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LUCASWILLEN05

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Everything posted by LUCASWILLEN05

  1. Just do me one favour and look at the road network in the area on Google Earth. And consider the logistics of a Russian advance down the Black Sea Coast. Also note the two airfields to the North West of the city which could be militarily useful t Russia
  2. The only way thus war is likely to happen is if NATO weakness and political division tempts Putin into doing and underestimating he NATO reaction something stupid. He will only invade the Baltic States if he thinks he can get away with it or he is already at war with NATO mover something else. In which case he might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb (it is the only chance Russia is going to get of retaking, as Putin sees it)
  3. If you can't run your fuel trucks down that road your armoured spearheads are going to run out of fuel. The Russians will have to take Mariupol for the same reason the US had o take An Nasiryah in2003. Whether it is a campaign to open a land route to the Crimea or a larger invasion of Ukraine the generls will still have t think about the logistics. Some form of fight for Mariupol is likely to happen unless the Ukranans choose to withdraw
  4. I have to side with Panzersaurkrautwerfer on this one Steve
  5. It is one of the options discussed in the Stratfor video link I posted An advance to the Dnieper line is certainly more modest than the scenario assumed in CMBS. Either an advance to the Dniepr or a full conquest of the Ukraine would indeed be big operation requiring a significant portion of the Russian military. Even more so if there were a contingency plan to operate in the Baltic States as well or o defend against a NATO attack from that area in the event of war with NATO. Russia would have to plan for the contingency if nothing else. Russia would be worried even if NATO imply blockaded Kaliningrad in the event of war. A sensible Russian war plan would have to consider the contingency. Regarding the longer term issues Russia would face, yes I agree with you there. If the Russians invaded Ukraine the best military option, as shown in the Stratfor video is to advance to the Dnieper line as the best defensible position
  6. Looking at the road network around Mariupol it is clearly an important transport hub. If Russia invades Ukraine one of the strategic objectives will be to open a land route to the Crimea. Mariupol is in a location where it blocks th advance down th coast road needed for that thrust and for the logistics to support that advance. True CMBS is a tactical game, not an operational /strategic one but we cannot simply ignore the issue We could certainly set a scenario or two in and around the city
  7. Also, as the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet it is a rather important strategic asset that really is surrounded by NATO territory. I could see NATO trying t take it in the event of war. Putin won't like that
  8. What abut a more modest mission such as either 1 imply opening a land route to the Crimea 2 Occupying Ukraine up to the line of the River Dnieper https://www.stratfor.com/video/wargaming-russias-military-options-ukraine I agree with you in that Russia won't want tp get bogged down n urban warfare. If a city cannot be taken quickly encircle and blockade until the main mission is achieved. Then capture the place. If Mariupol for example can be taken easily then do so. If not besiege the place perhaps using ethnic Russian militias. Same with Kharkov. The objective of the Russian army is to defeat Ukranian army armoured elements outside the cities and secure the area up to the Dnieper establishing defense line there Then negotiate for a ceasefire. Much e same in the Baltic Sates ##here the objective is to occupy Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia within a few dys and to open up a land route to the Kaliningrad Oblast. Then negotiate for a ceasefire. Regarding Mariupol itself. If you take a look on Google Earth and look specifically at the road network you will see that a major road, the M23 passes through the city and that it is the center of a road hub. There are a couple of airfields to the west of the city. These may provide good reasons for taking the city from the Russian POV assuming you are driving down the coast road either with the limited objective of opening a land route to the Crimea or as part of a bigger occuption of Eastern Ukraine up to the River Dniepr
  9. Nothing is inevitable. I would suggest we amend "Russia will inevitably lose" to "If Russia is unable to accomplish a quick military victory and can exploit this politically by negotiating from a position of strength the Russia will lose" Hence, to win Russia must go for limited political and strategic objectives achievable within a short period of time before NATO can mobilize and deploy superior forces
  10. Is it? Holding the Baltics opens up a route to the Russian naval base at Kaliningrad
  11. Arguably Russia is equally paranoid because of your history. You fear some kind of Barbarrossa 2. On the other hand the countries on Russia's borders fear Russian attack because of their history with Russia. Paranoia works both ways
  12. Only if Western leaders continue to show weakness. Shirreff's book looks like a 21st Century version of Hackett's 1978 Third World War. If it informs people and wakes the politicians upon time to reinforce our conventional defenses so Putin thinks twice the book will have done it#s job. One hopes we don't stumble into a war as happened in 1914 The danger is Putin thinking he can get away with something he cannot because he underestimates our willingness and capacity to act,For instance a small scale inursion into one of the Baltic States could escalate out of all control. Likewise, were Russia to invade Ukraine and NATO responds as assumed in the CMBS that cul result in an untended war nobody actually wants.
  13. Military weakness through defense cuts going to far can be just as dangerous. Putin, seeing NATO's military weakness and political division could decide to do something ill advised, thinking he can get away with it. A reasonable level of conventional military strength sufficient to give in aggressor pause for thought is a smart thing to d. Recall the lessons of he 1930s. Britain and France had slashed their defense budgets for the previous 20 years and failed to rearm sufficiently after Hitler came to power. That gave he impression, along with the appeasement policy. that little or no effective military action would be taken, thereby encouraging Hitler to go further. History records the dire consequences of such policies During the 1980s our leaders (Reagan and Thatcher) were wise enough to learn the lessons of the 1930s .and rebuilt our conventional forces to the extent where they were credible enough to make the Soviet leaders think twice about any plns they might have had to attack and to resist any temptation to do so Sir Richard Shirreff's new book seems to be a timely warning of the dangers NATO might face if Putin perceives the alliance as military and political weakness. General Sir Richard Sherriff's new book (and bear in mind the man was Deputy SACEUR until 2014 and thus probably knows what he is talking about) warns us of the possible consequences of being weak or as being perceived to be so. Our leaders would do well to heed such warnings and thus prevent a disasterous major conflict
  14. Another question is does Russia have the capacity to invade both the Baltic States and Ukraine either in the same operation or in a quick sequence? I think it might have the forces to do that but it would have to be quick and there would be little if any margin for error.
  15. This scenario would effectively be WW3. In this scenario I can see the Russian navy trying to do something in the Atlantc and Mediterranean to try to interfere with NATO Operations. The Russian navy won't last long. A few days, perhps a week. Some of the submarines maybe a little longer, Essentially, after the first week or so the Russian navy will be destroyd or blockaded in port. The question is how much damage and delay they could impose before that happns and what impact this has on the land war. Russia, give the disadvantages it is operating under has to fight and win quickly. Russia will be fighting for limited territorial and political objectives and will am to achieve these objectives before NATO and particularly the US can deploy large heavy forces Once that happens Russia has lost. If however Putin can achieve these limited objectives quickly he would hope to negotiate a favorable ceasefire from a position of strength as he sees it.. NATO would either have to negotiate or fght a major war wiytjh te risks of nuclear escalation I am not saying this would work, jus looking at it from Putin's perspective in so far as this is possible
  16. You're going to have to explain this one, because I have absolutely NO idea what you're talking about. I think what he means is a quick Russian Operation t occupy the Baltic States to humilite NATO and demonstrate that Article 5 is of no use in protecting NATO members. Putin's hope would be that NATO falls apart in this scenrio giving him a free hand to do as he likes
  17. Hitler used similar pretexts (Germanns in the Sudetenland, Danzig Corridor etc) And Putin himself has done it - ethnic Russians being attacked by Georgia in 2008. Same again in the Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine.. We all know it is a pretext
  18. It would not be wise for Russia to start a war. However, despite the fact that nobody wants a war a 1914 style crisis that escalates out of all control seems like the most likely scenario. As you say Putin seems to be taking deliberately provocative action and maybe Putin holds the same view of NATO's actions. This is a recipe for misunderstanding and escalations of a minor incident into something far nastier and much bigger. General Sir Richard Shirreff's new book looks worth a read. I ordered a copy from Amazon last night http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/books/2017-war-with-russia-by-general-sir-richard-shirreff-review-a3252576.html
  19. Russia would of course be employing political and military Maskirovka deception measures/ They practically invented the art http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36333664 A NATO response might, in the event be delayed politically as the member states debated whether this was a crisis, whether to deploy forces. It depends what the various governments wanted to do == and as indicated earlier politicas can stymie a response as happened over Libya. One hopes that a US response would be quick and forces deployed to the region in sufficient strength to deter a Russian invasion before it started. However, if Russia saw a divided NATO that might actually encourage a Russian invasion Putin may be a gambler a bit like Hitler prior to WW2. The question is what happens when his bluff is called. Does Putin know where the Red Line is and does he know not to cross it? Hitler didn't.
  20. This kind of thing could be the trigger for a 1914 style escalation. Something like this http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war Regarding Mariupol maybe tactical surpise was achieved and the Ukrainians caught napping
  21. I heard about this new book by General Sir Richard Shirreff. Entitled "The President's War (US version) 0r 2017 Warwith Russia (UK verson) which looks very relevant to this debate. Looks like it could be a modern day version of Hackett#s 1980s book Might be worth a look http://www.booksdirect.com.au/books/?isbn=9781473632226
  22. Interesting article from 2015 analyzing how a war might start. Possibly a 1914 style crisis http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war
  23. In a war situation Russia might well decide to occupy the Baltic States to open up a land corridor to Kaliningrad and to prevent NATO from using them as the launchpad for an invasion of Russia. NATO has no intention of doing so but Russia, in view of its' history fears some kind of "Barbarossa 2" St Petersburg is only some 80 miles from the border. Hitler got that far in WW2 from the 1941 border of German occupied Poland. So NATO armoured units could do it - and Russia fears this perceived threat
  24. In theory,yes, the policy is the Baltic States would be defended - and they should be. However, nations with left leaning governments might well be fr less willing to intervene. In Britain's case for example a Conservative government under Cameron probably would. But Cameron has a very slim 12 seat majority and the Labour Party under Corbyn is leaning towards the Far Left. The Syria Debate was very acrimonious although the Government finally go its way with a decent majority. In the case of war with Russia (with the very real risk of nuclear war) we would see strong anti war demonstrations and great Parliamentary opposition particularly with the Labour Party. We could not count on a vote committing Britain to war. If it passed it could be by a very slim margin, Regarding Putin I agree with you. He would need to win a war quickly before NATO mobilizes and deploys. The Baltic States could be occupied within a few days. Then NATO must choose between mobilizing for a big war o liberate the Baltic States or accepting their loss with all of the consequences to NATO credibility. If Putin were to make threatening noises about "selective nuclear strikes" particularly against the territories of key nations that were politically uncertain about the whole idea of going to war or, so Putin would hope, might be enough o get NATO to negotiate from a position of weakness. I am not saying that is what would happen, just tat Putin would likely see it that way. As you say h is a ruthless and clever opportunist but is no fool.He knows that he cannot fight a protracted non nuclear conventional war with the West. He also knows the West, particularly European nations fear the likely devastation even a conventional war would cause. Putin is clever enough and ruthless enough to try nuclear blackmail even though has no intention of actually using them.The question is whether we are prepared to call his bluff
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