kevinkin

One way to look at combat and warfare is it is a long series of interconnected ambushes. The right intel and firepower at the right place and time across multiple domains.

Thanks for the post: The Hollywood-tailored excitement of the Battles of Kyiv and Kharkiv may have unduly raised the bar for what Ukraine can accomplish in short order. Yet the Battle of Kherson, begun in August 2022, was a long, hard slog, the bulk of which garnered comparatively little contemporaneous front-page coverage — until all of a sudden it did. That operation culminated four months later with an announced Russian withdrawal. Good summary of the past. But does not predict the future by taking into account the combat abilities of both sides as they exist today. It's hopeful, but not analytical. But the article does mention what we all have to be aware of. In war things can stay same the same for a long time and then change very rapidly. The question becomes, which side is best positioned to obtain a positive discontinuity in the direction of the war. I can't say it's 100% on the side of Ukraine. Russian still has a lot of say in the matter at least in the short term. Maybe it's about whose tactics can preserve combat power and then project it at a critical point in time an space. If this is indeed critical, the UA will be in good shape long term.

That game has been discussed in one of the general forums here. It's 100% WW2 with no close air support or indirect fire. While fun to play, Black Sea is much closer even though it simulates circa 2017. I was thinking there might be a board game out there I missed. Pretty much up on all the PC ones.

I agree. The RA is conducting spoiling attacks on a large scale. They don't threaten to conquer Ukraine in the short term, but they might be aimed to maintain the status quo territorially while wearing down Ukraine and the west's resolve in the long term. I remember from some book that Rommel chimed in on the eastern front while in hospital, he recommended the mass use of mines to defend the Dniper position after Kursk backed up by mobile reserves. Very North Africa like. I think he also wanted to sue for some sort of peace before Normandy and with the Dniper line secure. He had more ideas that would have made little difference.

Reluctant to bring up military history in a situation that's unfolding live before us, but are we seeing Russian counter offensive taking advantage of the UA being held up by minefields and fortifications sort of like (dare I say it) Kursk? Not that the RA has the mass and mobility to repeat 1943. Not that the lines are shaped the same way and the weapons are as deadly. But more to do with the Russian mind set. Relying on the past and doing what they think than can pull off from an operational and cultural POV. Some general once summed it up as "grab them by the nose and kick them in the butt". There I go again with a historical reference. But like Kursk, maybe the UA offensive in the southern direction is too predictable. Russia fortifies that half of the line (approximately) and leaves the northern portion open to some type of war of movement.

Great maps you just posted. Thank you.

I think at this point the only PR that matters for Putin is the “us vs the west” narrative and in that model Bakhmut is peanuts. However, we don’t have any way to take the pulse of the Russian people. So perhaps Bakhmut has more symbolic meaning than would be rationally associated with it. Number of Russians involved and killed etc.. Meaning, I could be wrong. Maybe they will re-name the place Putingrad. I guess sometimes the motivations behind specific military operations can only be understood by the participants. https://news.sky.com/story/ukraine-war-why-is-bakhmut-so-important-to-russia-and-a-thorn-in-the-side-of-putin-12779619

That is a consideration i.e. thin/extend the defenders out. But I wonder it the density of the mines prohibits a board front operation of that sort meaning the UA has to focus on narrow sectors where their key equipment can be concentrated. Unfortunately a bunch of narrow attacks does not equate into a broad front approach. Russia can identify those sectors and concentrate on them or just sit back an wait to see which one is the most serious.

The business of war: duel use equipment and what to do about it. https://www.politico.eu/article/china-firms-russia-body-armor-bullet-proof-drones-thermal-optics-army-equipment-shanghai-h-win/

Ok, I agree the nuke stuff is going nowhere. Maybe we can lighten the discussion up. Which war game (computer or board game) would best simulated the static combat we are observing in eastern Ukraine? And would those products shed light on the war and combat so we all can learn from past mistakes? I use Combat Mission and Command, but they are obvious choices. Sure many other gamers do as well.

Who let you out tonight?

Well of course. The number one grand strategic imperative for the US is the prevention of nuclear war. And close behind that is the proliferation of WMD technology. But that does not mean those who have that technology should be given a place at the table with nations trying and trying very hard to do what's best. So North Korea, Iran and other such states in the future need to be contained. These states are often ruled by signal personalities that can be stared down. What if we didn't confront these despots?. Think about the future that would involve. Some day a gangster from South America will infiltrate the US border and have some form of destruction in the pocket. A surrogate for another nation. Yes fentanyl is already here. But think bigger.

We are not going astray. It is THE discussion from a strategic and policy making POW. Let's acknowledge the current landscape is defined by nuclear blackmail. Russian should not be in this game as a society. It's only possession of WMD that allows for Russian conduct. There is a reason that WMDs have not been used so far despite the west's large assistance to Ukraine. Some are open minded enough to want to know why that is and if the envelope can be pushed even further into Putin face. Pretty simple.

Not sure how many mine clearing vehicles the allies have since they never intended to fight a static war like we are now watching. If they have them, they date back to the cold war. I also think ATACAMS are a bit harder to shoot down than a cruise missile. I might be wrong in both statements since I am working off of memory.

Thanks for the post. Sums it up in one simple sentence. However, I would like to see Ukraine get whatever is available even if it's not relevant today. It will be at some point even as deterrence.

More of the same: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-lack-of-weaponry-and-training-risks-stalemate-in-fight-with-russia-f51ecf9 Gady said that rather than concentrating forces in assaults involving many units firing volleys of rockets and artillery—supporting simultaneous waves of advancing ground forces—Ukraine is attacking sequentially, with shelling followed by company-level infantry advances. The tactic “often telegraphs to the Russians that they’re attacking,” he said. The small-scale approach, which is easier for commanders to orchestrate than pushing ground forces under covering artillery, creates its own problems, such as reduced mobility. Safely removing wounded soldiers from the front and bringing in fresh ammunition is more treacherous in company-level operations because the medical and logistics corps are less protected. Conducting synchronized large-scale attacks is difficult for any armed force—even Western ones with more and better equipment than Ukraine has—because integrating vast numbers of land and air troops in the fast, violent ballet of a frontal assault is enormously difficult. No Western military would also try to breach established defenses without controlling the skies. “America would never attempt to defeat a prepared defense without air superiority, but they [Ukrainians] don’t have air superiority,” said John Nagl, a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel who is now an associate professor of warfighting studies at the U.S. Army War College. “It’s impossible to overstate how important air superiority is for fighting a ground fight at a reasonable cost in casualties.” Some think this war is vastly different from previous ones in the mechanized era. But I think Zhukov and von Manstein would easily recognize it. They would be surprised that so much ground could be covered by a limited number of troops for sure. That's different. And the speed at which death can occur to concentrated formations is scary. Yet the defeat phenomena is the same. Pin down, out flank, wash and repeat. Today's general have a lot of fun tools to deploy. But if they are easily countered by the enemy they just stay in the toolbox while the grunt does the work like our fathers and grandfather did.

I suppose that might be true for those handicapped with just 2 brain cells. Life must be scary especially when they run out of meds. This line of discussion boils down to trying to understand where Russia's red-line exists. It's impossible to know. I assure you, many in government are up late tonight trying to figure that out giving their third cell a whole lot to think about. But I don't think they are insulting each other based on differing opinions of where the red-line stands. They have a list of items donated to Ukraine that have not crossed the red-line. (HIMARS, AFVs, 155 mm shells, bullets, boats, etc,) And as they close up shop for the weekend the question becomes: "ya know maybe we are over thinking this, let's get a beer."

Back in the Spring we did discuss this. The net was we are just relying on videos of brave souls taking care of the wounded. A Ukrainian medical system exists for the troops, but its not a very sexy topic. Someone will write a gripping book on the topic after the war. For now, keep the media out of the way and let the the system work its miracles. I am sure it could be better. But it's probably as good as the damn war will permit.

Simple basic training of kids freshly reaching their 18 birthday is pretty much standardize and I don't think NATO's version will be some form of force multiplier. Lessons learned from the battlefield are very important for individual and small unit survival. But we can assume the the enemy is doing the same thing. What really matters in my opinion is training at the command level. Training the person to integrate the info coming from the top and from the trenches and act quickly as to out Boyd cycle the enemy. This training takes a lot more time and ideally involves training maneuvers. While not 100% reflective of real warfare, maneuvers are helpful in finding soldiers capable of commanding and leading rather that digging and pulling triggers. It's an imperfect science. In the case of Ukraine the needs are so immediate training at the command level might be skipped or abbreviated compared to what the US does in peace time.

No, it's far more important and therefore worth the added risk. All that can be managed. That's why we spent so much money on the technology and training to enforce a no-fly zone. If Russia lights up an allied a/c they would be toast. Yes, there is risk. But I think it's worth it to save Ukraine. I do respect your thoughts on this. Tough call.

Are you suggesting Putin can be reasoned with? I understand the analogy you are making but it just doesn't apply to warfare. Especially when one side only respects strength and dismisses nuisance.

Timely report/summary seeing all this is top of mind: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/zelensky-blames-western-aid-delays “Ukraine has a substantial amount of combat power that it has not yet committed to the fight, and it is trying to choose its moment to commit that combat power to the fight when it will have the maximum impact on the battlefield,” Sullivan said. “And we are in close consultation with Ukrainians on the conditions for that. But ultimately, that's a decision they will make, and it is at that moment ... that we will really see what the likely results of this counteroffensive will be.” Zelensky, who made a point to “thank all of our partners,” mentioning Biden by name, implied that this moment could be in the offing. “We are approaching a moment when relevant actions can gain pace,” he said, “because we are already going through some mines locations, and we are demining these areas.” The last sentence is vague but I'll say the glass is half full for now.

Well that was an unfortunate episode. But it's also unfortunate that Ukraine can't run for cover and they did call the cops in the name of the US. But the cops have so far arrived with insufficient firepower to end the dispute. Maybe that will change.

When I visited the Cliffs of Moher I marveled at the view the cows had every day. Never thought about nuclear war. But I guess those winds from multiple directions sum up life itself and we carry on regardless.

I am not advocating nuclear war but advocating being more aggressive short of that. We will never know where the red line is unless we start inching toward it. For example, would a no-fly zone over Ukraine instigate a nuclear war? Don't think so. Would a two week air campaign against Russian positions in Ukraine be dangerous. Maybe, maybe not. How did we come to the conclusion the current level of assistance to Ukraine is safe against escalation? We only know because we are giving it. I think measures directed to remove Russia from Ukraine, while not threatening Russia's existence, will not escalate.