Combatintman

The number of BMP-1s is interesting but what most interested me was the BMP-1KSh ... that's an HQ of some description gone ...

You'll have to show me the report about the RuAF attacks then. I admit I was away for a week and wasn't tracking it closely in my absence but nothing stood out in terms of reporting that suggested the bridges had been subsequently dropped when I spent about four hours doing catch up reading on this thread.

@Rinaldi - good AAR both entertaining and instructive ... plus pictures - doesn't get any better than that.

Not all of the bridges have been dropped - these were reported as still up about a fortnight ago at the time when a stack of other bridges were reported as being dropped: Intact Bridges.kmz

The question is better posted here ... CM2 General Tech Support - Battlefront.com Community However in simple terms and from long-distant memory, you should be able to see your purchases if you log into your customer account which is different to your forum account and then download as necessary. Once downloaded you need to activate the battle pack using the installer. Once activated you should be GTG. If you have any dramas raise a help desk ticket and @BFCElviswill sort you out.

This would be better ... with the inscription on the 'munition' on the outboard pylon image foreground - 'work out how to use it.'

It is an interesting discussion piece for sure. I recall my Introduction to Maritime Warfare Course at HMS Dryad in 2002ish where the training audience (predictably) was mostly naval types and the exercise scenario involved resolving some unpleasantness in Libya. Off the top of my head there were three Task Groups (TGs) - the amphib force, the carrier group (UK version so Invincible class rather than a proper one) and a logistics TG. The discussion over the verbiage of the set of orders to be issued to the logisticians took something like 30 minutes to resolve. In essence the intent was for both of the fighty TGs (amphib and carrier) to be resupplied to allow them maximum 'poise' (an in vogue phrase then) off the coast of Libya to execute the shaping and amphib operation outside the most likely enemy engagement envelopes. My suggestion that rather than discuss it at length to come up with some arcane phraseology and to avoid any chance of misinterpretation by the TGs it would be easier to make 'conduct a RAS (replenishment at sea)' a specified task in a designated ops box was dismissively responded by the statement that I was limiting the freedom of action of the TGs. Such are the joys of open discussion from a group of cleverish (not me obviously) people brought up in a system that encourages debate which certainly can be the enemy of tempo during a planning process. It was a thoroughly amusing course after that as I decided that I should act as the scribe during planning from that moment on ... until we did course of action (COA) selection where I had a robust discussion with a naval OF4 that by the group's own deductions and scoring, the COA he decided on was not the most favourable. An argument I didn't win inevitably in that forum but clearly I did if the scoring was robust (which it was) - anyway - I digress. The point; therefore, is that there is certainly merit in a more command directed and automated approach to planning in order to increase tempo but, it relies on a commander that knows what they're doing, good situational awareness and competent subordinates to execute the orders. From what we're seeing all three are absent. Additionally, the glacial pace of Russian advances shows that the approach taken is not working if the intent is tempo. My sense is that it is not happening at all - pretty much every tactical operation that we've been analysing and picking apart since about day two of this 'special military operation' has uncovered issues in both planning and execution. If the goal is to compress/beat an eight hour planning cycle and arrive at a six-hour cycle - why are we seeing so many bite and hold advances with three to four day gaps between the next iteration of bite and hold? At that rate, perhaps sitting down and taking more time, because it clearly is available, to plan in detail might pay a dividend or two.

Personally I think this is an overly platform-focused viewpoint. How many 203s are out there - or more importantly where they need to be to have the desired effect? Are the ISR assets able to find the targets that need to be engaged to achieve the desired effect? What is the shooter to sensor link like? What effect do you want your gunnery to have? How is that effect coordinated with manoeuvre and other elements? etc ...

Not necessarily regarding indirect fire assets - it all depends on the mission and task. Granted FIND is one of the core functions in combat and anything that that you can do to degrade the enemy's ability to execute that function always helps but indirect fire/gunnery/boom boom boom/whoosh-bang is not necessarily the be all and end all. I recall an exercise where I was the enemy commander and was able to slam a company-sized flanking attack unnoticed into the forward left battalion of a brigade because: There weren't enough ISR assets to provide redundancy on the cover all of the identified avenues of approach from the flank. The gunners controlling the UAVs were jerking around trying to locate a 120mm mortar battery that I kept displacing every time it fired. Granted that this was a simulation and I knew where all the moving parts were but I wanted to, and did, make the point that ISR needs to be focused and the people that are controlling key assets like UAVs need to be supporting the ISR plan ... which they weren't. BTW I did not take advantage of my god's eye view to use an avenue of approach that had not been identified during IPB or deliberately dodge the assets that should have been covering the NAI's in the Decision Support Matrix.

Ah yes that old chestnut which the Americans in particular were, quite rightly, thoroughly bored to death of. For some reason the British Army decided it was the master of counter-insurgency in the early 2000s because of the master tactic of wearing berets/soft hats in Northern Ireland. Funny old thing was that in my two tours there (1989-1990 and 1992-1995), every time I left a patrol base I was required to wear a helmet. There is a lot more to it clearly, the security force footprint in Northern Ireland was massive compared to the deployments in Basra and Helmand. Off the top of my head there were at least eight regular battalions, about six or seven Ulster Defence Regiment Battalions, and god knows how many RUC of various hues at any one time. Then of course the opposition was smaller than anything faced in either Basra or Helmand, was less liberally armed and not prone to employing suicide bombers. Add to that the environment in Northern Ireland was familiar and well-known with handy things like accurate census records, vehicle licensing offices, property/land ownership records, telephone books and no massive linguistic, religious or cultural differences on the scale of those seen in Basra and Helmand. Then there is the border - while there was certainly quite rightly a lot of sympathy in the Republic of Ireland for the nationalist cause, the Gards (Gardai - RoI Police Force) and Irish Defence Force were helpful in their dealings with us and the Republic of Ireland was a benign neighbour compared to Pakistan or Iran in the Afghan and Basra contexts. The border was; therefore, relatively secure, particularly when compared to Afghanistan and Iraq. I remember running pre-deployment training for both theatres and the number of people who looked at me blankly when I talked about 'Charlie 1s' (a form that was filled out by patrols in NI every time a vehicle stop was made with details such as make colour model VRN driver details, location of the stop etc). Masters of COIN indeed - although coming second in Basra and Helmand was personally disappointing for me, I hope that the particular COIN competence trope has been thoroughly killed off in grown up circles in the British military and that lessons have been learned.

I won't delve into the tank part of the question but the other two are pretty easy. One of the main bits of kit in the flamethrower platoon is the RPO-A RPO-A Shmel - Wikipedia As to its composition - not sure, in regular ground forces these elements sometimes get bundled under the title of 'assault engineers' or similar and at higher echelons are where you find the TOS rocket launcher. TOS-1 - Wikipedia Traditionally in the orbat, this equipment/capability sat under the chemical protection element at each level for reasons which always escaped me. The ZU-23/2 on top of the BMD discussion has been thrown around a few times with some claiming that it had left service but it has definitely been seen in Ukraine. I can't recall the origins of the idea of nailing a ZU-23/2 on top of a BMD - it could possibly have been back in Afghanistan to add high angle firepower to zap Mujahids on mountains. However, it makes sense to have an air defence capable weapon system which is mechanised if the rest of your force is mechanised. They probably are part of an air defence element bundled with a few MANPADS at the BTG level - nothing too sinister or worthy of overthinking here.

Or something resembling this ... old school ... New fangled school, albeit this diagram talks about support to a counterattack ... Narrative regarding the 'new' way of river xing ... A hasty attack across a water obstacle from the march is conducted to maintain the high tempo of the advance, seize bridgeheads, rapidly develop the opposite shore or secure an assembly area for an upcoming operation. Water crossings differ by season and weather. In the winter, crossing depends on the strength and stability of the ice. In the spring, there is drifting ice and flooding. In the summer and fall, TO&E and attached crossing equipment can be used. If the water obstacle is less than 5 meters deep, and the river banks are bottom are suitable, tanks can snorkel across. Crossing on a wide front at a quick tempo using a forward detachment or advanced guard is preferred. The crossing plan designates the crossing sector, the departure area, the attack crossing line (1-2 kilometers from the water's edge), the troop embarkation or cargo loading area (5-6 kilometers from the water's edge) and the tank sealing area for snorkeling (also 5-6 kilometers from the water's edge). Air defense assets will cover the crossing and preparation areas. If possible, an air assault may conduct a landing to seize the far shore. A deliberate attack will normally involve far more artillery and aviation preparation and may involve an attack from the march through friendly forces in contact with the enemy. Smoke, air defense and counterbattery efforts will be particularly crucial. Source: FMSO The Russian Way of War. Although particularly crucial in the last sentence appears somewhat tautological perhaps it was necessary - in this instance it seems that all three were absent. Perhaps Russian progress in tactical acumen versus the first week of the 'special operation' is that at least they remembered to rock up for a gap crossing operation with bridging kit .... crawl, walk run etc

Not if they don't have the assets - a fair few bits of PMP bridging (a divisional and above asset) are already gone in three attempts to cross, according to Google Earth mensuration, a 60m gap which therefore = 180m worth of PMP. An old school Soviet Division had enough PMP to cross a 191m gap at Class 20 rating (so forget about getting your tanks across). Time to rustle up another divisional set of bridging.

As @The_Captpointed out - a half-decent crossing involves securing a sufficiently large area of the hostile bank before getting everything out of the toy box. With UAVs in play and (quick a Google search using the hated term drone ranges) a medium commercial UAV has a range of about 3-5km. That; therefore, ought to be your basic start point planning figure for your bridgehead. In the case of the ... ahem ... partially successful attempt that has cropped up, that would look like this.

Back to the bridging ... there was talk of current and drift so I figured it was worth finding this out ...

That a probable platoon-sized group of Russians still haven't grasped tactical dispersion is the first deduction

Exactly - the point I wanted to highlight, given my particular trade, is the use of IPB. It is an effective tool, particularly when you can draw on the expertise of SMEs - in this case a combat engineer who knows the detail on the river and bank conditions. From there, as an analyst, once you narrow down the likely crossing sites you can start refining your NAIs and TAIs. He also discusses the likely enemy assets needed to cross that gap and that allows you to work out the echelon you're facing and where that equipment might come from and how it will get to where it needs to be. This allows you to add more NAIs to locate them and TAIs to strike them. By knowing the equipment that is likely to be used you can then give clearer direction to your ISR assets - in this instance look for boats. If deemed a High Payoff Target (HPT) then you are looking to strike that/those asset(s). There was also some good detail about timings as well as time estimates. A lot of people outside the intelligence trade seem to think that good tactical intelligence is enabled by super secret technical whizzbangery. In fact it isn't - it is essentially a speed-time-distance problem that you are solving based on a knowledge of the enemy's orbat/likely orbat and the area of operations. This is almost a classic case study of how to do this and how, if done competently (as in this case), tactical intelligence provides the decision support to get inside the enemy's OODA loop and to defeat him.

Assuming that the tank and infantry battalion were part of the same regiment/brigade they would be on that regiment/brigade's command net which is not modelled in CM. In UK practice the Bde HQ would be Callsign 0 on that net, the tank battalion would be Callsign 10, the infantry battalion 20, another infantry battalion would be Callsign 30. Information is therefore shared up/down and laterally across that net. Each battalion would have their own net on a different frequency with the battalion HQ as Callsign 0, with A Coy/Sqn as Callsign 10, B Sqn/Coy as Callsign 20, C Company/Squadron as Callsign 30 etc. Similarly, each company/squadron has its own net and frequency with the HQ as Callsign 0, 1 Platoon/Troop as Callsign 10, 2 Platoon/Troop as Callsign 20 and 3 Platoon/Troop as Callsign 30. Each of the HQs therefore can monitor and speak on their own net and that of the echelon above - eg B Company monitors and speaks on its own net and can monitor and speak on the net or the battalion that it is a part but cannot monitor or speak on the brigade net or the net of any other battalion in that brigade. Lateral communications at battalion and above level can also be facilitated by LOs (Liaison Officers) from flanking units who come with their own vehicle, a copy of their own battalion's plan/staffwork and are of course their own communications. The LOs will be callsigns in their own right on their own battalion's net and the LO vehicle would basically attach itself to the HQ packet of the unit that they are there to liaise with so that they can directly brief that HQ about what is going on in their parent battalion's AO and in turn brief their own battalion HQ via the radio net about what is going on in the AO of the unit they are liaising with. Although not explicitly modelled in CM as LOs and other bits and pieces of HQs are quite often the bits that get stripped from the RL TO@E when converted into the in-game TO@E you could achieve the same effect by buying a radio equipped team which sits under (in this case) the infantry battalion HQ and by buying a radio equipped team which sits under the tank battalion HQ and then moving them around the map as part of the other battalion's HQ. The principle is the same across most NATO or NATO-aligned armies I've come into contact with.

Funnily enough what we professionals call drones did exactly that (minus being able to kill stuff) - I used to have to tell where such drones were needed and what needed to be looked at with the target being along the line of an upside down 'U' (in this case a slightly curved 'U'). The route out was on one side and the route back along the other side of said 'U'. Wikipedia I know but I also know that this is reflective of my experience ... Being a drone meant that it flew a programmed course and was not under any form of external control. In the CL-89 the programmed flight path was constrained by the very limited number of 'events' that could be programmed. These events including turns, changes in altitude, sensor activations/de-activations and landing. The programmed flightpath had to be corrected for meteorological conditions. Data for this was provided by a standard artillery Target Acquisition meteor message. My bold ... and why professionals of a certain era do not call things that can be controlled in flight by someone on terra firma without the presence of people sat in the air frame, drones. Wikipedia article in full ... Canadair CL-89 - Wikipedia This system left British Army service in 1991 - apparently the trucks were driven off the pier at the end of GW1. If you search hard enough there is some BBC footage of one being launched during that conflict ... apparently, according to my gunner friends from 40 Field Regiment Royal Artillery with whom I had a close acquaintance during said war who'd heard the yarn, Kate Adie was most disappointed that she had not stumbled across a British truck-mounted cruise missile launcher ... Kate Adie - Wikipedia

It also depends on how you define quick. Afghanistan wasn't a bad example of a series of 'slow' simultaneous operations leading to a fairly quick collapse; however, I don't want to stretch the comparison overly far because although, it wasn't readily apparent in May 2021, a whole lot of shaping in terms of doing deals with various tribes, elders and minor warlords had clearly taken place and this must have taken time to put in place. Nevertheless, JonS's concept seems pretty sound and, as Afghanistan proved, once you hit a tipping point and have some exploitation forces with the freedom of action/manoeuvre to exploit, the tempo then increases.

I differ on some of the nuances regarding the UK structure but you're pretty close to the mark. For instance the jury seems to be out on whether the armoured squadron had that many tanks. If aligned with RAC structures between 1977 and 1981 then it should have that many but post that date the squadron should be 15-strong. The stuff I've looked at sees a couple of sources saying that the armoured squadron just kept the extra ones after the TO&E change which in the case of Berlin is vaguely plausible mainly because the infantry battalions there had unique 'TO&Es that are poorly documented so outliers shouldn't be ruled out. I also wouldn't place too much value in the RMP units in the city.

His Majesty's Ship Dreadnought was launched in 1906 and commissioned into the Royal Navy later that year.

More boom, boom, boom from Ukrainian gunners. Target is Russian troops in Sulyhivka. The image below is Google Earth roughly oriented to the starting angle of camera: Footage: Google Earth placemark: Sulyhivka.kmz General Orientation Overview: Strapped for time so not much analysis I'm afraid - at least one tank and between at least half a dozen and dozen AFVs, some of which being MTLB variants.

It is a matter of taste, perception and implementation. The Hull Down command in CMx1 was apparently quite good, I don't remember the intricasies myself but it seemed to work pretty much as designed; however, CMx2 is a lot more detailed in its modelling which makes things like hunt and hull down more tricky to implement in a way that satisfied players. Some very experienced and highly skilled players such as @Bil Hardenberger eschew the Hull Down command in favour of using a series of other commands to get their unit/vehicle to a point that they have identified is Hull Down in relation to the direction the unit/vehicle will face or hull down in relation to where the enemy might be pointing a day ruining weapon system. I am not a good player and rarely play the game other than testing scenarios so my comments in relation to whether Hunt-Slow-Pause combinations work better than Hull Down should be taken in that context. My preference is to use a combination system rather than Hull Down but. I have seen Hull Down do the job on many occasions. The sum of the parts is that it is not a case of coming up with a 'Don't Get Shot' (or whatever it is going to be called) command to replace Hull Down it is more one of deciding how much you are bothered by your troops getting zapped and working out whether Hull Down or another sequence of the available commands is the best solution to assuage your concerns.

In simple terms ... decidedly average. Now that is a sweeping statement because the army is a broad church in which some jobs require more current knowledge than others but, if the professionals are gash then it is a fair assumption that the reservists will be totally gash.