AFVs lost in 1950 were made good again, and again by November 1950 there were 1300+ US Army/USMC tanks in theater, let alone commonwealth platforms. I have to wonder if there's not one or two odd moments were T-34s showed up again later, but I certainly cannot find good references to it occurring again. Sort of bringing it back on topic: The Korean war is a really good benchmark in my opinion for measuring the T-34's performance objectively, neither the Russ Monster tank the Germans liked to paint it as, or the Hero Comrade Tank of Comrade Tankist 1st class that Soviet renditions show it as. The post-action analysis is pretty transparent, and fairly honest in assesing results. It also helps that unlike in the Eastern front, virtually none of the knocked out tanks escaped to fight again, or disappeared into the depths of history, virtually every T-34 provided for the initial invasion was destroyed or captured which provides a really good sampling of vehicles of differing circumstances. Further the small scale armor fights (usually fewer than five tanks on each side) generally makes for a good sort of microcosm, the relative numbers of tanks available in Korea meant less than the number occupying Ron-Ni-Ung (random madeup name mind you) Valley at 1343 on October 3rd 1950 in terms of making an assessment of performance. From that it's really interesting to draw the conclusion that the T-34/85 was effectively on par with an M4A3E8 (and even then, arguably a M4A3 76 (W) given the E8's big difference was the tracks vs armor or firepower). The 85 MM performed about as well as the 76 MM in terms of anti-tank, but a bit better in terms of spitting out HE. Both tanks could destroy each other with a high probability "kill" on the first hit....but in practice the Shermans were more typically mission/mobility/firepower kills with about 50% returning to duty after being recovered, and on average 1 KIA/WIA per knocked out tank. On the other hand, most T-34s knocked out were destroyed beyond repair, and on average T-34 crewmen stood something like a 75% chance of being killed (vs simply wounded) when the vehicle was knocked out. Of course this was somewhat a result of the US tanker's tendency to shoot up knocked out tanks until they burned, blew up, or the crew bailed (and even then unmanned tanks were frequently shot until entirely destroyed just to be sure). However it's pretty easy to note the location of the fuel tanks, internally stored ammo, and the small interior volume all would lead to fairly dramatic results when penetrated. Mobility was similar, T-34 likely commanded some sort of advantage there, but likely was balanced out by the fairly limited elevation/depression of the main gun (effectively it could go more places, but shoot from fewer of those positions). Which all and all gets to one of my personal things of no one will bat an eye if you claim the T-34 was the greatest tank of World War Two. They might argue the Panther was better blah blah whatever. But god help you if you call the Sherman tank the best despite it effectively being the equal of the T-34 in the most common variants.

I'm certainly not denying the weapons existed, just that the CPV and post 1950 NKPA lacked the prime movers to keep those guns in the fight, and further, the light infantry infiltration tactics used extensively precluded moving with many of the large caliber guns (while again, I will not deny they can be pushed/dragged....they're certainly not going up the hills of Korea without significant effort, and definitely not being man-hauled for more than short distances). In terms of battlefield threats, keep in in mind for the 1950 fighting (which represented the highest tempo, highest threat period for armor) 136 US tanks of all types were lost. 69% of those losses were from mines, so about 94 total, with 34 lost to enemy tank fire (T-34/SU-76) which leaves a whopping nine or so lost to all other causes. While the later fighting would doubtless include significantly less kills from tanks, it's fairly indicative that the NKPA anti-tank guns were fairly low on the threat threshold, and PVT Kim cooly remarking on the tiger painting should be taken with a grain of salt* *Especially given the painting was done on the frontal slope of the hull, which is a pretty bad point of aim, especially on the M26/M46. Sherman would have stood an okay chance at warding off anything less than 85 MM on the frontal slope too, with the 45 MM being not especially effective by 1950.

Re: Cromwell Eh. Looking at other tank-poor forces it's not uncommon to see moderately functional vehicles get turned around and sent back at the enemy. Re: Tiger face Anti-Tank Gunners were actually fairly uncommon too. The vast preponderance of US tank losses were actually from mines. And while the Korean restrictive terrain makes for bottlenecks, it also makes for difficult terrain to emplace larger weapons....and the NKPA and CPV both wanted for infantry portable AT assets. To a large degree the tendency of communist forces to flee from armor gave credence to the power of the tigerface.....while disregarding the average North Korean/Chinese unit had very little that would make a sizable impression on a tank and would have bugged out, even if it'd been a peaceful pastoral scene painted on the bow of the tank. Re: China China has done a lot to try to invent this legendary fighting strength from what has largely been a lackluster military history. To that end powerful Chinese tankmen crushing Shermans fits the image....and if you're on the wrong side of the Great Red Firewall, there's not much to counter that mythology. Also considering the losses sustained by the CPV to what ends...I have to imagine some fluffing is required to make it a less lopsided body stacking.

Re: John The mobility of the Centurion was never in doubt, as that quote as made the rounds, and the Centurion did good work in infantry support. However the vast overwhelming majority of tank vs tank fights occurred between August and November 1950. Simple basic fact, that's when the NKPA had the armor to use, but by November it had lost nearly all of it. November is also when the first Centurions show up, but they were not where the last ten or so T-34s in Korea were at. After that point the Chinese largely did not employ armor*, and the NKPA received only fairly modest resupply and much of it sat out the war. Armor was in both CPV and NKPA use post 1950, sort of a white elephant, very expensive, very hard to maintain over the very limited logistical system available, while also not especially effective (given the 1300+ UN tanks in theater, it was not like they could replay the armored battering ram thing the NKPA had done in opening stages of the war). So in that regard I'm interested to see some sources on Centurion vs T-34 fighting in Korea, as my sources don't seem to indicate it occurred. On the other hand, there's very little I've found on any tank vs tank fighting post November 1950, indicating either it simply did not happen, or perhaps is a subject I could use some more sources on. *There's Chinese sources that claim their knockoff of the T-34 went on to murderize several hundred US tanks during the conflict. There's no documentation of those tanks arriving in theater, and the US tank losses to other tanks amounted to 38 (with 15 of those destroyed beyond economical repair, the remainder recovered and returned to use), which makes those Chinese claims pretty dubious.

Armata also wise, will rule over liberated Europe with iron gauntlet of love. Homosex oppressive rule will end, Russian ownership of France will finally be recognized, and criticism of Russian fuzzy hats punishable by death.

Here's really your options when assessing the Armata: 1. Learn virtually everything about modern tank systems, spend hours gazing at the photos released of the platforms, reviewing claims, learning Russian and come to your own conclusions based on a well balanced technical perspective. 2. Ignore virtually everything. Wait until the tank actually comes out and enters duty. The Armata has gone beyond being simply a tank in Russia and it's now a propaganda tool. The Russian government and the government owned media has made some pretty dubious claims....and then Russian fanboys have added onto those claims to a positively insane level of performance well beyond what engineering, science, and human technology is capable of at the moment. So from that all we have is fairly modest estimates made by outside professional sources that paint a picture of what could be a pretty good tank (assuming you overcome a lot of technical and economic hurdles)....or the Russian version which is a little short of being the personal chariot of the god-emperor putin's warthrone that is immune to all HATO nuclear weapons and will bring the Russian people to their rightful place ruling over the American eastern seaboard with no losses. It's fairly reasonable to assume the Armata is still going to react poorly to most modern 120 MM sabot type projectiles given the current state of the art in ERA, APS, and passive armor arrays.

It's still rarely done unobserved. You have a finite number of shells, even if you think the enemy is somewhere around grid 38S AB 12345678 or whatever, the rounds could still be off, or that gridpoint could very well be in the right area, but just outside the kill radius of what you're trying to explode. Rotary aviation is different because it's low and slow enough, with some sensors that'll let it go to an area and poke around, possibly find targets (your mileage varies on the helicopter type). But artillery needs someone to see where the rounds are going to verify they're doing a thing, and fast movers are generally coming in fast enough they really need to know broadly where they're aiming and what they're aiming at. Re: TRPs Look in the same category that trenches and barbed wire lives in on the unit purchase menu for Quick Battle. There's an item called TRPs which stands for "Target Reference Point." They're a little red circle with an x on it when you place them on the map. They represent places the artillery guys have already crunched the numbers for. What they do is allow you to call in an artillery strike quite quickly with a high degree of accuracy within a fairly small radius wherever you've placed the TRP during the setup phase. They're really useful if you place them places that the enemy will almost certainly occupy, or have to pass through so you can bring the hurt down once you've got a few of the ? type target markers vs a solid contact.

I'd really like to see those records considering the first Centurions did not arrive in country until November of 1950, which marked the effective end of tank vs tank fighting. I'll need to find my reference for it, but the British tank on tank kill of the war was against a Chinese captured Comet. Centurion would have done a number on a T-34, don't get me wrong....but it arrived just after hunting season closed.

Re: Steve But, but they come in peace! http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33034844