Taranis

The Chieftain's comments and some slides from "the conference on armored vehicle design" he attended. Some big hitters presenting
surprisingly interesting and informative video. Also on Ukraine-related matters:
some top-pick screenshots (Especially Ukraine related):
Ukrainian colonel presentation (some comment picks):
- Ukraine replacing lots of donated equipment antennas with anti-jam variants
- Old tanks like T-55 ext. have their place and are effective at what they do
- Ukraine battle management system is a combination of "Delta" a browser-based battle management system similar to US systems in combination with Discord servers.


 

https://militaryland.net/news/5th-tank-brigade-makes-its-comeback/

 
 

Probably Russian soldiers of 83rd air-assault brigade in bad situation near Klishchiivka
 

I just put most of Mashovets writings on this map.
According to him Russian group on Kupiansk direction divided on two groupments - northern, which will advance on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and southern, which already started own offensive to Borova town. Each groupment in own turn has per two subgroups. The border of responsibility of both groups is probably along the road Svatove - Borova
Main goal of southern group - to reach Borova and in this way to cutt off northern group of UKR forces and then to smash them with nortehrn group attack from east and southern group attack from south to north along Oskil river. Their objectives - not only capture Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi (and maybe Kupiansk on right bank of Oskil), but completely eliminate UKR troops on left bank of Oskil. Now southern group is trying to acomplish nearest task - to come on the line Pershotravneve - Iziumske (vertical red dotted line)
Southern group approx since 17th of July could push off UKR forces of 66th mech.brigade from Zherebets river oppose to Kovalivka - Karmazynivka villages line and established there bridgehead. Using huge advantage in artillery and especially in MLRS, they for three last days significantly expanded this bridgehead up to 5 x 4 km area. Soldiers say, Russian MLRS fire even at small size units like half-squad. To stop this breakthrough, UKR command was forced to send rerverves. Now situation there is unknown. Against us here are 423rd MRR of 4th GTD and elements of 15th MRBr and 30th MRBr 
Also in interests of southern group two battalions of 21st motor-rifle brigade of Lyman groupment are operating. They try to attack on Makiivka, but without success. 
Between groups "borderline" Russians threw into the battle two units of reserves, keeping near Miluvatka (my bug on map) - 12th and 13th tank regiments of 4th GTD are in the battle on Dzherelne - Raihorodka line, but without significant gains.
Norhern groupment makes probe actions in Novoselivske area. All their success for now - they pushed off UKR troops about on 1 km and again captured railway stattion between Novoselivske and Kuzemivka. 
Mashovets also put intersting question - why Russians HQ have started this offensive now? Either they are trying to force UKR command move reserves from south here or they are already confident that UKR offensive on the south ALREADY failed. And from answer will be depend many things.
 

This is why I hate "human rights" organizations.

https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unesco-director-general-deplores-death-journalist-rostislav-zhuravlev-ukraine

One thing that I don't quite understand is "Journalists serve a critical role in informing the world about conflict situations and must be protected."

The guy looks pretty protected to me.

https://militaryland.net/news/5th-tank-brigade-makes-its-comeback/

 
 

The Wall Street Journal, and the NYT have declared the Ukrainian counter offensive to be more or less hopeless. I am all but certain this means Ukraine will achieve a massive breakthrough very soon. Whatever bit of the "Foreign Policy Blob" that is briefing them has been wrong about every other stage of the war, hard to believe they will start being right all of a sudden.

National Guard "Azov" brigade destroys Russian D-30 howitzer with own French TRF-1 howitzer. Enemy positin  was geolocated on NW ouskirt of Novofedorivka village of Zaporizhzhia oblast. This is NE from Verbove, but this is direction to Polohy town. So, on this direction at least two National Guard brigades of "Offensive Guard"are involved (12th special purpose "Azov" and 15th operative "Kara-Dag") as well as elements of 11th public order security brigade  
 

Things seem to be kind of hot now in Kleshcheevka according to Russian telegrammer, Two Majors:
https://t.me/dva_majors/21974
 

UKR TG. UKR troops fight inside Robotyne. But this is RUMINT for now.
Robotyne. We are beating up rusnya now. There is advancing to the settlement. Clashes around UKRPost office area (grey mark on the map)
 

Ammo dump on Oktiabrskoye airfield in Crimea before and after yesterday UKR strike
Before 2014 this airfield was formally belonged to Russian Black Sea Fleet, but it wasn't in use since 1995.

Ukr troops likely reached eastern outskirts of Robotyne. The video with Russian FPV drone hit Bradley was geolocated there

Column of Bradleys and Leo2 of 47th brigade advances under artilery fire
 

Leo 2A6 ran on a mine. The way the guys look, it's not serious.
 

Interesting document - the warning order of 12th July for units, defending positions in 4km north from Robotyne. Now these positions already under control of UKR forces.
On the piece of map you can see minefields marking and fire sectors
 
Commander of 1429th motor-rifle regiment colonel Chernyshov orders:
1. <Covered>... enemy activated offensive actions, inflicts fire effect, ..... main efforts concentrates on....
2 <Covered> .... defense sustainability, reinforcing of discipline, ...., denying of unauthrized withdrawing from combat....[positions]. 
3. Up to 20:00 of 12th of July 2023 with a forces of 4th motor-rifle company (without 2nd platoon) of 2nd motor-rifle battlaion of 1429th MRR, with a group of medical company in interaction with commander of 429th MRR of 19th MRD to substitute 6th motor-rifle company of 2nd motor-rifle battalion of 1429th MRR in occupied area of defense. 
4.  To reinforce the 6th motor-rifle company of 2nd motor-rifle battalion of 1429th MRR with three crews of AGS-17, 3 crews of ATGM, 3 servicemen of sniper company, 3 servicemen of recon company and to the end of day to put at disposal of commander of 70th MRR of 42nd MRD. The area of transferring 6th MRCoy of 2nd MRBn of 1429th MRR is western outskirt of Verbove.
5. Area of defense of 5th MRCoy of 2nd MRBn of 1429th MRR to leave unchaged. 
6. The moving of personnel to conduct in the dark by small groups with in compliance of blackout. 
7. To enter into interaction with units of Rosgvardiya in areas of responsibility of specified units, provide full assistance in functioning of barrier detachments of Rosgvardiya
8. The readiness to executing of tasks from 7:00 of 13th of July 2023 
 
1429th regiment is Territorial Troops unit. Looks like 70th regiment of 42nd division suffered losses or UKR pressure in their section too strong, so Operative Groupment HQ (or even HQ of 42nd division ) ordered comamner of 1429th regiment to send own company at disposal of 70th regiment.    

UK to send Malloy drones to Ukraine, capable of carrying equipment and even casualties
 

Likely spring photo

Sometime I think that with help of Ukraine some countries also search a ways to get rid of own junk to burn it in flame of war and not waste money for utilization
I think, these 100 BTR-60 can be moved to rear TD brigades on Belarusian border. Or better to use them as SVBIEDs... Or remote-controlled minefield breachers %)
The video of this weird acrobatic dismounting way from this APC must be modelled in CMCW )))  
 

This seems like the (predictable?) inverse of the Allied experience in the last year of WWII. This is from a thing I wrote a few years ago:
***
In the NWE campaign in WWII, so called 'veteran' units - especially infantry units - were predominantly manned by men with less than a couple of months service with the unit. The proof of that is in the casualty stats.

For example:
4th US Infantry Div suffered 250% of TOE strength in casualties (299 days in combat)
90th US Infantry Div suffered 196% of TOE strength in casualties (308 days in combat)
29th US Infantry Div suffered 204% of TOE strength in casualties (242 days in combat)

Therefore, on average, someone in:
4th US Inf Div saw 120 days of combat before becoming a cas
90th US Inf Div saw 157 days of combat before becoming a cas
29th US Inf Div saw 118 days of combat before becoming a cas

That’s averaged across the roughly 14,000 men in an infantry division, but the vast majority of those casualties were concentrated amongst the fairly small number of men in each division labelled "Infantry." Without rummaging through detailed statistics (which I anyway don't have access to), I suspect that no more than half that number of days-in-combat – about two months - would be the very upper limit of what a rifleman could expect to survive. Therefore I think that the average quality of individual riflemen probably declined across the campaign as long-service, highly trained men in the first waves were replaced by questionably trained men with little esprit de corps, led by 90-Day-Wonders.

In any infantry unit from mid-June onwards there'd have been a mix of men representing every stage of that chart (edit: Grossman’s combat effectiveness/exhaustion chart) which would tend to reduce the overall effectiveness of any given unit. As the campaign progressed and men started getting close to the 60 combat days referred to above, large-ish numbers of those survivors would have been in the combat-exhaustion and even vegetive phases. At the rifleman-squad-platoon-company level, infantry units were NOT on an ever escalating performance curve.

How, then, did divisions learn and improve if the individual riflemen weren't really getting a whole lot better at their jobs? They did it by becoming much better at the stuff that actually matters. Battalion and regimental staffs tended to survive much longer. And I specifically mean the staffs, rather than merely the commanders. Men in supporting arms like artillery, logistics, and even armour also had much greater longevity. Improvements in those areas meant that combat infantry units were fed into combat much better prepared and supported, and working to a plan based on realistic assessments and objectives. Given that, it didn't matter that Private Snooks in 3rd Squad, 1 Platoon, C Company, 2nd Battalion wasn't becoming a better soldier, because less was being asked of him, since he was being given more support to achieve objectives
***
The Ukrainians don’t have those competent and experienced higher level (bn, bde, and whatever they have above bde) staffs yet. Or, they do, but unevenly. This is equivalent to the position the US found themselves in at Kasserine, or the British during CRUSADER. They will get better (and are!), but it takes time, and there’s no shortcut or magic wand or uber-weapon-du-jour that will make the experiential shortfall just go away.

Supposedly Igor "Strelkov" Girkin was arrested by Russian authorities.
 
 

some pointers:
At the start of the southern offensive, we saw the employment of multiples of single companies, not brigades Ukraine is limited in its ability in embodying larger formations in an integrated way. Limited by enablers, operational environment, and experience. Was to the idea of establishing new "western" brigades proven/disproven? another way to go would have been to reinforce the existing experienced units with new battalions. a lot of the progress in the south was made by the older experienced units jury is still out but already merits questioning was this the way to go? Eighter way it was worth trying Was the idea of trying to make Ukraine to fight like "us" proven? Ukraine's way of war has been attritional, using fires decisively that then enables moment. Most actions have been platoon/company level where Ukraine has excelled compared to Russians.  The argument has been the west does not have the ability to sustain this type of war. The question is does the west then have the ability to train and sustain Ukraine in the western way of war? This would mean the enablers the western way of war requires, starting with air supremacy. The answer seems to be no. might be better to improve Ukraine's ability to fight the way it is already fighting Ukraine uses tanks in almost the complete opposite way than the west in Ukraine's experience driving a company of tanks over a ridge is a sure way of losing a tank co. Tanks are used in infantry support or indirect fire roles. Mainly in pairs. Same on the Russian side at this point AT role is mainly done with ATGM infantry This is what Ukraine has learned and thinks what works for them Now: New brigades have been bloodied and are going through some changes. This is good Ukraine is adapting The fight is now mainly an attritional fight with platoon/company-level infantry attacks problem is this is unlikely to achieve breakthrough and exploitation Mine clearing capacities are in high demand like Nammo APOBS. Now main ways are bangalores or grappling hooks. These are slow and create tiny lanes and do not enable vehicle moment. Now ongoing attritional counter-battery fight seems interesting and promising for Ukraine. Still hard to judge from the outside Russia is saving most capabilities and ammo for large vehicle formations. This rationing is often confused with Russia lacking artillery. 

Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:
 

Indepth article from a group of military analysts who spent time recently on the front lines. Quite specific takeaways from the larger article are below, in case you don’t want to read the full piece. Perhaps not as optimistic in tone as many posts, but good grist for the mill:
Franz-Stefan Gady, a senior fellow with the Institute for International Strategic Studies and the Center for New American Security, says after his visit to Ukraine it's clear the country is struggling with how to employ its forces.…Gady visited Ukraine with a group including Konrad Muzyka, an independent defense analyst focusing on Russia and Belarus and director of Rochan Consulting; Rob Lee, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Michael Kofman, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment and Principal Research Scientist, CNA.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/a-sobering-analysis-of-ukraines-counteroffensive-from-the-front
1.) By and large this is an infantryman’s fight (squad, platoon and company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications.
1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility. 
2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc. 
2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense and IMO [in my opinion] is the main cause for slow progress. 
3.) Ukrainian forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver. 
4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space and slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine’s ability to break through Russian defenses is Ukraine's inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale. Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There’s simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe. 
5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses. Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks and months. 
6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2 [command and control]/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR [information, surveillance, reconnaissance] coverage. 
Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind regarding any potential tactical impact of delivery of ATACMs [U.S.-produced Army Tactical Missile System]).
Russian forces, even if severely degraded and lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated and synchronized along the broader frontline. 
7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine. 
8.) Russian artillery rationing is real and happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses. 
9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration. 
Ukraine will have to better synchronize and adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tactically decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the Ukrainians IMO). 
10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed and will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire and maneuver at scale. 
Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.
Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st Russian minefield. 
11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.
12.) So far Ukraine’s approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks. 
13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying and tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian command and control.
14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent and morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied and older men called up for service now. 
15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal and is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting and exercising command on the frontline. 
16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition and hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains. But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination between units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. ... and Russians putting up stiff resistance. 
We asked Gady to drill a little deeper into a couple of the points he made.
On Tuesday, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley told reporters that the U.S. and allies have trained 17 brigade combat teams - 63,000 Ukrainian troops - in combined arms maneuver. More are in the pipeline.
But Ukraine is having trouble on the battlefield executing those coordinated maneuvers on a large scale because of the compressed training timelines while facing off against “one of the world’s most powerful militaries,” Gady told us.
Ukraine “is probably doing a lot of combined arms operations at smaller-unit levels, but I think it needs to scale this up,” he said. 
The U.S. is "probably expecting some sort of results with all the aid and the military hardware that it has provided," said Gady. "The basic idea here was to train Western-equipped mechanized arms brigades in combined arms maneuver. I think this approach has had some setbacks. I'm not sure that it has been a failure across the board. I think it just requires a more concerted effort."
Gady however was quick to emphasize that “no Western type of military can really do this sort of combined arms operations at scale, with the exception of the United States. But even the United States Armed Forces would have a very difficult time breaking through these defensive layers because no Western military in the world currently has any experience in breaching the types of defenses in depth that the Russians put up, in the south and east of Ukraine.”

Robotyne, Zaporizhzhia
 
https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1682062879632113675?s=20

LOL!
 
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1682017975572766722?s=20

To avoid “two guys talking on a forum” we should start with some references to frame things a bit:
https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.1/Glaser %26 Kaufmann IS 1988.pdf
https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Offense-Defense-Balance-and-War-Since-1648.pdf
As can be seen this is a pretty deep topic - and a controversial one - that cannot be framed by battlefield tactics alone.  For the Civil War, I recommended this:
https://www.amazon.ca/American-Civil-Origins-Modern-Warfare/dp/0253207150
As you note these are more themes of strategies of exhaustion vs annihilation and which one plays out better in a given time in history.
Regarding the US Civil War and as to whether it signalled that a shift was afoot.  I think it is clear that the North and South we both trapped between the classic Euro-centric doctrines that had been taught to entire generations of generals on both sides and the realities of 1) The scope and scale of the war - e.g. Gettysburg had 2.5 times more troops engaged than Waterloo, 2) the size and type of terrain being fought over, and 3) The introduction of industrialization and technology onto the battlefield.
Both sides struggled with a massive mobilization challenge while also trying to build the systemic backbones of then-modern militaries.  What we becoming very apparent to the generals fighting the war - and was preached and developed before the war by Denis Mahan, an influential professor at West Point - was that war in American, in that time was different than the Napoleonic wars from 50 years before.  
The driving military theory, as reflected by theorist such as Jomini and Clausewitz was concentration, offensive action and decisive engagement.  These ideas created a cultural mindset - something tactical analyses miss.  A cultural mindset that once embedded is incredibly hard to break out of.  Militaries will keep doing things well past the point they make sense as a result of this phenomenon - the history of which is well recorded going well back before the time periods we are discussing.  One could argue that failure to adapt has lost more wars than any other factor, far exceeded “adapting ahead of reality”, which does happen but I argue nowhere near as often.
So back to “Was the writing on the wall?”  I argue “yes”.  Your examples of “close order massacres” were also seen in the battles of the US Civil War.  The evidence that lethality and range of firepower was changing the requirements to mass effects was there, yet militaries of the day clung onto “the press of the bayonets” as a central doctrinal concept.  Even though in the Age of Rifles this was already an antiquated idea.  Defensive and Offensive primacy are really about relative costs as much as they are about culture. The cost of mass on the Offensive vs the cost of equal mass on the Defensive.  “Cost” is a significant concept that goes from institutional to operational - in the end we dumb it down to ratios.  So to oversimplify, Offensive primacy appears to occur when cost/benefit projection of effective manoeuvring mass outweighs static mass.  And Defensive vice versa.
I for one cannot see how one can view the key battles of the US Civil War and not see the trend of projected manoeuvre mass failing.  The war started with Lee’s operational offensive approach dominating the Eastern Theatre.  As the War progressed it became more clear that rapid projection of mass was not working.  In fact the costs were outstripping the South’s ability to force generate replacements.  The North adopted the slow grinding war of exhaustion - it first great victory was a defensive one at Gettysburg.  Even as Grant took over the war took one a grinding attritional nature to it.  
Of course Defensive primacy does not mean “defend only”.  It does mean that offensive strategies are going to be different.  They tend to be grinding and attritional as opposed to decisive - we can see symptoms of this all through 1864 to the wars end.  I disagree that the Franco Prussian War was a counter-example of offensive action.  The war began with rapid force projection, seeking decisive battle (which the Prussians found at Sedan), but ended in long sieges - Paris the notable one.  In many ways the Franco Prussian War was a WW1 teaser - opening with rapid force projection and manoeuvre which gets bogged down in sieges as the modern realities of capacity, organization, communication and firepower set in.
As to WW1, I think the latest wave of revisionist history is too kind by a half.  But to be fair, and to your point, the generals on all sides were not stupid, they simply did not have other viable options.  They were trapped in a reality no one was prepared for - Defensive dominance.  No force ratios were enough to breakthrough.  Even if they could, they could not move fast enough to exploit compared to the rail lines and their opponents ability to mass defences.  This was all a culmination of a trend going back to the US Civil War - effective manoeuvring mass was rendered inert.  Grinding exhaustion was the only card left in the deck.  First it worked on the Eastern Front, then the Western. Manoeuvre was not dead, it was still being applied in farther flung theatres but as soon as mass was created, it would bog down in places like Gallipoli.
I will only pull on this one quote (I hate quote by quote debates).  It is the fact that they still had a pseudo-Napoleonic system, after US Civl War, after Franco-Prussian, after the Boer War, after two Balkan Wars, after a Russo Japanese War that is the issue.  Why they still had that “pseudo-Napoleonic system” after all of those data points is not excusable in my opinion, but it is explainable - military cultural mindsets.  They invented “modern warfare” in four years because they had largely ignored, or saw only what they wanted to for previous 50.
And we stand here once more.  Evidence is starting to pile up that war is shifting again.  We will likely cling to Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission Command as tightly as pre-WW1 clung to bayonets and the cult of the offensive. Despite the evidence we are seeing suggesting warfare is evolving in other directions.  Manoeuvre is becoming Corrosive, Mission is becoming Hybrid, whether or not western militaries are able to evolve at pace remains to be seen.