Lethaface

What would a 'large operational defeat with bad strategic implications' look like in your opinion? Besides not necessarily HIMARS but I do think that the disappearance of 'HQ' and 'ammo' is not doing morale among soldiers a favor. Especially if combined with Ukraine rolling up important parts of the front/rear.

Lol I never said you 'assigned WTII' to your PBEM++ files. You just said you used it, I asked Ianl if he thought it could mix things up. He said no. That's it. Anything else is in people's imagination. I happened to have my PBEM++ on a separate install from my CMH install (I have never used WTII) and without knowing what's causing the issue that seems to be a 'safe' setup.

The 'only' thing UKR needs to do is convince the average soldier that 'further resistance is futile'. While some/a bunch local tactical victories are indeed probably not enough, another wave of the Russian rear HQs/ammo dumps blowing up followed by another large strategic setback is a different casus. Everyone has his limits. A massive multi axis assault is not necessarily a requirement for braking the will of average RA soldier. Anyway time will tell and there's no guarantees.

Because it's in their genetics ;-). Although perhaps @The_Capt had a Freudian typo (?) and meant generic? Anyway I think genetic might be a good term for the answer to your 'why'. And no I don't mean literally DNA but in the 'corporate genes' of the Russian army.

'Funny' thing is that many tactical battles I have seen footage of from this war (which is not a complete picture obviously) often sort of resemble a CM H2H battle between an experienced player and a (much)less experienced player. Usually Russian forces star in the latter. The most obvious one is advancing AFVs in complex terrain where the enemy has infantry with decent AT. Another one is (panic) area firing all around the place or mortars/artillery FFE being ordered against 'scout teams'. The Russian player has now 'descent' into sending disposable units (drivers/etc) as 'recon by death' units, followed up by (in)direct fires. While potentially effective, usually not a sign of a battle going their way.

It is sort of, as the .pdf version is included in every install since it came out AFAIK. I do agree it is good, as a matter of fact some of it came in handy as at the time I read it as I was hammering people about why it's important to develop a conceptual vision before committing deep on a project/program/product. Thanks, @JonS Although till this day I haven't created any CM scenario's/maps.

I guess we are less friendly to our cats or I just made an oopsie.

One thing about the economic situation is that because of the sanctions 'we' don't get much numbers anymore about the Russian economy. And the numbers that get communicated should probably sprinkled with some extra salt. So I think it's safe to say that the sanctions hurt. How much probably nobody knows, even those in the know of the numbers today in Russia might find it hard to predict what will happen. The thing about economics is that there are a lot of different models, but they usually assume the decision makers act rational at the lowest level (for example that a human will always seek to gain an advantage of $1 as much as he will seek to not lose $1. However we humans aren't rational decision makers on that level). So various models are perhaps good for understanding stuff but less good for predicting stuff. And other models work good for predicting stuff, assuming that the world will continue to operate more or less the same. Things didn't continue more or less the same so there's that. Russia had quite a bit of a warchest prepared and had some preparations to protect against more sanctions. Other countries seeking opportunity. All will alleviate some impact of the sanctions, be it temporary. The relevant part about the sanctions is imo that there was a reason for the sanctions and a purpose. We won't exactly know how effective they are for a while probably, but the reason and purpose for the sanctions are still there. We can rather safely say that Russia would be doing better without sanctions. So as long as we can keep them up they should be kept up, or intensified.

Regarding the 'winning', I call it 'loss aversion': losing less bad can feel like a win and indeed most important can be sold as one. And while Russia might be able to continue the war for a 'long' time, that's definitely not a goal in and of itself - even for Russia. Keeping the grind on does cost Russia heavily, in various ways, and indeed also comes with opportunity costs regarding endeavors outside Ukraine. So they are poised to achieve some results QUICKLY and like others have posted, that's probably a big reason while they keep failing as big as they did until now. Who is there to appoint after Gerasimov? Putin taking direct control of all military matters? In the scenario where his offensive fails, I guess he will look at ways or explanations to keep control of the narrative and repress or eliminate any threats to him (this wasn't the big offensive, we need to rebuild our forces because evil NATO tanks, there are traitors in our midst, etc; another of the usual window dressings). I find it difficult to predict how long he can succeed in staying afloat that way, but even cats only have 7 lives. How many does he have left? And indeed the regime probably doesn't want to go down with him necessarily, another setback could be just the thing someone/some powergroup needs to instigate a 'change'. Probably knives have been sharpened several times already. A (limited) military collapse seems to me one of the best case scenario's for Ukraine. If Ukraine can force upon Russia another pair of unexpected operational/strategic blows in 2023, I'd say indeed some form of military collapse seems plausible enough. If enough % of soldiers on the frontline realize that the special operation is a doomed case and rather take their chances advancing backwards rather then forwards, that's enough of a collapse imo. The average Russian is quite pragmatic in my experience so I don't see them all fighting till the last man for the special operation, if they believe it's a doomed cause anyway. But I personally prefer/try to always keep my expectations at a minimum . First the next RU offensive needs to fail (if it actually comes) and then Ukraine needs to achieve results. On your list I fully expect 1 to happen, and 2. Good hopes for 3, they've done it before and while that's no guarantee it's sure an indication they can do it again. When we get to number 4. in your list I'd say we're (or rather Ukraine is) already in 'good' territory and I feel it's 'safe' to raise expectations for an endgame being on the horizon. For the endgame in Russia my money would be on Putin 'dying from medical conditions after being ill for a long time' and the new leadership wanting to at least clean up the mess for a moment. Continuing a disastrous war wouldn't be high up anyones list after they've just ascended the throne. Whether they are any better in the long run will remain to be seen. Probably not.

My rudimentary quick tests with CMSF2 showed that ingame the 2A4 turret is actually rather decent against AT-3D/4C/5A/5B/AT-7 and even AT-13. It doesn't like AT-14 though. Hull varies more (lower/upper etc) and didn't really like AT-13 and the BMP-2 launched AT-5A and BRDM launched AT-5B ingame. So overall protection is a bit better than I remembered in CMSF2, but it doesn't like modern ATGMs. And of course every bit always helps, but I don't think those Kontakt-1 ERA bricks will do much against tandem heat rounds. They will be effective against the ubiquitous RPG rounds though. Although they will probably also put them on the 1A5s :D. The only 1A5 ingame is this one, didn't think it was really relevant to test it against ATGMs because the ERA. Would be cool if German industry has some ERA packages laying around for it :

That was my impression as well, although IIRC there exists rather decent 105mm APFSDS ammo, but I'm not into the exact penetration numbers or RHA mm numbers for the T-72B. From CMSF2 I remember the Canadian Leo1A5 (Mexas variant IIRC) doesn't have big problem KO'ing the Syrian (monkey) T-72 models. @The_MonkeyKing posted about a test he did yesterday with it against the Syrian T-90SA (monkey) model in CMSF2. Which has Kontakt-5 ingame. IIRC Russia has plenty of Kornet launchers, can the 2A4 withstand AT-7? I'm firing up CMSF2 to freshen up my knowledge, all the assets are in there.

Yeah I did already a while back ;-), but I haven't memorized everything. Anyway both have thermal optics for the gunner but not for commander. Both don't have hunter-killer mode as you described it. The 1A5 has an upgraded FCS. So my impression is that the 2A4 has better armour and a better gun, but it will still be penetrated by any ATGM the Russian army fields today. And the same probably goes for the tank munitions Russian tanks use (not sure about the T-62s though). So the 2A4 has advantages but they don't really mean much in todays war. I was curious if I'm missing something (not) obvious.

At the danger of starting another 'tank week', but imo the 2A4 doesn't offer much the 1A5 doesn't have. It's the 2A5/6 where the big improvements are.

That sounds like a reasonable explanation imo.

The 2A6 would be for the 'next war'. I mean if it's possible to send a good number of similar enough 2A4/5 in good condition in a decent timeframe, I agree. However it seems the 1A5s are filling in that 'role'. If it's going to be 18 2A4 variant X in March, 3 of another variant in April, 8 in May, 9 in June etc; you get my point. How I understand is that virtually all vehicles will need some sort of refurbishment before getting send to Ukraine (or rather before being able to be employed by Ukraine). So some extra time spent to ensure we are not unnecessarily sending hodge-podges and upgrading optics/armor package seems like a wise thing to me. Or perhaps I can phrase it more sharply, send similar packages as they are doing now with the 1A5. Decent numbers, training / ammo / logistics included. If we can do that for 2A4 but not for 2A6 (or that takes +1 year) then yes I agree.

Fools Good point, I'd imagine financing such a large force for longer duration will become a strain on population as well. There was a reason much of Europe has gotten rid of most of it's army and equipment after the end of the cold war. Obviously getting rid of most was a stupid decision, but going to the other extreme doesn't strike me as much wiser. I'd be glad if my country would step up it's defense commitments. But if I read we're going to order/build 50 nuclear subs overnight I would scratch my head ;-). Edit to add: over here some politicians are floating the idea of reintroducing (civil service) conscription. Although I think the idea has some merits, giving a couple of hundred thousand of youths something worthwhile to do is no small task by itself.

That looks like some drone directed tank 'sniping'. Not unlike a CM game where people utilize tanks/SPGs to shoot & scoot (move, areafire, reverse) at tentative contacts spotted by other units.

That would require knowing what they want/need to get out of it first. Going from what's posted in this thread / around the world, the logical goal of a new general offensive for Russia could be to achieve an outcome on the ground which they can hold on to and or an outcome they can sell internally as a 'hard fought victory' - Before Ukraine has the chance to utilize the supposed newly trained and well equipped brigades. In one phrase I'd say Russia is looking to shape the conditions for an endgame to the war, followed up by digging in and pushing for negotiations while continuing the terror campaign. If they don't get what they need out of it, it would mean the turn is back to Ukraine without Russia having the defensive positions / situation they feel they need to push for the endgame. More pressure on the 'social contract' between the Kremlin/Putin and some of the people. Nationalists going rogue? Inside Ukraine, I'd say an opening for Ukraine to exploit and take back another couple of % of lost land?

We've read more about the 'wild' numbers from Poland before. Maybe they added a zero as a way to make a long nose to Russia? Anyway I'd refrain from placing bets on the 500 number.

Now that's an effective initiative imo. Shared statement of DK/DE/NL: https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/publicaties/2023/02/07/joint-statement-by-the-defence-ministers-of-denmark-germany-and-the-netherlands "The LEOPARD 1 A5 is a robust and assertive Western-designed main battle tank. Our experts are currently working out the next steps together with the industry. Our "Leo 1 A5 Initiative" is open to further partners. So far, Belgium has also shown initial interest to participate." So a full package of vehicles/training/logistics/ammo of a single type of tank in good numbers, looking for more partners to provide the same capability. If they can achieve the same concept for Leo2A6 deliveries, that's a job well done I guess. Imo all the low number Leo2 variants getting pulled from (dusty) storages around europe now, should be round up in Germany (or wherever the required work can be done) is and converted to 2A6 before being send to Ukraine.

And FWIW I'd like to add to my post about my personal pet peeve CMSF2 (after all CMSF is how I got into CM), that whatever you do @Battlefront.com keep doing what your doing (not that I expect anything else lol). There's main and side issues. Of course everything can be improved, but even a quick look at this forum/this thread mainly shows a bunch of people passionate about the game and all what surrounds it. The moment BFC turns into a AAA studio, CM has probably lost it's main assets. That's my take / drop into the customer profile database building up in the thread ;-).

Fair point, I like to agree and there's probably quite some truth in there. But fact of the matter is that 'our' concern is selective and while being free and democratic helps for being a poster-child, there's no guarantees whatsoever. It's not like there are no examples of countries not really caring about the UN variant of international law and getting away with it. Russia however has pushed the envelope too far, I guess the recent meme of 'flick around and find out' does a good job of describing this progressive boundaries ;-). It's more that would I have been Taiwan I'd prioritize not finding out how exactly the interests in Taiwan status quo are hedged between economics and norms/values. There's always a connection between those as well.

In my anecdotal experience the grass does obscure LOS but not necessarily LOF. Not sure how thermals impact it, but they'll probably be better compared to non-thermals. At the same time thermals aren't x-ray so they shouldn't be able to see through grass but I'd say a thermal signature will stick out bright through any glimpse anyone could get. But that doesn't mean it works like that ingame.

Interesting to read from your POV, thanks. Edit to add: at the moment the Taiwanese (semi conductor) industry is very important for global economics. As long as that is true and would be hampered by Chinese efforts, there are significant geopolitical interests ensuring Taiwan can continue operating. If the economic situation changes, so will the geopolitical interests and the resolve on the side of Taiwan. At least imo from realpolitik POV.

Agreed. They are however churning out ships faster than USA was during WWII. But if one picks for example the carrier issue, how much actual experience with massed sorties in a 'real' combat environment do they have even have? At the same time we expect our militaries to not assume they are incompetent and actually (also) prepare for the eventuality they somehow are competent enough to pose a real threat. What else should they be doing? ;-). China understands that afai can see. They are also playing the long game of fighting for what they think is their place under the sun though. They're not trying to lose any opportunities asserting their dominance, testing out 'the waters'. Miscalculations aren't unthinkable, from either side.