LUCASWILLEN05

Yes. If Russia is to have any chance of winning this one it has got t be done quickly. As far as US heavy armour stocks are concerned there will probably be some pre-positioned stocks in Europe. As with the 1980s REFORGER program. At most let us assume there is enough for a division if you fly the men over. Lets say enough war stocks for hat unit to fight for, let us be generous a month. In reality likely less than that as heavy combat is likely to use up supplies at a greater tan expected rate . The heavy armour and high readiness forcws likely deploy to Poland and he Baltic States initially during the pre war crisis phase It then plays out much as Vladimir suggests with airborne units deploying into Ukraine as soon as the invasion starts ansd the US President gives the order. At sea US/NATO units engage the Russian Northern Fleet and Black Sea Fleet though combat is mostly limited to air and naval engagements at sea. There are however limited attacks o port facilities and transport hubs employing conventional bombing and guided missiles but any such attacks are carefully targeted t avoid angering the civilian population unduly. US light airborne infantry, the available US heavy armoured units in Europe whose manpower has been flown over and mobilized European units will be moved into Ukraine as soon as possible. probably to hold the Dneiper Line as depicted in CMBS. The Ukraian army will try to make a fighting retreat to the Dnieper Line while trying to gain as much time as possible for NATO to deploy into Ukraine - and avoiding its' own destruction. That is probably what the opening phase of he war is going to look likw.

That is called irritation because someone is not getting he point I am very obviously trying to get over to you which is that Putin is not a strategic moron like Saddam Hussein was and that, having miscalculated his way into a war with NATO he is going to have to at least try to do something with the navy to delay he arrival of US reinforcements which have to bw shipped over the Atlantic as you and I both knw perfectly well We also both know perfectly well that the best the Russians can do is cause delay and damage. They WILL lose the war at sea. The only question is how long this wlll take and how much damage they cn do and whether this gains them enough time to win the ground war in Ukraine. And as I understand it the Northern Fleet orbat looks something like this Joint Strategic Command Northern Fleet[edit]Northern Fleet[edit] The Northern Fleet, showing major bases and headquarters.Main article: Russian Northern FleetThe Russian Northern Fleet, established as a modern formation in 1933, is headquartered at Severomorsk and spread around various bases in the greater Murmansk area. This is the main fleet of the Russian Navy and currently comprises:[35] Admiral Kuznetsov (1)Kirov class nuclear-powered cruiser (2)Slava class cruiser (1)Udaloy class destroyer (4)Udaloy II class destroyer (1)Sovremennyy class destroyer (2)Dolgorukiy class submarine(1)Delta IV class submarine (6)Typhoon class submarine (1)Oscar-class submarine (3)Severodvinsk class submarine (1)Sierra class submarine (2)Akula-class submarine (6)Victor class submarine (4)Kilo class submarine (5)Lada-class submarine (1)Approximately 30 submarines that could deploy through the GIUK Gap and you know as well as I do that deploymn culd take place in he pre war stage under guise of "military maneuvers/ I am not saying they will last that long onc war starts. Thy won't. Just ha they will do some damage before they are sunk - and that is their job!!!

Yes I know very well how Arc Light ends. And need I remind you ta i also almost ends in nuclear Armageddon. Only avoided because General Razov has a secret code to disable the Russian nukes launched due, s I recall to the "Fail Deadly" strategy. My reference to the Fulda Gap by the way was as a 1980s parallel to the 2017 Ukraine scenario. I kind of assumed I was talking to informed and intelligent people here to whom I would no have to spell ths kind of hing out to Yes I have read your posts regarding Russian naval capabilities. The question is, hve you read mine on Russian the Russian strategic problem. Despite their naval weaknesses the Russians are going to have to make some ATTEMPT at interdicting US reinforcements deploying across the Atlantic BECAUSE IF THEY DON'T MAKE ANY SUCH ATTEMPT THEY ARE GUARANTEED TO LOSE THE WAR FOR JUST HE SAME REASON SADDAM HUSSEIN LOST THE `1990 - 1991 GULF WAR AND WITH EVEN LESS EXCUSE!!!! NOW WHAT PART OF THAT DO YOU NOT UNDERSTAND????? As for limited Russian attacks targeted at Port facilities, airports etc. Yes. I always said that would be a slight escalation AND I ALSO SAID NATO would be taking similar things, certainly in the Crimea and probably at Kaliningrad and around Murmansk DO YOU REALLY THINK VLADIMIR PUTIN IS AN EVEN GREATER STRATEGIC MORON THAN SADDAM HUSSEIBN? YES OR NO. ANSWER A STRAIGHT QUESTION PLEASE Jeez I feel I am going around in circles trying to get across a really basic strategic point that you, as a naval professional should definitely understand. And yet it seems to me that for some reason you just don't get the point I am trying to get across to you. WHICH IS, IN ORDER TO WIN IN UKRAINE SOME LIMITED AIR AND NAVAL ACTION BY RUSSIA WITH THE AIM OF SLOWING THE ARRIVAL OF HEAVY US ARMOURED FORCES TO UKRAINE FOR LONG ENOUGH FOR RUSSIA TO ACHIEVE MILITARY/POLITICAL OBJECTIVES ON THE UKRAINIAN BATTLEFIELD (OR A LEAST TO MAXIMIZE THE CHANCE OF DOING SO) WE ALL AGREE THAT IS WHAT RUSSIA HAS TO DO AND THE LIMITED AIR AND NAVAL ACTIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTH ATLANTIC ARE THE ONLY WAY RUSSIA CAN DO IT. IF YOU WERE THE SENIOR RUSSIAN NAVAL ADVISER TO PUTIN WHAT WOULD YOUR EXPERT MILITARY ADVICE BE TO HIM????????????

And remember all the US is likely to be able to deploy to Ukraine in the first instance is going to be 101st Airmobile, 82nd Airborne, some similar Light Infantry types and probably some heavy armour. Enough for say a division sized forc. And that still has to be supported logistically is what is obviously going o be very high intensity ground combat. Ammunition, fuel and war stocks are going to be used up at a frightening rate Which means these will need to be replenished from reserves in CONUS. So you are going to have to fly or ship war materials and reinforcements over the Atlantic. One o the navy's jobs in this scenario is to ensure all of this gets to the front in Ukraine. This may not be the Fulda Gap but it is the modern day equivalent.and failure could still lose the US the war by allowing Russia enough time to achieve her local strategc goals in Ukraine. Have you considered the possibility that this scenario or something much like it is what happens in the Russian victory timeline of the CMBS scenario?????

And what the Russians have to gain for the sacrifice of their elderly Northern Fleet,and Black Sea Fleet which are by the way going to have to be replaced quite soon anyway is the best shot hwy are going to get of delaying and reducing hwe flow f the vital US reinforcements to the theater off war in Ukraine. We are all agreed that Russia has to win the land wa here quickly if she is going to win ii at all. The sacrifice of Russia's navy is the bes way Russia can achieve that. In fact it is probably the only realistic way of doing it by using conventional weapons. Unless you want Putin to do what General Razov did in Eric L Harry's novel Arc Light and threaten strategic nuclear attack against the US and Europe. Which in he real world would be a seriously bad idea and far outside the concept of a limited conventional war. Te limited Russian military actions I suggest, primarily at sea and involving some carefully targeted strikes on land against clearly designated targets are, while a slight escalation, well within the bounds of a limited war and are no more than the US would do or has done in recent military conflicts. Russia can reasonably be expected to do much the same So, come on, what would you be saying o Putin if you were his senior naval adviser bearing in mind that allowing your navy to be bottled up will guarantee Russia loses the war. And probably gets you dismissed from command (that is if you are lucky!)

You have yet to answer my fundamental question. Which is this. Given that the whole CMBS scenario assumes that Putin has already miscalculated his way into war with NATO (f that does not happen then the fundamental basis for CMBS) cannot work. Why would Vladimir Putin not take limited actions to make SOME ATTEMPT at delaying and reducing the flow of US reinforcements I AM NOT saying tha this is a Russian strategy hat would work i AM MERELY SAYING THAT IT IS THWE RUSSIAN STRATEGY THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE TRIED BECAUSE THERE REALLY IS NOTHING ELSE SHORT OF ALLOWING THE RUSSIAN NAVY TO BE BOTTLED UP IN PORT LIKE THE KAISER'S NAVY 1914 - 1918 And that guarantees an early Russian defeat as US reinforcements pour, unimpeded across the Atlantic, deploy to Ukraine, builds up the logistical support for the kind of military operation he US does best Knowing that and given that he war had already started what, other than offering the same professional advice von Runstedt gave to Hitler would be your professional advice o Putin if you were his Chief naval adviser? Limited air and naval; action directed at 1 The North Atlantic Convoys themselves 2 The transport hubs they need to use 3 Sea Denial for as long as possible in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean 4 To avoid escalation elsewhere in he world no offensive action to be taken in the Far East. Persin Gulf or Indian Ocean. Defensive actions only and Russian forces to move well away from proximity to any Western forces in these regions to avoid accidental or unintended clashes that might escalate h conflict outside of the European/North Atlantic/Mediterranean area 5 Only conventional weapons to be used and no bombing of civilian targets beyond ports, airports, major road and rail hubs. Even in those cases bombing to b carefully targeted to avoid civilian losses. NATO is likely to be doing similar things at some stage eg targeting facilities around Murmansk., Kalingrad and un the Crimea. All this still falls within the bounds of a limited war. Now, if Putin were to do something really stupid such as employing chemical weapons such as the Novichok agents (which I seriously doubt would ever happen in this scenario) all bets would be off and NATO would very likely at least consider a "March on Moscow" and regime change. As I just said it would be an extremely stupid thing for Putin to do and I very much doubt he would do something like that even if desperae so let's not argue about that scenario further now

Same can be said about the US military. However, as far as the Russian military is concerned have you not heard f the Serdyukov Reforms 2008? The Russian military may be slimmed down but they are at least trying to iron out the old inefficiencies with he aim of developing competent modern armed forces. How successful his might be remains to be seen but performance in the Ukraine/Donbass and in he current Syrian intervention might provide some indicators http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602743-money-and-reform-have-given-russia-armed-forces-it-can-use-putins-new-model-army https://russiamil.wordpress.com/tag/syria/ However, in political terms I do agree with you in that Russia could indeed play a valuable and highly constructive role although that is no reallly the issue we are discussing here

One of the first sensible remarks about the Russian navy I have seen. Although I can see the Admiral Kuznetzov being deployed to the Mediterranean to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet but I think deploying it in the Black Sea would simply result in it being bottled up just lie the Kaiser#s navy in WW1, If you want to employ the Bastion strategy with the Adm Kuznetov the Kara Sea, White Sea or Barents Sea would be a far better position where the Kuznetzov Group could still pose a potential threat to the Atlantic Convoys I agree with you that the best way Russia could attack the Atlantic Convoys would be by submarines coming through what NATO calls the GIUK Gap. Also air attack employing long range ASMs would be used to harass and damage those convoys. Th same basic strategy as was expected during the late 1980s Cold War had WW3 begun then. Only now of course the forces involved are different and probably much smaller. Although he newer Russian submarines are supposed o be far harder o detect - which is one of the qualities you need when conducting a submarine offensive.but, if that gives Putin's generals enough time to win he land campaign that will be good enough in Moscow. Probably it won't matter too much if most of the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and Northern Fleets are lost doing it as long as the strategic and military objectives in Ukraine are met. Sure, such a campaign will only last a few weeks before NATO tracks most of them down and sinks them but in the meantime they will be accomplishing their Sea Denial mission. They are no expected to accomplish more than that and most of them won't be expected to survive. Possibly there may be a chance to grab the Baltic States as well given that Russia is at war with NATO anyway and the opportunity is not likely to come again

Now WHY, having gotten himself into a war with the West over Ukraine is the closest thing the modern world and Russia in particular got tO a modern day Henry Kissinger or Otto von Bismarck not going to listen to the advice of his senior military commanders WHICH IS GOING TO BE THAT IF THEY DO NOTHING ABOUT THE US REINFORCEMENT CONVOYS THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE THE FREAKING WAR FOR EXACTLY THE SAME REASON THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN LOST BECAUSE THE US IS VERY GOOD AT SET PIECE HEAVY ARMOURED WARFARE AND THE LOGISTICS TO SUPPORT SUCH OPERATIONS!!!! RE-READ THE HISTORIES OF DESERT STORM WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE AUGUST 1990- JANUARY1991 NOW WHY IS PUTIN, AN EX KGB MAN AND A VERY CUNNING STRATEGIST S SHOWN BY THE WAY HE ENGINEERED THE OCCUPATION OF THE CRIMEA AMONG MANY OTHER EXAMPLES GOING TO COMMIT THE SAME VERY BASIC STRATEGIC ERROR AS SADDAM HUSSEIN DID AND ALLOW THE US THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN UNIMPEDED BUILD UP WHICH WILL RESULT UIN RUSSIA BEING GIVEN THE MOTHER OF ALL THRASHINGS I should not have had to spell that out to anyone on this forum. I is a question of BASIC STRATEGY hat evven I. a History & Politics graduate, military history buff and keen wargamer can very easily grasp. And arguing "it wil just escalate the war" cuts no ice with me given that Putin has already gotten himself into war in ths scenario (likely through miscalculation on both sides - the only way this scenario can happen. So you explain to me why Vladimir Putin is going to be as stupid as Saddam Hussein was in 1990 and take a decision that will lose him the war, his power and quite possibly his life as well - because if he loses that badly I don't see him being President of Russia afterwards. Sheesh We might as well just fight the war and find out. Please report to your commands in Russia, Poland. Ukraine, the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and Continental United States for a prompt 0300 (GMT) start!

Still not thinking about Russian strategic aims. I know damn well that Russia will lose the war at sea and so does Putin. But th Russian aim is NOT to win the war at sea. Their aim is temporary SEA DENIAL in order to delay and somewhat reduce the flow of reinforcement and supplies over he Atlantic and that operation is going to mean the use of Russia's Northern Fleet. They will also have to do the same thing in the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea which is where Russia's Black Sea Fleet comes in. Regarding Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea fleet. Yes there will likely be some action there and yes, the Kaliningrad Oblast will av to be isolated and possibly neutralized. Room for a CMBS scenario when we get US Marines and certain NATO nations (Poland, Germany) Something similar could at some point happen in th Crimea with possible operations to seize Sebastopol I don't see much happening in the Far East but I would not rule out some limited clashes there due to mischance and werror although both sides would take strong steps to prevent that very early on.

Nor would I. Just precluding the possibility that someone is going to make an unfounded assumption that I would imagine such weapons would be used. Certainly at this early stage of a conflict. That said Russia seems to have a rather more, let us say permissive view about nuclear weapons use. I don't know if you saw it bu there was a rather interesting drama documentary on BBC2 last week depicting a crisis management wargame, this one assuming a crisis in the Baltic States As for the use of conventional weapons on ports, airports and the like, sure that will be a limited escalation. Most likely however it will be the UK, France, the Netherlands and Germany most likely to b hit. not the US itself although I would not rule a few attacks n ports/ai ports out where they are clearly being used for troop movements. Europe however is a far more likely target for attacks of this sort. Mostly however the targets will b the Atlantic convoy routes themselves and the transport hubs required to move troops fro their disembarkation ports to the front in Ukraine. Like I keep saying Putin and his military commanders are not fools and they will have to do something to delay and reduce the buildup of US forces in Europe who will be he ones to win or lose the whole war. Unless of course you actually do think Vladimir Putin is actually as stupid as Saddam Hussein was and is just going to sit back, watch US heavy armoured reinforcements flow unimpeded across the Atlantic and, sometime in August mount a Desert Storm style counter offensive forcing th Russian army into a battle which, at that point, it will lose - and lose badly! As I said earlier Russia's best chance of victory s early in the war. June and early July

No offence but you are quite wrong. You assume that Putin, having once gotten himself into a war with the US is not going to listen carefully to the expert advice offered by his senior military commanders. It should be as clear as day that that advice will involve interdicting the Atlantic convpy routes. And by the way I am not thinking of WW2 here although the same strategic principle is involved. I am actually thinking of 1 The1990 - 91 Persian Gulf War and of what the US did to Iraq having been allowed months to build up an overwhelming force. I put it to you that Putin saw that as well and is very well aware of what happened and why. The man is ex KGB for Pete's sake 2 The late Cold War era specifically the likely course of events had it turned hot for which I suggest you read Hackett's The Third World War and Michael Palmer'The War that Never was which, by the way concentrates very much on the naval aspect For the Russians the strategic problem is the same as the one that faced the Kaiser's Germany, Hitler's Germany or the Soviet Union. They are a CONTINENTAL power fighting a MARITIME power. The strategy is NOT Sea Control which is a battle they cannot win. It is SEA DENIAL FR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE which is a battle that Russia might be able to win if things go well on land quickly enough. In your terms that means forcing the Ukraine and the US into a negotiating position favorable to Russia. That means delaying and inflicting damage on those convoys Exactly the same scenario as a late 1980s Cold War gone hot scenario! Sure the forces today re rather different but the essentials of the strategic problems for both sides are essentially the same! I put it to you that the Russian navy of today is a cold war relic that will soon have to be replaced anyway. Some of th experienced sailors and airmen will be kept back to ensure their survival to assist in the building of the new Russian navy The old one is essentially sacrificed to the strategic goal of delaying US reinforcements while the Russian army does it's best to win the land war in Ukraine. Which essentially is what CMBS is all aboit So how about a few late June/early July scenarios where US forces are a little short on supplies and equipment owing to high expenditure of war stocks, losses of new AFVs/IFVs on the convoys. This should give us some indication of the likely impact of some quite limited Russian success against the early convoys. By mid/late July I suggest the Third Battle of the Atlantic will have been pretty much won and, by the end of the month supplies and reinforcements will not bw a problem for the US. As long as they weather he June/early July crisis which is when Russia has is' best shot at winning the war.

I am not talking about unrestricted cruise missile strikes conventional pr otherwise. i am talking about 1 Limited air and naval attacks against convoys 2 Limited air and missile strikes against transport hubs such as air ports and pots hat are or might be used for he transport of troops employing conventional HE, NOT NBC! 3

Just take out a few tanks per company and set the supply setting in the scenario editor to limited, scarce or severe to simulate supply difficulties and losses on the convoy routes and I suspect you will see a difference i would say a loss of 5 ships per convoy for the first two or three convoys would actually be about right as this is the time when the Russian submarine and air threat will be at its' highest for a combination of reasons. After that, as I keep saying it will drop off and become negligible by week 5 or week 6 As I also keep saying LIMITED air and sea action WON'T be too great an escalation particularly if targeting is largely restricted to military targets, ports and air ports. We are not countenancing restricted bombing campaigns or unrestricted attacks on intentional shipping here You have also yet to explain why Putin, clearly a very clever and astute leader, is going to make the same strategic blunder Saddam Hussein did in 1990 and allow an unimpeded US reinforcement and buildup of a fearsome armoured force with amazing logistical support. That would be fighting the kind of war the US is best at Putin is not stupid and he won't let that happen without some military attempt to prevent or at leas delay it. Essentially this war an be seen as a race between a maritime power and a continental power. And sea power is going to be the deciding factor,

Actually I would see the Russian Black Sea Fleet, at least the major surface elements being engaged and sunk in the first week.of the war. As far as a Battle of the Atlantic is concerned I must disagree with you on the grounds that. if Russia makes no attempt to delay and reduce the flow of reinforcements they would essentially be making the same strategic blunder as Saddam Hussein made and with even less excuse . In order to have any chance of winning the land war Russia has t delay and reduce that flow of reinforcements. Limited air and naval action in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, while an escalation, still keeps the war limited, Now, if air and naval action .developed elsewhere, say in the Indian Ocean/Middle East or the Far East that would be a serious escalation and both sides would be taking measures t prevent that scenario developing, even by mistake. Hence limited air and naval action in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic is plausible and indeed likely. NATO would be seeking to establish sea control to ensure safe deployment of ground forces to the Ukrainian battle fields. Russia would be aiming to delay and reduce that flow of reinforcements for as long as possible while they try o win a quick victory on land. Maybe, in the Russian victory timeline one of the reasons for the less successful NATO counter attack was because the Russians did better in attriting US convoys hence reinforcements and logistical support from the US were less thn anticipated

I will say it again. You need to look a this from Moscow's point of view,Having gotten yourself into a war with the US over Ukraine you are going to have t do what i takes to win hat war. Remember also thathe scenarion in CMBS DEPICTS A THREE MONTH WAR. The Russian objective will be to delay and attrite US reinforcements coming from CONUS. Having gotten into his war Moscow does not have any choice but to do this. If they just let the US pour reinforcements over the Atlantic then the US will do thwe same thing to Russia as they did to Saddam Hussein. It is essentially the same equation as it ws during the Cold War. We are NOT talking about an all out world wide war at sea. We are talking about LIMITED air and naval actions in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. Yes Russia will have to sacrifice a large part of the Northern and Black Sea Fleets. But Russia is a Continental power, not a maritime power. As for convoy loss rates it was not I who brought up the 5 ship loss rate per convoy. You must consider just how difficult it is to detect modern submarines. You must consider that merchant shipping in particular will not be used to operating in convoy and mistakes will be made and lessons learned over the first few convoys. In he meantime Russian submarines will be enjoying a couple of weeks of early success - their "happy time" if you will. Assuming his period lasts between two and three weeks seems like a reasonable assumption after which, as I said, convoy loss rates will drop off ssignificantl as tactics improve and Russian submarines are hunted down. Now, having gotten himself into a war with the US why would Putin not take the advice he would be given by hs military commanders to undertake limited air and naval action in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean with the objective of delaying and attriting the flow of US reinforcements to the land Theater of War which helps the ground forces in Ukraine in theiir objective of winning the war quickly

the point I am making is that they must make some attemptt to fight one I am not saying the Russians would win a naval war. They won't. But if they don't even try thy would be making the same strategic blunder Saddam Hussein made in 1990 in that, should they not do so, they would be allowing a massive buildup of US armour and logistical support If that hapens Putin knows very well h will lose they war. Once war has started Putin#s best bet as we have all agreed is to try to win the ground war fast. Sacrificing the Northern Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet is a key component of such as strategy. If we go with the hypothesis of 5 ships lost per convoy over the first two or three weeks that is going to put a dent in #US capabilities on the ground in Ukraine. Can you not see that? Such a dent may or may not be decisive but, in those opening weeks it will very likely be touch and go. After those opening weeks I would expect losses to drop off markedly to, say 1 or 2 ships per convoy in weeks 4 - 6 and then to negligible levels thereafter as Third Battle of the Atlantic is won I also see a naval battle in he Mediterranean. The US want to deploy Marines to the Crimea eventually and of course the Russian Black Sea Fleet id a threat to US asses in the Mediterranean. This won't be a long fight. A couple of days to a week at the most before the surface elements of the Black Sea Fleet are sunk. The US might lose a couple of ships to do it either sunk or badly damaged. . I would not rule out air and naval clashes elsewhere in the world although both sides want to keep the war limited.If such action does happen by mistake or design it will be limited to air and naval action To be honest the naval action will be limited to the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. I suggest strongly that you consider this a reasonable strategic assumption on the plain and simple ground that Putin and his military commanders are not fools. To assume that they are would be a foolish and dangerous assumption.

https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/4ac8b59c-4634-44b3-af06-dee0203d6c67/Russian-A2-AD-in-the-Eastern-Mediterranean---A-Gro.aspx

I agree they won't stop the convoys - which will run whether this is a WW3 situation or not. So let's go with the assumption of 5 ships sunk on he first few convoys (say over the first month of the war) This factors in long range Russian ASM strikes against the convoys, After the first month the West can be assumed to have won the naval war and convoy losses will be dropping to negligible losses after that point. I don't see anything like PQ-17 or for that matter Operation Pedestal happening in this scenario. I think we can all agree that there will be some losses and this will have a limited impact on US forces fighting in Ukraine early in the war. This may or may not be decisive depending on how the land battle goes. However, in certain circumstances where the land campaign s finely balanced small differences might tip the balance. So let us say that the reinforcement convoys *would they be called REFORGER THESE DAYS?) Having got as close to agreement about he course of the war at sea as we are likely to get perhaps we should get back to the land war. I think we can all agree Putin and his generals will know they need to push very hard before US heavy armour can arrive in strength. Presumably there will be something similar to the REFORGER sites with ebnough equipment for, say, divisional sized force with additional equipment coming ov on the convoys as they would have during the `1980s scenario, What I am not sure of is the likely timescale of embarkation, transport, disembarkation and deployment per convoy. About 14 days per convoy seems like a reasonable ball park figure but does anyone have any accurate data they could share? Remember the conflict portrayed in the game assumes a 3 month war

Thanks for that. Actually I am not saying the scenario would be an escalation to WW3 although I would not rule it out. I think he most likely air and naval aspect would be relatively limited but locally serious combat i the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic/ Putin and his military commanders likely expect that as well which would explain their real world actions. I agree Putin will try to complete his goals before heavy US reinforcements arrive. He will also try to interdict and attrite those reinforcements using submarine assets which, as we both know are a serious threat to Atlantic convoys.He would be a fool if he didn't and it could cost him the entire war if he just allows a US buildup in Europe without trying to do something about it. Some form of action by the Northern Fleet would be something I would expect in order to at least try to do something about he US convoys Allowing an unimpeded US build up was one the mistakes Saddam Hussein made. Putin on the other hand is no fool I do see Western forces going after the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Mediterranean very actively and the Russians would actually try to get the first good shot here, Which as you well know is often critical in modern naval combat. Writing off the a large pat of the Northern and Black Sea Fleets and hoping they can do as much damage as possible is something Putin and his commanders will have to accept in that this will be of some use in their atemt to achieve a quick win on land. That as you know is what a continental power like Russia with a relatively weak blue water navy has to do when at war with a maratime power. Regarding naval combat in the Indian Ocean/Middle East and the Far ast I see tht as possible but less likely. I would not however rule it out By the way, have you read the War that Never Was by Michael Palmer.? An interesting thought provoking study of a WW3 fought circa 1990. Anyway will take a look at CMANO though I probably won't buy it already owning Harpoon ANW. Having said that the map graphics in your game do look very attractive compared to the Harpoon maps even with heir colour palettes As far as possible naval aspects surrounding a 2017 Ukraine War either game will probably be just fine As I think both of us realize a computer game is probably the best way to play a simulation of modern naval warfare due to the vast area s involved if nothing else. A Anyway, fascinating a subject as it is we have probably said enough for now in regard to the strategic, air and naval aspects of the conflict so it is probably time to start drawing this to a close :-) Although feel free to PM me if you would like to discuss the naval/strategic aspects for a bit longer - happy to hear from someone who is a naval professional - from whom a History/Politics grad like myself would no doubt gain significant insights :-)

Codename Duchess what is the full title of the naval computer me you mentioned

What I am saying to you is that the conflict, while the major land fighting takes place in Eastern Europe is also going to involve quite considerable naval and air combat outside the main theater of war n land. Think Mahan and consider that the US is Maritime Power. Russia is of course disadvantaged by geography as well as by naval technology and will have to consider these factors in a war with the US over Ukraine or anywhere else for that matter. I am actually thinking about these factors even though naval and air combat elsewhere in the world might well be quite limited in scope and duration. Do you really imagine Putin and his military commanders are stupid? Why do you think there are so many incidents involving Russian war planes violating British air space for example And why do you think Russian naval activity has been so high world wide? Of which this is just one example http://sputniknews.com/us/20150416/1020951139.html And here is another. Much closer to home https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/nato-admiral-were-seeing-more-181127919.html You see only the Ukraine theater. I see that as the principal area of ground combat with a lot of air and naval combat going on elsewhere, primarily in the Mediterranean/Black Sea and in the Atlantic. I also see air and naval action potential in he Far East, Middle East and Indian Ocean if US/Western and Russian air and naval units are operating in relatively close proximity. In modern naval warfare terms "relatively close could mean up to a thousand miles. In the 2017 CMBS scenario I definitely see a major surface action within a day or two of the outbreak of hostilities taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean between the Russian Black Sea Fleet and US carriers I certainly do not question that Russia would lose this engagement and other surface engagements. Once hostilities open in Ukraine these naval battles are going to b fought. probably whether or not the Russians want to fight them or not. Personally I see the Russian surfacee navy wold wide lasting a week or maybe a little more. Say ten days a the outside. They would have to contest the Atlantic Convoy routes. Otherwise the US will just roll convoys over and build up a huge mechanized force backed by air power. In a couple of moths this will roll right over the Russian army. But his force won't be ready for a couple of months. So. if we assume hostilities open on 1 June 2017 the units and logistics of he US contingent won't be ready to strike back until some time in the first week in August although limited counter offensive will be mounted earlier than that. Russia on the other hand will be seeking to win the war quickly, achieving its' political/military aims before the US is ready to respond. Russia might hope t hand an over-confident US a "nasty little Kasserine" at the least causing significant losses, taking much or a;ll of Ukraine and perhaps taking the opportunity to take the Baltic Stats - a chance that probably will never come again Maybe even a good swipe at the Romanians, Poles or the Swedes if the opportunity presents itself What I am saying to you is that the conflict, while the major land fighting happens in the Ukraine will not be as limited as you think in terms of air and naval combat. Although I will grant you air and naval action will be limited in duration and, after the elimination of the Russian naval and air threats to the maritime trade routes that will probably be it as far as active combat goes outside some selective air and missile strikes and blockade of the Russian land mass

Well you would learn that the Russian navy would have to be defeated. I agree with you the magor Russiam surface elements probably would no last beyond the first week. Submarines somewhat longer. You would learn that the Dardanelles are a major choke point easily interdicted by submarines and naval minefields. You would earn that the Black Sea could well be turned into a shooting gallery. You would learn that finding the enemy before he finds you is often the hardest part. And you would learn that modern naval warfare is fought out ove vast areas and, wen actual cmbat begins is high speed and unforgiving. Those 20 or so Russian submarines coming through the GIUK are likely to be modern types including Yasen, Borei and Typhoon class. Maybe not as good as the most modern Western submarines but still hard to find and hard to destroy and could well make a mess of a least the firs few Atlantic convoys. Putin and his commanders are certainly not fools and will attempt to contest the Atlantic convoy routes as long as possible while they fight to win the ground war in Ukraine s rapidly as possible

Thank you for that interesting article on Russian capabilities John. As I said earlier the Russian air dwefense network is not something to be underestimated. We all know armies and generals that have underestimated the Russians have often com to very sticky ends. We must of course also consider the wider strategic and operational aspects of a war in Ukraine. 1 While the main land fighting will indeed take place in Ukraine it is quite likely, even probable that there will be a "second front in the Baltic States that might possibly include Poland and Belorussia to some Certainly there will be some sort of fight around the Kaliningrad Enclave 2 Considerable air and naval combat outside the scope of CMBS will certainly be seen in the Mediterranean/Black Sea, the Arctic Ocean, the North Atlantic and the Baltic.Further air and sea combat is likely between Russian and Western forces in the Indian Ocean/Middle East and the Far East. That will take up no more than the first month of the war although there will probably still be residual Russian capabilities at that sage 3 The air war over Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Western Russia which is probably of most interest to CMBS players. This will be influenced by the requirements of the sea control battles during the opening days and weeks owing to competition fo resources

Whatever First the Russians, not the US start this war with he initiative which mean land, air and naval assets are out of place I suggest you use Harpoon ANW to game the air and naval war. The Russian Black Sea Fleet surface elements last a day or two depending on how long it takes to find and engage them. Submarines and minefields take rather longer So say a week to two weeks to clear the Dardanelles of Russian submarines and naval mines and to eliminate the Russian land based anti ship missile Next we need to look at the Third Battle of the Atlantic which, in the event of a war in Ukraine is going to take place in the event of war. Do you honestly think that Putin and his military commanders are going to just let US reinforcements flow across the Atlantic and build up for some huge set piece offensive which is what the US military is best at? No of couse not! The Russians will be using air and sea power (mostly submarines to interdict the Atlantic convoy routes I am not saying the US won't win the air war and I am not saying hat they won't build up a large and effective force in Europe. They can and will do it. Eventually and at a significant cost. It will likely take 6 to 8 weeks to build up the required force levels and achieve at least some measure of air superiority/ Th point is it will take a while for hese conditions to vbe achieved. If you will not or cannot accept that you really are suffering from a bad case of hubris for which I suggest you ead this http://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=A7x9Un0sTrJWrgwA82p3Bwx.;_ylu=X3oDMTByaDRqYzNhBHNlYwNzcgRwb3MDNgRjb2xvA2lyMgR2dGlkAw--/RV=2/RE=1454554796/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fwww.usnwc.edu%2fPublications%2f-Luce-nt-%2fArchives%2f2013%2fEthics%2fSmith_Military_Operations_The_Harmful_Effects_of_H.aspx/RK=0/RS=OLvaoIiiU6Di.uVcS20ng5vvYz4- http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/us-military-folly-air-power-hubris/p4291 And this as an object lesson from military history as to what the bloody military costs of hubris can be http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/02/bloody-consequences-military-hubris If you continue with that attitude then, like Publius Quinctillius Varus or the arrogant Prussian officers who sharpened their sabers on the steps of the French embassy in 1806 then you could be heading for a modern day version of the Tetoburger Wald or Jena-Auerstadt this time fought out in the woods and fields of Ukraine/ Or at he least a nasty Kasserine like battle in which US forces are handed a nasty initial defeat - it could take something like that to teach you enough humility so that you don't underestimate the enemy. But future staff college students will still write essays pointing out how stupid the US military was at the start of the 2017 Ukraine War (or if future historians choose to name the conflict that way World War 3)