hcrof

I doubt this is real number. 
Now we have next: 
 - two confirmed Su-35 and A-50U from Russian side
- the video of falling down unknown combat aircraft near Dyakove (presumably Su-34, this is mathes with COSPAS information about eject signal from this area - Su-35 was shot down significantly west from this place)
- COSPAS ejection marks on the map allegedly from three Su-34 (including the one, mentioning above)
- bad quality of something falling down on the screen of some SAM (StarStreak?) claimed as Su-34
- just a claims of shot down jets. 
So, we have 3 100 % confirmed, 2 with high probability confirmed, 2 allegedly confirmed by COSPAS marks and rest 4 just unverified claims
 

Russian milbloggers write two UKR HIMARS hit the ceremony of awarding of 155th naval infantry brigade personnel in Olenivka (near Volnovakha). 
Reportedly 19 KIA, 12 WIA. Among killed three high-ranked officers, including deputy commander of brigade. The commander of brigade was wounded.

Interesting thread from UKR serviceman from engineer-position building unit of engineer brigade (these units subordinated to Support Troops Command, not to Ground Forces Command) about why unlike Russians UKR forces have so poor fortifications (if they were built after the big war started), which often dig hastily with shovels and limided engineer means of brigades instead to be prepared beforehand by engineer troops of Support Command.
1. Why we have so small number of useful fortifications. According to General Staff directive of Marh 11 2016 the infantry unit, seizing area of defense is a disposer of defense lines, and the performer of works of building and equipping of this defense line is Support Forces, which have to do it according to requests of infantry brigades engineer service chiefs.
2. Many of chiefs of infantry brigade engineer services do not know how to plan ahead and send requests to Support Command untimely. When I arrive on the place, I have neither a map nor enginner justification of positions. As a rule I hear some sort: "Dig here from the stump to tree-plant". But this is not work in this way. The defense must be continous. Ше must have a depth and the enemy hadn't to bypass it. But infantry engineers in stupid way don't know how to plan this and we have to do it themselves or even to shut up and to gig there, where they to tell, because your business is to shut up and execute.
3. Why is thete no concrete? According to the order of Engineer Troops Chief and a resolution of Chief-in -Command of July 4 2017, the character of defensive positions determinates by Operative Tactical Groupment Commands - OTU (wood cladding) and Operative Strategical Troops Groupment Commands - OSUV (pouring with a concrete) after appropriate request of the infantry unit, seizing defense area.  Wood is provided by Engineer seervice of OTU, and concrete and technic are provided by OSUV. The second defense line have to be cladded with a wood and the thired defense line with a concrete. Why there is no this, because, again, brigade's engineer services have no will to denand this and OTU have no money, because deals (author used a word more corresponding to "frauds") with a wood is a separate theme. 
4.Concerning a concrete - I report. There is no one engineer unit doesn't supply with corrwsponding technic (like and NATO too). These works performs civilian technic, but this is contracts with business. Moscovites just rob technic for works, but we can't do in such way. And again - where is third defense line should be? No one infantry brigade on East didn't provide a project.
5. Where are the tractors? According to numerous directives, orders, normative documents to maintain the defense line have to a units of Support Forces with a supply of infantry units. Alas, an excavator doesn't work on the water - it needs a diesel, and soldier, who works in it have to rest somewhere and to eat something, 
6. As result - with all my respects to engineer services of 110th, 47th, 53rd brigades, you guys are guilty themselves, that your troops hadn't proper trenches. And to all other collegues in Twitetr I recommend to study documents and contact the proper address.    
7. Concering to our work. We work from 6:00 to 17:00 and build continuosly, having more poor funding and more vulnerable technic. Pay attantion, there are many fundrising requestes, but no one engineer unit doesn't ask about a tractor or excavator. Because we undcerstand - the needs of infantry is more important. But instead the infantry for some reasons considers us as useless appendage 
    

FPV shrapnel type with air blast. MON-50 mine tied to FPV

Bulgarian defense minister: Bulgaria to send 100 armored vehicles to Ukraine 'in few days'(KyivIndependent)

Literally the only "evidence" they have is a picture of a submarine with a tarpaulin on top. That's it. The best part is that "Liz Truss disappeared for three days" like she personally swam over and blew up the pipe. This is getting desperate...

Russian propagandist Romanov complains that despite Shoigu's statements that Krynki was captured by the Russians, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were able to advance in Krynki to the west towards the Cossack Camps and that there is a TOTAL concealment of information from the high command

https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1762218401122976092?t=ldDz4GL2md9ZbXGgDwDFWw&s=19

Though Germany position is... well, Germany position, the overall EU situation is not that bad in the long term (it's bad in short term).
I'm slowly summarizing RU Opposition economist Milov's recent report on the Russian economy. He stated that he recently visited the European Parliament and spoke to several EU MPs. There are both bad and good news:
Bad news - EU is politically bickering around Ukraine assistance, also faster work (for example enforcing sanctions) is not possible due to democratic bureaucracy of EU parliament. And it is unlikely to improve in the short term. Good news - EU core politicians know the seriousness of war and about their bickering and slowness problem. They are committed to resolve it in the long term (long term means around year). He cited an example: he was privately told that the EU needs to recruit 50 professionals to successfully stop Russia from dodging sanctions. However, this requires passing money through EU democratic procedures, which is extremely lengthy owing to the politicking of MPs from various nations. But eventually, the EU will hire them and cut RU off. In a year.

Interesting UKR comment under video of Taras Cmut. An unknown commenter claims that UKR drone with 1.5 kg of plastid can take out any current RU dugout in typical Platoon Strongpoint (if it flies inside - they use another drone to blow up door/protective net first). 
BTW, hiding in dugouts is the main way to survive on frontline right now. 

A new kind of FPV drone. There have been airburst versions, but this one seems to direct its effect in a frontal cone and is triggered manually from a distance.
Since the video has no audio, Ill link reddit
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/s/pw5d85Su3G


 
 

Interesting:
 

Just CasEvac alone requires carrying a wounded soldier under FPV and artillery threat through 1.9kms of marshland, crossing 3 water obstacles that each require a boat and loading and unloading of the wounded. The boat, will either have to be carried too, or stashed somewhere, where it is likely to be hit by drones. 
Or you decide to follow the waterways, which requires only 1  boat but is significantly longer through the twisting river.
All of that has a very finite throughput, putting more than a couple Marines at risk would be a great way to end up with piles of uncollected bodies. There's already enough videos of stretchers getting hit in that bog.
The value of Krynki is that it is a very defensable position that funnels russian vehicles either through the few completely straight forest roads where they can bog down or get hit by drones or through the veery long river road, which is exposed and easily observable, leading to quick discovery and annihilation of russian forces.

Alexe Kopytko, collegue of UKR Mashovets wrote several posts about losses. I am not going to translate them as they are aimed at the general public. However, I am going to translate relevant information.
UKR is a significantly more open society and country. So, it is much easier to find and count deaths using open sources. The oldest community in Ukraine that monitors War deaths is "The Book of Memory of those who fell for Ukraine".
Quote from the UKR news article [I recommend but I am not going to translate for now due to lack of time] about UKR losses up to November 2023
Second article [for the same period]
From Kopytko posts
Zelensky numbers are close to actual numbers. UKR is nowhere near the defeat.

I'm looking at RU MOD directives on how to defend vehicles from FPV. Interesting bit:
FPV-suicide drones
«Hawk» airplane type - max speed 120 kmh «Kross» quadcopter type - max speed 60 kmh [Insane speed] Warheads
PG-7L PG-7M PG-9C PG-18 [Bar armor and spall liners are still effective. RU vehicles do not have either that or ERA]
P.S. 
I checked it. Well, the directives are not really interesting to us. They describe how to build cope cages and install RU crappy EW devices on various RU vehicles. The diagrams of Cope Cage installation would be interesting if the RU intelligence officers understood how the FVP attacks in practice. But they don't. So, the diagrams have glaring mistakes and are mostly useless.

Avdiivka. RU fighters tested UKR Humvee armored windows. Windows withstood 3-4 close hits without penetration. Any further hits though most probably would result in penetration. 
What's interesting is that they used Igolnik cartridges.
P.S. @Battlefront.com I think you will need that data for CMWW3

Some numbers:
Ukrainian military analysts Taras Cmut: cost of classic ATGM missile is 30 000 USD. You can get 25 good combat FPV drones or 20 very good combat FPV drones. Top UKR drone unit commander Magyar: 5 FPV crews block the tank company's [10 tanks] advance with preparatory mining and persistent patrolling, as well as the quick employment of attack weapons [drones]. 

We have GrigB Intelligent Translation Services. During next week, the Russian Statistical Service will release a fresh report. Over the weekend, Russian opposition economist Milov will assess the campaign's strategic impact. If nothing bad happens on my end, we'll have a summary by Sunday night.

Budanov said today the operation planning of A-50 hunting has took about two weeks. If Russia lost the third A-50 they will be forced to stop 24 hours flights, when one plane substitute other in the air. Thus, we can make conclusion, next step will be hunting for the third A-50.

RU Rybar gave following most probable description of UKR attack on BDK Novorossysk.

RU did not detect neither take off nor flight of UKR Su-24 from Starokostyantynyv airfield toward Feodosia (target location) At 3 AM RU detected missile launch from direction of Snihurivka (direction is not equal to near, usually it means closer to target but on the same axis) RU did not detect flight to Kanatovo airfield at 4 AM RU detected take off and flight of two planes from Kanatovo airfield to Starokostyantynyv airfield Analysis
Given Rybar said truth, from the old patrolling area:
RU could detect air targets at medium (and high) altitudes throughout Central Ukraine RU could detect air targets at low altitudes only at the Storm Shadow detection line UKR planes could operate at low altitudes undetected during attacks, but for routine operations, they prefer to operate at medium altitudes, even if it means being detected (probably because low flying operations reduce range and are dangerous) Monitoring UKR air activity makes it simpler for RU to establish the approximate present location of UKR planes for missile attacks that UKR has minimal possibility of countering Conclusion
First, Pushing A-50 further away reduces the risk of RU missile attacks on UKR airfields, that UKR cannot defend against. Given the arrival of the F-16 (HVT for RU), it is likely that UKR are providing a "safe space" for the F-16 to operate. Interesting, but it appears that the delay in sending F-16s might be due to the risk of operating them while the A-50 is near, rather than a lack of political will.
Second, pushing A-50 further east brings missile detection range directly to the frontline. It allows UKR planes to fly at low altitude to the front lines undetected, providing support for troops at a considerably lower risk.

Let's look at detection and early warning ranges.
New sketch based on UKR Mashovets post

Here are detection ranges from A-50 Old Patrolling Route.
Some info
 

Today's post of Kostiantyn Mashovets and some opinions in comments (some simplified by me) - he also hints this can be S-200. Mashovets is retired AD officer and practices on S-200 in early years of own military studying. 
As a variant. 5V28 missile - far limit of engagement zone for loitering AWACS plane is 255 km. Upgraded variant - 5V28M - all 300 km. And there is a strory among AD servicemen that on maneuvers this missile flew away on 340-350 km [like in similar way Russian Tu-154 was accidentally shot down by UKR S-200 in times of Kuchma much further of declared engagement zone - my comment]. Yes this old-school system, bulky, but according on number of features it still unique system. And AWACS planes are its "firm", highly specialized targets. Despite S-200 has semi-active homing, it can homes in passive mode, but the target have to be very bright source of radio-emmiting, and AWACS radar for S-200 seeker is a like firework. 
There was information S-200 misisles were recieved from Poland or Bulgaria. Also some of our missiles can be repaired. In Ukriane S-200 system was decomessioned long time ago and all launnchers were scrapped. But since S-200 was upgraded as erzats-ballistic missiles and some of them were used in this role I can assume we have some mobile launcher for them, not a stationery like in Soviet Union. And I think, we could upgrade some equipmemt in this missile. Some people in comments under post of Mashovets pointed out in USSR S-200 could by deployed on railway carts. One problem with S-200 is its toxic liquid fuel, demanding special chargng procedures, so even mobile launcher is not simply drove here - shot - ran away.
 
On background of video with Russian S-400 launches here is my version:
1. Two UKR S-200 launched in A-50
2. Operators in the plane see imcoming missiles and in desperation launched all what they can do - chaffs, flares, turned on EW equipment and gives targeting to incoming missiiles for S-400 to shot them down. PS. Flight time for S-200 is about 2 minutes.
3. S-400 crews launches missile(s) on incoming S-200 and:
a) they failed to intercept them - one missile is distracted by EW equipment of A-50 (but on video it looks like a flare repelled the missile), The second hit the plane
b) missile, launched at approaching S-200 mistakingly has locked on A-50. BOOM.
c) S-400 intercepted one missile (visible as if a flare did it), but the second S-200 hit A-50    
 

According to the most reliable reports, A-50, which was somewhat deep in Russia (see my drawing above), was hit. There were reports of two planes or one plane and one helicopter hit, however it appears that A-50 been broken into two parts, which were misidentified as two planes. There is a report based on video of broken parts that it was not A-50 but IL-76 transport airplane. I am waiting verification on this one. The UKR AF claims to have downed the A-50 and IL-22 command post. I am waiting verification on this one. Also, there are reports that Su-34 in Kherson negatively gained altitude.  One thing is certain: the RU Day of the Fatherland Defender was a great success. If you know what I mean.
[EDIT]
Rybar's map depicts a crashed A-50 near Mariupol. But it was dated 15.01.24. Probably something like this has caused the misunderstanding. Looks like IL-22 was not confirmed It is still possible that there are two planes. The reports are conflicting and confusing. Nobody seems to know right now.

Well, let's look at the data we have.
FPV attack on a RU soldier
RU comment
Another FPV attack on a RU soldier
00:05 start of first attack 00:15 before RU soldiers quickly moves out of the way 00:16-00:18 view from another drone - RU soldeir quickly moves away, UKR operator of the first drone decides to abort attempt and pulls drone up 00:19 UKR operator dive down again RU soldier quickly moves to a different direction 00:20 UKR drone misses RU soldier and hits ground nearby. A soldier is wounded in leg and hand (not criticaly) and survives. Interesting description of the whole attack:
First drone hit other target - a group of troops nearby (on video from 00:00 to 00:04) reported damage, one died The soldier was wounded by a second drone between 00:04 and 00:20The third drone fell nearby, quote "flew round and then fell... simply fell nearby"
The fourth drone exploded near the car where the solder was placed, "glass got broken...we waited for the driver and then left" Cheap mass-produced FPV drones aren't as quick or nimble as many thinks. Attacks using these low-cost drones are not as effective or devastating as many imagine.
Finally, the prototype was evaluated by a Ukrainian FPV operator, who stated that the army should be armed with them. it is not 100% protection, but it is definitely more effective than people think.