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LUCASWILLEN05

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Everything posted by LUCASWILLEN05

  1. Maybe it is my tactics at fault.However the only way I have found to deal with it is to send ATGM infantry in ahead to locate and eliminate threats while the tanks support them from hull down or concealed positions. Similar tactics to those employed to deal with anti tank guns in the final years of WW2. Regarding crew quality, are you suggesting that well trained troops (eg veterans) act in a more proportional way to a potential threat. I think that might work better. it could be more proportional if they reversed a short distance to the nearest cover r fired smoke. In the real world is that what you would actually do depending on the immediacy of the perceived threat In this case your professional experience and knowledge would clarify much and hopefully help me to improve from a gaming point of view. Dealing with this particular problem is something I find very frustrating. The solution i use seems t work most of the time but I am wondering whether there are better approaches that a professional like yourself would know. Thanks
  2. I find the way tanks act like frightened ballerinas and reverse as soon as they are lased quite irritating. I am not sure what is going on under the bonnet in software terms but a new patch that addresses the issue. perhaps by taking crew quality more into account would be an improvement in my view. as well. However, we can choose whether our M1A2s have APS or not via the sceanario editor. Maybe it would be possible to add further orbat information that removes the laser warning systems. Personally however i would prefer to see a less extreme reaction
  3. Tell you what.. Shall we just fight the war and find out. We are all speculating. I might be right. You might be right, As he Arab proverb says "He who predicts the future lies even when he tells the truth" All we can do is speculate. Sure, we might have a situation where NATO pushes Russian forces out of Ukraine but does not destroy enough Russian offensive capability. Then what happens? We either get a Korea like situation with major fighting having ceased but periodic skirmishing and artillery exchanges.NATO forces will be there for years or decades in case Russia ever tries another pus. Or there is a ceasefire and a Cold War again requiring a deployment of large NATO forces for decades. A new Cold War will follow and Ukraine becomes NATO member. Again no decisive finish and a renewed war in a few years is still a real possibility That would be the inevitable result of simply stopping at the Russian border without eliminating a reasonable proportion of offensive Russian conventional military capability before a ceasefire. The political and geopolitical considerations would have to be carefully analysed by NATO leaders and by the US President incumbent at the time in the light of the military situation and the advice of SACEUR and the Joint Chiefs. It would be a political decision in the final analysis
  4. You fail to consider the political issues here. We are not talking about a full scale "Operation Barbarossa 2" . We are talking about very limited cross border operations with the primary aim of destroying Russian offensive capabilities and maybe securing a few border cities like Kursk as political negotiating chips that can be exchanged for any territory the Russians occupied or for other Russian concessions. Very like the Israel crossing of the Suez Canal during the closing stages of the Yom Kippur War. Let's say for example that during the conflict Russian forces occupied part of the /Baltic States and/or still holds some territory on the Ukrainian side of the border. maybe there are some significant Russian forces that have pulled back over the border in the Kursk area. The NATO commander will have to think about this in political and military terms. A limited cross border operation might be ended to deal with this Air and artillery bombardment is probably not gong to be enough to eliminate or reduce any remaining offensive capability. Kursk can be traded back to the Russians after the war just as the part of Egypt occupied by the IDF at the end of the Yom Kippur War was traded for the part of the then Israeli Sinai held bty Egyptian 3rd Army. An alternative plan might be to destroy the Russian military forces around Kursk and then, as you say, retire bck over the Ukraine border. much like the US incursions into Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War it would be a limited military operation in terms of size, scope and duration, it could be anything from a few hours to a few days depending on the circumstances and involve perhaps just a division or two - by the final stage of the war US forces n Europe will be strongly re-inforced by both European NATO members and by forces from the US itself, NATO will have control of the air to a significant even if not full air dominance War is the extension of politics by other means and NATO, in this case would,like the Israelis in 1973 be seeking to gain political advantages in post war peace talks. If the Russians were to use any kind of WMD at this point they would be most likely to employ chemical weapons, not nukes. Chemical weapons will at least force NATO units into NBC suits thus degrading their ability to operate to best effect.
  5. Have you considered the concept of limited war? In operation Desert Storm (1992) Coalition forces as you recall invaded Iraq as part of the operation to liberate Kuwait. During the Yom Kippur War (1973) Israeli forces invaded both Syria and Egypt later in he conflict. There was never any plan to change the regime by either the Israelis in 1973 or the Coalition in 1991. In regard to nuclear weapons there has never yet been a conflict between nuclear armed powers. We do not and cannot know how such a conflict would play out. unless or until it happened. However, in WW2 we do know that both sides had access to weapons such as anthrax and to chemical weapons. These weapons were never used by anyone during he conflict. Apparently, in Pentagon Wargames it is very difficult to get anyone to go nuclear without the scenario forcing the issue. Morally, even for a Russian President it is very likely to be he same. Despite Russian doctrine Putin is not insane and he won;To go nuclear over a few border crossings alone particularly if he has been told through back channel sources that these are limited and Russian territorial integrity will be respected (any land occupied will be returned after a ceasefire and peace talks.If anything, in the situation am talking about the use of chemical weapons might be a possibility. These would degrade the conventional capabilities of NATO forces. However, such a scenario might still escalate to nukes. In terms of he CMBS scenario, by the time NATO is in position to consider crossing the Russian border the war is likely to be in its' closing stages. NATO objectives at this point will be to gain political negotiating chips (like Kursk) and to destroy Russian offensive capabilities so they cannot continue the war in an offensive manner (ie re- invade Ukraine Talks about a ceasefire may be imminent or indeed already have begun but fighting will continue, including NATO counter offnsiv operations. At thispoint the Russians would not be given any rest or time to regroup
  6. There has never been a nuclear exchange so we don't knowhow his might play out. There may be a small scale exchange f a handfu of nukes.If Russia employed,let's say half a dozen small tactical nukes NATO would probably respond proportionatly against similar targets. If Russia made a "demonstration" attack on a Western city a similar Russian city might be nuked. If Russia launched a full scale nuclear strike the west would respod in kind. Taking hypothetical NATO ground operations as the assumed scenario the Russian government would be informed through back channels that the operations are limited and would not come within a certain distnce of Moscow (let's say 80 miles. NATO might well announce, again for the purposes of discussion, that NATO would encrcle St Petersburg burt not enter the city (more likely however it would be treted much the same as Moscow. It would be made clear that regime change was not being sought and that NATO would be agreeable to a ceasefire. Any NATO or Ukranian territory would be exchanged for any NATO occupied Russian territory including Kaliningrad assuming NATO had captured this place instead of blockading it
  7. The Russian elite won't want to be ruling over an irradiated wasteland with much of the population dead or dying. Doctrine might be for the nukes to fly but in reality they will only lunch if he survival of the regime is directly at stake. In other words is Moscw and St Petersburh are about to fall to a NATO "March on Moscow" which we all agree is highly unlikely Dooming the Rodina to become a nuclear wasteland wont happen over small scale and limited cross border incursions or even occupying a couple of cities like Kursk. Bear in mind that in the CMBS scenario t was Russia, not NATO that started the war. NATO will be looking for a favourable political solution to th conflict and that may require limited operations into the Rusian border areas to gain some political avantages in post war talks. Putin is not crazy - he won't go nuclear over that. Zhirinovsky maybe but not Putin. Regarding chemical weapons I doubt the Russians would use them unless in a desperate situation in the conventional battle. However it would be more likely they would use the Novichok chemical arsenal instead of a nuclear strike
  8. However it is most unlikely Russia would risk nuclear annihilation over a limited cross border operation particularly if it has been stated publicly and through private back channel messages Similar hints were apparently made to Baghdad during the 1991 Gulf War n regard to the consequences of chemical weapons use. in political terms Putin might be informed that, though NATO troops were operating on Russian territory there was no intent tobring bout regime change, NATO would not advance major forces towards Moscow or within a certain distance of Moscow.It might also be stated that NATO forces would not enter St Petersburg. NATO would very likely reiterate its no frst use policy but make it clear it would retaliate proportionately to any Russian nuclear strike. However, as I sated earlier these issues are far above the pay grade of the commanders into whose combat boots we are stepping for a CMBS war game. If someone wants to do scenarios involving limited cross border operations late in the war or even a hypothetical "March on Moscow" then so be it. This is a war games scenario, Nothing more. As for so kind of Operation Barbarossa 2 I simply don't see this happening short of a massive provocation on Russia's part. We are talking about something on the scale of the accidental nuclear attack portrayed in Eric L Harry's novel Arc Light. If someone wants to do war game scenarios based around a 2017 version of that then I would say fair enough, go right ahead and do it. It is after all just a war game, not the real world
  9. There are plausible reasons and motivations for NATO to conduct strictly limited conventional operations near the Ukrainian border Anyway this is a war game and we can assume, for scenario purposes that the nuclear decision has either not been taken yet or that the war leaders are all too scared of the consequences and the war remains a conventional conflict. At the level we are gaming (roughly Company Combat Team) the nuclear decision is a long way above our pay grade. Any NATO operations on Russian territory will be strictly limited as I already said. Operations to capture Kursk for example given that the city is close to the Ukraine - Russia border, A march on Moscow and regime change are unlikely to be considered unless something really extreme happens. All we are talking about are limited military operations on Russian territory aimed at securing negotiating chips prior to a ceasefire and maybe destroying or capturing mobile elements of the Russian army so they cannot r-invade Ukraine in the future.There is no reason the Russian army should be permitted a secure base on Russian territory while a state of war continues to exist. Even if NATO chooses not to actually occupy Russian territory on the border that should not rule out temporary incursions to secure military objectives close to the Ukrainian border such as destroying Russian offensive capabilities prior to a ceasefire. That would be a sensible alternative NATO decided it did not need an important border city like Kursk as a negotiating chip. Our war game can assume one or more of the above options for a scenario depicting limited operations on Russian territory. It is probable that both sides know he war is nearing its' end at the point we are discussing. Maybe the Russians still occupy some territory in Ukraine and NATO wants some Russian territory it can use in future peace talks.
  10. Eventually yes. But it could still be a while before this phase is reached
  11. Indeed. Look for example at the terrain the Germans and Red Army fought over during the Battle of the River Mius (July - August 1943) detailed in Decision n the Ukraine (George Nipe) Plenty of ravines (balkas as they are known locally), crops and unduations. The steppes are certainly not a billiard table https://uk.images.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search;_ylt=A7x9UnK2smdX6gIAK4h3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTBsYWhiN2NvBHNlYwNzYwRjb2xvA2lyMgR2dGlkAw--?_adv_prop=image&fr=yhs-SGMedia-sgm_fb&va=ukrainian+steppes&hspart=SGMedia&hsimp=yhs-sgm_fb
  12. Political and military leaders know what will happen when someone stars throwing nukes about.There as never been a war between nuclear armed powers hence we have no idea how this scenario will play out. However in WW2 both sides had large stocks of chemical weapons that were never used. in a future conflict it could very well be the same with nukes. Although Russian doctrine says they should be used that does not mean they will be. Personally I think Putin will only use nukes if NATO actually marched on Moscow and St Petersburg and the survival of Putin's government was at sake. If NATO made it clear that it was conducting limited operations on Russian territory and any territory captured would be returned post war negotiations (in return for any NATO/Ukrainian territory held by Russia for instance or for some other political concessions. I don' tsee Putin risking nuclear Armageddon for the Crimea. Kursk, Rostov on Don etc. If NATO advanced to and captured St Petersburg rather than surrounding the city then that would be a different matter entirely. In regard to use of Russian chemical weapons I doubt the alliance would go nuclear over that. More likely NATO war aims would be expanded beyond simply liberating any occupied NATO or Ukrainian territory. Limited war aims would be announced such as disarming Russia's WMD capability and limiting or destroying conventional forces. Unless Putin did something very stupid regime change would not be on the agenda and that would likely be stated explicitly
  13. By the time we get to a NATO counter offensive phase NATO has probably got control of the air but Russian SAMs will continue to be an issue, probably a serious one. This would not be like Desert Storm. If anything perhaps it would be more like the closing stages of the Yom Kippur War (closest analogy I can think of right now :-) )
  14. I think you could look at Steppe fighting in similar terms as modern desert warfare (Desert Storm, Arab - Israeli Wars nd, to some extent the India - Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971) Regarding the Serbs, had they not agreed to a ceasefire there might well have been a NATO ground invasion
  15. I don't see why combat could not take place in the open steppes. Here armoured combat would be fast paced as it was ibn Desert Storm (1991) From a strategic/operational view the roads would be important. Initially, in South Ukraine I would expect major Russian pushes down the M14 coast road to link up with the Crimea, down the M04 (Donetsk - Dnepropetrovsk. A later NATO counter offensive would, as one of the military/political objectives seek to liberate Southern Ukraine from Russian occupation. Potentially advances might be made into Crimea and the Donetsk Region. While less likely there might be an advance over the Russian border proper at me point,most likely if Putin had does something really stupid like using the Novichok type chemical weapons (a really serious escalation like this may well case NATO war aims to expand beyond liberating occupied areas of Ukraine. While unlikely it might be interesting to allow a branch f the campaign scenario to consider the option of an expanded war (most likely this would be limited operations over the Russian border to punish and destroy significant portions of the Russian army and occupy some Russian territory as a future political bargaining chip. A march on Moscow and regime change seems very unlikely as it would drive Putin too close to the nuclear threshold. There could be a modern day version of II SS Panzer Korp's battles - gaming those with US forces (or modern Germans) could be interesting scenarios though obviously we would be gaming from a Combat Team Commander level on the same terrain. The ultimate military/political objective can, as in 1943, be assumed to be the capture of Kursk prior to negotiating a ceasefire on terms favourable to NATO. In the South perhaps there would be similar operation aimed at capturing places like Rostov on Don and Luhansk prior to a ceasefire, again for use as political bargaining counters. Again, all of this must be considered as a possible branch of the NATO victory timeline for purely war gaming reasons as a scenario background
  16. We have the points issue in tabletop war gaming as well. Personally I don't hve much tim,e for that method of gaming - it smacjks too much of competition gaming.How many points did 2nd Armourwd Cavalry hve at 73rd Easting? Havinfg said that,using points differently can be a hlpful scenario design tool as a means of checking game balance. You can have mismatched force which might suggest a rearguard acion type scenario might be the way to go. Or you might need to introduce ther methods of balance through adding entrenchments, adjusting victory conditions etc
  17. Arguably there is Gaurd and "Guard" There was a big difference between Napoleonic French Old Guard, tje 1813 Young FGuard and Spanish Walloon Guards. They all had the title of "Guard" but it does not follow hey are all really Elite troops. The Walloon Guards might be "elite" by the standards of the Napoleonic Spnish army but, bty the standards of Napoleonic Europe they were actually pretty average troops. The same goes for the Iraqi Republican Guard. They were the cream of the Iraqi Army under the Saddam #Hussein regime and they did stand and fight in both Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Their equipment was certainly inferior and perhaps t a lesser extent so was their training. They had quite a bit of experience in the Iran - Iraq War. I would, on this basis, consider them as Regular with pretty good morale/motivation and a fairly average leadership. The Regular Iraqi Army armoured and mechanized units, since they did stand and fight in ODS t least would probably be rated as Green but would be well motivated with a very average leadership. Many of those hapless frontline conscripts who surrendered very quickly would likewise be rated eiher Green or Conscript with poor or abysmal leaders (-1 or -2) and lousy morale. As Panzersaurkrautwerfer says, the truly elite units are ging to be few and far between. Possbbly a USMarine Recon unit might qualfy as Elite though in most cases Crack might be more like it. Elite is very excetional. Something like the best of the best in Special Forces or one of the WW2 German Tank Aces suc as Wittmann. And remember you can still do a lot with the Motivation and Leadership ratings so don't ignore them. Some Green or Conscrpt units might be very highly motivated to the point of being fanatical and a handful of leaders could be exceptionally qualified eiher because of personal charima or because of theiir previous military service. Even some irregular foces such as some IS units could get a higher training grade than you would give most irregular units in addition to good leadership and high morale. Maybe Regular Training, Fanatical Motivation and quite a few +1 or +2 leaders scattered around the force
  18. From the CMSF Shock Force Manual which should give you some guidance EXPERIENCE – determines the experience and training level of the soldiers of the formation. Options include: - Conscript: draftees with little training and no combat experience whatsoever. - Green: draftees with little training and some combat experience or reservists with some training and no combat experience. Green can also represent professional soldiers whose training is substandard in comparison to another force. - Regular: professional soldiers who went through extensive, quality training programs, but lack combat experience. Or Regular can represent troops that received mediocre training that have a fair amount of combat experience. - Veteran: professional soldiers with standard military training and first hand combat experience. Alternatively, it can be professional soldiers who have trained to a slightly higher standard than Regulars, yet lack combat experience. - Crack: exceptional soldiers with more than the average training and plenty of combat experience. - Elite: the best of the best. Superb training, frequent combat experience, and generally all around tough guys. I would give units such as the US Marines, 82nd Airborne, US Marines, British paras and Royal Marine Commandoes a Veteran rating. Seleced units would get a Crack Rating. Elite is relly the best of the best and I would reserve this for Spcial Forces of he major nations (eg British SAS, Russian Spetznaz or Crack troops with a lot of major combat experience. The trouble with your Russianvolunteers, though some of them will certainly have served in Chechnya (Afghanistabn is too long ago for most) is that their experience was some time ago. If it were my decision I would rate them as Veterans with quite high motivation and mostly +1 and occasional +2 leaders. Another point is you can actually rate individual squads, Hence,althogh your entire force might have an overall rating of Regular you can still have individual squds with better ratings. would be very cautious about uing n Elite squad with your Russim Volunteers. I woud reservthis for actual Specisl Forces "advisors) and you won't have more than one squad of these in most cases
  19. Ah, I see where you are coming from. Maybe give them a variable rating between Regular and Veteran. Crack might be too high for most units however - few make it into Special Forces. You could give units a good leadership rating and probably get similar results. A crack squad seems to me like a very exceptional unit - we don't want "The Dirty Dozen" in our typical battle - these are not the US Marines, Royal Marine Commandos, etc :
  20. Re Russian volunteers I think a veteran/crack rating may be over inflating their capabilities. Taking into account recent service I would think Regular might be a more accurate reflection with faiirly average leadership and Normal/High motivation. I would consider a veteran/crack rating would be more appropriate to good quality regulars such as British Paras, US Marines and their Russian equivilants. The rest of your evaluation makes sense to me
  21. Sounds like a reasonable assumption. Battalion sized airdrops on or near strategic objectives like Mariupol and Kharkov where they could capture certain strategic objectives and prevent or delay Ukrainian forces from reinforcing strategic points (NATO is unlikely to intervene at this early stage) Small scale amphibious landings on the Southern coast might also fulfill a similar role. Maybe somewhere like Berdyansk to capture the airfields nearby and to secure the nearby road junction northwest of Novovasylivka and cutting the E58 road. Russia can subsequently develop an attack aimed at Melitopol and linking up with operations pushing out from the Crimea
  22. Kharkov also is a key road hub as well as being politically and symbolically important as even a cursory glance at the map (see Google Earth) There is a reason the city saw four battles during WW2 as most of us know very well. I agree with Vladimir hat, in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine a Russian thruston this axis is likely
  23. Not until the front lines were further west. However, NATO would want to hit any such airfields to prevent the Russians from using them. However, what the Russians would really want is the road in order to keep their tank spearheads supplied.
  24. You should read General Sir Richard Shirreff's new book. As a recently retired Deputy SACEUR the general will have some cogent insights regarding NATO preparedness and political considerations. I agree with you however in that it will be difficult politically for NATO to become involved in a Ukrainian conflict. Maybe a future President Trump might make an ill advised decision to get involved but I don't think the Joint Chiefs would let him
  25. Not until the front lines were further west. However, NATO would want to hit any such airfields to prevent the Russians from using them. However, what the Russians would really want is the road in order to keep their tank spearheads supplied.
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