Combatintman

It is a critical part of the process - and as you say many people do a form of own force analysis, it is particularly relevant for QBs so you can maximise your points allocation. Also I think many people do it during execute, the best example I can think of is for indirect fire missions - you're generally going to pick your best observer/HQ to call those missions in to minimise the time to call it in and to reduce the chances of dropping short. Talking soft factors, for real it is one of the reasons a commander must know his subordinates well. If he knows who his top performers are, you can guarantee they will be the people getting the most difficult missions/tasks.
 
The relevance of the hard factors you will see later in the process, particularly when I do Question 5, which is all about resourcing.
 
In my example analysis, those hard and soft factors will add value later and you'll find that some of the analysis may not be used in the final plan. In this instance, the lack of resources means that I may have to go for sub-optimal solutions - as it is never a perfect World, this is where the commander accepts risk or mitigates it by adding resources, synchronising effects or using some other means such as surprise or deception. But it is only until you do the analysis that you understand those risks and your strengths and weaknesses versus those of the enemy.
 
Stay tuned to see how they come into play ..

Again, thanks for the comments gents and hopefully the plan will resemble the genius of Paulus's avatar but I can't guarantee execution will minimise casualties as C3K predicts ... there will be some attacking though. Anyway ... in the spirit of a drill lesson 'I left you in this position' (being Question 2, What have I been told to do and why?). On with the rest of it ...
 
Mission Analysis Step 3 – Analyse tasks.
 
Here you look at specified tasks and identify implied tasks. A specified task is generally stated in the order. In this case there are none which is no biggie because we can come up with plenty of implied tasks from what we have worked out from all of the previous steps. So here’s how it looks:
 
Remember my mission is to secure the woods to the SW (or as I have called them – Main Wood) and my intelligence analysis has identified that the enemy is likely to be in those woods. Given all of this some implied tasks are:
 
Task 1 - Clear Main Wood because I cannot secure the wood without clearing it and the enemy is likely to be in there.
 
Task 2 - Clear Village A because the enemy has been reported there and it provides overwatch of the road to the Main Wood (this links into my understanding of the two up and one up –  my force cannot launch an attack onto our off-map village from Main Wood if the enemy can call fire onto it.
 
Task 3 - Clear Wood E because it is likely that there will be some form of enemy there but the main reason is because it will be difficult for me to clear and secure the Main Wood without clearing Wood E.
 
Task 4 - Clear Wood M because this is part of me making such disposition as to prevent destruction of loss of the Main Wood by the enemy. Also within the context of the Main Wood being a form-up point, if I put some form of reconnaissance element or outpost there it will provide early warning of an enemy counter attack and allow me to disrupt or delay it.
 
As I have been using the term, it is probably best to define it so that you understand what is meant by ‘Clear’. The definition is:
 
 ‘to clear terrain of enemy direct fire and keep clear until handed over to another unit/formation’.
 
To save you trawling back through the thread - here is the BAE graphic with all of the annotations on it again:
 

 
Mission Analysis Step 4 – Determine freedom of action.
 
Here we look at what we can and can’t do and identify any opportunities. Again this requires a bit of analysis because not everything is stated. Within the CM context we don’t need to do this ad nauseum. It goes something like this:
 
I must secure Main Wood NLT 0800 hours.
I cannot cross my assigned boundaries (eg the extent of the map)
I have complete freedom of action within the AO.
 
Mission Analysis Step 5 – Identify critical facts, judgements and assumptions.
 
Some clarification here on the terminology:
 
Critical facts are statements of information that are known to be true.
Judgments are statements of information that are believed to be true and are substitutes for facts.
Assumptions are statements for which no proof is currently available and are substitutes for judgments. Note that all assumptions should be turned into facts by generating an information requirement which would then form part of the intelligence collection plan.
 
Critical facts:
 
There was an enemy presence in Village A last night
The wind is from the west and is very strong.
Friendly force is at 90% CE.
Friendly force dismounts have a full ammunition load.
I have only 2 x mortars.
The AO is 1km x 1km
 
Judgements:
 
There is an enemy presence in Village A
Smoke will likely be ineffective due to wind strength
Accuracy at long range will be affected by crosswinds
Other weather conditions will have no adverse effects on friendly and enemy operations
Vehicles will have to manoeuvre carefully over damp ground
Main Wood is restricted terrain
I am unlikely to be able to employ indirect fire effectively in Main Wood.
Coy HQ, one manoeuvre platoon and some support elements will not arrive until 0705 hrs at the earliest (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars are unlikely to arrive until 0710 hrs (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms it would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars can only provide four minutes of indirect fire each.
I have sufficient direct fire weapons and ammunition to be able to suppress targets in LOS.
 
Assumptions:
 
The enemy is of approximate platoon strength
The enemy lacks armour and significant heavy weaponry
The enemy can call on or has an indirect fire capability
There are no manmade obstacles in the AO
The enemy is unlikely to have sufficient ammunition to conduct a sustained defence.
 
For Question 2 .... that is it - all done (no outputs at this stage but the results of Mission Analysis are recorded and will be used as inputs for flashes of brilliance later on in the process).
 
Question 3 will be the subject of the next post so stay tuned ....

Again, thanks for the comments gents and hopefully the plan will resemble the genius of Paulus's avatar but I can't guarantee execution will minimise casualties as C3K predicts ... there will be some attacking though. Anyway ... in the spirit of a drill lesson 'I left you in this position' (being Question 2, What have I been told to do and why?). On with the rest of it ...
 
Mission Analysis Step 3 – Analyse tasks.
 
Here you look at specified tasks and identify implied tasks. A specified task is generally stated in the order. In this case there are none which is no biggie because we can come up with plenty of implied tasks from what we have worked out from all of the previous steps. So here’s how it looks:
 
Remember my mission is to secure the woods to the SW (or as I have called them – Main Wood) and my intelligence analysis has identified that the enemy is likely to be in those woods. Given all of this some implied tasks are:
 
Task 1 - Clear Main Wood because I cannot secure the wood without clearing it and the enemy is likely to be in there.
 
Task 2 - Clear Village A because the enemy has been reported there and it provides overwatch of the road to the Main Wood (this links into my understanding of the two up and one up –  my force cannot launch an attack onto our off-map village from Main Wood if the enemy can call fire onto it.
 
Task 3 - Clear Wood E because it is likely that there will be some form of enemy there but the main reason is because it will be difficult for me to clear and secure the Main Wood without clearing Wood E.
 
Task 4 - Clear Wood M because this is part of me making such disposition as to prevent destruction of loss of the Main Wood by the enemy. Also within the context of the Main Wood being a form-up point, if I put some form of reconnaissance element or outpost there it will provide early warning of an enemy counter attack and allow me to disrupt or delay it.
 
As I have been using the term, it is probably best to define it so that you understand what is meant by ‘Clear’. The definition is:
 
 ‘to clear terrain of enemy direct fire and keep clear until handed over to another unit/formation’.
 
To save you trawling back through the thread - here is the BAE graphic with all of the annotations on it again:
 

 
Mission Analysis Step 4 – Determine freedom of action.
 
Here we look at what we can and can’t do and identify any opportunities. Again this requires a bit of analysis because not everything is stated. Within the CM context we don’t need to do this ad nauseum. It goes something like this:
 
I must secure Main Wood NLT 0800 hours.
I cannot cross my assigned boundaries (eg the extent of the map)
I have complete freedom of action within the AO.
 
Mission Analysis Step 5 – Identify critical facts, judgements and assumptions.
 
Some clarification here on the terminology:
 
Critical facts are statements of information that are known to be true.
Judgments are statements of information that are believed to be true and are substitutes for facts.
Assumptions are statements for which no proof is currently available and are substitutes for judgments. Note that all assumptions should be turned into facts by generating an information requirement which would then form part of the intelligence collection plan.
 
Critical facts:
 
There was an enemy presence in Village A last night
The wind is from the west and is very strong.
Friendly force is at 90% CE.
Friendly force dismounts have a full ammunition load.
I have only 2 x mortars.
The AO is 1km x 1km
 
Judgements:
 
There is an enemy presence in Village A
Smoke will likely be ineffective due to wind strength
Accuracy at long range will be affected by crosswinds
Other weather conditions will have no adverse effects on friendly and enemy operations
Vehicles will have to manoeuvre carefully over damp ground
Main Wood is restricted terrain
I am unlikely to be able to employ indirect fire effectively in Main Wood.
Coy HQ, one manoeuvre platoon and some support elements will not arrive until 0705 hrs at the earliest (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars are unlikely to arrive until 0710 hrs (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms it would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars can only provide four minutes of indirect fire each.
I have sufficient direct fire weapons and ammunition to be able to suppress targets in LOS.
 
Assumptions:
 
The enemy is of approximate platoon strength
The enemy lacks armour and significant heavy weaponry
The enemy can call on or has an indirect fire capability
There are no manmade obstacles in the AO
The enemy is unlikely to have sufficient ammunition to conduct a sustained defence.
 
For Question 2 .... that is it - all done (no outputs at this stage but the results of Mission Analysis are recorded and will be used as inputs for flashes of brilliance later on in the process).
 
Question 3 will be the subject of the next post so stay tuned ....

Again, thanks for the comments gents and hopefully the plan will resemble the genius of Paulus's avatar but I can't guarantee execution will minimise casualties as C3K predicts ... there will be some attacking though. Anyway ... in the spirit of a drill lesson 'I left you in this position' (being Question 2, What have I been told to do and why?). On with the rest of it ...
 
Mission Analysis Step 3 – Analyse tasks.
 
Here you look at specified tasks and identify implied tasks. A specified task is generally stated in the order. In this case there are none which is no biggie because we can come up with plenty of implied tasks from what we have worked out from all of the previous steps. So here’s how it looks:
 
Remember my mission is to secure the woods to the SW (or as I have called them – Main Wood) and my intelligence analysis has identified that the enemy is likely to be in those woods. Given all of this some implied tasks are:
 
Task 1 - Clear Main Wood because I cannot secure the wood without clearing it and the enemy is likely to be in there.
 
Task 2 - Clear Village A because the enemy has been reported there and it provides overwatch of the road to the Main Wood (this links into my understanding of the two up and one up –  my force cannot launch an attack onto our off-map village from Main Wood if the enemy can call fire onto it.
 
Task 3 - Clear Wood E because it is likely that there will be some form of enemy there but the main reason is because it will be difficult for me to clear and secure the Main Wood without clearing Wood E.
 
Task 4 - Clear Wood M because this is part of me making such disposition as to prevent destruction of loss of the Main Wood by the enemy. Also within the context of the Main Wood being a form-up point, if I put some form of reconnaissance element or outpost there it will provide early warning of an enemy counter attack and allow me to disrupt or delay it.
 
As I have been using the term, it is probably best to define it so that you understand what is meant by ‘Clear’. The definition is:
 
 ‘to clear terrain of enemy direct fire and keep clear until handed over to another unit/formation’.
 
To save you trawling back through the thread - here is the BAE graphic with all of the annotations on it again:
 

 
Mission Analysis Step 4 – Determine freedom of action.
 
Here we look at what we can and can’t do and identify any opportunities. Again this requires a bit of analysis because not everything is stated. Within the CM context we don’t need to do this ad nauseum. It goes something like this:
 
I must secure Main Wood NLT 0800 hours.
I cannot cross my assigned boundaries (eg the extent of the map)
I have complete freedom of action within the AO.
 
Mission Analysis Step 5 – Identify critical facts, judgements and assumptions.
 
Some clarification here on the terminology:
 
Critical facts are statements of information that are known to be true.
Judgments are statements of information that are believed to be true and are substitutes for facts.
Assumptions are statements for which no proof is currently available and are substitutes for judgments. Note that all assumptions should be turned into facts by generating an information requirement which would then form part of the intelligence collection plan.
 
Critical facts:
 
There was an enemy presence in Village A last night
The wind is from the west and is very strong.
Friendly force is at 90% CE.
Friendly force dismounts have a full ammunition load.
I have only 2 x mortars.
The AO is 1km x 1km
 
Judgements:
 
There is an enemy presence in Village A
Smoke will likely be ineffective due to wind strength
Accuracy at long range will be affected by crosswinds
Other weather conditions will have no adverse effects on friendly and enemy operations
Vehicles will have to manoeuvre carefully over damp ground
Main Wood is restricted terrain
I am unlikely to be able to employ indirect fire effectively in Main Wood.
Coy HQ, one manoeuvre platoon and some support elements will not arrive until 0705 hrs at the earliest (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars are unlikely to arrive until 0710 hrs (note that this is a ‘fact’ in the briefing but in real terms it would be a judgement and still might be a judgement if SeinfeldRules has done a varied arrival time for this reinforcement in the mission editor).
My mortars can only provide four minutes of indirect fire each.
I have sufficient direct fire weapons and ammunition to be able to suppress targets in LOS.
 
Assumptions:
 
The enemy is of approximate platoon strength
The enemy lacks armour and significant heavy weaponry
The enemy can call on or has an indirect fire capability
There are no manmade obstacles in the AO
The enemy is unlikely to have sufficient ammunition to conduct a sustained defence.
 
For Question 2 .... that is it - all done (no outputs at this stage but the results of Mission Analysis are recorded and will be used as inputs for flashes of brilliance later on in the process).
 
Question 3 will be the subject of the next post so stay tuned ....

It may have seemed a marathon already but there is plenty more to do. We have now done the majority of the ground and enemy stuff so it is time to look at something else ....
 
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
 
Mission Analysis Step 1 – Review the situation.
 
Here you look at aspects such as time, how the IPB affects the battlespace and own forces. The time is a given – I have one hour. In reality, planning and rehearsal time would be considered and the amount of time required to get to the Area of Operations (AO) plus the time required to complete the mission. These are not factors in CM because the forces are in place and there is only one person planning and controlling all of the forces so we just need to be aware of the fact that we have an hour to do this. From my IPB event overlay I can see that it will take me about 20 minutes to move from my start point to the far end of the Main Wood objective.
 
Although I could do more with the IPB aspects for friendly forces, you have seen enough to see how it works so there’s not a huge amount of value in revisiting them.
 
So let us focus on own forces and again I want to keep this fairly simple …
 
First up there is an error in the briefing which states that 1 Platoon is on the map, 2 Platoon will arrive in 5 minutes and the mortars will arrive in 10 minutes (I think I'll allow SeinfeldRules the error because his missions are awesome  ). In reality 2 Platoon is on the map, 1 Platoon arrives in 5 minutes and the mortars in 10 minutes. For the purposes of Mission Analysis, this makes no real difference.
 
In basic terms then I command a Panzergrenadier Company Minus comprising:
 
Coy HQ
1 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
2 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
4 (Support Platoon) (2 x MG and 2 x Mortars)
1 x Sdkfz 251/17 20mm Half Track
 
Graphically shown in the next schematic:
 

 
So in essence I have one command element, two manoeuvre elements and a support element which is capable of protected mounted and dismounted manoeuvre and can bring direct and indirect fires on to the enemy. Force flow is such that I cannot bring all of my combat power to bear until 0710 hrs at the earliest and realistically (taking into account the time required to set up mortars and cue indirect fire) until 0720-0725 hrs.
 
I’ll now delve into some of the soft and hard factors which I have tabulated:
 

 
On top of that (ignoring the trucks) I have 8 x Sdkfz 251/1 half-tracks each armed with an LMG and I have 1 x Sdkfz 251/17 mounting a 20mm cannon and my two mortar teams each have 1 x 81mm mortar.
 
The reason for analysing own forces in detail is to establish things like force ratios and relative combat power as well as identifying those soft factors which could influence allocating units to task later on (eg I may prefer to allocate the more difficult tasks to those units with the most experience, best leadership and best morale while allocating easier tasks to those units that score lower in those factors).
 
So for the soft factors, some relevant factors might be:
 
My most experienced units are 1 Squad/1 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ
My most motivated unit is 2 Squad/2 Platoon
My best led units are Coy HQ, 1 Squad/1 Platoon, 2 Squad/1 Platoon, 1 Squad/2 Platoon, 3 Squad/2 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ.
 
The hard factors are:
 
2 Platoon is better optimised to take on buildings and vehicles due to the number of panzerschrecks
1 Platoon is better optimised for dismounted combat in the woods due to its larger number of small arms
I have 14 x LMG/HMG among my dismounted elements.
I have only 2 x mortars.
 
I will return to friendly forces later, but for now this is a good enough start because hopefully already you have seen that the hour that I’ve been given for this mission is suddenly looking less generous than it did at face value at the start.
 
Mission Analysis Step 2 – Analyse superior commander’s intent and own mission.
 
This is the core of the Mission Command or Manoeuvrist Approach style and in reality commanders and staffs will really pick this apart. In CM games, there is less value in doing so because what happens two up and one up, which in this mission’s context would be Regiment and Battalion has no effect on the mission. This means that we can skimp this step a bit.
 
But as a reminder – here is what we have been told:
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position. (Remember from my earlier posts that the town mentioned is not on the mission map - this caused a bit of confusion earlier)
 
So what to pick out of all of that, I know about my 2 up level of command (Regiment) but not too much about my 1 up level of command (Battalion). I also at this point bump up against another artificial situation. This is because it states that my overarching mission is to take a small town to protect the regiment’s flank. What this means is that in reality, this scenario is one small part of a plan to take the town and would therefore not have its own dedicated set of orders and detailed plans. However, we can move on from this, it is not a showstopper but I point it out for context. For the purposes of Mission Analysis though I deduce straight away that I have to take a small town later so I am going to need to conserve combat power. I also deduce that as my task is all about flank security, I am unlikely to be on the Regiment’s main effort which means I’m not going to be high on the list for support priorities.
 
The ‘Mission’ part of the briefing quite simply tells me to ‘Secure the woods to your SW’. So what does this mean? Doctrinally ‘Secure’ is defined as:
 
to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
 
As a reminder – this is where the Secure objective has been designated:
 

 
At this point I’m going to wordsmith the components of the briefing to come up with a mission statement so that we can move on:
 
1 Kompanie is to secure Main Wood NLT 250800Jun44 in order to provide a line of departure for the attack on the town.
 
Mission statements should state who is to do what, where at what time and then have a unifying purpose. The unifying purpose is the ‘in order to’ part of the statement. This is key to the manoeuvrist approach because it allows subordinates to understand the overall intent and put things into context. My in order to statement is not the best to be honest but it serves the purpose.
 
So that is all pretty simple then … next time we will finish off Mission Analysis by completing steps 3, 4 and 5 of that part of the process.
 
 
 
 
 

It may have seemed a marathon already but there is plenty more to do. We have now done the majority of the ground and enemy stuff so it is time to look at something else ....
 
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
 
Mission Analysis Step 1 – Review the situation.
 
Here you look at aspects such as time, how the IPB affects the battlespace and own forces. The time is a given – I have one hour. In reality, planning and rehearsal time would be considered and the amount of time required to get to the Area of Operations (AO) plus the time required to complete the mission. These are not factors in CM because the forces are in place and there is only one person planning and controlling all of the forces so we just need to be aware of the fact that we have an hour to do this. From my IPB event overlay I can see that it will take me about 20 minutes to move from my start point to the far end of the Main Wood objective.
 
Although I could do more with the IPB aspects for friendly forces, you have seen enough to see how it works so there’s not a huge amount of value in revisiting them.
 
So let us focus on own forces and again I want to keep this fairly simple …
 
First up there is an error in the briefing which states that 1 Platoon is on the map, 2 Platoon will arrive in 5 minutes and the mortars will arrive in 10 minutes (I think I'll allow SeinfeldRules the error because his missions are awesome  ). In reality 2 Platoon is on the map, 1 Platoon arrives in 5 minutes and the mortars in 10 minutes. For the purposes of Mission Analysis, this makes no real difference.
 
In basic terms then I command a Panzergrenadier Company Minus comprising:
 
Coy HQ
1 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
2 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
4 (Support Platoon) (2 x MG and 2 x Mortars)
1 x Sdkfz 251/17 20mm Half Track
 
Graphically shown in the next schematic:
 

 
So in essence I have one command element, two manoeuvre elements and a support element which is capable of protected mounted and dismounted manoeuvre and can bring direct and indirect fires on to the enemy. Force flow is such that I cannot bring all of my combat power to bear until 0710 hrs at the earliest and realistically (taking into account the time required to set up mortars and cue indirect fire) until 0720-0725 hrs.
 
I’ll now delve into some of the soft and hard factors which I have tabulated:
 

 
On top of that (ignoring the trucks) I have 8 x Sdkfz 251/1 half-tracks each armed with an LMG and I have 1 x Sdkfz 251/17 mounting a 20mm cannon and my two mortar teams each have 1 x 81mm mortar.
 
The reason for analysing own forces in detail is to establish things like force ratios and relative combat power as well as identifying those soft factors which could influence allocating units to task later on (eg I may prefer to allocate the more difficult tasks to those units with the most experience, best leadership and best morale while allocating easier tasks to those units that score lower in those factors).
 
So for the soft factors, some relevant factors might be:
 
My most experienced units are 1 Squad/1 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ
My most motivated unit is 2 Squad/2 Platoon
My best led units are Coy HQ, 1 Squad/1 Platoon, 2 Squad/1 Platoon, 1 Squad/2 Platoon, 3 Squad/2 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ.
 
The hard factors are:
 
2 Platoon is better optimised to take on buildings and vehicles due to the number of panzerschrecks
1 Platoon is better optimised for dismounted combat in the woods due to its larger number of small arms
I have 14 x LMG/HMG among my dismounted elements.
I have only 2 x mortars.
 
I will return to friendly forces later, but for now this is a good enough start because hopefully already you have seen that the hour that I’ve been given for this mission is suddenly looking less generous than it did at face value at the start.
 
Mission Analysis Step 2 – Analyse superior commander’s intent and own mission.
 
This is the core of the Mission Command or Manoeuvrist Approach style and in reality commanders and staffs will really pick this apart. In CM games, there is less value in doing so because what happens two up and one up, which in this mission’s context would be Regiment and Battalion has no effect on the mission. This means that we can skimp this step a bit.
 
But as a reminder – here is what we have been told:
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position. (Remember from my earlier posts that the town mentioned is not on the mission map - this caused a bit of confusion earlier)
 
So what to pick out of all of that, I know about my 2 up level of command (Regiment) but not too much about my 1 up level of command (Battalion). I also at this point bump up against another artificial situation. This is because it states that my overarching mission is to take a small town to protect the regiment’s flank. What this means is that in reality, this scenario is one small part of a plan to take the town and would therefore not have its own dedicated set of orders and detailed plans. However, we can move on from this, it is not a showstopper but I point it out for context. For the purposes of Mission Analysis though I deduce straight away that I have to take a small town later so I am going to need to conserve combat power. I also deduce that as my task is all about flank security, I am unlikely to be on the Regiment’s main effort which means I’m not going to be high on the list for support priorities.
 
The ‘Mission’ part of the briefing quite simply tells me to ‘Secure the woods to your SW’. So what does this mean? Doctrinally ‘Secure’ is defined as:
 
to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
 
As a reminder – this is where the Secure objective has been designated:
 

 
At this point I’m going to wordsmith the components of the briefing to come up with a mission statement so that we can move on:
 
1 Kompanie is to secure Main Wood NLT 250800Jun44 in order to provide a line of departure for the attack on the town.
 
Mission statements should state who is to do what, where at what time and then have a unifying purpose. The unifying purpose is the ‘in order to’ part of the statement. This is key to the manoeuvrist approach because it allows subordinates to understand the overall intent and put things into context. My in order to statement is not the best to be honest but it serves the purpose.
 
So that is all pretty simple then … next time we will finish off Mission Analysis by completing steps 3, 4 and 5 of that part of the process.
 
 
 
 
 

Having promised Threat Integration - here it is:
 
Step 3 – Threat Integration
 
Recall that in this step we combine our analysis from Step 1 (BAE) and Step 2 (TE) to come up with a likely enemy course of action. Also don't forget we are still in Question 1.
 
Likely Enemy Mission
 
This is pretty much stated in various bits of the briefing:
 
The enemy is an outpost line
The enemy is to deny the woods
The enemy is to inflict casualties (especially half-tracks)
 
So a likely mission statement would be:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
This is all very well but it is now time to return to the ground to work out what is feasible given the resources available to the enemy and his preferred tactics.
 
So some context about the ground and effects specific to the defender because my previous analysis, particularly that relating to Key Terrain, was focused on my mission.
 
Key terrain for the enemy I assess as follows:
 
Village A
 
Mainly for the same reasons I designated it a key terrain for myself – but most importantly because the enemy is reported to be there.
 
Entrances F, G and H
 
Designated because these are the most likely points of entry onto the wooded objective for any attacking force.
 
Track Crossroads I
 
This crossroads blocks avenues of approach from entrances F, G and H.
 
It is also worthy of note that Woods C and E and Complex D would be suitable outpost locations but are not significant enough to warrant the deployment of significant combat power given the Red Army commander’s limited resources.
 
So initially, on the basis of the above, I will throw the Doctrinal Overlay onto the map centred on Track Crossroads I just to give me an idea of how everything works in terms of ground and tactics. This will provide the basis for subsequent COA analysis which will take into account my terrain deductions and will involve some amendments to the doctrinal solution to make it best fit the terrain and the analysis of the enemy’s mission and tasks as previously described. The schematic below illustrates this step:
 

 
As you can see from the graphic, some manipulation is now required to turn this into a viable defensive COA on this particular piece of ground. Also on my initial laydown, I have not taken into account the probable scout team reported to be in Village A. So let’s do that now.
 

 
COA 1
 
The graphic above becomes COA 1 which I will call ‘Defend Forward’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO Complex D, Wood E and Entrance H. The main outpost line is linear and lies back from the forward edge of the main wood. In this laydown the eastern most squad can cover Entrance F and any advance along AAs 1 and 2. The centre squad can cover Crossroads I and AA3. The westernmost squad can cover Entrance H and approaches up AAs 4 and 5.
 
Note that there is nothing in Wood C but it is possible that the scout team in Complex D could equally be positioned there or Wood C could be a fall-back position for the scout team in Village A once it decides that remaining in Village A becomes untenable. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Also note that the westernmost scout team could also be located further forward at the western end of Wood E and achieve the same effect of covering Entrance H and AAs 4 and 5. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Each of the platoon scout teams in this COA I would see as being augmented by an LMG squad and an ATR squad to take advantage of their ranged capabilities. The role of these teams being to identify my avenue of approach and to disrupt my attack by engaging HVTs before falling back on to the main outpost line in the woods. The probable scout team in Village A will likely have an observer grouped with it and its role will be to identify my avenue of approach and disrupt my attack through indirect fires before falling back to an alternate position in either Wood C or Complex D.
 
COA 1 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Allows early identification of the German axis.
Allows early attrition of the German attacker.
Makes best use of ranged weapons.
Makes good use of concealment in the main wood.
 
COA 1 Disadvantages
 
Dispersion creates C2 problems.
Extraction of two platoon scout teams will be over open ground
Linear main outpost line lacks depth
Linear outpost line does not provide mutual support.
Defence can be outflanked and taken down from the rear.
 
So that is the first COA, on to COA 2 - illustrated below and derived using the same process:
 
COA 2
 

 
The graphic above becomes COA 2 which I will call ‘Defend Deep’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed  rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO the northern perimeter of the main wood. The main outpost position is constructed as a standard defensive position with two squads forward and one back with the killing area centred on Track Crossroads I. This laydown means that the probable scout team in Village A covers AAs 1 and 2. The easternmost platoon scout team provides very limited coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and good coverage of AA3. The centre platoon scout team provides coverage of AA3. The westernmost platoon scout team provides good coverage of AA4 within the main wood and limited coverage of AA5.
 
As with the previous COA, I would see each of the platoon scout teams having an LMG and ATR team grouped to permit best use of those weapons systems and the scout team in Village A having an observer grouped with it.
 
COA 2 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Excellent use of concealment in the main wood.
Excellent C2.
Good all round defence and mutual support.
Provides best defence of Track Crossroads I.
 
COA 2 Disadvantages
 
Limited observation and fields of fire over avenues of approach.
Limited ability to maximise use of ranged weapons.
Surrenders initiative to the attacker.
Allows easy break in to the main woods by the attacker via entrances F, H, K and L.
Scout team in village A is entirely dislocated from the main force.
 
One really useful product from the IPB process is the Event Overlay which is designed to show activities related to time and space. Doctrinally it would contain timelines or events, I have done this but in a very simplistic form. The purple dotted lines are my timelines (measured in minutes) and are based on dismounted ‘Move’ rates of movement (which in broad terms = 2 minutes per 100m). Of course I could make this more comprehensive by showing movement rates for ‘Quick’ and ‘Hunt’ etc and applying movement rates over different types of ground (woods dismounted ‘Move’ speed per 100m is about 2 minutes and 45 seconds) and also for my vehicles.  Clearly by doing so, you expend more time and sometimes make the product to complicated. By keeping it simple my event overlay is telling me the following already:
 
I can cover the AO in 20 minutes.
The earliest I can assault Village A is H+10 or 0710 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Village A may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest I can assault Wood E is H+12 or 0712 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Wood E may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest time I can start my clearance of the Main Wood is H+16 or 0716 hrs in the scenario.
The earliest time I can finish clearing the Main Wood is H+20 or 0720 hrs in the scenario.
 
These are all useful for planning and particularly any synchronising and phasing required. It also gives me a window (H+10 to H+12) to potentially acquire track and engage moving enemy targets.
 
So that was a very basic look at the timings, now I will focus on the Named Areas of Interest (NAI) part of this product. The NAIs show where you need to look in order to acquire the enemy and determine his likely COA. This product will later be refined but for the time being let’s look at NAIs.
 
NAIs are placed based on the previously derived enemy COAs. In simple terms, wherever an enemy is reported or wherever you assess an enemy grouping to be is the starting point. The process involves drawing a box around those areas and if required, refining those boxes or combining them. This is important to get right because ultimately each of those NAIs should be covered by a reconnaissance asset, and ideally for redundancy two assets. Clearly the more NAIs there are to cover, the more troops you have to allocate to the task.
 
Here is the Event Overlay for this mission
 

 
To complete the process and to add meaning to the above, an Event Matrix is produced and the combination of these two products drive the Collection Plan and ultimately the plan as a whole. In the Event Matrix you are basically defining, where you are looking, when you are looking, what you are looking for and what it all means. I will ignore the ‘when’ part of this for simplicity and because I don’t think it is a war-stopper given that the only moves I anticipate from the enemy will occur in the H+10 – H+12 window.
 
Here is the Event Matrix
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT) are another consideration, doctrinally these are the assets that are critical to the success of the Enemy Commander’s mission. This demonstrates why it is important to thoroughly analyse the likely enemy mission and tasks – if you don’t go through this process you end up targeting everything which is sometimes difficult to do and it is wasteful of time and resources. There are a number of ways of deriving these but I’m going to keep this simple. So if we refer back to assessed mission and tasks, I had them as these:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
From this my HVT list looks like this:
 
Platoon HQ – Destruction of this will affect enemy C2 and morale and reduce his ability to communicate back to higher HQ.
 
Forward Observer IVO Village A – Destruction of this limits the enemy’s ability to call in indirect fire.
Anti-Tank Rifle Squads – These are the only assets that can effectively defeat my light armoured vehicles.
 
I could go further with this but the more I add, the more I have to target which means allocating assets. The above list is the minimum needed to effectively limit the enemy’s ability to achieve his mission.
 
The above, although it is truncated, is about as far as we need to go with Question 1 so next time we will move on to Question 2 – What have I been told to do and why? This in effect is Mission Analysis and there are many ways of cracking this nut and again I will pare this down to what I consider to be essentials for this situation.

With the BAE done it is on to the next step of IPB (remembering that we are still in Question 1 - so a long way to go yet!!!)
 
Step 2 – Threat Evaluation
 
Recall that in this step we look at the enemy in isolation focusing on organisation and tactics.
 
The synopsis of the information about the enemy is as follows:
 
Comprised of an outpost line from a UI Rifle Regiment of approximately platoon strength located IVO the wooded grove and 1 x probable scout team IVO the village. Probably reinforced with ATR and MG teams. No armour expected.
 
Enemy Composition
 
So initially I will look at the likely enemy strength and from the above I assess the enemy ORBAT to be as shown in the graphic:
 

 
As context to these deductions I will discuss MGs, observers and mortars mainly because these were the things I had to think about.
 
I went for 3 x LMG teams as an assessment based on the statement that the enemy would be reinforced by MG teams. In TO&E terms, the natural choice would be HMG teams because they sit within the TO&E but in relation to the assessed enemy outpost mission, the imperative is to be able to extract back to the main defensive position and HMGs are less able to do that than LMGs.
 
Observers are not specifically mentioned but again by thinking about the outpost mission context, it is logical to assume that the outpost will be covered by some form of indirect fire assets and observers provide the best means of calling this support in.
 
I went for mortars in my assessed enemy grouping because these do sit within the TO&E and can be better employed in woods and forests than other forms of artillery.
 
Some quick deductions about strength and composition combined with previous ground and weather analysis are as follows:
 
The enemy cannot defend everywhere and must have a compact defence to maximise combat power and facilitate command and control.
 
The enemy has limited long range firepower and therefore is likely to prefer short range engagements.
 
The enemy’s anti-tank rifles and MGs are his only effective ranged weapons.
 
The enemy is limited to what he can carry and therefore lacks the ammunition to sustain lengthy engagements.
 
The enemy has few radios and can only call in indirect fire through HQ or dedicated observers
 
Enemy Tactics
 
Delving into this a little more because of the insights it provides, a rummage around Red Army tactics of the era tells me this:
 
A rifle platoon on outpost duty will act as a large picquet from an outpost battalion (or outpost company) or as a self-contained permanent large picquet directly from the regiment (or battalion).
 
The duties of a large picquet post are:
 
Not to allow enemy scouts to approach the rest of the forces.
To secure the resting troops (main body) against machine-gun or mortar bombardment, against attacks by enemy tanks, armoured vehicles and motorised infantry.
 
The large picquet post covers a front of 1-1.5 km at a distance of up to 4km from the resting troops.
 
In principle, the large picquet post is reinforced with HMG, mortars, cannons and anti-tank rifles, sappers and chemical defence troops and must be supported by artillery fire from the main positions.
 
Added to this and returning to doctrine we need to generate a doctrinal template. This is a graphic which shows how the enemy would deploy/manoeuvre according to his doctrine.
 
Doctrinally the platoon would have outposts about 100m forward of the main position over a frontage of about 250m. The main position would be about 150m in depth over the same 250m frontage.
 
Set up for defence, the standard two up one back layout is the preferred doctrine although in the case of an outpost there is the possibility that a linear formation could be employed. So here is the doctrinal template:
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT)
 
Doctrinally I should identify HVT at this stage … HVT are those that are important to the enemy commander’s mission. Personally I am not a fan of doing it at this stage, because if you identify them here you are just making work for yourself … we will return to this later.
 
So that is Threat Evaluation squared away ... next step is Threat Integration which predictably will be covered in the next post.
 
 
 
 
 
 

QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?
 
This is broken into the three steps of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ( IPB). I am aware that most armies go for four steps (including the one I currently work for) but I was brought up on three and as I am inherently lazy, I’m sticking with three. These steps are:
 
Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) which in simple terms is the ground and weather.
 
Threat Evaluation (TE) where you look at the enemy in isolation according to organisation and doctrine.
 
Threat Integration (TI) where you combine steps 1 and 2 to determine enemy courses of action
 
Step 1 - BAE
 
To do this properly I’ve had to crack open the scenario editor to get some of the mission data, however rest assured I have not had a sneaky peek at the Russian forces or setup. So from a combination of information supplied to me from the map, orders and the data screen in the editor here is what I have come up with.
 
Weather
 
According to the data screen it is 250700Jun44, the ground is damp, temperature is cool with overcast skies. Wind source is from the West with heavy wind.
 
Deductions:
 
Wind direction will blow smoke from my setup zone up the map as I look at it, this could be an advantage when using smoke to masking any approach into the woods from the West but is negated by the wind speed. Overall judgement is that I should not rely on smoke and weapon accuracy over long range could be effected.
 
Ground conditions, when combined with terrain mean that all vehicles should manoeuvre carefully when off road.
 
Temperatures should have no adverse effect on dismounted troops.
 
Despite the overcast skies, visibility will be generally good.
 
Ground
 
The area of operations (AO) is approximately 1km x 1km and is best described as a mix of open and close terrain. The two principal features are the small village (Village A) and the large wooded feature to the South which is the form up objective specified in the mission orders. The remainder of the ground comprises open farmland and small wooded areas with a single road running generally West to SE. Elevation is best described as rolling countryside with low ground to the South rising to higher ground to the East.
 
The map again ...
 

 
The traditional method of looking at ground is under the OCOKA headings (shown below) so here is a brief description
 
O - Observation and Fields of Fire
 
Generally good throughout with the exception of the wooded features where visibility is limited to approximately 30m. In open areas, visibility and fields of fire can extend up to 600m but changes in elevation creating dead ground restrict this to an average of 200m to 300m
 
C - Cover and Concealment
 
The only readily identifiable features that provide true cover are the buildings, the majority of which are located in Village A. There are two additional small building complexes, complex D which lies between Village A and the wooded objective and a small complex at the NE exit of the woods near annotation L. Otherwise, all wooded areas provide good concealment with the best concealed positions located in the depths of the woods.
 
O - Obstacles
 
There are no significant natural obstacles with the exception of some small areas of heavy woods. Overall the natural environment would be rated as unrestricted with areas of restricted terrain around village A and all wooded areas. Although not a significant obstacle, I am aware that the boundary of the woods is delineated by a single strand low wire fence and this may expose my dismounts as they enter the woods.
 
K - Key Terrain
 
In relation to my mission, the entrances to the woods (marked F, G, H, K and L) are potential key terrain but I designate Village A, Wood C and Complex D as my key terrain. Here is why:
 
Village A
 
My intelligence briefing states that the enemy has a probable scout team deployed there. It is therefore important because the enemy has deemed it important and because it overlooks my initial deployment area. It is also important because it covers AA1 and AA2 and can disrupt manoeuvre along AA3. If I choose do so, once I get into Village A, it allows me overwatch and a base of fire into Wood C, Complex D and parts of Wood E.
 
Wood C
 
Although not apparent from the top down view, close analysis shows that Wood C is on high ground and forces on this position cover AAs 1, 2 and 3. In addition they have overwatch on to my start position. Most importantly, this position gives good observation and fields of fire across the northern boundary of the main woods, Complex D and the Eastern extent of Wood E.
 
Complex D
 
Comprises two buildings which offer both cover and concealment. It covers AAs 2 and 3 and to a limited extend, parts of AA1. Most importantly it again provides a potential good base of fire across the North of the main woods as well as Wood E.
 
A - Avenues of Approach
 
Are as marked on the schematic – in essence there are five broad avenues of approach with a number of branches designated AAs 1-5.
 
 
 
Finally just some other things to note about fighting in woods and forests
 
Other tactical points to note regarding ground in woods:
 
Command and control is extremely difficult due to close terrain and limited visibility.
Observation and fields of fire are limited.
Indirect fire is extremely difficult to employ effectively due to limited visibility and command and control issues.
 
We will look at Threat Evaluation next.
 

On with the planning then ...
 
For the planning process, I am going to use a number of planning models or tools that I’ve come across in my career – many of you board regulars will have seen some of these in other similar threads but some may be new to you. I’m not saying that these are the best tools or that this is the only way to skin the cat – it is just the way I have chosen to do it.
 
The framework MDMP (Military Decision Making Process) I am going to use is the UK Combat Estimate, which is also known as the 7 Questions. The main reason I am using this format is because I am very familiar with it (I was involved in the trials) and I find it very intuitive. The basic premise is that if you answer all of the 7 Questions you will have a plan at the end of it.
 
The 7 Questions are:
 
Q1 What is  the enemy doing and why?
Q2 What have I been told to do and why?
Q3 What effects do I want to have on the enemy; and what direction must I give to develop a plan?
Q4 Where can I best accomplish each action or effect?
Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?
Q6 When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
Q7 What control measures do I have to impose?
 
At this point it is probably worth adding a graphic to orientate you:
 

 
The blue lines are a 100m grid overlay.
 
Also required for context are the orders supplied for the mission:
 
Situation
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position.
 
Mission:
 
Secure the woods to your south west.
 
Execution:
 
Your 1st PLT is currently staged on the road leading into the village of Osinnik. 2nd PLT is not far behind and will arrive within the next 5 minutes. Your 2 company mortars are in trucks and will arrive within 10 minutes. Currently our friendly tanks are occupied in more important areas on the line, and the only support battalion has attached is in the form of a Sd.Kfz. 251/17, travelling with your 2nd PLT.
 
The enemy defense is not expected to be fairly strong. Their tanks are many kilometers to the west, and are using their regular rifle infantry to hold the corridor. The forces to your immediate front are an outpost line, delaying our advance to give their main defense on the reverse slope more time to dig in.
 
There should be no more then a platoon of dismounted infantry, though expect several machine guns and anti-tank teams. Friendly observers had been using Osinnik to direct fire, but were driven out by a small Russian patrol last night. Expect no more then a scout team in Osinnik itself, with the majority of their forces in small blocking positions south of the village among the treelines. Utilize your HMGs, halftracks and mortars to suppress the enemy and secure a foothold in the woods to your SE.
 
Your panzergrenadier company consists of:
 
-1x Company HQ
-1x Sd.Kfz. 251/17
 
-2x Panzergrenadier Platoons, each with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---3x Panzergrenadier Squads (90% manning)
---4x Sd.Kfz. 251/1
 
-1x Weapons PLT, with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---2x HMG42 Teams
---1x Mortars HQ Team
---2x 81mm Mortars
---2x Opel Blitz Trucks
 
Notes:
 
Scoring is as follows:
 
500 points for each objective, 500 for inflicting casualties, for a total of 1000 points. Russian side scores the same, weighted heavily towards vehicle kills. Preserve your halftracks, they are easily destroyed!
 
Orders End
 
I have attached these orders as a PDF for you to refer back to as we go through this process.
 
So that is the problem laid out – time to get on with solving it so here we go ….
 
 
Mission Briefing.pdf

There seem to be a few tutorials doing the rounds of late … so you’re going to get another one – on planning. So if you’re somebody who wondered how it is done, or are somebody who casts a rudimentary eye over the ground, skims through the orders and then just launches across the line of departure with the view to developing a plan on the hoof and wants to change this – then this is the thread for you.
 
The vehicle for the tutorial is SeinfeldRules Assault Position Mission.  The associated thread is here:
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/119212-seinfeldrules-scenario-thread/page-1
 
The mission can be downloaded from here:
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/d85cs6w3xeeg0oi/AD%20Assault%20Position.zip?dl=0
 
What do you get from this thread – simply put it will delve into the planning process and then roll into an AAR. I am playing this as designed so Axis attacker versus the AI. So without further ado, let’s crack on with it. Also I’d be grateful if people could refrain from posting spoilers on this mission if you’ve played it – I haven’t yet – which is kind of the point of stepping through the planning process first!!!!
 
I will warn you that I am no means an expert on military planning but have been around it enough to know how it works. I will cut corners with it here and there but this isn’t necessarily about military doctrine, it is about giving you guys an understanding of some techniques to help you plan your battles should you have a mind to do so.
 
Clearly questions (that do not contain spoilers) are welcome but many of my answers might be ‘I’ll come to that later’.

Thanks for the comments - there is an argument that too much planning is done these days which creates undue complexity. I think there is a certainly merit in that argument.
 
In the context of this scenario and the amount of planning a German company commander would have done in 1944 the effort expended would be far less than that I am showing here. That is mainly because he didn't have a massive staff to do the planning and he would probably be fairly experienced so would be able to plan intuitively.
 
As stated, the purpose is not to show you German company level command and control procedures, it is to show you a planning methodology for your education and to assist you in planning your missions and maybe apply them to scenario design too. What I certainly wouldn't advocate is planning to this extent every time you fire up the game ... believe me you'd hardly ever play and that is no fun at all!!!
 
Anyway - thanks again for following the thread and hope it is useful and interesting.

It may have seemed a marathon already but there is plenty more to do. We have now done the majority of the ground and enemy stuff so it is time to look at something else ....
 
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
 
Mission Analysis Step 1 – Review the situation.
 
Here you look at aspects such as time, how the IPB affects the battlespace and own forces. The time is a given – I have one hour. In reality, planning and rehearsal time would be considered and the amount of time required to get to the Area of Operations (AO) plus the time required to complete the mission. These are not factors in CM because the forces are in place and there is only one person planning and controlling all of the forces so we just need to be aware of the fact that we have an hour to do this. From my IPB event overlay I can see that it will take me about 20 minutes to move from my start point to the far end of the Main Wood objective.
 
Although I could do more with the IPB aspects for friendly forces, you have seen enough to see how it works so there’s not a huge amount of value in revisiting them.
 
So let us focus on own forces and again I want to keep this fairly simple …
 
First up there is an error in the briefing which states that 1 Platoon is on the map, 2 Platoon will arrive in 5 minutes and the mortars will arrive in 10 minutes (I think I'll allow SeinfeldRules the error because his missions are awesome  ). In reality 2 Platoon is on the map, 1 Platoon arrives in 5 minutes and the mortars in 10 minutes. For the purposes of Mission Analysis, this makes no real difference.
 
In basic terms then I command a Panzergrenadier Company Minus comprising:
 
Coy HQ
1 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
2 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
4 (Support Platoon) (2 x MG and 2 x Mortars)
1 x Sdkfz 251/17 20mm Half Track
 
Graphically shown in the next schematic:
 

 
So in essence I have one command element, two manoeuvre elements and a support element which is capable of protected mounted and dismounted manoeuvre and can bring direct and indirect fires on to the enemy. Force flow is such that I cannot bring all of my combat power to bear until 0710 hrs at the earliest and realistically (taking into account the time required to set up mortars and cue indirect fire) until 0720-0725 hrs.
 
I’ll now delve into some of the soft and hard factors which I have tabulated:
 

 
On top of that (ignoring the trucks) I have 8 x Sdkfz 251/1 half-tracks each armed with an LMG and I have 1 x Sdkfz 251/17 mounting a 20mm cannon and my two mortar teams each have 1 x 81mm mortar.
 
The reason for analysing own forces in detail is to establish things like force ratios and relative combat power as well as identifying those soft factors which could influence allocating units to task later on (eg I may prefer to allocate the more difficult tasks to those units with the most experience, best leadership and best morale while allocating easier tasks to those units that score lower in those factors).
 
So for the soft factors, some relevant factors might be:
 
My most experienced units are 1 Squad/1 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ
My most motivated unit is 2 Squad/2 Platoon
My best led units are Coy HQ, 1 Squad/1 Platoon, 2 Squad/1 Platoon, 1 Squad/2 Platoon, 3 Squad/2 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ.
 
The hard factors are:
 
2 Platoon is better optimised to take on buildings and vehicles due to the number of panzerschrecks
1 Platoon is better optimised for dismounted combat in the woods due to its larger number of small arms
I have 14 x LMG/HMG among my dismounted elements.
I have only 2 x mortars.
 
I will return to friendly forces later, but for now this is a good enough start because hopefully already you have seen that the hour that I’ve been given for this mission is suddenly looking less generous than it did at face value at the start.
 
Mission Analysis Step 2 – Analyse superior commander’s intent and own mission.
 
This is the core of the Mission Command or Manoeuvrist Approach style and in reality commanders and staffs will really pick this apart. In CM games, there is less value in doing so because what happens two up and one up, which in this mission’s context would be Regiment and Battalion has no effect on the mission. This means that we can skimp this step a bit.
 
But as a reminder – here is what we have been told:
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position. (Remember from my earlier posts that the town mentioned is not on the mission map - this caused a bit of confusion earlier)
 
So what to pick out of all of that, I know about my 2 up level of command (Regiment) but not too much about my 1 up level of command (Battalion). I also at this point bump up against another artificial situation. This is because it states that my overarching mission is to take a small town to protect the regiment’s flank. What this means is that in reality, this scenario is one small part of a plan to take the town and would therefore not have its own dedicated set of orders and detailed plans. However, we can move on from this, it is not a showstopper but I point it out for context. For the purposes of Mission Analysis though I deduce straight away that I have to take a small town later so I am going to need to conserve combat power. I also deduce that as my task is all about flank security, I am unlikely to be on the Regiment’s main effort which means I’m not going to be high on the list for support priorities.
 
The ‘Mission’ part of the briefing quite simply tells me to ‘Secure the woods to your SW’. So what does this mean? Doctrinally ‘Secure’ is defined as:
 
to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
 
As a reminder – this is where the Secure objective has been designated:
 

 
At this point I’m going to wordsmith the components of the briefing to come up with a mission statement so that we can move on:
 
1 Kompanie is to secure Main Wood NLT 250800Jun44 in order to provide a line of departure for the attack on the town.
 
Mission statements should state who is to do what, where at what time and then have a unifying purpose. The unifying purpose is the ‘in order to’ part of the statement. This is key to the manoeuvrist approach because it allows subordinates to understand the overall intent and put things into context. My in order to statement is not the best to be honest but it serves the purpose.
 
So that is all pretty simple then … next time we will finish off Mission Analysis by completing steps 3, 4 and 5 of that part of the process.
 
 
 
 
 

Having promised Threat Integration - here it is:
 
Step 3 – Threat Integration
 
Recall that in this step we combine our analysis from Step 1 (BAE) and Step 2 (TE) to come up with a likely enemy course of action. Also don't forget we are still in Question 1.
 
Likely Enemy Mission
 
This is pretty much stated in various bits of the briefing:
 
The enemy is an outpost line
The enemy is to deny the woods
The enemy is to inflict casualties (especially half-tracks)
 
So a likely mission statement would be:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
This is all very well but it is now time to return to the ground to work out what is feasible given the resources available to the enemy and his preferred tactics.
 
So some context about the ground and effects specific to the defender because my previous analysis, particularly that relating to Key Terrain, was focused on my mission.
 
Key terrain for the enemy I assess as follows:
 
Village A
 
Mainly for the same reasons I designated it a key terrain for myself – but most importantly because the enemy is reported to be there.
 
Entrances F, G and H
 
Designated because these are the most likely points of entry onto the wooded objective for any attacking force.
 
Track Crossroads I
 
This crossroads blocks avenues of approach from entrances F, G and H.
 
It is also worthy of note that Woods C and E and Complex D would be suitable outpost locations but are not significant enough to warrant the deployment of significant combat power given the Red Army commander’s limited resources.
 
So initially, on the basis of the above, I will throw the Doctrinal Overlay onto the map centred on Track Crossroads I just to give me an idea of how everything works in terms of ground and tactics. This will provide the basis for subsequent COA analysis which will take into account my terrain deductions and will involve some amendments to the doctrinal solution to make it best fit the terrain and the analysis of the enemy’s mission and tasks as previously described. The schematic below illustrates this step:
 

 
As you can see from the graphic, some manipulation is now required to turn this into a viable defensive COA on this particular piece of ground. Also on my initial laydown, I have not taken into account the probable scout team reported to be in Village A. So let’s do that now.
 

 
COA 1
 
The graphic above becomes COA 1 which I will call ‘Defend Forward’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO Complex D, Wood E and Entrance H. The main outpost line is linear and lies back from the forward edge of the main wood. In this laydown the eastern most squad can cover Entrance F and any advance along AAs 1 and 2. The centre squad can cover Crossroads I and AA3. The westernmost squad can cover Entrance H and approaches up AAs 4 and 5.
 
Note that there is nothing in Wood C but it is possible that the scout team in Complex D could equally be positioned there or Wood C could be a fall-back position for the scout team in Village A once it decides that remaining in Village A becomes untenable. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Also note that the westernmost scout team could also be located further forward at the western end of Wood E and achieve the same effect of covering Entrance H and AAs 4 and 5. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Each of the platoon scout teams in this COA I would see as being augmented by an LMG squad and an ATR squad to take advantage of their ranged capabilities. The role of these teams being to identify my avenue of approach and to disrupt my attack by engaging HVTs before falling back on to the main outpost line in the woods. The probable scout team in Village A will likely have an observer grouped with it and its role will be to identify my avenue of approach and disrupt my attack through indirect fires before falling back to an alternate position in either Wood C or Complex D.
 
COA 1 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Allows early identification of the German axis.
Allows early attrition of the German attacker.
Makes best use of ranged weapons.
Makes good use of concealment in the main wood.
 
COA 1 Disadvantages
 
Dispersion creates C2 problems.
Extraction of two platoon scout teams will be over open ground
Linear main outpost line lacks depth
Linear outpost line does not provide mutual support.
Defence can be outflanked and taken down from the rear.
 
So that is the first COA, on to COA 2 - illustrated below and derived using the same process:
 
COA 2
 

 
The graphic above becomes COA 2 which I will call ‘Defend Deep’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed  rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO the northern perimeter of the main wood. The main outpost position is constructed as a standard defensive position with two squads forward and one back with the killing area centred on Track Crossroads I. This laydown means that the probable scout team in Village A covers AAs 1 and 2. The easternmost platoon scout team provides very limited coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and good coverage of AA3. The centre platoon scout team provides coverage of AA3. The westernmost platoon scout team provides good coverage of AA4 within the main wood and limited coverage of AA5.
 
As with the previous COA, I would see each of the platoon scout teams having an LMG and ATR team grouped to permit best use of those weapons systems and the scout team in Village A having an observer grouped with it.
 
COA 2 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Excellent use of concealment in the main wood.
Excellent C2.
Good all round defence and mutual support.
Provides best defence of Track Crossroads I.
 
COA 2 Disadvantages
 
Limited observation and fields of fire over avenues of approach.
Limited ability to maximise use of ranged weapons.
Surrenders initiative to the attacker.
Allows easy break in to the main woods by the attacker via entrances F, H, K and L.
Scout team in village A is entirely dislocated from the main force.
 
One really useful product from the IPB process is the Event Overlay which is designed to show activities related to time and space. Doctrinally it would contain timelines or events, I have done this but in a very simplistic form. The purple dotted lines are my timelines (measured in minutes) and are based on dismounted ‘Move’ rates of movement (which in broad terms = 2 minutes per 100m). Of course I could make this more comprehensive by showing movement rates for ‘Quick’ and ‘Hunt’ etc and applying movement rates over different types of ground (woods dismounted ‘Move’ speed per 100m is about 2 minutes and 45 seconds) and also for my vehicles.  Clearly by doing so, you expend more time and sometimes make the product to complicated. By keeping it simple my event overlay is telling me the following already:
 
I can cover the AO in 20 minutes.
The earliest I can assault Village A is H+10 or 0710 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Village A may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest I can assault Wood E is H+12 or 0712 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Wood E may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest time I can start my clearance of the Main Wood is H+16 or 0716 hrs in the scenario.
The earliest time I can finish clearing the Main Wood is H+20 or 0720 hrs in the scenario.
 
These are all useful for planning and particularly any synchronising and phasing required. It also gives me a window (H+10 to H+12) to potentially acquire track and engage moving enemy targets.
 
So that was a very basic look at the timings, now I will focus on the Named Areas of Interest (NAI) part of this product. The NAIs show where you need to look in order to acquire the enemy and determine his likely COA. This product will later be refined but for the time being let’s look at NAIs.
 
NAIs are placed based on the previously derived enemy COAs. In simple terms, wherever an enemy is reported or wherever you assess an enemy grouping to be is the starting point. The process involves drawing a box around those areas and if required, refining those boxes or combining them. This is important to get right because ultimately each of those NAIs should be covered by a reconnaissance asset, and ideally for redundancy two assets. Clearly the more NAIs there are to cover, the more troops you have to allocate to the task.
 
Here is the Event Overlay for this mission
 

 
To complete the process and to add meaning to the above, an Event Matrix is produced and the combination of these two products drive the Collection Plan and ultimately the plan as a whole. In the Event Matrix you are basically defining, where you are looking, when you are looking, what you are looking for and what it all means. I will ignore the ‘when’ part of this for simplicity and because I don’t think it is a war-stopper given that the only moves I anticipate from the enemy will occur in the H+10 – H+12 window.
 
Here is the Event Matrix
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT) are another consideration, doctrinally these are the assets that are critical to the success of the Enemy Commander’s mission. This demonstrates why it is important to thoroughly analyse the likely enemy mission and tasks – if you don’t go through this process you end up targeting everything which is sometimes difficult to do and it is wasteful of time and resources. There are a number of ways of deriving these but I’m going to keep this simple. So if we refer back to assessed mission and tasks, I had them as these:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
From this my HVT list looks like this:
 
Platoon HQ – Destruction of this will affect enemy C2 and morale and reduce his ability to communicate back to higher HQ.
 
Forward Observer IVO Village A – Destruction of this limits the enemy’s ability to call in indirect fire.
Anti-Tank Rifle Squads – These are the only assets that can effectively defeat my light armoured vehicles.
 
I could go further with this but the more I add, the more I have to target which means allocating assets. The above list is the minimum needed to effectively limit the enemy’s ability to achieve his mission.
 
The above, although it is truncated, is about as far as we need to go with Question 1 so next time we will move on to Question 2 – What have I been told to do and why? This in effect is Mission Analysis and there are many ways of cracking this nut and again I will pare this down to what I consider to be essentials for this situation.

With the BAE done it is on to the next step of IPB (remembering that we are still in Question 1 - so a long way to go yet!!!)
 
Step 2 – Threat Evaluation
 
Recall that in this step we look at the enemy in isolation focusing on organisation and tactics.
 
The synopsis of the information about the enemy is as follows:
 
Comprised of an outpost line from a UI Rifle Regiment of approximately platoon strength located IVO the wooded grove and 1 x probable scout team IVO the village. Probably reinforced with ATR and MG teams. No armour expected.
 
Enemy Composition
 
So initially I will look at the likely enemy strength and from the above I assess the enemy ORBAT to be as shown in the graphic:
 

 
As context to these deductions I will discuss MGs, observers and mortars mainly because these were the things I had to think about.
 
I went for 3 x LMG teams as an assessment based on the statement that the enemy would be reinforced by MG teams. In TO&E terms, the natural choice would be HMG teams because they sit within the TO&E but in relation to the assessed enemy outpost mission, the imperative is to be able to extract back to the main defensive position and HMGs are less able to do that than LMGs.
 
Observers are not specifically mentioned but again by thinking about the outpost mission context, it is logical to assume that the outpost will be covered by some form of indirect fire assets and observers provide the best means of calling this support in.
 
I went for mortars in my assessed enemy grouping because these do sit within the TO&E and can be better employed in woods and forests than other forms of artillery.
 
Some quick deductions about strength and composition combined with previous ground and weather analysis are as follows:
 
The enemy cannot defend everywhere and must have a compact defence to maximise combat power and facilitate command and control.
 
The enemy has limited long range firepower and therefore is likely to prefer short range engagements.
 
The enemy’s anti-tank rifles and MGs are his only effective ranged weapons.
 
The enemy is limited to what he can carry and therefore lacks the ammunition to sustain lengthy engagements.
 
The enemy has few radios and can only call in indirect fire through HQ or dedicated observers
 
Enemy Tactics
 
Delving into this a little more because of the insights it provides, a rummage around Red Army tactics of the era tells me this:
 
A rifle platoon on outpost duty will act as a large picquet from an outpost battalion (or outpost company) or as a self-contained permanent large picquet directly from the regiment (or battalion).
 
The duties of a large picquet post are:
 
Not to allow enemy scouts to approach the rest of the forces.
To secure the resting troops (main body) against machine-gun or mortar bombardment, against attacks by enemy tanks, armoured vehicles and motorised infantry.
 
The large picquet post covers a front of 1-1.5 km at a distance of up to 4km from the resting troops.
 
In principle, the large picquet post is reinforced with HMG, mortars, cannons and anti-tank rifles, sappers and chemical defence troops and must be supported by artillery fire from the main positions.
 
Added to this and returning to doctrine we need to generate a doctrinal template. This is a graphic which shows how the enemy would deploy/manoeuvre according to his doctrine.
 
Doctrinally the platoon would have outposts about 100m forward of the main position over a frontage of about 250m. The main position would be about 150m in depth over the same 250m frontage.
 
Set up for defence, the standard two up one back layout is the preferred doctrine although in the case of an outpost there is the possibility that a linear formation could be employed. So here is the doctrinal template:
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT)
 
Doctrinally I should identify HVT at this stage … HVT are those that are important to the enemy commander’s mission. Personally I am not a fan of doing it at this stage, because if you identify them here you are just making work for yourself … we will return to this later.
 
So that is Threat Evaluation squared away ... next step is Threat Integration which predictably will be covered in the next post.
 
 
 
 
 
 

Bill - we are way off the plan at this stage - you won't see a scheme of manoeuvre for a few days yet. This is what I believe is one of the strengths of the Combat Estimate - rather than rush into a scheme of manoeuvre, the process encourages you to resource the plan - once you know the resources and where they are needed, you come up with a scheme of manoeuvre to get them there.

QUESTION 1 – WHAT IS THE ENEMY DOING AND WHY?
 
This is broken into the three steps of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield ( IPB). I am aware that most armies go for four steps (including the one I currently work for) but I was brought up on three and as I am inherently lazy, I’m sticking with three. These steps are:
 
Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) which in simple terms is the ground and weather.
 
Threat Evaluation (TE) where you look at the enemy in isolation according to organisation and doctrine.
 
Threat Integration (TI) where you combine steps 1 and 2 to determine enemy courses of action
 
Step 1 - BAE
 
To do this properly I’ve had to crack open the scenario editor to get some of the mission data, however rest assured I have not had a sneaky peek at the Russian forces or setup. So from a combination of information supplied to me from the map, orders and the data screen in the editor here is what I have come up with.
 
Weather
 
According to the data screen it is 250700Jun44, the ground is damp, temperature is cool with overcast skies. Wind source is from the West with heavy wind.
 
Deductions:
 
Wind direction will blow smoke from my setup zone up the map as I look at it, this could be an advantage when using smoke to masking any approach into the woods from the West but is negated by the wind speed. Overall judgement is that I should not rely on smoke and weapon accuracy over long range could be effected.
 
Ground conditions, when combined with terrain mean that all vehicles should manoeuvre carefully when off road.
 
Temperatures should have no adverse effect on dismounted troops.
 
Despite the overcast skies, visibility will be generally good.
 
Ground
 
The area of operations (AO) is approximately 1km x 1km and is best described as a mix of open and close terrain. The two principal features are the small village (Village A) and the large wooded feature to the South which is the form up objective specified in the mission orders. The remainder of the ground comprises open farmland and small wooded areas with a single road running generally West to SE. Elevation is best described as rolling countryside with low ground to the South rising to higher ground to the East.
 
The map again ...
 

 
The traditional method of looking at ground is under the OCOKA headings (shown below) so here is a brief description
 
O - Observation and Fields of Fire
 
Generally good throughout with the exception of the wooded features where visibility is limited to approximately 30m. In open areas, visibility and fields of fire can extend up to 600m but changes in elevation creating dead ground restrict this to an average of 200m to 300m
 
C - Cover and Concealment
 
The only readily identifiable features that provide true cover are the buildings, the majority of which are located in Village A. There are two additional small building complexes, complex D which lies between Village A and the wooded objective and a small complex at the NE exit of the woods near annotation L. Otherwise, all wooded areas provide good concealment with the best concealed positions located in the depths of the woods.
 
O - Obstacles
 
There are no significant natural obstacles with the exception of some small areas of heavy woods. Overall the natural environment would be rated as unrestricted with areas of restricted terrain around village A and all wooded areas. Although not a significant obstacle, I am aware that the boundary of the woods is delineated by a single strand low wire fence and this may expose my dismounts as they enter the woods.
 
K - Key Terrain
 
In relation to my mission, the entrances to the woods (marked F, G, H, K and L) are potential key terrain but I designate Village A, Wood C and Complex D as my key terrain. Here is why:
 
Village A
 
My intelligence briefing states that the enemy has a probable scout team deployed there. It is therefore important because the enemy has deemed it important and because it overlooks my initial deployment area. It is also important because it covers AA1 and AA2 and can disrupt manoeuvre along AA3. If I choose do so, once I get into Village A, it allows me overwatch and a base of fire into Wood C, Complex D and parts of Wood E.
 
Wood C
 
Although not apparent from the top down view, close analysis shows that Wood C is on high ground and forces on this position cover AAs 1, 2 and 3. In addition they have overwatch on to my start position. Most importantly, this position gives good observation and fields of fire across the northern boundary of the main woods, Complex D and the Eastern extent of Wood E.
 
Complex D
 
Comprises two buildings which offer both cover and concealment. It covers AAs 2 and 3 and to a limited extend, parts of AA1. Most importantly it again provides a potential good base of fire across the North of the main woods as well as Wood E.
 
A - Avenues of Approach
 
Are as marked on the schematic – in essence there are five broad avenues of approach with a number of branches designated AAs 1-5.
 
 
 
Finally just some other things to note about fighting in woods and forests
 
Other tactical points to note regarding ground in woods:
 
Command and control is extremely difficult due to close terrain and limited visibility.
Observation and fields of fire are limited.
Indirect fire is extremely difficult to employ effectively due to limited visibility and command and control issues.
 
We will look at Threat Evaluation next.
 

On with the planning then ...
 
For the planning process, I am going to use a number of planning models or tools that I’ve come across in my career – many of you board regulars will have seen some of these in other similar threads but some may be new to you. I’m not saying that these are the best tools or that this is the only way to skin the cat – it is just the way I have chosen to do it.
 
The framework MDMP (Military Decision Making Process) I am going to use is the UK Combat Estimate, which is also known as the 7 Questions. The main reason I am using this format is because I am very familiar with it (I was involved in the trials) and I find it very intuitive. The basic premise is that if you answer all of the 7 Questions you will have a plan at the end of it.
 
The 7 Questions are:
 
Q1 What is  the enemy doing and why?
Q2 What have I been told to do and why?
Q3 What effects do I want to have on the enemy; and what direction must I give to develop a plan?
Q4 Where can I best accomplish each action or effect?
Q5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action or effect?
Q6 When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
Q7 What control measures do I have to impose?
 
At this point it is probably worth adding a graphic to orientate you:
 

 
The blue lines are a 100m grid overlay.
 
Also required for context are the orders supplied for the mission:
 
Situation
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position.
 
Mission:
 
Secure the woods to your south west.
 
Execution:
 
Your 1st PLT is currently staged on the road leading into the village of Osinnik. 2nd PLT is not far behind and will arrive within the next 5 minutes. Your 2 company mortars are in trucks and will arrive within 10 minutes. Currently our friendly tanks are occupied in more important areas on the line, and the only support battalion has attached is in the form of a Sd.Kfz. 251/17, travelling with your 2nd PLT.
 
The enemy defense is not expected to be fairly strong. Their tanks are many kilometers to the west, and are using their regular rifle infantry to hold the corridor. The forces to your immediate front are an outpost line, delaying our advance to give their main defense on the reverse slope more time to dig in.
 
There should be no more then a platoon of dismounted infantry, though expect several machine guns and anti-tank teams. Friendly observers had been using Osinnik to direct fire, but were driven out by a small Russian patrol last night. Expect no more then a scout team in Osinnik itself, with the majority of their forces in small blocking positions south of the village among the treelines. Utilize your HMGs, halftracks and mortars to suppress the enemy and secure a foothold in the woods to your SE.
 
Your panzergrenadier company consists of:
 
-1x Company HQ
-1x Sd.Kfz. 251/17
 
-2x Panzergrenadier Platoons, each with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---3x Panzergrenadier Squads (90% manning)
---4x Sd.Kfz. 251/1
 
-1x Weapons PLT, with:
---1x Headquarters Team
---2x HMG42 Teams
---1x Mortars HQ Team
---2x 81mm Mortars
---2x Opel Blitz Trucks
 
Notes:
 
Scoring is as follows:
 
500 points for each objective, 500 for inflicting casualties, for a total of 1000 points. Russian side scores the same, weighted heavily towards vehicle kills. Preserve your halftracks, they are easily destroyed!
 
Orders End
 
I have attached these orders as a PDF for you to refer back to as we go through this process.
 
So that is the problem laid out – time to get on with solving it so here we go ….
 
 
Mission Briefing.pdf

You're not wrong there - I started putting this together in April I think!!!!

There seem to be a few tutorials doing the rounds of late … so you’re going to get another one – on planning. So if you’re somebody who wondered how it is done, or are somebody who casts a rudimentary eye over the ground, skims through the orders and then just launches across the line of departure with the view to developing a plan on the hoof and wants to change this – then this is the thread for you.
 
The vehicle for the tutorial is SeinfeldRules Assault Position Mission.  The associated thread is here:
 
http://community.battlefront.com/topic/119212-seinfeldrules-scenario-thread/page-1
 
The mission can be downloaded from here:
 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/d85cs6w3xeeg0oi/AD%20Assault%20Position.zip?dl=0
 
What do you get from this thread – simply put it will delve into the planning process and then roll into an AAR. I am playing this as designed so Axis attacker versus the AI. So without further ado, let’s crack on with it. Also I’d be grateful if people could refrain from posting spoilers on this mission if you’ve played it – I haven’t yet – which is kind of the point of stepping through the planning process first!!!!
 
I will warn you that I am no means an expert on military planning but have been around it enough to know how it works. I will cut corners with it here and there but this isn’t necessarily about military doctrine, it is about giving you guys an understanding of some techniques to help you plan your battles should you have a mind to do so.
 
Clearly questions (that do not contain spoilers) are welcome but many of my answers might be ‘I’ll come to that later’.

Thanks for the comments - there is an argument that too much planning is done these days which creates undue complexity. I think there is a certainly merit in that argument.
 
In the context of this scenario and the amount of planning a German company commander would have done in 1944 the effort expended would be far less than that I am showing here. That is mainly because he didn't have a massive staff to do the planning and he would probably be fairly experienced so would be able to plan intuitively.
 
As stated, the purpose is not to show you German company level command and control procedures, it is to show you a planning methodology for your education and to assist you in planning your missions and maybe apply them to scenario design too. What I certainly wouldn't advocate is planning to this extent every time you fire up the game ... believe me you'd hardly ever play and that is no fun at all!!!
 
Anyway - thanks again for following the thread and hope it is useful and interesting.

It may have seemed a marathon already but there is plenty more to do. We have now done the majority of the ground and enemy stuff so it is time to look at something else ....
 
QUESTION 2 – WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?
 
Mission Analysis Step 1 – Review the situation.
 
Here you look at aspects such as time, how the IPB affects the battlespace and own forces. The time is a given – I have one hour. In reality, planning and rehearsal time would be considered and the amount of time required to get to the Area of Operations (AO) plus the time required to complete the mission. These are not factors in CM because the forces are in place and there is only one person planning and controlling all of the forces so we just need to be aware of the fact that we have an hour to do this. From my IPB event overlay I can see that it will take me about 20 minutes to move from my start point to the far end of the Main Wood objective.
 
Although I could do more with the IPB aspects for friendly forces, you have seen enough to see how it works so there’s not a huge amount of value in revisiting them.
 
So let us focus on own forces and again I want to keep this fairly simple …
 
First up there is an error in the briefing which states that 1 Platoon is on the map, 2 Platoon will arrive in 5 minutes and the mortars will arrive in 10 minutes (I think I'll allow SeinfeldRules the error because his missions are awesome  ). In reality 2 Platoon is on the map, 1 Platoon arrives in 5 minutes and the mortars in 10 minutes. For the purposes of Mission Analysis, this makes no real difference.
 
In basic terms then I command a Panzergrenadier Company Minus comprising:
 
Coy HQ
1 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
2 (Panzergrenadier) Platoon (3 Squads and 4 Half-Tracks)
4 (Support Platoon) (2 x MG and 2 x Mortars)
1 x Sdkfz 251/17 20mm Half Track
 
Graphically shown in the next schematic:
 

 
So in essence I have one command element, two manoeuvre elements and a support element which is capable of protected mounted and dismounted manoeuvre and can bring direct and indirect fires on to the enemy. Force flow is such that I cannot bring all of my combat power to bear until 0710 hrs at the earliest and realistically (taking into account the time required to set up mortars and cue indirect fire) until 0720-0725 hrs.
 
I’ll now delve into some of the soft and hard factors which I have tabulated:
 

 
On top of that (ignoring the trucks) I have 8 x Sdkfz 251/1 half-tracks each armed with an LMG and I have 1 x Sdkfz 251/17 mounting a 20mm cannon and my two mortar teams each have 1 x 81mm mortar.
 
The reason for analysing own forces in detail is to establish things like force ratios and relative combat power as well as identifying those soft factors which could influence allocating units to task later on (eg I may prefer to allocate the more difficult tasks to those units with the most experience, best leadership and best morale while allocating easier tasks to those units that score lower in those factors).
 
So for the soft factors, some relevant factors might be:
 
My most experienced units are 1 Squad/1 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ
My most motivated unit is 2 Squad/2 Platoon
My best led units are Coy HQ, 1 Squad/1 Platoon, 2 Squad/1 Platoon, 1 Squad/2 Platoon, 3 Squad/2 Platoon and 4 Platoon HQ.
 
The hard factors are:
 
2 Platoon is better optimised to take on buildings and vehicles due to the number of panzerschrecks
1 Platoon is better optimised for dismounted combat in the woods due to its larger number of small arms
I have 14 x LMG/HMG among my dismounted elements.
I have only 2 x mortars.
 
I will return to friendly forces later, but for now this is a good enough start because hopefully already you have seen that the hour that I’ve been given for this mission is suddenly looking less generous than it did at face value at the start.
 
Mission Analysis Step 2 – Analyse superior commander’s intent and own mission.
 
This is the core of the Mission Command or Manoeuvrist Approach style and in reality commanders and staffs will really pick this apart. In CM games, there is less value in doing so because what happens two up and one up, which in this mission’s context would be Regiment and Battalion has no effect on the mission. This means that we can skimp this step a bit.
 
But as a reminder – here is what we have been told:
 
Our forces are counterattacking. Having detrained merely days ago, your Regiment has been pushing around the flank of the Soviets, looking for an opportunity to halt the Russian juggernaught. Your panzergrenadier company has been tasked with securing the flank of our regiment's counterattack by taking a town overlooking an important road highway. Located on the reverse slope of a ridgeline, you determine that a wooded grove just NW of the town (and SE of your assembly area) would be the perfect place to form up your company before it's final attack on the main Soviet defenses. The morning of your attack, you begin to move your company to take your assault position. (Remember from my earlier posts that the town mentioned is not on the mission map - this caused a bit of confusion earlier)
 
So what to pick out of all of that, I know about my 2 up level of command (Regiment) but not too much about my 1 up level of command (Battalion). I also at this point bump up against another artificial situation. This is because it states that my overarching mission is to take a small town to protect the regiment’s flank. What this means is that in reality, this scenario is one small part of a plan to take the town and would therefore not have its own dedicated set of orders and detailed plans. However, we can move on from this, it is not a showstopper but I point it out for context. For the purposes of Mission Analysis though I deduce straight away that I have to take a small town later so I am going to need to conserve combat power. I also deduce that as my task is all about flank security, I am unlikely to be on the Regiment’s main effort which means I’m not going to be high on the list for support priorities.
 
The ‘Mission’ part of the briefing quite simply tells me to ‘Secure the woods to your SW’. So what does this mean? Doctrinally ‘Secure’ is defined as:
 
to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
 
As a reminder – this is where the Secure objective has been designated:
 

 
At this point I’m going to wordsmith the components of the briefing to come up with a mission statement so that we can move on:
 
1 Kompanie is to secure Main Wood NLT 250800Jun44 in order to provide a line of departure for the attack on the town.
 
Mission statements should state who is to do what, where at what time and then have a unifying purpose. The unifying purpose is the ‘in order to’ part of the statement. This is key to the manoeuvrist approach because it allows subordinates to understand the overall intent and put things into context. My in order to statement is not the best to be honest but it serves the purpose.
 
So that is all pretty simple then … next time we will finish off Mission Analysis by completing steps 3, 4 and 5 of that part of the process.
 
 
 
 
 

Wow, this is great, seeing one of my scenarios used in such a fashion - makes all the work worth it! Hopefully the scenario execution won't let you down. For everyone reading, this stuff really does happen, in this level of detail too, especially at the battalion level. And as an artilleryman and fire supporter, I get to see this level of planning from the maneuver guys every time I go to the field  - and every time I'm thankful my job is the easy part of all this - blowing stuff up! 

Having promised Threat Integration - here it is:
 
Step 3 – Threat Integration
 
Recall that in this step we combine our analysis from Step 1 (BAE) and Step 2 (TE) to come up with a likely enemy course of action. Also don't forget we are still in Question 1.
 
Likely Enemy Mission
 
This is pretty much stated in various bits of the briefing:
 
The enemy is an outpost line
The enemy is to deny the woods
The enemy is to inflict casualties (especially half-tracks)
 
So a likely mission statement would be:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
This is all very well but it is now time to return to the ground to work out what is feasible given the resources available to the enemy and his preferred tactics.
 
So some context about the ground and effects specific to the defender because my previous analysis, particularly that relating to Key Terrain, was focused on my mission.
 
Key terrain for the enemy I assess as follows:
 
Village A
 
Mainly for the same reasons I designated it a key terrain for myself – but most importantly because the enemy is reported to be there.
 
Entrances F, G and H
 
Designated because these are the most likely points of entry onto the wooded objective for any attacking force.
 
Track Crossroads I
 
This crossroads blocks avenues of approach from entrances F, G and H.
 
It is also worthy of note that Woods C and E and Complex D would be suitable outpost locations but are not significant enough to warrant the deployment of significant combat power given the Red Army commander’s limited resources.
 
So initially, on the basis of the above, I will throw the Doctrinal Overlay onto the map centred on Track Crossroads I just to give me an idea of how everything works in terms of ground and tactics. This will provide the basis for subsequent COA analysis which will take into account my terrain deductions and will involve some amendments to the doctrinal solution to make it best fit the terrain and the analysis of the enemy’s mission and tasks as previously described. The schematic below illustrates this step:
 

 
As you can see from the graphic, some manipulation is now required to turn this into a viable defensive COA on this particular piece of ground. Also on my initial laydown, I have not taken into account the probable scout team reported to be in Village A. So let’s do that now.
 

 
COA 1
 
The graphic above becomes COA 1 which I will call ‘Defend Forward’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO Complex D, Wood E and Entrance H. The main outpost line is linear and lies back from the forward edge of the main wood. In this laydown the eastern most squad can cover Entrance F and any advance along AAs 1 and 2. The centre squad can cover Crossroads I and AA3. The westernmost squad can cover Entrance H and approaches up AAs 4 and 5.
 
Note that there is nothing in Wood C but it is possible that the scout team in Complex D could equally be positioned there or Wood C could be a fall-back position for the scout team in Village A once it decides that remaining in Village A becomes untenable. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Also note that the westernmost scout team could also be located further forward at the western end of Wood E and achieve the same effect of covering Entrance H and AAs 4 and 5. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Each of the platoon scout teams in this COA I would see as being augmented by an LMG squad and an ATR squad to take advantage of their ranged capabilities. The role of these teams being to identify my avenue of approach and to disrupt my attack by engaging HVTs before falling back on to the main outpost line in the woods. The probable scout team in Village A will likely have an observer grouped with it and its role will be to identify my avenue of approach and disrupt my attack through indirect fires before falling back to an alternate position in either Wood C or Complex D.
 
COA 1 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Allows early identification of the German axis.
Allows early attrition of the German attacker.
Makes best use of ranged weapons.
Makes good use of concealment in the main wood.
 
COA 1 Disadvantages
 
Dispersion creates C2 problems.
Extraction of two platoon scout teams will be over open ground
Linear main outpost line lacks depth
Linear outpost line does not provide mutual support.
Defence can be outflanked and taken down from the rear.
 
So that is the first COA, on to COA 2 - illustrated below and derived using the same process:
 
COA 2
 

 
The graphic above becomes COA 2 which I will call ‘Defend Deep’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed  rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO the northern perimeter of the main wood. The main outpost position is constructed as a standard defensive position with two squads forward and one back with the killing area centred on Track Crossroads I. This laydown means that the probable scout team in Village A covers AAs 1 and 2. The easternmost platoon scout team provides very limited coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and good coverage of AA3. The centre platoon scout team provides coverage of AA3. The westernmost platoon scout team provides good coverage of AA4 within the main wood and limited coverage of AA5.
 
As with the previous COA, I would see each of the platoon scout teams having an LMG and ATR team grouped to permit best use of those weapons systems and the scout team in Village A having an observer grouped with it.
 
COA 2 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Excellent use of concealment in the main wood.
Excellent C2.
Good all round defence and mutual support.
Provides best defence of Track Crossroads I.
 
COA 2 Disadvantages
 
Limited observation and fields of fire over avenues of approach.
Limited ability to maximise use of ranged weapons.
Surrenders initiative to the attacker.
Allows easy break in to the main woods by the attacker via entrances F, H, K and L.
Scout team in village A is entirely dislocated from the main force.
 
One really useful product from the IPB process is the Event Overlay which is designed to show activities related to time and space. Doctrinally it would contain timelines or events, I have done this but in a very simplistic form. The purple dotted lines are my timelines (measured in minutes) and are based on dismounted ‘Move’ rates of movement (which in broad terms = 2 minutes per 100m). Of course I could make this more comprehensive by showing movement rates for ‘Quick’ and ‘Hunt’ etc and applying movement rates over different types of ground (woods dismounted ‘Move’ speed per 100m is about 2 minutes and 45 seconds) and also for my vehicles.  Clearly by doing so, you expend more time and sometimes make the product to complicated. By keeping it simple my event overlay is telling me the following already:
 
I can cover the AO in 20 minutes.
The earliest I can assault Village A is H+10 or 0710 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Village A may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest I can assault Wood E is H+12 or 0712 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Wood E may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest time I can start my clearance of the Main Wood is H+16 or 0716 hrs in the scenario.
The earliest time I can finish clearing the Main Wood is H+20 or 0720 hrs in the scenario.
 
These are all useful for planning and particularly any synchronising and phasing required. It also gives me a window (H+10 to H+12) to potentially acquire track and engage moving enemy targets.
 
So that was a very basic look at the timings, now I will focus on the Named Areas of Interest (NAI) part of this product. The NAIs show where you need to look in order to acquire the enemy and determine his likely COA. This product will later be refined but for the time being let’s look at NAIs.
 
NAIs are placed based on the previously derived enemy COAs. In simple terms, wherever an enemy is reported or wherever you assess an enemy grouping to be is the starting point. The process involves drawing a box around those areas and if required, refining those boxes or combining them. This is important to get right because ultimately each of those NAIs should be covered by a reconnaissance asset, and ideally for redundancy two assets. Clearly the more NAIs there are to cover, the more troops you have to allocate to the task.
 
Here is the Event Overlay for this mission
 

 
To complete the process and to add meaning to the above, an Event Matrix is produced and the combination of these two products drive the Collection Plan and ultimately the plan as a whole. In the Event Matrix you are basically defining, where you are looking, when you are looking, what you are looking for and what it all means. I will ignore the ‘when’ part of this for simplicity and because I don’t think it is a war-stopper given that the only moves I anticipate from the enemy will occur in the H+10 – H+12 window.
 
Here is the Event Matrix
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT) are another consideration, doctrinally these are the assets that are critical to the success of the Enemy Commander’s mission. This demonstrates why it is important to thoroughly analyse the likely enemy mission and tasks – if you don’t go through this process you end up targeting everything which is sometimes difficult to do and it is wasteful of time and resources. There are a number of ways of deriving these but I’m going to keep this simple. So if we refer back to assessed mission and tasks, I had them as these:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
From this my HVT list looks like this:
 
Platoon HQ – Destruction of this will affect enemy C2 and morale and reduce his ability to communicate back to higher HQ.
 
Forward Observer IVO Village A – Destruction of this limits the enemy’s ability to call in indirect fire.
Anti-Tank Rifle Squads – These are the only assets that can effectively defeat my light armoured vehicles.
 
I could go further with this but the more I add, the more I have to target which means allocating assets. The above list is the minimum needed to effectively limit the enemy’s ability to achieve his mission.
 
The above, although it is truncated, is about as far as we need to go with Question 1 so next time we will move on to Question 2 – What have I been told to do and why? This in effect is Mission Analysis and there are many ways of cracking this nut and again I will pare this down to what I consider to be essentials for this situation.

Having promised Threat Integration - here it is:
 
Step 3 – Threat Integration
 
Recall that in this step we combine our analysis from Step 1 (BAE) and Step 2 (TE) to come up with a likely enemy course of action. Also don't forget we are still in Question 1.
 
Likely Enemy Mission
 
This is pretty much stated in various bits of the briefing:
 
The enemy is an outpost line
The enemy is to deny the woods
The enemy is to inflict casualties (especially half-tracks)
 
So a likely mission statement would be:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
This is all very well but it is now time to return to the ground to work out what is feasible given the resources available to the enemy and his preferred tactics.
 
So some context about the ground and effects specific to the defender because my previous analysis, particularly that relating to Key Terrain, was focused on my mission.
 
Key terrain for the enemy I assess as follows:
 
Village A
 
Mainly for the same reasons I designated it a key terrain for myself – but most importantly because the enemy is reported to be there.
 
Entrances F, G and H
 
Designated because these are the most likely points of entry onto the wooded objective for any attacking force.
 
Track Crossroads I
 
This crossroads blocks avenues of approach from entrances F, G and H.
 
It is also worthy of note that Woods C and E and Complex D would be suitable outpost locations but are not significant enough to warrant the deployment of significant combat power given the Red Army commander’s limited resources.
 
So initially, on the basis of the above, I will throw the Doctrinal Overlay onto the map centred on Track Crossroads I just to give me an idea of how everything works in terms of ground and tactics. This will provide the basis for subsequent COA analysis which will take into account my terrain deductions and will involve some amendments to the doctrinal solution to make it best fit the terrain and the analysis of the enemy’s mission and tasks as previously described. The schematic below illustrates this step:
 

 
As you can see from the graphic, some manipulation is now required to turn this into a viable defensive COA on this particular piece of ground. Also on my initial laydown, I have not taken into account the probable scout team reported to be in Village A. So let’s do that now.
 

 
COA 1
 
The graphic above becomes COA 1 which I will call ‘Defend Forward’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO Complex D, Wood E and Entrance H. The main outpost line is linear and lies back from the forward edge of the main wood. In this laydown the eastern most squad can cover Entrance F and any advance along AAs 1 and 2. The centre squad can cover Crossroads I and AA3. The westernmost squad can cover Entrance H and approaches up AAs 4 and 5.
 
Note that there is nothing in Wood C but it is possible that the scout team in Complex D could equally be positioned there or Wood C could be a fall-back position for the scout team in Village A once it decides that remaining in Village A becomes untenable. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Also note that the westernmost scout team could also be located further forward at the western end of Wood E and achieve the same effect of covering Entrance H and AAs 4 and 5. This is marked in the diagram by a dashed circle.
 
Each of the platoon scout teams in this COA I would see as being augmented by an LMG squad and an ATR squad to take advantage of their ranged capabilities. The role of these teams being to identify my avenue of approach and to disrupt my attack by engaging HVTs before falling back on to the main outpost line in the woods. The probable scout team in Village A will likely have an observer grouped with it and its role will be to identify my avenue of approach and disrupt my attack through indirect fires before falling back to an alternate position in either Wood C or Complex D.
 
COA 1 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Allows early identification of the German axis.
Allows early attrition of the German attacker.
Makes best use of ranged weapons.
Makes good use of concealment in the main wood.
 
COA 1 Disadvantages
 
Dispersion creates C2 problems.
Extraction of two platoon scout teams will be over open ground
Linear main outpost line lacks depth
Linear outpost line does not provide mutual support.
Defence can be outflanked and taken down from the rear.
 
So that is the first COA, on to COA 2 - illustrated below and derived using the same process:
 
COA 2
 

 
The graphic above becomes COA 2 which I will call ‘Defend Deep’. In this COA we have the reported probable scout team in Village A which provides coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and then all three assessed  rifle squads have pushed forward scout teams IVO the northern perimeter of the main wood. The main outpost position is constructed as a standard defensive position with two squads forward and one back with the killing area centred on Track Crossroads I. This laydown means that the probable scout team in Village A covers AAs 1 and 2. The easternmost platoon scout team provides very limited coverage of AAs 1 and 2 and good coverage of AA3. The centre platoon scout team provides coverage of AA3. The westernmost platoon scout team provides good coverage of AA4 within the main wood and limited coverage of AA5.
 
As with the previous COA, I would see each of the platoon scout teams having an LMG and ATR team grouped to permit best use of those weapons systems and the scout team in Village A having an observer grouped with it.
 
COA 2 Advantages
 
Conforms to doctrine.
Excellent use of concealment in the main wood.
Excellent C2.
Good all round defence and mutual support.
Provides best defence of Track Crossroads I.
 
COA 2 Disadvantages
 
Limited observation and fields of fire over avenues of approach.
Limited ability to maximise use of ranged weapons.
Surrenders initiative to the attacker.
Allows easy break in to the main woods by the attacker via entrances F, H, K and L.
Scout team in village A is entirely dislocated from the main force.
 
One really useful product from the IPB process is the Event Overlay which is designed to show activities related to time and space. Doctrinally it would contain timelines or events, I have done this but in a very simplistic form. The purple dotted lines are my timelines (measured in minutes) and are based on dismounted ‘Move’ rates of movement (which in broad terms = 2 minutes per 100m). Of course I could make this more comprehensive by showing movement rates for ‘Quick’ and ‘Hunt’ etc and applying movement rates over different types of ground (woods dismounted ‘Move’ speed per 100m is about 2 minutes and 45 seconds) and also for my vehicles.  Clearly by doing so, you expend more time and sometimes make the product to complicated. By keeping it simple my event overlay is telling me the following already:
 
I can cover the AO in 20 minutes.
The earliest I can assault Village A is H+10 or 0710 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Village A may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest I can assault Wood E is H+12 or 0712 hrs in the scenario.
Related to that, enemy in Wood E may attempt to extract at the same time.
The earliest time I can start my clearance of the Main Wood is H+16 or 0716 hrs in the scenario.
The earliest time I can finish clearing the Main Wood is H+20 or 0720 hrs in the scenario.
 
These are all useful for planning and particularly any synchronising and phasing required. It also gives me a window (H+10 to H+12) to potentially acquire track and engage moving enemy targets.
 
So that was a very basic look at the timings, now I will focus on the Named Areas of Interest (NAI) part of this product. The NAIs show where you need to look in order to acquire the enemy and determine his likely COA. This product will later be refined but for the time being let’s look at NAIs.
 
NAIs are placed based on the previously derived enemy COAs. In simple terms, wherever an enemy is reported or wherever you assess an enemy grouping to be is the starting point. The process involves drawing a box around those areas and if required, refining those boxes or combining them. This is important to get right because ultimately each of those NAIs should be covered by a reconnaissance asset, and ideally for redundancy two assets. Clearly the more NAIs there are to cover, the more troops you have to allocate to the task.
 
Here is the Event Overlay for this mission
 

 
To complete the process and to add meaning to the above, an Event Matrix is produced and the combination of these two products drive the Collection Plan and ultimately the plan as a whole. In the Event Matrix you are basically defining, where you are looking, when you are looking, what you are looking for and what it all means. I will ignore the ‘when’ part of this for simplicity and because I don’t think it is a war-stopper given that the only moves I anticipate from the enemy will occur in the H+10 – H+12 window.
 
Here is the Event Matrix
 

 
High Value Targets (HVT) are another consideration, doctrinally these are the assets that are critical to the success of the Enemy Commander’s mission. This demonstrates why it is important to thoroughly analyse the likely enemy mission and tasks – if you don’t go through this process you end up targeting everything which is sometimes difficult to do and it is wasteful of time and resources. There are a number of ways of deriving these but I’m going to keep this simple. So if we refer back to assessed mission and tasks, I had them as these:
 
X Platoon Group is to deny the woods IVO OSINNIK Village until 250800Jun44 in order to allow the regimental main body to prepare its main line of defence.
 
Likely associated tasks would be:
 
Identify and track German attacking forces
Delay German attacks through direct and indirect fires.
Engage high value targets (HVTs)
Preserve own combat power and break clean to the main defensive position
 
From this my HVT list looks like this:
 
Platoon HQ – Destruction of this will affect enemy C2 and morale and reduce his ability to communicate back to higher HQ.
 
Forward Observer IVO Village A – Destruction of this limits the enemy’s ability to call in indirect fire.
Anti-Tank Rifle Squads – These are the only assets that can effectively defeat my light armoured vehicles.
 
I could go further with this but the more I add, the more I have to target which means allocating assets. The above list is the minimum needed to effectively limit the enemy’s ability to achieve his mission.
 
The above, although it is truncated, is about as far as we need to go with Question 1 so next time we will move on to Question 2 – What have I been told to do and why? This in effect is Mission Analysis and there are many ways of cracking this nut and again I will pare this down to what I consider to be essentials for this situation.