LUCASWILLEN05

Depends on period but for moderns I'd have to go for a Nimitz Class Carrier for force projection. I just love those Fleet Command boardgames but only ever purchased 6th and 7th Fleet. Would love to get my hands on one or two of the others. Now, here's one for you. Your favorite naval miniatures rules. Mine is WWII Micronaughts th game Uninspiring title but streamlined mechanics. a decent emphasis on the human factor and lots of fun to play although I seem rather prone to suffering magazine explosions. Just wish I could find something like them for modern. Harpoon was too complicated althogh the PC version is good enough. Shipwreck was ok but a bit dated

Look. This is getting increasingly acrimonious. Views are entrenched and none of us is going to shift our positions much further as i think must be obvious to all of us at this point. Everyone has raised valid points and opinions but we are never going to agree on this one. Given the circumstances we can either let this degenerate into a flame war which will get locked down by the forum moderators or we can agree to disagree and shut this down ourselves now . I suggest we all agree to disagree and leave it there. Do the rest of you agree that this is the most sensible social option given current conditions?

Ever heard of Groupthink????

Like Bismarck. In terms of what he is trying to do and the methods the chooses to do it the man is smart. In the same way that Al Capone can b seen as a smart gangster. I agree the ma is a deeply unpleasant thug but that does not make him a fool. Were he to achieve his aims however historians would remember him as they do Bismarck. Should he fail he will be seen in an entirely different light as you say. The History books on this one are yet to be written but I think we can safely say that our time wil l be a highly controversial period of study for future history students. There will be many views and controversies about Vladimir Putin

Putin is for one thing human and thus can make mistakes. Secondly and more importantly you need to consider Putin's aims and objectives such as the Eurasian project, rebuilding the Soviet Union/Russian Empire etc. The point I have been trying to make to people here fr days is that, in the CMBS scenario Russia has already got into a war with NATO and will therefore take steps to win that war. Look a the way the US acts when it has gone to war against Iraq, Serbia or Islamic State. Why can Putin not take the same kinds of actions when he goes to war. In fact he does. Just look at what h Russian airstrikes conducted n behalf of Russia's client/ally in Damascus. f Russia in our hypothetical war reasonably restricts targeting to military/military related targets NATO will do the same. Do you seriously think that in this scenario NATO will not be hitting Russian air bases, ports, command centers, perhaps even power supplies and infrastructure - as has been done in previous campaigns such as Iraq, Kossovo or the current action against IS Why can't intelligent people like you understand that or are you simply refusing to do so for the sake of prolongijng the argument?

Read David Ascoli's A Day of Battle. Ascoli argues that the way Bismarck manipulated France into war using the Ems Telegram was an evil act. He just changed a few words and put a whole different spin to get a war that hw wanted at least according to Ascoli's analysis As for as Bismarck is concerned I studied him 20 years ago when doing my History degree prt of which included Nationalism in 19th Century Europe. Suffice to say I never liked him but, though I think he was essentially evil the man was nevertheless also a genius as a statesman. It probably required someone like him to complete the unification of Germany. Putin somehow always reminds me of Bismarck. Certainly more so than he does of Hitler.. Having said that some of Putin's methods are reminiscence of those employed by Hitler for example he annexation of Crimea may compare with te Anschluss with Austria and the Sudetenland Crisis. I suspect future historians will be debating this one long after we are all dead and gone.

That is really sad :-(

Sadly war often does that to people. One of my late Aunts from Switzerland married an ex German soldier who fought on he Russian Front. I asked him about it once when I was too young to know better. He only told me a very little and refused to answer most of my questions. Took me years to understand why. And the closest, thankfully, that I have ever come to th real thing is seeing the destruction of the WTC live on the TV news. I never want to see anything like that again. And, compared to what your father and others see or have seen on the battlefield my experience is nothing at all. I hope your father was able to come to terms with what he experienced to a least some degree. All of us, even civvies like myself, and perhaps civvies in particular must try to be more understanding of the problems our veterans experience thrugh having done the job they did for us. I think we can all agree on that.

His skills as a military strategist have been severely criticized by even his own former military commanders including Hamdani. He also had a bad habit of, as you say, misreading he political situation. In short the man was neither a general nor was he a statesman. His decision to go to war against Iran in 1980 was a serious misjudgement resulting in an 8 year blood bath. The decision to invade Kuwait was a strategic blunder. My point however was that Vladimir Putin, a trained and experienced KGB officer and clearly a highly educated man is a very different leader and far more strategically savvy than Saddam ever was. Just look at he way Putin opeates. I don't like him and personally I would consider him, like Bismarck, as essentially evil. And the assessment of Bismarck as evil has been made by historians such as Ascoli in his book A Day of Battle.Certainly there are lot of people who have compared Putin with both Bismarck and with Hitler. I tend to go more for the Bismarck comparison myseld

Again not reading my post which specifically stated the period August to September 1990. At that point, as every history f the Gulf War I have read agrees Saddam had he best chance of unleashing an attack that would have been very hard for 18th Airborne Corps and the Marines to deal with As you know there was very little thee at that time to oppose Iraqi armoured attacks Have you read either Certain Victory or XVIII Airborne Corps in Desert Storm,? An early Iraqi attack could have done serious damage . I know there were probably good political and military reasons such an attack never came but, at the time, it was widely feared by the media and, according to the histories of the war, by the US military as well And I was in fact referring to Saddam Hussein as a "strategic moron" Something many people have said, not just me. Including a certain General Norman Schwartzkopf of whom I am sure you have heard. Now as regards Putin's options. essentially in this scenario he has once he has started the war 1 The Bastion Strategy. Essentially this means the Russian navy sits back defensively in the Black Sea and in its bases i the Russian arctic. There like the Kaiser's navy 1914 - 1918 it will contribute little o nothing of vlue. Worse, the failure or inability to prevent he flow of US reinforcements over the Atlantic wlll only hasten Russian defeat. In fact it will likely make that defeat all the more certain 2 A more offensive strategy. Let's face it any Russian surface fleet elements out in the Atlantic o in the Mediterranean have had it anyway. They are going to be unceremoniously sunk or they will have to surrender and be interned, So they might as have a go at something like a US Carrier Group. If they manage to get the first short it is just possible tat they could do some damage, Even severe damage or a "mission kill" on a US Carrier, though very hard to achieve would be a significant contribution and would be of significant use to Moscow's plans. A lot more could be accomplished with naval mines at critical choke points like the Dardanelles and by the use of submarines. Plus of course air attack employing long range ASMs Option 2 is the option I suggest is best for the Russians. It is at least a more active approach that has same possibility of damaging and delaying US reinforcements. Maybe only for a few days but a few days might be all the Russian land forces need to accomplish their mission. Then Moscow can try to get their ceasefire and end the war fast on their terms which, as we all agree is Putin's best chance of winning

Did you not read my post??? i specifically stated the period August and September 1990at which time it was greatly feared an attack would take place but it never did.Read for example Certain VictoryBrig Gen Robert E Scales, XVIII Airborne Corps in Desert Storm : from Planning to Victory Charles Lane Tooney, With particular reference to the EARLY phase of the crisis AUGUST - OCTOBER 1990 Nothing to do with the spoiling attack at Khafji or those elsewhere along the Saudi i=and Kuwaiti border which took place during the active Operations of Desert Storm Jeez I was actually completing my History degree while the Gulf War was actually being fought. As it happens I was on vacation in Lucerne Switzerland in early August 1990 when the news of the Iraqi invasion actually broke And regarding Varus, Fetterman, Custer etc you are again deliberately missing my point which is this. Military history is replete with examples of arrogant soldiers who ignored the opinions of others and consequently led the men under their commands to famous (or infamous military disasters. A point only a bloody fool would ignore.I might have added the very obvious point that very often commanders have badly underestimated the Russians and that has caused some of the most famous disasters in military history. Now, all you gentlemen have to do is acknowledge that I do in fact have a valid point in regard of possible Russian strategy even if you don't agree and even if that strategy probably would not work. I don't think it would either, t least not for very long. Any Russian surface elements out and about in the ~Mediterranean have had it anyway. So they might as well either surrender and be interned or they can have a go at a US Carrier, hope they can do some serious damage and go down fighting

Our resident Quintus Varus speaks again You arrogant, arrogant man. You think that a well read and somewhat informed civilian avoid acknowledging that I do, in fact have a fair point cannot have a valid opinion - just because he is a civilian, not a trained military professional. You completely miss the point yet again or choose to do so. And you twist my words and statements in order to support your own arguments rather than admitting that I actually have a fair case on the matter of possible Russian strategy. A wiser man would know that under estimating the enemy is ne of the cardinal sins of warfare. I may be over estimating the Russians but it is far better to respect the enemy and thus avoid falling into a trap through your own arrogant hubris. As Varus found out at Teutoburger Wald And then from your own military history there was Matthew Fetterman. Thought he could "ride through the whole Sioux Nation with 80 men" despite being advised to the contrary, Massacred along with his entire command and even had the defeat named after him. The Fetterman Massacre George Armstrong Custer. Ignored advice to wait before attacking the Indian Camp at the Little Big .Horn. Massacred along with a large part of his command General Lloyd Fredendall of whom one of his contemapories General Truscott said "Small in stature, loud and rough in speech, he was outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. He was inclined to jump to conclusions which were not always well founded. Fredendall rarely left his command post for personal visits and reconnaissance, yet he was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he.[2]" Underestimated Rommel and indeed considered incompetent by some of the British generals he worked qwith. Including General Anderson. Did not listen to the advice given him by those who had fought the Germans and Irwin Rommel before Walked into the well known disaster at Kasserine Pass General Douglas MacArthur. Certainly on of he great commanders of US military history and indeed one of the great captains of all time. However, during the Korean War. Nevertheless, despite CIA intelligence warnings about the Red Chinese he still managed to walk into a devastating ambush on the Yalu River and was handed one of the greatest defeats in US military history. All these commanders had one thing in common. An arrogant belief in their own infallibility and that, in every case, led them into a stunning military disaster. Now, you may claim to have "won" the debate but hat does not in any way make you |"right" It just means I have other things to do than waste my time on arrogant fools. By the way, should I be proven right and should you be the one in command of US forces in Ukraine I pity the unfortunate soldiers under your command who would be the ones to pay the price of your arrogant folly in underestimating the Russians. Just as he soldiers of Charles XII, Napoleon and Hitler who also committed the mistake of underestimating the Russians also had to pay the price f their leaders' folly And regarding Desert Storm I was, as any history buff would know, referring to the period immediately after the invasion of Kuwait (August/September 1990)when, as we knew at the time and as the historical accounts tell us there were grave concerns in regard off a possible Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia. In the case of the Kuwait War Saddam could have at least attempted to attack into Saudi Arabia between August and early October to at least disrupt the buildup. He might have lost militarily but it is possible he could have won politically by inflicting such heavy losses as to sap will on the US home front to a such an extent that anti war demonstrations forced the government to quit. That is how you win wars against the US. Jeez I kind of expected you to KNOW this - it is part of US military history and you probably studied it at West Point - so I should not need to tell you this! Jeez!

Look re-read accounts of OPERATION DESERT STORM and tell me for Pete's sake if you think VLADIMIR PUTIN is an even bigger strategic fool than bloody SADDAM HUSSEIN!!!!!! You seem to believe that he is WHICH IS A VERY DANGEROUS UNDERESTIMATION OF THE MAN. Perhaps from now on I will have to refer to you as PUBLIUS QUINTUS VARUS since you appear to be suffering from the same ARROGANT HUBRIS that led Varus to the famous disaster at the Teutoburger Wald. 3 Roman Legions wasn't it?????? Panzersauerkrautwerfer GIVE ME BACK MY LEGIONS!!!! YOU KNOW THE ONES YOU LOST IN THE MODERN DAY VERSION OF TEUTOBURGER WALD FOUGHT IN THE WOODS AND FIELDS OF UKRAINE

Everyone else is still assuming that Putin and the Russian navy are going to be totally passive, just sit back in a bastion stratefgy, make essentially the same MORONIC decision that SADDAM HUSSEIN made in 1990 Which as I have reiterated AGAIN and AGAIN and AGAIN UNTIL I AM BLUE IN THE FACE IS THE BEST AND QUICKEST WAY FOR PUTIN TO LOSE T HE FREAKIN WAR!!!!!

Potentially the big air ports, if they are being used for troop transport could be considered as legitimate military targets by the Russians. In fact I would be surprised if they were not used for military purposes in this scenario. The sane as in the old REFORGER 1980 scenario. As could other similar installation./. And yes any Spetznaz sleeper cells would be watchng I suspect and doing what hey are being paid for

Stop trying to misrepresent me. Article 5 is more likely to be invoked successfully in th event of a ground invasion of a NATO state. In other situations you are more likely going for an Article 4 as Turkey did in this example http://www.rferl.org/content/explainer-nato-articles-4-and-5/24626653.html In the Ukraine case we can assume the US, probably with he UK has made a political decision to commit ground troops to Ukraine. Russia, going with my assumptions mounts limited actions at sea and mounts some air attacks against Briish pors, air ports and NATO airbases in the UK being used t support deployment in Ukraine. Poland which has also supported yhe move in our scenario is also targeted by air attack. Most of the other West European NATO members are against the Ukraine intervention. Kaliningrad is blockaded but Russia has taken no actual military action there or against he Baltic States as yet. he UK and Poland are very unlikely to get the votes for an Article 5 in this situation even thought they are the targets of limited Russian air strikes. they will probably go for an Article 4 at this stage. This does not mean tat there will not be an escalation later on. However the Ukrainian War would already be a magor conflict. At this point both sides' actions are pretty limited in nature and scope. Things would escalate in scenarios such as Russia invading the Baltic States to relieve Kaliningrad or Polish forces, assisted by US Marines ad UK Royal Marines were used to reduce KalinINgrad. Or if Russia were to employ chemical weapons. These sorts of actions would be very serious escalations NB I AM NOT SAYING THESE THINGS WOULD HAPPEN, JUST THAT IF THEY DID THAT WOULD SERIOUSLY ESCALATE THE CONFLICT

Days for the surface fleet. Two or thee days sounds about right for that. Rather longer for submarines and minefields. As I pointed out there are at least two choke points in the Mediterranean that Russia could choose to mine, The Straits of Gibraltar and the Dardanelles.The Strait of Sicily (aka Pantallera Channel is another one but not so easy s the oter two options. As regards Russian naval options these are to be undertaken in conjunction wiht a speedy ground war, ot instead of t. I always indicated that Russian naval action was tied to supporting the achievement of their objectives in Ukraine. As to why they would do it this way. I reiterate THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE is to allow the Russian navy to be bottled up in port just like the Kaiser's navy for most of WW1 doing precisely nothing. In a situation where the Russian navy is bottled up what happens is a situation where the US is able to pour men and material across the Atlantic with no impediment at all. Essentially he same kind of buildup he US was able to achieve in Saudi Arabia in 1990 during the buildup for Operation Desert Storm. Remember that? This for Putin is most certainly the quickest way to lose the war. Conversely, we all agree that Russia is going to have to win fast. Sacrificing he navy to delay and reduce he flow of reinforcements and war material over the Atlantic has to be a key component of that strategy. Yes, Russia will have to sacrifice most of the Atlantic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet to do it. But these are old ships in need of replacement anyway. And you can hold some of the experienced men back to train the new modern navy you were going to be building anyway. Tough on the sailor and airmen you are sacrificing in he North Atlantic and Mediterranean. If the succeed in their mission they are "Heroes of the Rodina) and you can hand out lots of posthumous medals at the victory parade after the war If you lose the war you are out of power and probably lined up in front of a firing squad following the generals' coup that ousts you from power.Either way, the sacrifice of an elderly navy to gain even a few days of valuable time in the land war is a sacrifice that, while callous to our eyes, would be worth it for Putin once he has got himself nto tthis war

The critical question is whether the US intervenes in a Russian invasion of Ukraine at all. For CMBS w assume that the decision to intervene is made. Then, at some point here is a serious ground or air clash. Or maybe something happens at sea in the Mediterranean. Whatever happens someone screwed up in a very tense military standoff and kicks off a war by mistake, for whatever reason As far as European support is concerned Eastern European countries like Poland and the Baltic States, feeling threatened themselves by Russia will probably support he Ukrainian intervention initially. Britain probably will unless Corbyn gets enough votes to veto intervention. Other EU states are probably going to be lukewarm at best Then it depends on whether Putin does anything in the Baltic States which could get Article 5 invoked. Just limited air and naval action in the Atlantic/Mediterranean probably won't be enough. A direct Russian invasion of Latvia or instance probably would get an Article 5.

We have to consider th factors likely to b motivating Putin. Issues like 1 The Eurasian Economic Union project 2 Putin as a Russian Nationalist. Is he trying to build a Greater Russia, rebuild he Soviet Union/Tsarist Russian Empire? 3 Domestic Russian issues 4 The perceived "Western Threat" Does he fear the Ukrainian Revolution will be repeated in Moscow? Does he fear some kind of "Barbarossa II" or being surrounded by Western influence? 5 Putin: Hitler or Bismarck? Just a few examples of he issues and explanations for Putin's actions which I don't have time to go into further here but anyone is welcome to research these things further on their own in far greater depth However these points could provide some explanation for what Putin has been doing in Ukraine and what he might do in the future either there or elsewhere

Putin would be playing on Western fears. Remember, as a Russian and ex KGB he thinks differently than we do. Just very vague hints about possible nuclear use without making an actual, obvious actual threat might well be something he would do and is, in fact something he has already done http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-threatens-to-use-nuclear-force-over-crimea-and-the-baltic-states-10150565.html

Whatever. Russia has to achieve its Ukraine objectives , whether these might be a full annexation, acquisition of territory along the Black Sea Coast linking up with Moldovan Russian separatists or annexing Eastern Ukraine up to the Dnieper Line those objectives have to be achieved swiifly before US heavy forces are deployed. At which point, as you say Putin goes for ceasefire. P{Possibly trying nuclear blackmail to scare the west into negotiating. Note this just means veiled threats, certainly not actual use. Limited action in the Atlantic and Mediterranean is a likely and, to the Russians useful course of action in that it delays the arrival of heavy US armourd forces. It still maintains the fighting below that certain threshold as log as the targeting is primarily against military or military relad targets. Hence Russia could hit targets like 1 UK airports used for the deployment of US troops 2 UK ports used for same 3 The US reinforcement convoys sailing over the Atlantic or through he Mediterranean 4 NATO military bases and air bases in the UK and Europe 5 Possibly an invasion of the Baltic States to relieve a blockade of Kalingrad 6 Naval and air engagement with NATO forces in the Baltic Sea These would be reasonable actions associated more or less with Russian action in Ukraine. Actions such as unrestricted bombing of civilian targets in the UK, unrestricted attacks on shipping in the Atlantic or Mediterranean, any unprovoked military action elsewhere in the world (eg Far East), use of chemical weapons or other WMD would not fall within the limited Russian war aims that we both agree would be likely in this conflict scenario https://www.stratfor.com/video/wargaming-russias-military-options-ukraine

I never said the Russians would succeed. Just that they would have to try if hey are going to have the slightest possibility of winning in Ukraine. The most they can do is cause delay and damage. I never disputed hat Russia would win the naval war - I agree they will lose on that front of how much time hey can gain and what damage they can do in the pursuit of accomplishing their objectives ON LAND . Same principle as per the old Gulf Strike and Aegean Strike bord wargames Whether this is a limited war scenario as CMBS assumes or WW3 it doesn't really matter. That's it.Like I said I am done with this discussion

If we assume that actions are taken to keep he Pacific Fleet out of the war as with Russian warships in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean which s fair on the assumption that both sides want to keep this limited we should assume military action of any sort is limited to the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. I am perfectly happy to go along with that assumption. Regarding Russian naval strategy in the Mediterranean I would try to interdict the Straits of Gibraltar using mines and submarines. Likewise he Dardanelles. Assuming major elements of the Black Sea Fleet are in the Eastern Mediterranean at the time I would expect to lose them so I might as well try to take down a US aircraft carrier during the opening D Day shootout. Anything i the Blacck Sea is probably going to be bottled up there pretty quickly, mucch like he Kaiser'ss navy in WW1 was bottled up in port during WW1

Oh I give up! Vladimir Putin is obviously a greater strategic moron than Saddam Hussein. He will, despite the REAL WORLD evidence to the contrary of his actual strategic skills make not the slightest attempt to prevent, interdict or delay the US military reinforcement of forces deployed to Ukraine. And this will lead directly to a massive Russian military disaster. History majors and military college graduates will write essays and thesis pointing out just how stupid Vladimir Putin was for making not the slightest effort to do anything about it - despite saving the military resources to a least attempt something. Sheesh I have just about had it with this debate which flies against every iota of common sense as regards Vladimir Putin's most sensible strategy having blundered into a war with NATO. Which is the very premise of CMBS I must now bow out of this discussion in the face of your obviously far superior wisdom

I am not saying Russia will hit US ports or airports. More likely British and European facilities will be attacked in this scenario. Much as in the 1980s Cold War gone hot but, I granT you, in a far more limited and targeted way. Most of the air and naval fighting will be out in the North Atlantic and probably a brief but spectacular day or two of surface actions in the Mediterranean The Black Sea Fleet will lose the D Day shootout. Russian submarines will interdict the Dardanelles and probably the Gibraltar Straits. Mines would be a cheap and effective way to do this. The whole idea, from the Russian perspective is to gain as much time as possible while Russian ground forces try to win the ground war fast Now, can we agree tht, in the event of hostilities over Ukraine this is the best Russian strategy in a limited war scenario, as this scenario is assumed to be. As I have agreed earlier steps will be taken to void deliberate or accidental hostilities elsewhere including the Far East. Regarding Kaliningrad. I agree that is definitely a wildcard.Most likely, in the first instance it will be isolated and blockaded but we cannot rule out the possibility of some form of major action at a later date if the Russian garrison were to take some form of action. For a CMBS wargame some form of ground action around Kalingrad might provide some interesting scenario possibilities. Much he same can be said fr any Russian military actions in the Baltic States and Belorussia. Russian invasions of Poland are far less likely within The CMBS timeline anyway. Although That would be an interesting wargame in itself that could be simulated with CMBS