Streety

Oh, don't be too harsh on us simple-minded manual-modders, GaJ. McMMM, CMMOS and JSGME are all well and good if you are savvy and intend to do some frequent swapping-out (i.e. regularly switch mods to make your units more specific to a particular campaign etc). But they all require a little effort to learn/use. For example, for your McMMM you have 5 rules for mod-makers, including creating subfolders for different versions instead of modifying the names of the bitmap, and told not to put zips inside zips (see note below) and so on. And for CMMOS there's a different format required, and for JSGME its different again (I use that one for Silent Hunter). Now, I never use mod-managers for Combat Mission and, like many mod-makers, I have not made my mods in those formats. So as a gamer, you will almost certainly have to learn how these mod-manager programs work and sometimes put the effort in yourself to format the mods to get them to work properly. And yet not everyone is that computer-savvy. So if you only look at mods to generally improve your stock BMP set (e.g. I just want a better church than the default), and that once you're happy then it's there for good, without swapping them around for different scenarios, then its simpler to make a backup copy your existing folder or the bitmaps concerned and do it manually. And it makes sense to make a back-up copy of all your bitmaps anyway and place them all on another drive, disk or memory stick, just in case your computer dies. Note on zips inside zips - I've seen this, and sometimes done it myself, because in the past (maybe windows 98?) I've used machines or unzippers that would ignore an unzipped subfolder inside a zip, and so just unzip the main folder (or unzip the main folder then unzip the subfolder and over-write the main folder). So you'll sometimes see old-timer modders like me having in the past sometimes put zips inside zips to avoid the problem.

Oh, sorry, no need to renumber in that instance, just keep the winter ones - but remember that for the CMAK Germans they'd be yellow-based winter and not grau-based (unless you changed them with imported and renumbered CMBB winter grau versions). Ok, I'm done.

Hmmm, that's some interesting finds via the Editor! Hardly ever use it myself - I mainly live in solo-gamer Quick Battle world. I don't use CMMOS so can't comment there. Yes, over 9000 bitmaps in Western Front and that's not even a complete replacement of CMAK (i.e., desert buildings and terrain are bypassed, and users should themselves also add Gurra's Westfront interface mod). No, there's no winterised uniform, vehicle or armour bitmaps in the default CMAK set except for tracks and tyres (I think). Yes, the winter-ability of the CMAK .exe to allow winterised bitmaps is a legacy from CMBB's variation of CMBO. Yes adding the 5 in front of the uniform is the same as adding 50,000 to the number (i.e. 9,005 + 50,000 = 59005) and its probably more useful to think of it as adding 50,000 because when you get to the late-war armour, some winter numbers start 5, 6, 15 or 16, depending on how low or high the summer/default bitmap was numbered, but when you add 50,000 you get the right winter number for all uniforms and armour. but NOTE that this does not include the armour side-view icon bitmaps that appear down on the interface when you select a piece of armour. Some mods incorrectly include a winterised version of that icon but it doesn't show in CMAK. And adding 500 to the summer building number gets you the correct winter number. But the other terrain bitmaps are not part of that numbering scheme - and they (and the winter buildings) are not game-optional (i.e. if missing you get a blank or failure instead of the game simply reverting to show the summer version like it does for uniforms or armour). Another thing I found is that if you don't use the Italy armour bitmap numbers that are in the 100,000s (i.e. those that are so numbered to make them different from where an early-war desert version of the same model also exists), and then load an Italy game, the game gives you the earlier bitmap. I suspect CMBB would act in the same way (i.e. let you keep the grau version into the late-war). I explored this because for Western Front you could remove the 100,000s summer/default numbers and keep the German grau and BritCom green if you wanted. However, when doing that in CMAK you'd have to keep (and possibly renumber - i.e. subtract 100,000) from any of the 100,000s winterised late-war versions if you have and want to still use them. And I don't think I ever quite figured out the early-mid-late transitions except to vaguely appreciate that "early" was desert, "mid" was 1943-Italy and "late" was 1944-45. But I'm sure you've already reached that point. There's no June 1943 fighting in CMAK because it was essentially a quiet month in between the end of the North Africa campaign (May) and the start of the Sicily campaign (July). You've probably also noticed that you can get some odd effects in May 1941 due to the inclusion of the Crete bitmaps. Yes, the helmets are a PAIN! Especially the US (why so many if they're mostly duplicates? but yet still too few, and erratically shared out, so you can't dedicate them). And other odd sharing of other uniform numbering too. All of which even major modders didn't always figure 100% correctly. So don't take them as gospel - remember that all modders were themselves on a journey of bitmap exploration over the years they modded. With hindsight I could have built a half-decent database through my work, and I'm sure some might scream at me for not doing so, but when I started I never planned to release my work as a mega-mod (nor really considered myself a "modder") - it was just a very private labour of love over 2 to 3 years, done in sporadic efforts with no ultimate grand plan. Then I returned to the forum and saw that despite CM2 there was still some interest in Sealion, so did my best to tidy up what I'd done so far and put it out there (with no pretence at having figured it all out - for indeed I haven't).

Well done, Womble, for trollishly pointing out that a later post by someone else added more factors to those I'd already listed. I was merely helping to answer the specific question "Why should a bipod and base, sighted in, "heavy" weapon miss its aimpoint in combat?" And I did not explicitly exclude human factors - of course if under stress/attack themselves, all sorts of variation can occur such as knocking the mortar etc. But these things can also be modelled on the range, by the way, and mortars are not always under direct fire. But more to the point, I was referring to factors which effect a heavy mortar AFTER it had been successfully set-up and sighted-in - hence Newlife's points (though of course very valid factors in preparing the mortar to fire) don't really apply (as these are more to do with setting up and accuracy in attaining a sighting-in BEFORE firing) and his other comment about the ground is one of the factors I'd already mentioned. If you want to go around trying to pick holes, I suggest you start with the one between your ears.

There's play in the mortar tube (i.e. the ammo is not a 100% perfectly tight fit into the tube), which widens the trajectory cone, and no two rounds have the exact same shape, weight, charge or speed and intensity of ignition (not down to the nearest microgram, or millisecond, etc). Same goes for fins - even those which aren't bent. Which each all have a tiny impact on trajectory but which added together over a distance can have a small (sometimes randomly off-setting and sometimes randomly cumulative) effect. Then there's the temperature of the firing tube (which will vary and effect the above factors), and you probably have chaos theory with regard to exhaust gasses as they interact with the fins. The ground can move a tiny amount. Then there's the weather/wind which is not constant (even on a calm-ish day).... oh lots of little things like that can all play a part.

Oh, I was mainly referring to "waffle" grenadiers as being a rare term. Just in case any future reader isn't familiar with the background behind srm79's issue, its because use of Nazi symbols "can" break the law in Germany, Poland and Hungary (and probably a couple of other countries too). However, the European Union voted (in 2005) against an EU-wide ban of Nazi symbology. And in most European countries there was never a similar ban (albeit such symbols are still generally seen as extremely offensive). However, the law in Poland and Hungary seems to allow for artistic and educational use, and the law in Germany (criminal code 86a) only regards either public displays of such symbols or where they are used (publicly or privately) to actively promote such ideology. So an historical wargame intended for private use at home would not automatically break any of these laws - but given the sensitivity in those countries (and others where such symbols are still considered extremely bad taste, if not illegal as such), you can see why the makers edged away to play it safe, at least for European distribution. "Symbols" can mean not just swastikas, SS and other badges and flags, but also mottoes, salutes and even the format of a rally or other public display, etc. Indeed, anything that is deemed "symbolic" of Nazism. Poland was also considering making an equivalent law against communist-era symbols too, but I'm not sure if the law's been passed (or how likely).

You're welcome. Just thought I'd qualify my comment about those spreadsheets - any minor messing up is not down to whoever made the charts but instead mostly due to the game's sometimes slightly screwy numbering system, some (seemingly unused) residual CMBB bitmaps in the CMAK set, and the sharing of some bitmaps (especially artillery, which is probably why they aren't in the charts either - just too messy).

Blimey, you got me confused at first because what you're talking about aren't common terms used widely around the rest of the World. All I thought at first was: well there wouldn't be a "US version of 11240.bmp" as it's for CMBB and the US didn't fight that war. Then I figured out you must be wanting cute little swastikas and "SS" instead of "WG" (Waffen Grenadiers). By the way, there's nothing incorrect with "Waffen Grenadiers" as a term (its merely short for "Waffen Grenadiers of the SS"), but my advice would be to simply download and check-out the various "User Interface" mods at CMMODS until you find one. I know that the "Dark Steel Interface" mod by Tarkus has the SS symbols on 11240.bmp, so you could try that. And there's the "definitive swastika pack" by juju for the in-game flags.

Hi DARoot, I think all the bitmap number and availability charts (for both CMBB and CMAK) that I refer to for my work are from here: http://www.webandofbrothers.de/tablescharts.htm Plus there's some other interesting stuff on that page. But note that there's no uniform data - its just for the vehicles and armour. And note that some vehicles/armour numbers on these simple spreadsheets are a bit messed up because they don't always take account of the models that share bitmaps. And they don't include winter numbers (I think you need to add 50,000 to the summer bitmap number but would have to double-check that as it's been a while). I've asked around for a uniform list but no luck - I should have made my own up while modding but instead did it all by trial and error and taking my cue for the right uniform numbers from David Inglett's and Andrew Fox's mods. Oh, by the way, I'm afraid there was no "team" as such for the Western Front Total Conversion mod - it was just me, but I also reused/remodded (or otherwise built on) lots of others' previous mods or ideas in addition to all my own twiddling, so I wanted to properly credit them all. As far as I know you can't edit the game data - I once tried to edit the infantrymen's names (by opening the .exe application in various text editors) but although I could find and change the names this way, the .exe file thereafter doesn't run. But I'm no expert - a program geek might be able to do it with what you mention, but Battlefront might not be too happy. I've asked Battlefront if they'd be interested in an update (or release of code etc) and they declined.

Oh, do stop trying to split hairs JonS. Military gongs don't equal fame. And if you think Slim is just as well known as Bradley, I'd suggest you come visit Earth from your home near Venus. I could argue with your posts highly selective points in detail but I must get on with life, so the bottom line is this: considering his relative importance in the war, akin to Monty et al, Slim is relatively far less remembered in the British (and most other countries') public's knowledge of WW2 history. And he gets far less coverage in the various media (be it news, books or TV) with regard to WW2, than most other top-echelon British WW2 leaders.

Its OK but it's not a British documentary, it's one episode from two series that have been made under the brand "Soviet Storm: WW2 in the East", and is Russian-made. The series overall has some good (at times, too fancy) graphics and often sets the mood nicely (you can't wait to fire-up CMBB after watching), but lacks depth in places and in other places covers too much far too quickly (like a key-notes speed revision), each covering a major topic/campaign of the war in a mere 45mins. Bagration is from series 1, I think, which was generally better than series 2. They've been showing in the UK on the Military History Channel, with the narration dubbed into English, but I like how they kept the maps in Russian Cyrillic. Worth watching as they of course give the Russian point of view of WW2, something we (at least in the UK) don't otherwise see much of.

I suppose there's not too much I could say about any military ships and subs I worked on, but most are no longer in service, or about to retire. And whilst I had some great experiences, it was a poor career choice because from there onwards our British navy (and hence design work) slowly shrank to a shadow of its former self. See this graph: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:RN_warships.png I joined at the start of the 1980s and left as part of the huge shrinkages in the early 1990s. But anyway, the general, relative concepts and info for this sort of forum would all be available in Jane's or in other books etc. Yes, just to clarify: I wasn't disagreeing with you - the Battlecruiser design/role could hunt armoured cruisers too, if they were smaller, which is what I meant when I previously said "smaller warships" (i.e. meaning anything smaller than the Battlecruiser). But they were also intended to be scouts and commerce raiders. The big problem with Fisher's battlecruiser concept was that they were still given "the big guns" like a battleship and so admirals tended to want to use them more like battleships (or at least battleship supports) in the big battles. But this put them in less mobile situations and within range of the enemy battleships. Having big guns like a battleship, a battlecruiser was dangerous to enemy battleships and thus an enemy battleship commander would sensibly wish to identify battlecruisers and pick them off first as soft targets to help improve the odds. That's why HMS Hood was up-armoured by another 5,000 tons while still being built (to the extent you could argue she was no longer a true "cruiser"), and why Fisher's other battlecruiser lovelies (HMS Renown and class) were also up-armoured (not once, but twice), because the admiralty decided that the battlecruiser concept had this Achilles-heel in large battles. In particular they were all far too susceptible to plunging shell fire. After the war, some of the bigger ones were up-armoured (to make them a bit more like true battleships) and the rest scrapped. So by WW2 you see light cruisers (with somewhat smaller guns) fulfilling more of the original battlecruiser role.

JonS, All that was just after the war, and awards he more than deserved from the powers that be, and not about how well the wider British public, or wider World's public, remembered him in the following decades. Compared to Monty, Patton, Rommel, McArthur, or even Stilwell, Bradley, Clark, Model, Brooke, Dowding, etc, etc, how well has Slim been remembered? Its not for nothing that Burma became known as the forgotten war. Even today, with a little more awareness of the Burma campaign than 20-30yrs ago, walk around my home town (where Slim came from) and ask 100 people if they've heard of General Slim? You'd probably need to ask more than 100 before you got a right answer. And Gundolf, we did, please note post #42

I think you guys are wandering too far from the topic and the obvious issue here, which is: should IKEA open a branch in Kabul? I can think of a good store manager, if you can spring him.

Oh, there was nothing wrong with the concept when used in the right conditions. Fisher wasn't entirely original, he just ran counter to the prevailing wisdom of the day. As a former naval architect I can confirm that the issue of speed versus armour is an age-old design question. And not just in ships but in all other military circles too. The problem with the battlecruiser was not in having too little armour per se, but in the way they were sometimes used as replacement battleships in more static slug-fests. And that's what happened to our Battlecruiser heroes of the Falklands (HMS Invincible and HMS Inflexible), when they were instead used in a big battle: Invincible blew up and after the war Inflexible was deemed obsolete, despite the class being only 11yrs old. They were deemed just too vulnerable to plunging shell-fire. Scrappped. Even in the earlier Falklands they were lucky - Inflexible had been obscured by the smoke from Invincible, while Invincible herself was hit and holed by the German ships 22 times despite the German ships only having 6-inch & 8-inch guns to the British 12-inch. Invincible was listing and half-flooded, holed in the coal-bunker which could alone have lead to the loss of the ship but luckily just some flooding. Fortunately, the damaged British ships from the battle were literally just outside the safe harbour of the Falklands and could make some repairs, else they'd have perished in any storm trying to make it to anywhere else. And so providence and the fact that the German crews were exhausted before the battle started played a big part in the British success that day.

Hi Guys, There was indeed a significant deck fire on the Hood, probably caused by a hit to a cordite locker that supplied the smaller 4-inch guns. Although it's not a 100% definite cause, a very detailed, 4-part (and updated) review here: http://www.warship.org/no21987.htm concludes that the eventual spread of this fire caused the loss of the Hood after it spread inboard to other propellant stocks. And no, it didn't take long for the Admiralty to learn from Jutland because the causes were obvious - the fact is that unlike armoured cruisers, WW1 battlecruisers were built with the concept of being faster as a means of protection rather than being heavily armoured. Thus these cruisers were meant to hunt down merchant shipping, raiding, skirmishing and seeing off smaller warships. But instead, what happened at Jutland was they acted more like ship-of-the-line battleships, and they lacked the armour for such stand-to slug-fests. Yes, poor practice of ammo and cordite handling may have played a part, but essentially the lack of armour caused the problem of penetrative hits in the first place. Just two years later, in 1917, even while Hood was still under construction (the largest battlecruiser ever built), her armour plating design was increased by 5,000 tons as a result of the lessons of Jutland. In 1920, a further Admiralty analysis estimated that the Hood could need another few inches belt protection, just be on the safe side - but this remedial work was never undertaken. This lead to the sense that Hood was under-armoured in WW2, however, a lot of analysis of the likely dynamics of Bismark's and Prinz Eugen's shells at the range engaged suggests that in the event, Hood's armour was probably just about sufficient to stop their shells reaching critical internal locations before exploding. However, nothing is 100% certain, even if they could recover her to a dry dock. But to return to the WW1 game, you'd need to compare like with like - how do other nation's true (faster but less armoured) battlecruiser designs compare? I'd suggest that the game values may have been tweaked for play-balance or to allow for other factors such as the (generally overall) better experience and other intangibles of the Royal Navy. After all, despite the losses and some poor decisions at Jutland, and despite good gunnery from the German navy, it was a strategic defeat for Germany.

Oh, much agree with you about the press - some things never change, do they? And of course "the powers that be" also built and used the likes of Monty and Erwin purely for when it suited them......

Hiya Womble. I never said anything about tank engines starting at the simple press of a button, merely pointing out that some tanks had separate auxiliary power to the turret traverse, and others could be hand-cranked (in fact, I think some crappy turrets HAD to be hand-cranked or they wouldn't move at all, engine on or off!). So you could move the turret without the engine running - just as well, by the looks of GaJ's video!

Not sure about that. I think some were hand-cranked and some had small auxiliary engines they could switch to. But if you're hiding you probably wouldn't want to be moving your turret around much anyway.

If its anything like CM1 then hiding vehicles will lose some spotting capability because the crew aren't stood on the roof fighting over the binoculars but instead going off for a pee or brewing tea. If you turn the graphics quality right up, you even see a little steam coming out the British window when the kettle boils......

Hiya Longleftflank. No, Slim had humble origins but squeaked in as a 2nd Lt for WW1. But are you getting mixed-up between the 1st and 2nd Arakan Campaigns? The 1st was indeed a disaster, but that was while command of XV-corps had been taken away from Slim and given to General Irwin, only to be handed back to Slim once Irwin had screwed the advance up and Slim had to rescue it as best he could. Irwin lost his job after that and Slim promoted. The 2nd Arakan Campaign, wherein I lost my great uncle (shot and drowned crossing the Irrawaddy) was lead by Slim and not defeated by the Japs. But Slim's finest hour was not just really the advance through Burma in 1945 but the earlier twin battles of Imphal-Kohima, which not only stopped the Japs but stopped the pro-Jap elements of the Indian Nationalists from taking India over to the Japanese side. And don't forget he also won in the East Africa campaign before that. And don't forget that it wasn't until the fall of Mandalay in March 1945 (a couple of months into the 1945 campaign) that the Burmese National army switched sides to join the allies. Burma wasn't a meaningless campaign and a lot of soldiers and civilians died in the recapture effort. For all that, I don't know enough about Slim regards his position on the Egotist scale except to think he wasn't as bad as the average b*stard. He certainly suffered from them though. From what I'd understood, at what should have been his crowning moment, Slim's boss, Mountbatten, took over and took the glory for Burma (much in the same way Eisenhower did to Monty just before Paris). Anyone who served under Slim never forgave Mountbatten for it. As for "Vinegar tits" Stilwell, no, he wasn't all bad but I've read enough to put him above the mid-way point on the E-scale.

Hey Longleftflank, I was going to call my book "An Ego Too Far", but you're right: "Egotistical B*stards, the Lot of Them" would be more accurate.... Slim certainly is the most forgotten Field Marshall of WW2. He was also a veteran of WW1. What he did with what he had in Burma in WW2, and the fact that the men (both Brit and Anzac) loved him despite their terrible hardships, possibly puts him above all other BritCom commanders. But yes, coming from fairly humble origins, he wasn't the "right sort" for the posh-lot that ran the levers of power. My guess is he'd have done about the same as Monty in Normandy with the exception of being a lot more liked by the Americans and a little less liked by the rest of the British Top-Brass. Almost completely forgotten after the war back in Britain (but not down under, where he became Governor General of Australia!), there's at least a belated effort to erect a statue to him here in Bristol, his home town.

Hi Vanir, Oh, Monty's bad rep in the US had its origins during the war - he and the US bigwigs didn't get along. It probably goes back to 1943, if not the winter before, and was certainly well in place by 1944. It started when he was among a few Brit commanders who had a generally low opinion of the US troops (but more particularly their commanders). Back in the early days, in the winter of 1942/43 when the US TORCH forces were very green, this was probably an accurate assessment (Bradly concurred - see Atkinson's "Army at Dawn") but in turn the US commanders thought the Brits like Monty in particular were coming it a bit too high and mighty and didn't take well to being told where they were going wrong. And no doubt Monty etc were undiplomatic, and this initial clash of huge egos set up a rivalry, especially between Monty and Patton, and set the scene for the pattern of bad opinion and bad press of Monty from US quarters. I'd recommend watching the exceptionally good BBC series "D-Day to Berlin" which goes into the ill-feeling between Monty and his US conterparts (and how it affected the war) in some detail. Although I'm not a huge fan of Monty, Eisenhower deserved a bit of bite-back from Monty - the way Eisenhower shamelessly stole Monty's limelight by taking over Monty's Land Forces command and Normandy game-plan just before Paris, meant that thereafter Monty is chiefly remembered in the US for things like not reaching Caen on day 1 and for failure at Arnhem, and not remembered for reaching Paris ahead of his schedule and war-plan as commander of the Normandy campaign. Egotistical b*stards, the lot of them....

Oh sorry Michael, forgot your second question. Yes, that road (both before Nijmegan as well as beyond it to Arnhem), like the whole concept (for the amount of effort/forces that were applied to the task) was a mistake. Partly, I think, the road was bad not just because of the ditches and the single-file, but because recently bad weather conditions had made the ground either side too boggy for tanks. Thus, once one or two tanks had skirted the road, the ground was found to become impassible for further vehicles, so they had to stay single file. But as to turning off after Nijmegan and heading around further west for Arnhem? Probably too indirect. On paper, even the most direct-line approach chosen was barely do-able under ideal circumstances, and a moot point because in the event, even getting to Nijmegan on time turned out to be far too optimistic anyway.

Hi again guys, Oh, I wasn't having a go at you, Sublime, and very sorry if I seemed to be. As a Brit, I'm not Monty's biggest fan either. Yes he was brave in WW1, but no more so than many poor chaps. And he got an unfairly bad press from the Americans, but I put the main blame for the failure of Arnhem on his long-running ego-war with Patton, and so to a certain extent blame Patton's ego too, both here and elsewhere (in the sense of them both always wanting to out-do each other).... Ah, a lovely cup of tea on the beach before having "a little go" at Caen. An American stereotyping of we Brits but one which we happily play up to. But I think Sburke's previous contribution to this thread has it spot on - Brits brewed a tea whenever they had a break much like the GI's would have a smoke (or a "fag break" as we Brits would say). And boiling water to make tea was a safe way to have a drink on the front line. The failure of not getting into Caen by day 2 was (if memory serves) probably down to one green British officer who sent an armoured column single-file up the road without any support, scouting or flank protection (I forget his name but he lost his job after that) straight into Germanany's greatest tank ace (what were the chances?) which destroyed the whole column almost single-handed. But which idiot put that British officer in charge of such a task and why did other elements not push on more quickly? I think part of the answer is that: a) Capturing Caen on day 1 or 2 was probably always unrealistic (but note Monty's plan of reaching Paris by day 90 was ultimately attained a few days early, except Eisenhower came over and took control - and all the glory - for himself, just before Paris was entered. the Brits weren't expecting as much resistence as they got. c) when the Germans countered in Normandy, 2/3 of their effort (inc 3/4 of their panzer units) went against the Brits (even Ambrose says so, in one brief line of his D-Day book) but such concentration of German resistance probably doesn't account enough for day 1 failures. But sorry, its been too long since I last looked at the DDay-Caen events, but if I remember your query I'll share my thoughts (for what they're worth) when I do. I've long considered going back to my research and writing a book on the false impressions given by Hollywood about the war. Of course, you guys here all know better than to get your history from Hollywood, but that's how much of the world gets it's history, and its had an insidious effect to the extent that many US-originated TV documentaries today, and some serious books (including Atkinson and Ambrose) are not entirely free of such bad/incorrect influence. The false notion that the 82nd captured Nijmegan bridge on their own, the false notion from Ambrose (Band of Brothers) that they also rescued all the Brit paras from Arnhem (when in fact 90%, of those who made it back across the river, did so by other means or with other, British, help), are just a very few of a great many examples. This "propaganda" had completely succeeded and reached its zenith when Sarkozy initially only invited Obama to the 65th anniversary of D-Day, saying the Queen hadn't been invited because it was primarily a "French-US" commemoration! Hmm, last time I counted, the BritCom forces very slightly outnumbered the US forces that day (but both around 57,000), but did you know that only 48 French troops took part on D-Day! And even they had been told not to go by deGaulle but decided to ignore him as they were part of a special Anglo-French commando force. I believe it was the Whitehouse that first suggested Sarkozy rethink the format, but too late and that's why the Queen, despite being head og the Commonwealth, stayed in Britain that day. Perhaps I should start a new thread called "Streety's long rant about the war" and you can all help with my therapy - er, I mean "my book idea"....